Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kann's Estate
This text of 174 F.2d 357 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kann's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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[358]*358■ Mrs. Bertha -F. Kann, the decedent, sold certain securities to-her children in'return for their unsecured promises to pay her life annuities. The question presented for our determination is: Did the Tax Court err in holding’1 that the decedent realized no taxable gain under. Section 111(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.'C.A. § 111(a), and the applicable regulation on the ground that annuity contracts undertaken by individual obligors do not have an ascertainable fair market value as a matter of law? The pertinent statute and regulation are in the margin.2 See also Section 22 of the -Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S’.C.A. § 22, set out in note 3.3
As the Tax Court pointed out, it -is no-t necessary to decide whether the entire capital is to ibe recouped before any amount becomes taxable, J. Darsie Lloyd v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 903; Frank -C. Deer-ing v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 984, or. [359]*359whether a 3% 4 annual return on an investment computed at insurance company rates, Anna L. Raymond v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 244, affirmed 7 Cir., 114 F. 2d 140, certioriari denied 311 U.S. 710, 61 S.Ct. 319, 85 L.Ed. 462, is to be charged as ordinary income under Section 22(b) (2) until the capital expended has been <re-covered. See Maude Gillespie v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 399, reversed on other grounds, 9 Cir., 128 F.2d 140. The question at bar turns on the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase “fair market value” in Section 111(b) and the 'regulation.
The petitioner would have us change what we believe to be a salutary rule of law established by the Board of Tax Appeals in the Lloyd case, supra, that where both the annuitant’s life span and the obligor’s ability to pay are uncertain no fair market value should be ascribed to the contract or obligation. That rule was again enunciated in the Deering case, supra, and was viewed with approval in Bella Hommel v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 992. To elaborate a little, the Tax Court has held in the instant case, as in 'the past, that where obligors are individuals, whether rich or poor, their obligations to pay in the future do not possess such standing as to come within the purview of the statute, that such obligations possess no value by way of ordinary business. It should be noted that this court took a similar view in Evans v. Rothensies, 3 Cir., 114 F.2d 958, and in Cassatt v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 137 F.2d 745, wherein, it will be observed, the Commissioner took a position diametrically opposed to that which he seeks to maintain in the case at bar. See also Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 51 S. Ct. 550, 75 L.Ed. 1143. Like the Tax Court we think that there is little to be gained by giving up the principle, now well established, that an agreement by an individual to pay a life annuity to another has no “fair market value” for purpose of computing capital -gain. In conclusion we state parenthetically that there is little in the record which can support the Commissioner’s view that the transactions between Mrs. Kann and her children were ordinary arm’s length business transactions. See the Raymond case, supra.
The decision of the Tax Count will be affirmed.
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174 F.2d 357, 12 A.L.R. 2d 584, 37 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1434, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 4391, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commissioner-of-internal-revenue-v-kanns-estate-ca3-1949.