Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eldon E. Wolfe and Sara A. Wolfe

361 F.2d 62, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 17 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 875, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6402
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedApril 22, 1966
Docket19617
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 361 F.2d 62 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eldon E. Wolfe and Sara A. Wolfe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eldon E. Wolfe and Sara A. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 17 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 875, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6402 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

Opinions

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:

Respondents are husband and wife who filed a joint tax return in 1959 and 1960, the tax years subject to the dispute in this case. They sought exclusion, under § 911(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, of amounts earned by them while residing and working in Iran during the years in question. The Commissioner allowed the exclusion of the wife’s income in Iran. The sole, question is whether respondent Eldon E. Wolfe properly excluded, as exempt from federal income taxation, amounts earned while employed by the United States Bureau of Public Roads to work on a highway project of the Government of Iran.

Section 911(a) (2) exempts from taxation earned income received by a United States citizen located in a foreign country for eighteen consecutive months if such' income constitutes “amounts received from sources without the United States (except amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof).” Mr. Wolfe satisfies the foreign residency requirements of § 911. The question is whether the amounts received by him from his employer, the United States Bureau of Public Roads, are to be considered “amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof,” and thus outside the scope of the exemption.

On December 7, 1956, the Government of Iran entered into a credit agreement with the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) in Washington with respect to a road construction project in Iran. Pursuant to this agreement Iran deposited in the Riggs National Bank in Washington funds, out of the proceeds of the Eximbank loan, to be used “exclusively for the purpose of financing United States dollar [64]*64expenditures in connection with the Project.” The credit agreement also provided that prior to and as a condition of the first advance under the loan to Iran, the Bureau of Public Roads would make arrangements satisfactory to Eximbank for providing the services of United States engineers and technicians for the road construction project. It was this aspect of the agreement that brought the taxpayer to work in Iran.

The Tax Court concluded that taxpayer was entitled under § 911(a) (2) to exclude from his income the salary paid him by the Bureau of Roads for his work in Iran. 43 T.C. 572 (1965). It reasoned that since the reimbursement provisions of the credit agreement between the Eximbank and Iran placed the ultimate burden of taxpayer’s salary on the Government of Iran, Wolfe’s salary did not represent “amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof.” In drawing the checks upon the funds belonging to Iran for the payment of petitioner’s salary, concluded the Tax Court, “the officials of the United States were acting as paymasters for Iran.” 43 T.C. at 579.

We cannot agree with the Tax Court’s interpretation of the statute and its application of the statute to the facts of this case. We disagree, too, with a similar ruling in Krichbaum v. United States, 138 F.Supp. 515 (E.D.Tenn. 1956).

A. In our opinion the exception provision has broad sweep as to taxpayers who are employees of the U. S. Government, as well as applying in some circumstances1 to taxpayers who are not employees. The salient features of this case are certainly sufficient, though we do not say they are all necessary, to establish that taxpayer’s salary should be viewed as “amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof.” Four aspects are especially significant.

1. Táxpayer was an employee of the United States, maintaining unique status as such and receiving unique benefits as such.

On April 8, 1956, taxpayer, an employee of the Bureau of Public Roads, transferred from the competitive civil service and accepted an appointment offered by the Bureau in the excepted service. He was then assigned to perform services in Pakistan. On June 22, 1957, he was transferred from Pakistan to the Iran Division in Tehran. Neither the Iranian Government nor any of its employees was empowered to, or did, supervise or control the work of any of the employees of the Iran Division. The Iranian Government could not hire or fire any of the employees of the Iran Division or in any manner control the salary paid or the promotions given to any of the personnel of the Bureau of Public Roads assigned to the Division.

As a United States Government employee in the excepted service having prior Civil Service status, Wolfe was covered throughout the period by various federal laws giving benefits to Government employees.2 The Tax Court found (43 T.C. at 576):

During the years in question the Bureau of Public Roads deducted from petitioner’s salary the regular 6% percent Federal employee retirement contribution, and an amount representing his contribution for the U. S. Government employee group life insurance. Moreover, the petitioner was entitled to exercise rights under the U. S. Government employee group health benefits program.
[65]*65The petitioner is a career civil service U. S. Government employee, having commenced his service counting toward career tenure on July 12, 1937. The entire period he spent assigned to the Iran Division counted as service toward his career tenure. During his service in Iran petitioner received periodic grade and in-grade step increases, as well as a foreign differential allowance equal to 10 percent of his applicable base salary rate.

Furthermore, taxpayer had re-employment rights to reinstatement in the competitive service; and he was reinstated in the competitive service effective July 10, 1960.

2. The United States had the primary and indeed sole obligation to pay taxpayer’s salary, and his rights were only against the United States.

Taxpayer’s only contract, whether express or implied through employee status, was with the United States. The parties stipulated:

Eldon E. Wolfe at no time, and in no event, had any right to request or demand payment of his salary from Iran. Mr. Wolfe did not acquire, by virtue of either his employment agreement with the Bureau of Public Roads or his assignment to the Iran Division, any direct rights against the Iranian Government [except immunity from taxation by Iran].

Taxpayer’s only connection with Iran was as an engineer included in a group of employees of the Bureau of Public Roads sent by the Bureau to Iran to assist Iran in developing a highway system. His presence in Iran was in discharge of the obligation of the Bureau, under a letter agreement with Iran, to send experts to assist Iran.

Iran agreed to make funds available to the Bureau in order that the Bureau might pay taxpayer’s salary. But the obligation of Iran ran to the United States, not to taxpayer.

It was stipulated that taxpayer had no agreement either with Iran or with the Bureau of Public Roads whereby payment of his salary was to be made out of Iranian funds or was dependent upon advances having first been made by Iran to the Bureau.

3. A United States agency actually executed and delivered the salary checks to taxpayer.

The Tax Court specifically found that taxpayer’s salary was paid by a check drawn by the Treasurer of the United States. The record shows that the Treasury checks were drawn on the appropriation of the Bureau of Public Roads.

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Bluebook (online)
361 F.2d 62, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 45, 17 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 875, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commissioner-of-internal-revenue-v-eldon-e-wolfe-and-sara-a-wolfe-cadc-1966.