SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of a defendant in an action in which recovery was sought on a contract of continuing guaranty. Following trial the district court granted a motion for involuntary dismissal and rendered judgment for the defendant on the merits. We reverse.
Plaintiff-appellant Commercial Credit Corporation conducts a financing business and the defendant-respondent Chisholm Bros, is a corporation engaged in the sale and service of trucks, automobiles and farm equipment. Prior to the present dispute the parties had been dealing with each other for approximately ten years during which Commercial Credit regularly purchased notes, conditional sales contracts and other security instruments from Chisholm Bros. On June 12, 1958, the parties hereto executed a written instrument designated as “Reserve Agreement.” 1 By the terms of the instrument Chisholm Bros, agreed to sell to Commercial Credit “acceptable notes, conditional sale contracts” or other security instruments which it might acquire from purchasers of new or used vehicles. Certain provisions of the instrument required certain actions to be taken by Commercial Credit within stated time limits after any default by a purchaser prior to any liability attaching to Chisholm Bros. It is clear thereby that Chisholm Bros, assumed the role of a continuing conditional guarantor.
We note initially that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are not applicable to the instant case since the instruments in question herein were executed prior to the effective date of the Code in Idaho. The law in effect at the time of the execution of the documents must govern. I.C. § 28-10-101, 28-10-102.
A guaranty is an undertaking or promise on the part of the guarantor which is collateral to a primary or principal obligation on the part of another and which binds the obligor to performance in event of nonperformance by the other. Durant v. Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 151 P.2d 776 (1944). A contract of continuing guaranty contemplates a future course of dealing covering a series of transactions extending over an indefinite time. Stearns, Law of Suretyship, § 4.7, p. 67 (5th ed. 1951). While an absolute guaranty is an uncondi[197]*197tional undertaking on the part of the guarantor that he will pay the debt or perform the obligation immediately upon the debtor’s default without any necessity to first exhaust the principal, Stearns, Law of Suretyship, supra, a conditional guaranty expressly or impliedly contemplates as a condition precedent to the guarantor’s liability the happening of some contingent event or the performance of some act on the part of the creditor. Stearns, Law of Suretyship, supra, § 4.6.
In December 1967, while the reserve agreement was in force, a customer of Chisholm desired to purchase an automobile other than the brand sold by the defendant. He located a car at a Colorado dealership but needed to secure financing. Chisholm Bros, undertook to obtain the necessary financing from Commercial Credit. • On December 15, 1967, Chisholm Bros, and their customer entered into a conditional sales contract on the form provided by Commercial Credit. Chisholm was denominated “seller" and the customer as “purchaser.” The total alleged purchase price was $6,350.30 due and payable on December 12, 1968.
Chisholm delivered the conditional sale contract to Commercial Credit and Commercial Credit issued a check for $5,773.00 payable to Chisholm. Chisholm endorsed the check and delivered it to the customer who in turn paid the funds to the Colorado car dealership and received possession of the automobile and its unencumbered title.
The contract contained the following language:
“Accepted: and this contract hereby is assigned in accordance with the plan marked below and under the terms of the assignment on the reverse.”
The words “plan marked below” referred to a section on the face of the instrument which permitted Chisholm Bros, to designate its choice of the extent of its liability as guarantor of the debt of the purchaser. The first alternative was “conditionally without recourse” which would have imposed liability upon Chisholm only to the extent of the buy-back provisions of the reserve agreement and would have incurred more extensive liability only in the event of breach of warranty. The second alternative was “with recourse” which, if designated, would have imposed on Chisholm absolute liability for every delinquency or default regardless of its own compliance with the terms of the assignment. The instrument provided a box beside each of the alternatives in which a check mark should have been placed but Chisholm failed to check either alternative. The district court properly found that the failure of Chisholm to so indicate the extent of its liability was an omission rather than an ambiguity and that the evidence presented by the parties to explain the omission still left the question unresolved.
It is undisputed that Chisholm did not secure compliance with the provisions of either Idaho or Colorado law for the protection of a security interest in the vehicle against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers.2 No payments were made by the customer under the conditional sale contract and after December 12, 1968, the customer was in default. The customer was not found within the State of Idaho and the car had been sold to a bona fide purchaser, apparently in Colorado.
Commercial Credit brought this action to recover the unpaid balance on the contract from Chisholm Bros., alleging the conditional sale contract, the assignment of that contract for consideration, the customer’s default, the “unconditional guaranty” provisions of the reserve agreement, Chisholm’s failure to protect Commercial Credit’s security interest in the vehicle and Commercial Credit’s resulting damage.
[198]*198At the conclusion of the trial, the district court concluded that the liability, if any, of Chisholm could not be determined without the court in effect making a contract for the parties. Therefore upon motion the district court ordered involuntary dismissal and entered judgment on the merits for the defendant.
In our view the district court was correct in concluding that no liability to Chisholm as guarantor arose under the provisions of the conditional sale contract and its assignment. As a result of a material omission the guarantorship options on the face of the conditional sale-assignment instrument are of no force and effect. The printed words which describe the alternative degrees of liability are only surplusage. This court stated in Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 349 P.2d 556 (1960), that the trial court therein was correct in finding:
“ * * * omissions which cannot be ascertained from a reading of the contract. Evidence introduced by the parties left all such and similar questions unsolved and in uncertainty. This Court is not at liberty to determine such essentials for the litigants. What is to be included in a contract is not for the court to determine, * * 83 Idaho at 63, 349 P.2d at 559.
If Chisholm is to be held liable to Commercial Credit as a guarantor of its customer’s debt such liability can only arise under the provisions of the 1958 reserve agreement. In that agreement Chisholm agreed to:
“13.
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SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of a defendant in an action in which recovery was sought on a contract of continuing guaranty. Following trial the district court granted a motion for involuntary dismissal and rendered judgment for the defendant on the merits. We reverse.
Plaintiff-appellant Commercial Credit Corporation conducts a financing business and the defendant-respondent Chisholm Bros, is a corporation engaged in the sale and service of trucks, automobiles and farm equipment. Prior to the present dispute the parties had been dealing with each other for approximately ten years during which Commercial Credit regularly purchased notes, conditional sales contracts and other security instruments from Chisholm Bros. On June 12, 1958, the parties hereto executed a written instrument designated as “Reserve Agreement.” 1 By the terms of the instrument Chisholm Bros, agreed to sell to Commercial Credit “acceptable notes, conditional sale contracts” or other security instruments which it might acquire from purchasers of new or used vehicles. Certain provisions of the instrument required certain actions to be taken by Commercial Credit within stated time limits after any default by a purchaser prior to any liability attaching to Chisholm Bros. It is clear thereby that Chisholm Bros, assumed the role of a continuing conditional guarantor.
We note initially that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are not applicable to the instant case since the instruments in question herein were executed prior to the effective date of the Code in Idaho. The law in effect at the time of the execution of the documents must govern. I.C. § 28-10-101, 28-10-102.
A guaranty is an undertaking or promise on the part of the guarantor which is collateral to a primary or principal obligation on the part of another and which binds the obligor to performance in event of nonperformance by the other. Durant v. Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 151 P.2d 776 (1944). A contract of continuing guaranty contemplates a future course of dealing covering a series of transactions extending over an indefinite time. Stearns, Law of Suretyship, § 4.7, p. 67 (5th ed. 1951). While an absolute guaranty is an uncondi[197]*197tional undertaking on the part of the guarantor that he will pay the debt or perform the obligation immediately upon the debtor’s default without any necessity to first exhaust the principal, Stearns, Law of Suretyship, supra, a conditional guaranty expressly or impliedly contemplates as a condition precedent to the guarantor’s liability the happening of some contingent event or the performance of some act on the part of the creditor. Stearns, Law of Suretyship, supra, § 4.6.
In December 1967, while the reserve agreement was in force, a customer of Chisholm desired to purchase an automobile other than the brand sold by the defendant. He located a car at a Colorado dealership but needed to secure financing. Chisholm Bros, undertook to obtain the necessary financing from Commercial Credit. • On December 15, 1967, Chisholm Bros, and their customer entered into a conditional sales contract on the form provided by Commercial Credit. Chisholm was denominated “seller" and the customer as “purchaser.” The total alleged purchase price was $6,350.30 due and payable on December 12, 1968.
Chisholm delivered the conditional sale contract to Commercial Credit and Commercial Credit issued a check for $5,773.00 payable to Chisholm. Chisholm endorsed the check and delivered it to the customer who in turn paid the funds to the Colorado car dealership and received possession of the automobile and its unencumbered title.
The contract contained the following language:
“Accepted: and this contract hereby is assigned in accordance with the plan marked below and under the terms of the assignment on the reverse.”
The words “plan marked below” referred to a section on the face of the instrument which permitted Chisholm Bros, to designate its choice of the extent of its liability as guarantor of the debt of the purchaser. The first alternative was “conditionally without recourse” which would have imposed liability upon Chisholm only to the extent of the buy-back provisions of the reserve agreement and would have incurred more extensive liability only in the event of breach of warranty. The second alternative was “with recourse” which, if designated, would have imposed on Chisholm absolute liability for every delinquency or default regardless of its own compliance with the terms of the assignment. The instrument provided a box beside each of the alternatives in which a check mark should have been placed but Chisholm failed to check either alternative. The district court properly found that the failure of Chisholm to so indicate the extent of its liability was an omission rather than an ambiguity and that the evidence presented by the parties to explain the omission still left the question unresolved.
It is undisputed that Chisholm did not secure compliance with the provisions of either Idaho or Colorado law for the protection of a security interest in the vehicle against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers.2 No payments were made by the customer under the conditional sale contract and after December 12, 1968, the customer was in default. The customer was not found within the State of Idaho and the car had been sold to a bona fide purchaser, apparently in Colorado.
Commercial Credit brought this action to recover the unpaid balance on the contract from Chisholm Bros., alleging the conditional sale contract, the assignment of that contract for consideration, the customer’s default, the “unconditional guaranty” provisions of the reserve agreement, Chisholm’s failure to protect Commercial Credit’s security interest in the vehicle and Commercial Credit’s resulting damage.
[198]*198At the conclusion of the trial, the district court concluded that the liability, if any, of Chisholm could not be determined without the court in effect making a contract for the parties. Therefore upon motion the district court ordered involuntary dismissal and entered judgment on the merits for the defendant.
In our view the district court was correct in concluding that no liability to Chisholm as guarantor arose under the provisions of the conditional sale contract and its assignment. As a result of a material omission the guarantorship options on the face of the conditional sale-assignment instrument are of no force and effect. The printed words which describe the alternative degrees of liability are only surplusage. This court stated in Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 349 P.2d 556 (1960), that the trial court therein was correct in finding:
“ * * * omissions which cannot be ascertained from a reading of the contract. Evidence introduced by the parties left all such and similar questions unsolved and in uncertainty. This Court is not at liberty to determine such essentials for the litigants. What is to be included in a contract is not for the court to determine, * * 83 Idaho at 63, 349 P.2d at 559.
If Chisholm is to be held liable to Commercial Credit as a guarantor of its customer’s debt such liability can only arise under the provisions of the 1958 reserve agreement. In that agreement Chisholm agreed to:
“13. * * * unconditionally guarantee any Instruments and waive protection against loss resulting from conversion, confiscation or collision covering new or used Cars under the following circumstances :
******
“(4) loss' results from our [Chisholm Bros.’] failure, when required by State laws, to properly file or record purchaser’s obligation or obtain certificate of title showing your lien, or both.”
As hereinabove noted said reserve agreement was to constitute the entire agreement between the parties and could not be amended in any manner except in writing signed by the parties.
Where a contract is clear and unambiguous a determination of its meaning and legal effect are questions of law for determination by the court. Parks v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 241, 419 P.2d 683 (1966). The reserve agreement clearly and unambiguously provided that in the absence of a subsequent agreement in writing Chisholm was liable to Commercial Credit if a loss of the collateral and security interest through conversion, confiscation or collision resulted from the failure of Chisholm to comply with relevant state law.
Chisholm’s failure to protect Commercial Credit’s security interest by filing or recording notice of the security interest or lien enabled the customer to make a sale of the car to a bona fide purchaser without the permission of Commercial Credit. Such a sale was a conversion. Casper v. Spaulding, 78 Idaho 282, 301 P.2d 1097 (1956). As noted above the incomplete guaranty provisions on the conditional sale document are only surplusage and we must reject Chisholm’s assertion that such guaranty provisions be construed as a writing which modified the parties’ earlier 1958 agreement and evidenced the parties’ intent that Chisholm was to be absolved of any and all guaranty liability resulting from the transaction in question.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of appellant. Costs to appellant.
DONALDSON, McQUADE, McFADDEN, JJ., concur.