Com. v. Wise, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided April 5, 2023·No. 488 WDA 2022·Unpublished

Opinion

J-S45028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

SCOTT GUTH :

:

Appellant : No. 1878 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 19, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No.: CP-48-CR-0002784-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 5, 2023 Appellant Scott Guth appeals from the April 19, 2022 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (“trial court”), following his open guilty plea to drug delivery resulting in death.1 Upon review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly, following a fatal fentanyl overdose, Appellant was charged with, and subsequently pled guilty to, the foregoing crime. On April 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment. On April 26, 2022, Appellant pro se moved for post-sentence relief, indicating that he was without counsel. On April 29, 2022, the trial court issued an order accepting as timely filed Appellant’s April 26 post-sentence motion and directing Appellant to seek

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a).

J-S45028-22

appointment of a public defender. On May 18, 2022, Attorney Molly Heidorn, Office of the Public Defender, Northampton County, filed a praecipe for entry of appearance on Appellant’s behalf. On June 3, 2022, Attorney Heidorn filed an amended post-sentence motion, challenging the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. On June 30, 2022, the trial court denied post-sentence relief. Appellant timely appealed. The trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant complied, reasserting his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

On appeal,2 Appellant presents a single issue for our review.

[I.] Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence inconsistent with the Sentencing Code and/or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process, in that said sentence constituted an abuse of discretion because the sentence imposed represented an unreasonable and excessive sentence which failed to consider mitigating factors.

2 When reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s discretion, our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 2002)), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013).

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Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted). At the core, he claims only that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances.

It is well-settled that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary aspect of sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant’s appeal should be considered as a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by- case basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 796 A.2d 979 (Pa. 2002).

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Here, Appellant has satisfied the first three requirements of the four-

part Moury test. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court, preserved the issue on appeal through his post-sentence motions, and included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief.3 We, therefore, must determine only if Appellant’s sentencing issues raise a substantial question.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have found that a substantial question exists “when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 895 (Pa. 2009). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013), affirmed, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015).

It is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super.

2006). When we examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine

3 Rule 2119(f) provides that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).

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whether a substantial question exists, “[o]ur inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-87 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005)). A Rule 2119(f) statement is inadequate when it “contains incantations of statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of law[.]” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 528 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

Here, as indicated, Appellant essentially asserts in his Rule 2119(f)

statement that his sentence is excessive because the court did not consider mitigating factors, such as “his remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and his history of addiction and mental illness.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Based on his 2119(f) statement, we conclude that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question.

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