Com. v. Williams, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 20, 2025
• Docket: 320 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S48043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : : Appellant : No. 320 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003416-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : : Appellant : No. 321 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003419-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2025

Appellant, Michael Williams, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

December 18, 2023 order denying, as untimely, his petition filed under the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful

review, we affirm.

The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not germane to our

disposition of his appeal. We glean the following procedural history from the J-S48043-24

certified record. On June 9, 2015, a jury convicted Appellant, in two separate

but consolidated cases, of burglary (18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)), fleeing and

attempting to elude a police officer (18 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a)), and conspiracy

(18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)). On August 10, 2015, the trial court sentenced him to

an aggregate term of 17 to 34 years’ incarceration. Appellant initially failed

to file a direct appeal, but his appellate rights were later reinstated via a

timely-filed PCRA petition. He appealed from his judgment of sentence nunc

pro tunc and, after this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on

November 27, 2017, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of

appeal on June 4, 2018. Commonwealth v. Williams, 181 A.3d 445 (Pa.

Super. 2017), appeal denied, 186 A.3d 946 (Pa. 2018).

Appellant then filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on December 26,

2018, raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and violations of

his constitutional rights. Appellant retained counsel, who filed an amended

petition on his behalf. On January 21, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s petition without a hearing. He did not appeal.

On June 15, 2022, Appellant filed a second, pro se PCRA petition, which

underlies his instant appeal. Counsel was appointed, and filed an amended

petition alleging that Appellant’s prior PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing

to file an appeal from the denial of his first petition. On November 16, 2023,

the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

Appellant’s petition as untimely. Appellant did not respond and, on December

18, 2023, the court issued an order dismissing his petition.

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On January 13, 2024, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in each

case.1 Appellant and the court thereafter complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Herein, Appellant raises three issues for our review:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [A]ppellant’s petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing when [A]ppellant established by clear and convincing evidence that he specifically requested that counsel file [a] direct appeal of the dismissal of his PCRA petition, and that counsel ignored that request.

2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [A]ppellant’s petition for post-conviction relief when [A]ppellant established by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal.

3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [A]ppellant’s petition for post-conviction relief when [A]ppellant established by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied his constitutional rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

Initially, we note that this Court’s standard of review regarding an order

denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s notices of appeal listed both docket numbers of his underlying

cases. However, when transmitted to this Court, each notice of appeal singled out, with a check mark, one docket number. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (holding that even though the appellant filed multiple notices of appeal, each listing multiple lower court docket numbers, the appeals should not be quashed because the appellant filed an appropriate number of appeals and he had italicized only one trial court docket number in each notice of appeal). Consequently, this Court assigned a docket number to each notice of appeal and consolidated the appeals sua sponte on April 30, 2024.

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Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin

by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time

limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in

order to address the merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett,

930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-

conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within

one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of

the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, any petition attempting to

invoke one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

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Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in September of

2018, after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal in

June of that same year. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment

of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking the review); Commonwealth v. Owens, 718 A.2d

330, 331 (Pa. Super. 1998) (directing that under the PCRA, petitioner’s

judgment of sentence becomes final ninety days after our Supreme Court

rejects his or her petition for allowance of appeal since petitioner had ninety

additional days to seek review with the United States Supreme Court). Thus,

for this Court to have jurisdiction to grant Appellant the relief he requests of

reinstating his right to appeal from the denial of his first petition, Appellant

must plead and prove that he meets one of the timeliness exceptions set forth

above.

In this regard, Appellant argues that “an appellant is entitled to relief

upon pleading and establishing that his request for [a] direct appeal was

ignored or rejected by counsel.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing

Commonwealth v. Maynard, 900 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Appellant

insists that the “court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether [A]ppellant requested that counsel file the direct appeal.” Id.

(citation omitted). According to Appellant, “[a]n evidentiary hearing would

have provided [A]ppellant with the opportunity to present … documentary

evidence[,]” including “email communications between him and prior

counsel[,] that definitively proves that [A]ppellant requested counsel file [a]

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notice of appeal, counsel’s acknowledgment of [A]ppellant’s request, and

counsel’s assurance that the notice of direct appeal would be filed.” Id. at 15.

Thus, Appellant concludes that he “is entitled to have this matter remanded

to the PCRA court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing….” Id.

No relief is due. Initially, Maynard involved a timely-filed PCRA

petition in which Maynard claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing

to file an appeal from Maynard’s judgment of sentence. See Maynard, 900

A.2d at 397. In contrast, here, Appellant’s petition is untimely, and he is

seeking reinstatement of his right to appeal from the denial of his prior PCRA

petition, not his judgment of sentence. Accordingly, Maynard is inapplicable.

We recognize that, in Bennett,

our Supreme Court found that attorney abandonment may constitute a factual basis for the section 9545(b)(1)(ii) timeliness exception. In that case, the appeal from the dismissal of Bennett’s first, timely, PCRA petition was dismissed by this Court because counsel failed to file a brief. [Bennett,] 930 A.2d at 1266. Bennett filed a second PCRA petition alleging that he had attempted to find out the status of his PCRA appeal, did not learn that it was dismissed due to counsel’s failure to file a brief until he received a letter from this Court explaining what had transpired, and filed a new PCRA petition within 60 days of so learning. Id. at 1274. The PCRA court granted Bennett leave to appeal the dismissal of his first PCRA petition nunc pro tunc, but this Court quashed the appeal as untimely. Our Supreme Court reversed this Court, holding that Bennett sufficiently alleged that he had been abandoned by counsel on his first PCRA petition and acted with due diligence in ascertaining the fact of the abandonment to satisfy the timeliness exception of the PCRA found at section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at 1272.

Commonwealth v. Huddleston, 55 A.3d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2012).

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Although Bennett provides an avenue by which Appellant’s claim could

meet the timeliness exception of section 9545(b)(1)(ii), Appellant has failed

to demonstrate that he has satisfied the requirement of section 9545(b)(2).

Specifically, Appellant fails to explain “when he first learned that counsel failed

to file an appeal.” PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 2/12/24, at 5. Appellant’s first

PCRA petition was dismissed on January 21, 2021, and he did not file his pro

se PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his right to appeal from that

dismissal until June 15, 2022. Thus, well over one year passed from the

dismissal of Appellant’s first petition and his filing of his instant petition

seeking reinstatement of his appeal rights. Without any information regarding

when, and how, Appellant discovered that his prior PCRA counsel failed to file

an appeal on his behalf, we cannot discern whether he filed his instant petition

within one year of that discovery as required by section 9545(b)(2).

Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to examine Appellant’s claim that his

prior PCRA counsel abandoned him, which he more fully develops in his second

issue on appeal.

Finally, we note that in his third appellate issue, Appellant argues that,

[i]n his pro se filing, [he] sought additional relief based on the realization of evidence that was not available at trial and could not have become known to him through the exercise of due diligence. The PCRA court completely ignored this filing. Appellant was entitled to review of this pro se filing, and the PCRA court’s failure to consider the filing constitutes a violation of [A]ppellant’s procedural due process rights. The Superior Court should remand this matter to the PCRA court with instructions to provide a decision on the merits of [A]ppellant’s pro se filing.

Appellant’s Brief at 18.

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Again, no relief is due, as we discern no error in the court’s failing to

address Appellant’s pro se claim that he has discovered exculpatory evidence.

In Appellant’s pro se petition, he cursorily claimed that his trial counsel was

ineffective for “fail[ing] to present exculpatory evidence” and that, had it been

“properly presented[,]” it would have changed “the outcome of the verdict….”

Pro Se PCRA Petition, 9/8/21, at 3 (unnumbered). Appellant did not explain

at all what this exculpatory evidence is or how he discovered it. Likewise,

when Appellant’s current PCRA counsel filed an amended petition on

Appellant’s behalf, he made no mention of exculpatory evidence or develop

this claim in any way. Instead, counsel solely argued that Appellant’s prior

PCRA counsel was ineffective for not filing an appeal on his behalf.

Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in declining to

consider Appellant’s brief mention, in his pro se petition, of exculpatory

evidence.2 ____________________________________________

2 Moreover, we recognize that Appellant subsequently filed several pro se documents, including another PCRA petition, alleging that he discovered new, exculpatory evidence that certain police officers involved in his case had been engaged in misconduct in other, unrelated cases. However, the PCRA court did not err in declining to consider these filings. Our Supreme Court has expressly prohibited hybrid representation. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1138-39 (Pa. 1993). Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999), the Court extended Ellis’s prohibition on hybrid-representation to post-conviction proceedings, declaring that it “will not require courts considering PCRA petitions to struggle through the pro se filings of defendants when qualified counsel represent those defendants.” Id. at 302. Thus, the Pursell Court found “no basis … to conclude that the PCRA court abused its discretion when it refused to consider the issues raised in [Pursell’s] pro se pleading.” Id. We conclude that the same is true in the (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Order affirmed.

Date: 2/20/2025

instant case, and that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion by not considering Appellant’s pro se filings after his counsel was appointed.

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