J-S05037-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ALPHONSO WILLIAMS, : : Appellant : No. 1230 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 21, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004668-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2020
Alphonso Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his conviction of escape.1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the facts underlying the
instant appeal as follows:
Lester Smith [(“Smith”)], a shift supervisor at [] Keystone Correctional Services [(“Keystone”)], testified that Keystone is a secured facility that serves as “a halfway house and work release center.” Residents of Keystone are “getting released from jail and they come there on parole, or else they come back…. They’re brought back from [a] parole violation. So[,] they stay with us until parole sees them, and then they get a home plan and go back out.” The doors are locked[,] and the property is surrounded by fences with barbed wire.
On June 8, 2018, [Williams], a resident at Keystone, was out on a job search. When he returned to the facility, [] Smith was instructed to strip search [Williams] due to a suspected drug offense. During the search, [] Smith found two bags of synthetic ____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121. J-S05037-20
marijuana in [Williams’s] underwear. [Williams] was then given a urine test and tested positive for synthetic [marijuana]. The facility director was notified, as was the Pennsylvania State Police. [] Smith testified that [Williams] returned to the housing unit [but], after a formal count of residents was conducted, it was determined that [Williams] was missing. [] Smith was able to view Keystone surveillance footage and observed [Williams] going over the fence with a sheet on top of the barbed wire.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 1-2 (citations omitted; paragraph break
added). Williams was apprehended on August 4, 2018.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Williams of escape. The
trial court subsequently sentenced Williams to one to three years in prison,
plus fines and costs. Thereafter, Williams filed the instant timely appeal,
followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
complained of on appeal.
Williams presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the evidence was insufficient to prove [Williams] guilty of escape[,] when the Commonwealth’s witness testified that Keystone Correctional Facility houses individuals who are released from jail and paroled[,] and failed to provide evidence to refute that he was on parole status at Keystone Correctional Facility?
Brief for Appellant at 4.
Williams claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
of escape. See id. at 11. Specifically, Williams argues that the
Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding his “resident status” at
Keystone. Id. According to Williams, the Commonwealth failed to present
evidence that he was at Keystone “for one of the reasons delineated for official
detention under [18 Pa.C.S.A.] § 5121(e)[,] nor was testimony presented that
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he was committed to Keystone under any court order.” Brief for Appellant at
11-12. Further, Williams argues that there was no evidence that his status
was anything other than a “parolee.” Id. at 12.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s claim and concluded
that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 3-7. We agree with
the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm
on this basis as to Williams’s claim. See id. We additionally observe the
following.
In Commonwealth v. Davis, 852 A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. 2004), this
Court addressed a similar issue. The defendant in Davis claimed that he had
been paroled, and was therefore no longer subject to “official detention,” as
defined by the escape statute. Id. at 396. In considering whether the
defendant remained in “official detention,” this Court opined that “the term
‘prerelease’ essentially translates into ‘prior to release’ and begs the question,
prior to release on what? Given that the provisions for ‘prerelease programs’
are found in the provisions for parole, it logically follows that the term
‘prerelease program’ refers to a program that predates release on parole.”
Id. at 396.
In Commonwealth v. Scott, 967 A.2d 995 (Pa. Super. 2009), this
Court applied Davis in addressing a similar claim. The defendant in Scott
was on “prerelease.” Id. at 998. Id. However, the defendant was not
required to serve a minimum period in the prerelease program. Id. at 999.
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The defendant argued that the evidence had failed to establish that he was in
“official detention,” as he was on parole at the time he left the facility. Id. at
998. The defendant’s argument was based upon his receipt of a letter
indicating his parole status, “and the apparent presumption that [the]
issuance of the letter commenced his release on parole.” Id. at 998. The
defendant argued, in the alternative, that, even assuming he was not yet
paroled, the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish that he remained in
official detention. Id. The defendant relied upon Davis as supporting this
proposition. See id.
This Court rejected the defendant’s assertions: “Unfortunately, the
authority upon which [the defendant] relies does not establish that his parole
commenced before he left [the facility,] or that the Commonwealth is
compelled to disprove his assertion that parole had been granted.” Id.
[T]he record verifies only that [the defendant] was serving a period of prerelease when he absconded from Kintock Broad,[2] not that he was on parole. Commonwealth witness Roberta Albany, a [Department of Corrections (“DOC”)] records custodian, testified that she was familiar with the letter [the defendant] had received from the [Pennsylvania] Board of Probation and Parole. She also testified, however, that [the defendant’s] parole remained to be confirmed before a DOC public hearing officer[,] who would issue a release order following [the defendant’s] agreement to the terms of the probation[,] and that the order would then be included in [the defendant’s] DOC file. Id. [The defendant] never attended a DOC hearing and no release order [was] ever issued for his parole. Id. Accordingly, his “prerelease” status remained unchanged and he continued in “official ____________________________________________
2 Kintock Broad was a Community Correction Center then in operation in Philadelphia. See id. at 997.
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detention” while at Kintock Broad. As the trial court recognized, [the defendant] was not on parole and, consequently, was properly subject to a charge of [e]scape upon leaving the Kintock facility. As [the defendant] does not dispute his conduct in leaving the facility without authorization, we find the evidence legally sufficient to sustain his conviction for [e]scape….
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, in Davis and Scott, the use of the term “parole” was not
dispositive of the defendant’s status for purposes of the escape statute.
Rather, the Court looked to whether the defendant was in “confinement” or
“official detention.” See Davis, 852 A.2d at 396; Scott, 967 A.2d at 998-99.
Here, the evidence established that Williams was confined in a secure
facility. See N.T., 6/21/19, at 9 (wherein Smith testified that the facility was
a secured facility where the “doors are locked[,] and the property is
surrounded by fences with barbed wire”). Further, as defense counsel
conceded to the trial court, Williams would need a “home plan … before he
[could] be officially released out onto the street.” N.T., 6/21/19, at 27
(emphasis added). Thus, the evidence established that Williams had not yet
been “released” from “official detention.” See id. Therefore, based upon the
analysis set forth in the trial court’s Opinion, and our review set forth above,
we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Williams’s conviction of
escape.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 04/17/2020
-6- Circulated 03/24/2020 02:12 PM
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
vs. NO. 4668-CR-2018
ALPHONSO WILLIAMS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial held on June 21, 2019, Defendant Alphonso Williams was found
guilty of Escape. He was sentenced to one ( 1) to three (3) years of imprisonment, plus fines and
costs.' Defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2019, and has raised one issue for
consideration: The Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence that Defendant was
"committed" to a community corrections facility under 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 5006.
The following evidence was adduced at trial: Lester Smith, a shift supervisor at the
Keystone Correctional Services, testified that Keystone is a secured facility that serves as "a
halfway house and work release center." Residents of Keystone are "getting released from jail,
and they come there on parole, or else they come back ..... They're brought back from [a] parole
violation. So they stay with us until parole sees them, and then they get a home plan and go back
out." The doors are locked and the property is surrounded by fences with barbed wire. [Bench
Trial, June 21, 2019, Notes of Testimony, p. 9]. On June 8, 2018, Defendant, a resident at
Keystone, was out on a job search. When he returned to the facility, Mr. Smith was instructed to
strip search Defendant due to a suspected drug offense. During the search, Mr. Smith found two
bags of synthetic marijuana in Defendant's underwear. Defendant was then given a urine test
I Defendant was also granted time credit of ten ( I 0) months and eighteen ( 18) days, as reflected in the Amended Sentencing Order filed June 27, 2019. and tested positive for synthetic. The facility director was notified, as was the Pennsylvania
State Police. [N.T., 6-21-19, pp. 9-10]. Mr. Smith testified that Defendant returned to the
housing unit and, after a formal count of residents was conducted, it was determined that
Defendant was missing. Mr. Smith was able to view Keystone surveillance footage and
observed Defendant going over the fence with a sheet on top of the barbed wire. [N .T., 6-21-19,
p. 11 ].
Trooper Lisa Riccardo with the Pennsylvania State Police also testified. On June 8, 2018
she received a dispatch to Keystone for a report of an inmate being in possession of suspected
contraband. [N.T., 6-21-19, p. 13]. Trooper Riccardo described Keystone as a secured halfway
house and community correctional facility, due to the manner in which it is secured and the
policies in place for everyone upon entry into the facility. Upon arriving at Keystone, Trooper
Riccardo buzzed the intercom and identified herself. While waiting outside the rear of the
facility, she heard loud thuds, observed a door being kicked from the bottom, and saw an inmate
wearing a white shirt, jeans, and sneakers doing the kicking. A Keystone employee then directed
her inside, and Trooper Riccardo told that person that someone was trying to get out of the door
and it should be secured. Trooper Riccardo identified Defendant at trial as the inmate she saw
kicking the door. After realizing that Defendant was no longer in the facility, Trooper Riccardo,
Mr. Smith, and another Keystone employee reviewed the security cameras and observed
Defendant leaving the facility by means of a sheet draped over the barbed-wire fence.2 He was
wearing the same outfit: white shirt, jeans, and sneakers. [N. T., 6-21-19, pp. 13-16]. Once
Trooper Riccardo realized that Defendant was no longer in the secured facility and was last seen
2 The video viewed by Trooper Riccardo did not make it into evidence, as Keystone was unable to provide documentation, as they were having difficulties as a result of switching security camera companies. [N.T., 6-21-19, p.45].
2 heading towards Route 22, she immediately radioed to dispatch to notify units to aid in
Defendant's apprehension. Trooper Riccardo testified that Defendant was apprehended on
August 4, 2018. [N.T., 6-21-19, p. 17].
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that on the day in question he was
residing at Keystone, and described his residence status as being paroled to Keystone, a secured
facility, "upon transfer from Harrisburg CCC on Cameron Street." [N.T., 6-21-19, pp. 24-26].
It is well-settled that:
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. However, the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
The applicable provision of the Crimes Code is as follows:
§ 5 121. Escape
3 (a) Escape. - A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes himself from official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
***** ( e) Definition. - As used in this section the phrase "official detention" means arrest, detention in any facility for custody of persons under the charge or conviction of crime or alleged or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or any other detention for law enforcement purposes; but the phrase does not include supervision of probation or parole, or constraint incidental to release on bail.
I 8 Pa.C.S.A. § 5 I 21. The legislature added:
§ 5006. Escape
An individual committed to a community corrections center or a community corrections facility shall be deemed to be in official detention under I 8 Pa.C.S. § 5 I 21 (relating to escape).
61 Pa.C.S.A. § 5006.
Section 5006 indicates the legislature's intent to include those parolees who have been
committed to a community service center within the term "official detention" pursuant to section
5121 (e). Defendant claims he was not actually "committed" to an "official detention" facility
but rather, was "paroled" to that address. Defendant argues that he was not under official
detention; there was no court order holding him there. The conditions of his parole included a
"home plan" before he could be officially released out onto the street. Keystone was his parole
address, not where he was serving any additional sentence; therefore, he argues he was not in
official detention as he was not committed to Keystone Correctional Service. [N.T., 6-21-19, pp.
26-27]. Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that the testimony reflects that Defendant was in
a secured facility; he had to jump a barbed-wire fence to get out. The Commonwealth also
asserts that he was still under detention for his robbery conviction; thus, he unlawfully removed
himself from that detention as outlined in Section 5006. [N.T., 6-21-19, p. 28].
4 In Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 966 A.2d 1 I 44 (Pa. Super. 2009), the defendants were
apprehended by their respective parole officers for technical violations of the terms of their
parole. They were placed in a private facility owned by Firetree, Ltd., which administered the
Pennsylvania Community Alternative to Prison Program (Penn CAPP) via a contract with the
Commonwealth. Id. at 1145. Upon their admission to Penn CAPP, each defendant signed a
form advising them that they were no longer on parole but, instead, in a pre-release status. Id.
The defendants absconded from the facility and were charged with escape; however, the trial
court dismissed the charges on the basis that they were parolees within the meaning of the escape
statute. Id. at I 146. In vacating the trial court's order, the Maldonado Court began its analysis
by noting that "placement in Penn CAPP, though not a prison, may subject one to official
detention as contemplated in the escape statute." Id. The Court reasoned that "detainment in
Penn CAPP constrains one's freedom of movement to within the confines of a housing facility
such that placement there effects the kind of detention contemplated within the meaning of
section 5121.'" Id. at 1147. In addressing the defendants" assertion that they were under
supervision of parole when detained and thus precluded from being charged under section 512 I,
the Court looked to statutory interpretation of "supervision of parole." Id. Applying those
considerations, the Court held:
Once a parolee is arrested and detained for failing to report, and acknowledges he is essentially in prerelease status, he is in official detention for purposes of section 5121 just as any other person placed in custody is. As such, he can hold no reasonable expectation that he retains the liberties and freedoms customary to a person operating under "supervision of parole."
Id. at 1 I 48.3 See Commonwealth v. Wegley, 574 Pa. 190, I 97, 829 A.2d 1148, 1152 (2003)
(while Section 5121 exempts general parole supervision from the definition of "official
3The Court further noted that "such an interpretation is necessary lest an absurdity having no basis in reason, law, or public policy arise. To give recommitted parole violators incentive to attempt a "no-risk" escape from detention
5 detention," our Supreme Court has construed "official detention" broadly to mean the restraint of
a detainee's "liberty to come and go as [the detainee] pleases," regardless of the facility in which
the detainee was confined); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 153 A.3d 372, 379 (Pa. Super.
2016) (following Maldonado and affirming judgment of sentence for escape conviction, where
parole violator fled from his supervisor after supervisor escorted parolee from parole violation
center to hospital in ambulance). Also addressing "pre-release" status, our Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Davis, 852 A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. 2004) affirmed a judgment of sentence under
Section 5121 for an inmate who had been removed from prison and housed at Penn CAPP in
"pre-release" status at the time he left the facility without permission. There, the Court rejected
the defendant's claim that when he was out of prison, he was on parole, and thus eligible for the
"supervision of parole" exclusion while at the halfway house. The Court reasoned that "pre-
release" translates to "prior to release," finding parole could not have commenced as long as the
defendant was in "pre-release" status. Id., 852 A.2d at 396. Because the defendant was
receiving credit for jail time while in the halfway house, he was not on parole and his
unauthorized departure from the institution constituted removing himself from "official
detention." Id
Based on the evidence of record and applicable case law, this Court concludes that the
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant unlawfully removed himself from official
detention for purposes of committing the crime of escape. As stated above, a reading of Section
5006 indicates the legislature's intent to include parolees who have been committed to a
centers such as Penn CAPP, centers from which they are told they are not free to leave, needlessly taxes our enforcement resources and places the public at large in danger. We find this potentiality was not what the General Assembly intended when it crafted and enacted the "supervision of probation or parole" exclusion for persons released on parole." Maldonado, supra at l 148.
6 community corrections facility within the meaning of "official detention" pursuant to Section
5121 ( e ). Official detention is not synonymous with incarceration. It is noted that missing from
Section 5006 is language limiting the "official detention" definition to encompass only certain
types of parolees. The statute makes no differentiation between being committed to a
community corrections facility for purposes of a parole address, or being committed to a
community corrections facility for purposes of pre-release status or other such similar
supervision. The trial testimony revealed that Defendant was certainly not free to come and go
as he pleased while at Keystone. The doors are kept locked and under control of facility
supervisors, it is surrounded by a fence with barbed wire on top, and there are policies in place
for residents of the facility. It would be a stretch to conclude that Defendant's actual parole
could have commenced while in the confines of the secure facility at Keystone. Defendant's
distinction between being "committed" to a community facility and being "paroled" to a
community facility for purposes of "official detention" is not contemplated by Section 5006. As
noted in the cited case law, infra, our courts have taken a broad view of what constitutes official
detention, and Defendant's circumstances fall within the purview of that definition. Viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was more
than sufficient to satisfy the elements of escape, and Defendant's conviction should be upheld.
Slocum, supra.
7 BY THE COURT:
e ;:;4�f ;; .2 Scott Arthur Evans, Judge
DA TED: October 31, 2019
Distribution:ll/ / 1 Jq e g: 10� Julia Jacobs, Esq., District Attorney's Office :ro Jacqulyn R. Gagliardi, Esq., Public Defender's Office �o Prothonotary, Superior Court of Pennsylvania .-uti I Chambers of Judge Scott Arthur Evans �·(t C�f 1