Com. v. Vializ, M.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 15, 2020
Docket2040 MDA 2019
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Vializ, M. (Com. v. Vializ, M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Vializ, M., (Pa. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

J-S34006-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MIGUEL ENRIQUE VIALIZ : : Appellant : No. 2040 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001072-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Miguel Vializ appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered on

November 4, 2019, of an aggregate term of 4½ to 10 years’ imprisonment, in

the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, following his nonjury

conviction of one count each of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”)

fentanyl, PWID cocaine, PWID marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia,

and tampering with physical evidence.1 On appeal, Vializ challenges the denial

of his motion to suppress and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After

review, we affirm.

Due to the limited scope of Vializ’s issues on appeal, we need only

summarize the history of this case. In late December 2018 and January 2019,

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), (32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1), respectively. J-S34006-20

three members of the Lancaster County Drug Task Force received information

from three confidential informants (“CI”), that Vializ was dealing drugs from

his apartment in Lititz, Pennsylvania.

Following an independent investigation, members of the Lancaster

County Drug Task Force obtained a warrant and searched Vializ’s apartment

on January 25, 2019, recovering 470 bags containing fentanyl, 8.8 grams of

cocaine, 80.8 grams of marijuana, U.S. currency and drug paraphernalia. The

next day, the Commonwealth filed charges against Vializ.

Vializ filed an omnibus pretrial motion, seeking to suppress the seized

items. A hearing took place on August 12, 2019, following the trial court’s

denial of the motion to suppress, the court held a nonjury trial and found Vializ

guilty of all charges.

Following receipt of a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”), on

November 4, 2019, the trial court sentenced Vializ. On November 13, 2019,

Vializ filed a motion to modify his sentence. The trial court denied the motion

and this timely appeal followed.2

In his first issue, Vializ contends the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress because “the search warrant was so lacking in probable

cause so as to render the issuance of the warrant manifestly unreasonable.”

2On January 3, 2020, in response to the trial court’s order, Vializ filed a timely concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 30, 2020, the trial court issued an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

-2- J-S34006-20

Vializ’s Brief, at 8-10. Specifically, Vializ alleges only one of the three CIs had

previously provided information leading to a conviction and the information in

the warrant was stale. See id. Our analysis is guided by the following legal

principles:

When reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression

motion, our standard of review is

limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2013).

The legal principles applicable to the instant case are well established. Before an issuing authority may issue a constitutionally valid search warrant he or she must be furnished with information sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that probable cause exists to conduct a search. The requisite probable cause must exist at the time the warrant is issued and be based on facts closely related in time to the date of issuance.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 484 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1984) (citations

omitted).

-3- J-S34006-20

Further, “[i]n determining whether a search warrant is supported by

probable cause, appellate review is confined to the four corners of the

affidavit.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 785 (Pa. 2009).

Importantly, “[t]he issuing authority, in determining whether probable cause

has been established, may not consider any evidence outside of the

affidavits.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 830 A.2d 554, 560 (Pa. 2003)

(citation omitted).

In part, Vializ contends that the information contained in the search

warrant application was too old, or “stale,” to be reliable. Settled Pennsylvania

law establishes stale information cannot provide probable cause in support of

a warrant. Commonwealth v. Gomolekoff, 910 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Super.

2006). In particular:

[A]ge of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor in determining probable cause. If too old, the information is stale, and probable cause may no longer exist. Age alone, however, does not determine staleness. The determination of probable cause is not merely an exercise in counting the days or even months between the facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant. Rather, we must also examine the nature of the crime and the type of evidence.

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 158–59 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Vializ combines his staleness argument with an allegation that the CIs

whose tips formed part of the basis for the search warrant application were

not established as sufficiently reliable. “A determination of probable cause

based upon information received from a confidential informant depends upon

the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge viewed in a common sense,

-4- J-S34006-20

non-technical manner.” Commonwealth v. Clark, 28 A.3d 1284, 1288 (Pa.

2011). “An informant’s tip may constitute probable cause where police

independently corroborate the tip, or where the informant has provided

accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where the informant

himself participated in the criminal activity.” Id. “Under the totality-of-the-

circumstances approach, there is no talismanic recitation of a particular phrase

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Commonwealth v. Jones
484 A.2d 1383 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1984)
Commonwealth v. Moury
992 A.2d 162 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2010)
Commonwealth v. Coleman
830 A.2d 554 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Commonwealth v. Galvin
985 A.2d 783 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Commonwealth v. Devers
546 A.2d 12 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)
Commonwealth v. Clark
28 A.3d 1284 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
Commonwealth v. Gomolekoff
910 A.2d 710 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Janda
14 A.3d 147 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
Commonwealth v. Manuel
194 A.3d 1076 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2018)
Commonwealth v. Dukeman
917 A.2d 338 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)
Commonwealth v. Delvalle
74 A.3d 1081 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)
Commonwealth v. Dodge
77 A.3d 1263 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)
Commonwealth v. Zirkle
107 A.3d 127 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Com. v. Vializ, M., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-vializ-m-pasuperct-2020.