J-S11045-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SEBASTIAN HERBERT VAN CAMP : : Appellant : No. 1215 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 4, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-42-CR-0000266-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SEBASTIAN HERBERT VAN CAMP : : Appellant : No. 1216 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 4, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-42-CR-0000267-2023
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: May 28, 2025
Sebastian Herbert Van Camp (“Van Camp”) appeals from the amended
judgments of sentence imposed following his jury convictions of rape of a
child1 and related offenses, as well as his guilty pleas to sexual abuse of
children/possession of child sexual abuse material (“possession of child
____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c). J-S11045-25
pornography”).2 Additionally, the trial court found Van Camp is a sexually
violent predator (“SVP”) under the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act3 (“SORNA”). Van Camp’s court-appointed trial counsel,
Philip Clabaugh, Esquire (“Attorney Clabaugh”), has filed a petition to
withdraw from representation and a brief styled pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We grant Attorney Clabaugh’s petition and
affirm the judgments of sentence.
The Commonwealth charged Van Camp at two trial dockets for separate
incidents. First, at trial docket CP-42-CR-0000267-2023 (“Docket 267”), the
Commonwealth alleged that Van Camp had ongoing sexual contact with T.T.
(the “Victim”) over a two-year period, from December 2019 to December
2021. This matter proceeded to a jury trial in December 2023, where Attorney
Clabaugh represented Van Camp. The Victim testified to the following. When
she was eleven years old, she met Van Camp, her friend’s brother, then
nineteen years old, and they began “dating.” N.T., 12/4/23, at 31. They had
vaginal intercourse, where Van Camp’s “penis [was] in [her] vagina,” more
than ten times, and they had oral sex, where Van Camp’s “penis [was] in [her]
mouth,” more than once. Id. at 20-21. The Victim further stated she and
2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.75.
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Van Camp “[h]ad anal intercourse” once, describing it as “sex in the butt.”
Id. at 22.
These incidents occurred in Van Camp’s house, garage, bedroom, and
his sister’s bedroom, as well as “in the woods” and near “the watering hole”
“[b]ehind the high school.” Id. at 23-24. The sexual contact continued until
the Victim was twelve years old. See id. at 21. The Victim reported the
conduct to an adult “about two years” later. Id. at 28. At the time of trial,
the Victim was fifteen years old.
A teaching assistant at the Victim’s school testified to the following. In
March 2023, she observed the Victim was upset and crying. The Victim told
the teaching assistant about issues “with her familial relationships,” and
“made a statement about Sebastian [Van Camp] using her for sex.” Id. at
12-13. The teaching assistant did not know Van Camp but reported this
information to Childline.
Olivia Baumgarten (“Baumgarten”), a forensic interviewer at the Child
Advocacy Center at Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, testified to the following.
In April 2023, she conducted a video-recorded forensic interview of the Victim,
then fourteen years old. The Commonwealth played the video of the Victim’s
interview, while Baumgarten answered questions about it. While the trial
transcript does not include transcription of what the Victim stated in the
interview, Baumgarten confirmed the Victim said the sexual contact occurred
at Van Camp’s home and “the swimming hole.” N.T., 12/4/23, at 65.
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Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Eric Thompson (“Trooper
Thompson”) testified to the following. He received the Childline report
concerning the Victim. He observed the Victim’s forensic interview through a
“mirrored glass,” but was not in the room with the Victim and Baumgarten.
N.T., 12/4/23, at 69. Trooper Thompson also interviewed Van Camp at the
PSP barracks. The Commonwealth played a video of this interview while
Trooper Thompson answered questions about it. In the video, Van Camp
stated he and the Victim “were dating,” and he had “penis/vagina intercourse”
and oral sex with the Victim, and it occurred in the garage and “a swimming
hole” behind the high school. Id. at 72-73. Van Camp estimated he had
vaginal intercourse with the Victim “probably more than five” times but he
“wasn’t sure if it was more than” ten. Id. at 74.
Van Camp did not testify or present any evidence. The jury found him
guilty of: (1) two counts of rape of a child; (2) two counts of statutory sexual
assault; (3) five counts of indecent assault;4 and (5) one count of corruption
of minors.5
4 Three counts of indecent assault were under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7) (complainant is less than thirteen years of age), and two counts were under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(8) (complainant is less than sixteen years of age and is not married to the defendant, who is four or more years older). Additionally, the jury found Van Camp not guilty of four counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child and a person less than sixteen years of age.
5 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(a)(1), 3126(a)(7)-(8), 6301(a)(1)(ii).
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Nine days later, on December 14, 2023, Van Camp entered a negotiated
guilty plea at the second trial docket, CP-42-CR-0000266-2023 (“Docket
266”). The Commonwealth averred that for the first count, possession of child
pornography, Van Camp possessed and viewed 312 images and videos of
prepubescent children that depicted indecent contact. The Commonwealth
averred that for a second count of possession of child pornography, Van Camp
possessed and viewed 933 images and videos, which did not depict indecent
contact. The dates for these offenses were December 2022 through March
2023. In exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth withdrew other charges.
The trial court ordered an SVP assessment at both dockets and
conducted an SVP hearing.6 The Commonwealth presented Brenda Manno
(“Manno”), a board member of the Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Assessment
Board (“SOAB”), as an expert in the field of sexual offender assessments. She
testified to the following. Van Camp did not submit to an interview with her.
Nevertheless, Manno considered: the facts at both dockets; that Van Camp
“had both hands-off victims [in] the pornography charges, and a hands-on
victim with the female adolescent;” and the approximate time span of “a year
where he has engaged in two separate deviant sexual acts involving children.”
6 Additionally, Van Camp’s rape and statutory sexual assault convictions are
Tier III offenses, requiring lifetime registration under SORNA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(2)(3), 9799.15(a)(3). His convictions of indecent assault, corruption of minors, and sexual abuse of children (including possession of child pornography), are Tier I offenses, requiring fifteen years’ registration. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(b)(6), (8)-(9), 9799.15(a)(1).
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N.T., 5/17/24, at 13, 15. Manno opined that: Van Camp met the diagnostic
criteria for unspecified paraphilic disorder; he was “more likely than not to
engage in this same type of behavior in the future;” and thus he met the
classification for an SVP. Id. at 14, 16-17. Subsequently, on June 25, 2024,
the trial court determined Van Camp was an SVP.
On August 29, 2024, the trial court conducted sentencing for both
dockets together. At Docket 267, the trial court imposed the following
sentences: (1) two terms of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment, for the two
counts of rape of a child, to run consecutively; (2) one to two years’
imprisonment, for corruption of minors, to run concurrently; and (3) additional
terms for the corruption of minors and indecent assault convictions, all to run
concurrently. At Docket 266, for the two counts of possession of child
pornography, the court imposed: (1) two to four years’ imprisonment, also to
run consecutively; and (2) one to two years’ imprisonment, to run
concurrently. The trial court also imposed a term of three years’ probation,
to run consecutively.7 Van Camp’s aggregate imprisonment term was thus
7 In its August 29, 2024 sentencing order, the trial court did not specify to which conviction the three years’ probation sentence applied. Instead, the order merely stated: “Pursuant to applicable legal authority, [Van Camp] is also required to undergo a period of three . . . years of consecutive probation following this sentence.” Order, 8/29/24, at unnumbered 2 (emphasis added).
While the trial court did not cite the “applicable legal authority” for this probation sentence, we note that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.5(a) provides:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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twenty-two to forty-four years, with a consecutive probation term of three
years.
On September 4, 2024, the trial court amended its sentencing order to
clarify that it imposed no further penalty on the two statutory sexual assault
counts at Docket 267. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (providing that “a court upon
notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within [thirty] days . . .
if no appeal from such order has been taken”); see also Commonwealth v.
Wenzel, 248 A.3d 540, 545 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining that “in cases
where the trial court amends the judgment of sentence . . . pursuant to
Section 5505, the direct appeal lies from the amended judgment of
sentence”).
Van Camp then filed a timely post-sentence motion, which: (1) argued
he was twenty-three years old and had a prior record score of “0;” and (2)
A person who is convicted in a court of this Commonwealth of an offense under section 9799.14(d) (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) shall be sentenced to a mandatory period of probation of three years consecutive to and in addition to any other lawful sentence issued by the court.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.5(a) (emphasis added).
Here, Van Camp incurred four convictions of offenses under Section 9799.14(d): two counts of rape of a child and two counts of statutory sexual assault. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(2)-(3). As we discuss infra, the trial court imposed no further penalty on the statutory sexual assault convictions. It thus appears the trial court imposed the three years’ probation on one of the rape counts, although the record does not indicate which.
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requested the trial court run his two rape sentences concurrently, rather than
consecutively. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing.
Van Camp then filed separate, timely notices of appeal at each docket.8
In response to the trial court’s order to file Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements of
errors complained of on appeal, Attorney Clabaugh filed statements, at each
docket, presenting the issues Van Camp wished to pursue, but also stating
counsel intended to file an Anders petition to withdraw and brief. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) (stating that counsel, who intends to seek to withdrawal,
shall file a statement of intent to withdraw). The trial court has filed Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinions at both trial dockets.
This Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals. As stated above,
Attorney Clabaugh has filed in this Court a petition to withdraw from
representation and an Anders brief.
“Before we address the merits of this appeal, we must determine
whether counsel has complied with the procedures provided in Anders and
its progeny,” including Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009). Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 270 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(en banc). This Court has explained:
Counsel who wishes to withdraw must file a petition to withdraw stating that he or she has made a conscientious examination of ____________________________________________
8 See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) (stating that when “one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeals must be filed”).
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the record and determined that the appeal would be frivolous. Also, counsel must provide a copy of the Anders brief to the appellant and inform him of his right to proceed pro se or retain different counsel.
The substance of the Anders brief must “(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.” [Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.]
Id. at 270 (some citations omitted). If counsel’s brief complies with the above
requirements, this Court then conducts “a full examination” of the record “to
decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Id. at 271 (citation omitted). If
we similarly conclude the appeal is frivolous, we may grant counsel’s petition
to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence. See id.
Here, in the Anders brief, Attorney Clabaugh provides procedural and
factual histories for both trial dockets with citations to the record, discusses
the issues arguably supporting the appeal, and explains why he concluded the
issues were frivolous. See Anders Brief at 12-17, 29-44. In his petition to
withdraw, Attorney Clabaugh states: he reviewed the record and transcripts
and believes there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal; he provided a copy
of the motion and Anders brief to Van Camp; and he sent Van Camp a letter,
advising him of his right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, and raise
any points he deems meritorious. Attorney Clabaugh has also provided a copy
of this letter to Van Camp. We thus determine Attorney Clabaugh has
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substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago, and
proceed to independently review the record to determine whether the appeal
is frivolous. See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 270-71.
In the Anders brief, Attorney Clabaugh identifies the following issues
for our review:
1. At [Docket 267], was there sufficient evidence presented at the time of trial to support a verdict of guilty for Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and[] 14?
2. At [Docket 266] and [Docket 267], did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence in these matters?
3. At [Docket 266] and [Docket 267], did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that [Van Camp] be classified as [an SVP] following hearing on that issue?
Anders Brief at 11 (unnecessary capitalization omitted and issues reordered).
The first issue in the Anders brief is whether the evidence was sufficient
to support all of Van Camp’s jury convictions at Docket 267.9 We consider the
applicable standard of review:
9 The trial court suggests that Van Camp has waived his sufficiency claim, for
failure to identify with specificity the challenged elements of the offenses in the Rule 1925(b) statement. See Trial Court Opinion, Docket 267, 11/26/24, at 3. The trial court aptly points out that “in order to preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) concise statement must state with specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient or against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2020).
However, this Court has reasoned: “Nevertheless, when presented with an Anders brief and a petition to withdraw, this Court has a duty to (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
[A] solitary witness’s testimony may establish every element of a crime, assuming that it speaks to each element, directly and/or by rational inference.
As to the content of a victim’s testimony, this Court has repeatedly indicated that such testimony, if believed by the fact-finder, may be sufficient to establish all the elements of a sexual offense.
Id. at 479 (emphases omitted). See also Commonwealth v. McDonough,
96 A.3d 1067, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “[t]he uncorroborated
testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient
to convict a defendant”).
independently review the record to determine whether, in fact, the appeal is wholly frivolous, despite the deficient framing of the issue in the [Rule 1925(b)] concise statement.” Cox, 231 A.3d at 1016 (some citations omitted). Accordingly, we decline to find waiver of Van Camp’s sufficiency issues in this appeal.
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The Pennsylvania Crimes Code10 defines the offense of rape of a child
as the engagement “in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than
[thirteen] years of age.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c). A person commits statutory
sexual assault “when that person engages in sexual intercourse with a
complainant to whom the person is not married who is under the age of
[sixteen] years and that person is . . . four years older but less than eight
years older than the complainant[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(a)(1). The
Crimes Code defines sexual intercourse as follows: “In addition to its ordinary
meaning, includes intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration
however slight; emission is not required.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
With respect to indecent assault, the jury found Van Camp guilty of three
counts under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7) and two counts under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3126(a)(8). Those subsections state:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and:
****
(7) the complainant is less than [thirteen] years of age; or
(8) the complainant is less than [sixteen] years of age and the person is four or more years older than the
10 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-9546.
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complainant and the complainant and the person are not married to each other.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)-(8). The Crimes Code defines indecent contact as
“[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3101.
Finally, the Crimes Code defines corruption of minors, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Whoever, being of the age of [eighteen] years and upwards, by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than [eighteen] years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter 31 commits a felony of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). In interpreting the meaning of Subsection
6301(a)(1)(ii), this Court has determined the phrase, “course of conduct,”
“imposes a requirement of multiple acts over time.” Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2014). Additionally, rape of a child,
statutory sexual assault, and indecent assault are all sexual offenses
appearing in Chapter 31. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3122.1(a), 3126(a).
On appeal, Attorney Clabaugh reasons the trial evidence was sufficient
to support Van Camp’s two convictions each of rape of a child and statutory
sexual assault. In support, Attorney Clabaugh cites the Victim’s testimony
that she had sex with Van Camp, then eighteen and nineteen years old, more
than ten times, describing that his penis was in her vagina; and she had sex
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with him from the time she was eleven years old to twelve years old. Attorney
Clabaugh also points to Trooper Thompson’s testimony, that Van Camp
confessed to having vaginal intercourse with the Victim in his garage and near
the swimming hole behind the high school. Attorney Clabaugh reasons this
same evidence showed indecent contact, establishing Van Camp’s five
convictions of indecent assault. Finally, Attorney Clabaugh contends the
evidence was sufficient to support corruption of minors, where Van Camp
engaged in a course of conduct, which corrupted her morals through the
commission of Chapter 31 sexual offenses.
In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s discussion
is similar to Attorney Clabaugh’s, above. First, the trial court opined the
evidence was sufficient to establish two counts of rape of a child, where the
Victim testified she and Van Camp had “sex” and Van Camp’s penis penetrated
her vagina, mouth, and rectum. Trial Court Opinion, Docket 267, 11/26/24,
at 4. Second, the court reasoned this same testimony, along with the
evidence that Van Camp and the Victim were not married, were sufficient to
establish the two counts of statutory sexual assault. Third, the court found
the evidence sufficient to show indecent contact, supporting the five counts of
indecent assault. Finally, the court found the evidence supported the
convictions of corruption of minors, where Van Camp engaged in a course of
conduct of sexual intercourse with the Victim, in violation of Chapter 31.
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Based upon our review of the record, we determine the trial evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to
support all of Van Camp’s jury convictions. See Johnson, 180 A.3d at 478.
As the trial court and Attorney Clabaugh discussed, the Victim gave
uncontradicted testimony that she and Van Camp had vaginal intercourse
more than ten times, as well as oral sex and anal sex, over the course of two
years when she was eleven and twelve years old and Van Camp was eighteen
and nineteen. Van Camp and the Victim were not married. This evidence,
alone, was sufficient to support the convictions of rape (sexual intercourse
with a complainant less than thirteen years of age) and statutory sexual
assault (sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age of sixteen, to
whom the person, four to eight years older, is not married). See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 3121(c), 3122.1(a)(1); see also Johnson, 180 A.3d at 479.
Nonetheless, we note the Commonwealth also showed the video of the
Victim’s forensic interview, in which she made statements consistent with her
trial testimony, as well as the video of Van Camp’s PSP interview, in which he
admitted he and the Victim had sexual intercourse. Additionally, the
testimony of the forensic interviewer, Baumgarten, and Trooper Thompson
corroborated the above videos.
This same evidence above also supported the jury’s convictions of
indecent assault, as it showed Van Camp had indecent contact with the Victim,
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or touched the Victim’s sexual parts for arousing or gratifying sexual desire.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3101, 3126(a)(7)-(8).
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to establish corruption of minors,
where the Commonwealth showed Van Camp engaged in a course of conduct,
or multiple acts, of committing violations of Chapter 31 — namely rape of a
child, statutory sexual assault, and indecent assault — which corrupted or
tended to corrupt the Victim’s morals. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii); see
also Kelly, 102 A.3d at 1031. For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
Van Camp’s first issue is wholly frivolous.
The second issue in counsel’s Anders brief is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing an aggregate sentence of twenty-two to
forty-four years’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ probation. This
issue goes to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. This Court has
explained:
It is well-settled that “the right to appeal [the] discretionary aspect[s] of [a] sentence is not absolute.” Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, we should regard his[, or her,] appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal. . . .
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his[, or her,] sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
. . . (1) whether [the] appellant [] filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4)
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whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
We evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the appropriateness of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Dove, 301 A.3d 427, 435-36 (Pa. Super. 2023) (some
citations omitted).
Here, Van Camp filed a timely post-sentence motion, challenging the
consecutive nature of his two rape sentences and arguing he was twenty-three
years old and had no prior record score. Van Camp also filed timely notices
of appeal. See Dove, 301 A.3d at 435-36. Attorney Clabaugh’s Anders brief
does not include “a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance
of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence,” which
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) requires. See id. However, when counsel has filed an
Anders brief and petition to withdraw, the lack of this statement does not
preclude our review. See Commonwealth v. Blango, 327 A.3d 670, 678
(Pa. Super. 2024).
Thus, we review whether Van Camp’s challenge to the consecutive
nature of his sentences raises a substantial question. This Court has stated:
It is well-established that “Pennsylvania law affords the [trial] court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.” [S]ee also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) (stating that, a trial court may order sentences to run consecutively or concurrently). “Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.”
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Id. at 436-37 (some citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v.
Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337-38 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating “the imposition of
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a substantial
question in only ‘the most extreme circumstances, such as where the
aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and
the length of imprisonment’”). “In addition, this Court repeatedly has held
that ‘a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise
a substantial question for our review.’” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 257
A.3d 75, 79 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted).
Attorney Clabaugh contends that a challenge to the consecutive nature
of sentences, alone, does not raise a substantial question. Thus, he contends,
this issue is wholly frivolous for appeal.
The trial court construed Van Camp’s claim to be that it failed to consider
mitigating factors. The court then found such an issue did not raise a
substantial question. In the alternative, the trial court opined that no relief
would be due, as the aggregate maximum sentences on the two rape counts
equaled twenty years, merely half the possible maximum of forty years’
imprisonment. See Trial Court Opinion, Docket 267, 11/26/24, at 13. The
trial court also considered the Victim’s testimony showing Van Camp raped
her on more than occasion, and found “[t]he sentence was commensurate
with the facts of the case, namely that an adult established a relationship with
an [eleven]-year-old child and used that relationship to engage in sexual
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acts.” Id. The trial court thus found “consecutive sentence[s were]
warranted.” Id.
Based on our review, we similarly conclude that neither of Van Camp’s
sentencing claims — that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences or failing to consider mitigating factors — raises a
substantial question. See Blango, 327 A.3d at 436-37; see also Crawford,
257 A.3d at 79; Swope, 123 A.3d at 337-38. Thus, on the record before us,
we conclude that Van Camp’s second issue is wholly frivolous.11
The final issue in counsel’s Anders brief is whether the evidence was
sufficient, at both trial dockets, to support the trial court’s finding that Van
Camp is an SVP. We consider the applicable standard of review:
A challenge to a trial court’s SVP designation presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP designation requires the reviewing court to accept the undiminished record of the case in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. The reviewing court must examine all of the Commonwealth’s evidence without consideration of its admissibility. . . . “We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been satisfied.”
11 We note the certified record on appeal did not include the notes of testimony
of the August 29, 2024, sentencing hearing. Upon informal inquiry by this panel, the trial court confirmed that none was produced. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 8 (arguing that Van Camp did not obtain the sentencing transcript and this “should result in waiver of the merits”). However, as we have determined Van Camp does not raise a substantial question invoking our review, we do not reach the merits of his sentencing claims.
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Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(citations and footnote omitted).
Under Subchapter H of SORNA, the SOAB must assess an individual
convicted of a sexually violent offense12 “to determine if [they] should be
classified as” an SVP. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b). SORNA defines an SVP as
“[a]n individual who committed [an enumerated] sexually violent offense . . .
who is determined to be [an SVP] under section 9799.24 (relating to
assessments) due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (definitions). The Act defines “predatory” as “[a]n act
directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been
initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to
facilitate or support victimization.” Id.
Section 9799.24(b) provides:
An assessment shall include, but not be limited to, an examination of the following:
(1) Facts of the current offense, including:
(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense.
(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim. ____________________________________________
12 Indecent assault, corruption of minors, possession of child pornography, rape, and statutory sexual assault are enumerated sexually violent offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.12, 9799.14(b)(6), (8)-(9), (d)(2)-(3).
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(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.
(v) Age of the victim.
(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.
(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
(2) Prior offense history, including:
(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.
(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders.
(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Use of illegal drugs.
(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.
(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual’s conduct.
(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4).
This Court has explained:
The trial court’s inquiry at an SVP hearing is different from the SOAB’s assessment. Whereas the SOAB member must consider the fifteen factors listed in section 9799.24(b), the trial court must determine whether the Commonwealth has proven by clear and
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convincing evidence that the defendant is an individual who has “a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.”
Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-79 (citations omitted).
An “SOAB expert opinion falls within the general rules regarding expert
witnesses.” Id. at 778 (citations omitted).
[An] SOAB expert’s opinion may be based on facts or data that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed so long as experts in the particular field reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject; the facts or data consulted need not be admissible for the expert’s opinion to be admitted.
Id. at 781 (citation omitted). An SOAB expert may “consider more than the
limited facts included in a plea colloquy, [including] records provided by state,
county and local agencies, offices and entities[.]” Id. at 782. Such
documents include an “affidavit of probable cause, criminal information,
criminal complaint, preliminary hearing transcript, and [any] investigative
reports prepared by Child Protective Services.” Id. at 781.
Attorney Clabaugh suggests Van Camp’s sufficiency challenge to his SVP
determination is frivolous. Counsel cites Manno’s testimony that she
reviewed: the records at both trial dockets, including the age of the Victim
and Van Camp’s telling her that he was in love with her; the dates of Van
Camp’s offenses; the facts that there were multiple victims, including “hands-
off victims [in] the pornography charges[] and a hands-on victim with the
female adolescent;” and the lack of displays of unusual cruelty and lack of
exceeding the means necessary to achieve the offenses. Anders Brief at 38.
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Attorney Clabaugh thus states the record supported Manno’s unchallenged
opinion that Van Camp met the criteria for an SVP.
Similarly, the trial court cited Manno’s consideration of: the fact there
were multiple victims; “[t]he nature of the sexual contact being both ‘hands
off’ and ‘hands on;’” Van Camp’s commission of the crimes at both dockets
“[i]n the same short time span;” the ages of the Victim and the victims in the
child pornography images; and Van Camp’s admission to police that he was
“addicted to child porn.” Trial Court Opinion, Docket 267, 11/26/24, at 9-10.
The trial court also “heavily weight[ed] Manno’s opinion that [Van Camp] was
predatory,” where he established a relationship with her when she was a minor
and commenced sexual conduct when she was eleven and twelve years old,
and he was nineteen. Id. at 10. The trial court thus credited Manno’s opinion
that Van Camp was an SVP.
After review of the record, we determine the record evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supported the trial court’s
determination that Van Camp is an SVP. See Aumick, 297 A.3d at 776-77.
Manno properly considered the statutory SVP factors at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). As both Attorney Claubaugh and the trial court
discussed, Manno testified that: Van Camp’s offenses included multiple
victims, both “hands-on” and “hands-off;” between December 2019 and
December 2021, he engaged in vaginal intercourse with the eleven- and
twelve-year old Victim, telling “her that he was in love with her;” and between
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December 2022 and March 2023, he possessed more than 1,100 images or
videos depicting child pornography. N.T., 5/17/24, at 12-13. Manno also
considered Van Camp’s age. Relevantly, Manno found there was: no display
of unusual cruelty; no indication that the Victim had decreased mental
capacity; and no prior criminal offenses or illegal drug use in Van Camp’s
history.
Manno also explained: “[T]he DSM 5 indicates that to meet the diagnosis
for a paraphilia, there has to be a period of at least six months with recurrent,
intense, sexually arousing fantasies, urges or behaviors involving non-
consenting adults[ or] children.” Id. at 15. Manno then considered that
between the two trial dockets, there was “approximately a year where [Van
Camp] engaged in two separate deviant sexual acts involving children.” Id.
The record supported Manno’s opinions that Van Camp met the diagnostic
criteria for unspecified paraphilic disorder and that he was “more likely than
not to engage in this type of behavior in the future.” Id. at 16.
With respect to predatory behavior, Manno properly testified that
SORNA’s definition of predatory “as an act [sic] directed at a stranger, or a
person with whom a relationship was initiated, established, maintained, or
promoted in whole or in part in order to facilitate or support victimization.”
Id. at 17; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Manno opined that Van Camp
met this criterion, where he “established a relationship with [a] child when
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she was a minor and moved that relationship into the sexual realm on more
than one occasion.” N.T., 5/17/24, at 17.
In light of the foregoing, we determine the record supported the trial
court’s determination that Van Camp met the statutory criteria for an SVP.
Van Camp committed a sexually violent offense, as defined in SORNA, and the
Commonwealth presented Manno’s expert opinion that he suffered from a
mental abnormality that made him likely to engage in predatory sexually
violent offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Accordingly, we conclude that
Van Camp’s final issue is wholly frivolous.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine there are no non-frivolous
issues for appeal. Thus, we grant Attorney Clabaugh’s petition to withdraw
and affirm Van Camp’s judgments of sentence.
Application to withdraw granted. Judgments of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 5/28/2025
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