Com. v. Staten, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 31, 2024
• Docket: 226 MDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S35021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MALCOLM APRANISE STATEN : : Appellant : No. 226 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000772-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: JANUARY 31, 2024

Malcolm Apranise Staten appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his jury convictions for conspiracy to commit simple assault,

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and riot. 1 We

affirm.

The trial court properly summarized the factual and procedural history,

and we adopt and incorporate its summary. See Rule 1925(a) Op., filed

5/9/23, at 1-4. Staten’s convictions arise from an assault on his former

girlfriend. He committed the assault along with three females, two of whom

were his sisters.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(a), 2702(a)(1), and 5501(1), respectively. J-S35021-23

Following a jury trial, Staten was found guilty of all charges and the

court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 92 months to 184 months’

incarceration. Staten filed a post-sentence motion that the trial court denied.

This timely appeal followed.

Staten raises the following issues before this Court, which we have

reordered for ease of discussion:

I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 2: 18 § 903 Conspiracy – Simple Assault when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] had an agreement with the other Co- Defendants to commit a crime?

II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 2: 18 § 903 Conspiracy – Simple Assault when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] had an agreement with the other Co- Defendants to cause bodily injury to the victim.

III. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 5: 18 § 2702 §§ A1 – Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] had an agreement with the other Co-Defendants to commit a crime?

IV. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 5: 18 § 2702 §§ A1 – Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward causing serious bodily injury to Fawn Baer?

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V. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 5: 18 § 2702 §§ A1- Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten’s] conduct in this regard was intentional?

VI. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 3: 18 § 2702 §§ A1 – Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] acted with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense of Aggravated Assault?

VII. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 3: 18 § 2702 §§ A1 – Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] solicited, commanded, encouraged, or requested the other person to commit it; or aided, agreed to aid, or attempted to aid the other person in planning or committing it?

VIII. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 3: 18 § 2702 §§ A1- Aggravated Assault- Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt attempted to cause serious bodily injury to Fawn Baer?

IX. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for Count 4: 18 § 5501 §§ 1 - Riot when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Staten] “participated” with two or more other persons in a course of disorderly conduct.

X. Was the verdict on Count 2: 18 § 903 Conspiracy – Simple Assault against the weight of the evidence

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such as to shock one’s sense of justice and making the award of a new trial imperative?

XI. Was the verdict on Count 3: 18 § 2702 §§ A1 – Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference against the weight of the evidence such as to shock one’s sense of justice and making the award of a new trial imperative?

XII. Was the verdict on Count 4: 18 § 5501 §§ 1 – Riot against the weight of the evidence such as to shock one’s sense of justice and making the award of a new trial imperative?

XIII. Was the verdict on Count 5: 18 § 2702 §§ A1 – Aggravated Assault – Attempts to cause [serious bodily injury] or causes injury with extreme indifference against the weight of the evidence such as to shock one’s sense of justice and making the award of a new trial imperative?

XIV. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in allowing Dr. Maserati to testify when his testimony did not relate to the charge of conspiracy, did not relate to the charge of aggravated assault-attempted serious bodily injury and did not relate to the charge of riot when the jury was not charged with finding whether or not [Staten] caused a serious bodily injury?

Staten’s Br. at 4-6 (renumbered, suggested answers omitted).2

In our discussion, we address Staten’s issues in groups. Issues one

through nine are addressed under the heading, “Sufficiency of the Evidence.”

2 Staten’s brief fails to conform with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) because the argument

section is not divided into as many sections as there are questions presented. Nonetheless, we will review his claims since this defect does not substantially impair our review. See Thompson v. Thompson, 187 A.3d 259, 263 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2018) (declining to quash appeal where the content of appellant’s brief violated Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)).

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Issues 10 through 13 are addressed under “Weight of the Evidence.” Issue 14

is addressed under “Admissibility of Evidence.”

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Staten challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each of his

convictions. We address each separately.

Our standard of review is as follows:

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the crime charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 484 (Pa.Super. 2019). “The

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id.

at 484-85 (citation omitted).

Conspiracy to Commit Simple Assault

Staten maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he had an agreement with his co-defendants to commit

a crime or to cause injury to the victim. He alleges that the evidence shows

that he did not know that Angela, his sister’s friend, was at the scene or that

he had any contact with his sister, Shakira, before the assault. He also claims

that he tried to leave the scene and did not “participate or assist in the fight.”

Staten’s Br. at 14.

The crime of conspiracy is defined as follows:

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A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

***

(e) Overt act.--No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). An overt act is “an act done in furtherance of the object

of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 A.3d 28, 34 (Pa. 2014).

Simple assault, the underlying crime at issue, occurs when a person “attempts

to cause, or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes, bodily injury to

another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

“[A] conspiracy may be inferred where it is demonstrated that the

relation, conduct, or circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts of the

co-conspirators sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal confederation.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation

omitted). “Even if the conspirator did not act as a principal in committing the

underlying crime, he is still criminally liable for the actions of his co-

conspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. (citation omitted).

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Here, the trial court determined that the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit simple assault.

Taken in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it is reasonable for a jury to infer Malcolm had an agreement with his sisters and their friend, Angela, to confront [the victim] on Washington Street and conclude [Staten] acted in furtherance of an assault on [the victim]. . . .

The jury heard testimony of the communication between [Staten] and Laketta and their agreement to meet on Washington Street, the convergence of all Co-Defendant[s’] vehicles on Washington Street, and Shives’ testimony that [Staten] actively prevented him from getting involved in the [i]ncident. The jury concluded that [Staten] had an agreement with at least one Co-Defendant and took an active role in allowing the assault on [the victim] to occur.

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 8, 9. We agree and, after reviewing the briefs, record,

and trial court’s opinion, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

See id. at 5-9.

Aggravated Assault and Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Assault

Staten alleges that the Commonwealth failed to “prove the existence of

a conspiracy” and failed to show that he “intended to cause injury that would

create a substantial risk of death or that would cause serious, permanent, or

protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”

Staten’s Br. at 25.

As previously stated, to prove a criminal conspiracy the Commonwealth

must show: 1) an agreement; 2) shared criminal intent; and 3) an overt act.

See Johnson, 180 A.3d at 479. The underlying crime of aggravated assault

occurs when a person “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or

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causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(1). “A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element

of an offense when . . . it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that

nature or to cause such a result . . . .” Id. at § 302(b)(1)(i).

Intent to cause serious bodily injury may be proven with direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254,

1257 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). A defendant’s intent to cause serious

bodily injury may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the attack.

See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. 1978). These

include: 1) whether the defendant “was disproportionately larger or stronger

than the victim”; 2) whether the defendant “was . . . restrained from

escalating his attack upon the victim”; 3) whether the defendant had a weapon

or “other implement to aid his attack”; and 4) any statements made by the

defendant “before, during, or after the attack which might indicate his intent

to inflict further injury upon the victim.” Id.

The victim testified that Staten’s sisters pulled her out of her vehicle by

her legs, causing her to hit her head on the ground. The women began

assaulting the victim and the victim said the beating only stopped when she

heard Staten say something to the women and “they got off her[.]” N.T., Trial,

6/7/22, (Day 2), at 48-49. She also testified that when she heard sirens, her

assailants left the scene.

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This evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that Staten entered into

an agreement with his co-defendants to injure the victim and acted in

furtherance of that goal by showing up at the victim’s location and then fleeing

with his co-defendants from the location after hearing police sirens. Viewed in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to

support the charge of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. See

Commonwealth v. Poland, 26 A.3d 518, 519–20, 523 (Pa.Super. 2011)

(finding evidence sufficient to prove conspiracy to commit aggravated assault

where defendant and others approached the victim as a group; kicked victim

to the ground and continued to punch and kick the victim, knocking out a

tooth; and fled the scene together); Commonwealth v. French, 578 A.2d

1292, 1294 (Pa.Super. 1990) (finding evidence sufficient to prove conspiracy

to commit aggravated assault where defendant, defendant’s boyfriend,

defendant’s sister, and the sister’s boyfriend approached the victim together,

knocked the victim to the ground, continued to beat the victim).

Staten also claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

intended to commit an aggravated assault or serious bodily injury. He claims

the evidence shows that he was trying to “calm people down” and that the

fight started because of the victim’s reckless driving. Staten’s Br. at 13. He

notes that at some point during the incident, he returned to his vehicle and

directed the driver to pull to the side of the road.

Staten’s aggravated assault conviction was based on the theory of

accomplice liability. Accomplice liability is defined, in relevant part:

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A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or (2) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it . . . .

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c). “Accomplice liability requires only aid, not an

agreement.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 95 (Pa.Super. 2019).

“[A] shared criminal intent between the principal and his accomplice may be

inferred from a defendant’s words or conduct or from the attendant

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 969 (Pa. 2019). Mere

presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient. See Commonwealth v.

Adams, 39 A.3d 310, 324 (Pa.Super. 2012).

Here the court determined that the evidence sufficiently established

Staten’s liability as an accomplice and as such determined that his conviction

for aggravated assault was sufficiently supported by the evidence.

We find it reasonable for the jury to find [Staten] either gathered or agreed to aid his Co-Defendants in the Washington Street Incident. [Staten] was the only participant who knew [the victim’s] location and shared it with at least one Co-Defendant. T.P., 6/14/22 at p. 33. [Staten] had at least one verbal altercation with Barbour and [the victim] earlier in the day that resulted in him threatening them both. T.P., 6/7/22 at p. 24 and T.P., 6/9/22 at p. 9. He was the only Co-Defendant who had any disagreement with [the victim] prior to the [i]ncident.

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 13.

The court further concluded that the evidence showed Staten prevented

a witness from intervening in the fight and that Staten never called the police.

Additionally, once Staten and his co-defendants heard police sirens, they all

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drove away from the scene. At no point during the assault did Staten attempt

to stop his sisters and their friend from assaulting the victim or try to aid the

victim, while his sisters kicked and punched her in the head and torso. See

N.T., Trial, (Day 2), at 49, 50. Furthermore, the victim testified that the

assault did not stop until Staten “said something” to her attackers. See id. at

48-49. The evidence was sufficient to sustain this conviction.

Riot

Staten claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he “engaged in fighting or threatening, or violent or

tumultuous behavior” when he blocked the victim’s car and stopped the other

vehicles in the middle of the street. Staten’s Br. at 21-22. He also maintains

that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he “acted with intent to commit

or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor.” Id. at 22. He argues

that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he took a substantial step towards

causing serious bodily injury to the victim or that his conduct was intentional.

Additionally, he alleges that there was no evidence that he directed anyone,

verbally or otherwise, to attack the victim.

A person is guilty of riot if the person “participates with two or more

others in a course of disorderly conduct: . . . with intent to commit or facilitate

the commission of a felony or misdemeanor[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501(1). To

prove that the defendant engaged in disorderly conduct, the Commonwealth

must show that the defendant “with intent to cause public inconvenience,

annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, . . . engage[d] in

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fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior[.]” Id. at §

5503(a)(1).

Since we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of the felony crime

of aggravated assault, the only question that remains is whether Staten

engaged in disorderly conduct with two or more individuals. Here, the trial

court determined that “[t]aking the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth establishes [Staten’s] participation in a course of activity

which constituted disorderly conduct” and that he committed his additional

crimes with his three co-defendants. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 17. The court made

note of the following evidence:

The testimony of [the victim], Barbour, Shives, Stull, and [Staten] all corroborate that [Staten] was present on Washington Street when the [i]ncident occurred. In addition to the [i]ncident occurring in broad daylight and in the middle of a borough neighborhood and public street, the [i]ncident interfered with the flow of traffic. T.P., 6/10/22 at p. 8-9, T.P., 6/7/22 at p. 2220-222, T.P., 6/9/22 at p. 24- 25. The [v]ideo shows an uninvolved motorist had to maneuver around the vehicles blocking [the victim’s] car. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 00:00:25. Onlookers who observed the [i]ncident were worried about the child in the rear seat of [the victim’s] car. T.P., 6/7/22 at p. 221 and T.P., 6/10/22 at p. 4. While there is no evidence presented that [Staten] took an active role in striking [the victim] or her vehicle, [Staten] prevented at least one bystander from approaching the scene of the [i]ncident to assist [the victim] and [Staten] was yelling at [the victim’s] vehicle along with Co-Defendants. T.P., 6/10/22 at p. 4-5. These actions disrupted peace and dignity in the community and created a level of public unruliness which meets the definition of disorderly conduct.

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Id. at 16. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court and affirm on

this basis. See Rule 1925(a) Op. at 14-17.

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

In his weight argument, Staten maintains that “[t]he evidence on all

counts is so weak and inconclusive” and that the Commonwealth’s witnesses

and evidence “were inconsistent and incredible.” Staten’s Br. at 26.3 He notes

specific inconsistencies in the Commonwealth witness’s testimony and

maintains that the victim and another witness “testified to a wild and fantastic

chase,” and claims that their testimony was “completely unreliable.” Id.

Staten suggests that his testimony in comparison to the Commonwealth’s

evidence was credible, truthful, and accurate.

When reviewing a weight challenge, we review the trial court’s discretion

“in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 192 A.3d 1149, 1152 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

Assessing the weight of the evidence is within the exclusive purview of the

fact-finder, “who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to

determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court determined that the jury, as fact-finder, could

resolve any inconsistencies, was free to accept the Commonwealth’s witness’s ____________________________________________

3 Staten challenges the weight of the evidence “on all counts.” Staten’s Br. at

26. However, as the trial court concluded, any challenge to the count of aggravated assault is waived for failure to raise it in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement . . . are waived”); Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 3/1/23; Rule 1925(a) Op. at 18 n.8.

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testimony and afford the proper weight to any evidence of bias on the part of

the witnesses. After reviewing the briefs, record, and trial court’s opinion, we

affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See Rule 1925(a) Op. at 18-

22. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury’s verdict

did not shock its conscience.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

In his final claim, Staten maintains that the trial court erred when it

allowed Dr. Maserati to testify regarding his treatment of the victim. He also

claims that Dr. Maserati’s “testimony, use of spinal models and diagnosis of

the victim were all highly prejudicial” and “tended to inflame the jury into

making a decision based on something other than the legal proposition

relevant to the case[.]” Staten’s Br. at 31. He notes that Dr. Maserati was not

qualified as an expert witness and did not testify as to the cause of the victim’s

injuries. As such, he maintains that the doctor’s testimony was “wholly

irrelevant and served only to prejudice [Staten].” Id. at 29. He further claims

his testimony was irrelevant because it was not related to the charges of

conspiracy, aggravated assault, or riot.

The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the court and will

only be reversed upon an abuse of that discretion. See Commonwealth v.

Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1081 (Pa.Super. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs

when the court’s “judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is

not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,

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prejudice, bias or ill will.” Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 284

(Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

The trial court found this claim meritless because Staten failed to make

a timely objection to Dr. Maserati’s testimony. We agree. See Rule 1925(a)

Op. at 22-29. As the trial court pointed out, Staten did not lodge a relevancy

objection until after Dr. Maserati had given a significant amount of testimony

about his medical experience and employment, the surgery he performed on

the victim, the scans and imaging that he ordered and reviewed, and each of

the visits he had with the victim. Furthermore, Staten did not object at trial

that Dr. Maserati’s “testimony, use of spinal models and diagnosis of the

victim,” “tended to inflame the jury[.]” Therefore, this issue is waived. See

N.T., 6/8/22, (Day 3), at 77-95; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v.

Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1145 (Pa.Super. 2017). We affirm the judgment

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/31/2024

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