J-S34022-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYLER JACOB SPINKS : : Appellant : No. 547 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-50-CR-0000127-2018
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 26, 2025
Tyler Jacob Spinks (“Spinks”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed for his direct and technical violations of probation, asserting the
revocation court did not consider his time served and should have allowed him
to serve his sentence locally rather than in a State Correctional Institution.
We affirm.
The facts relevant to Spinks’s claim are as follows. In January 2019,
Spinks entered a guilty plea to statutory sexual assault, a felony of the second
degree. The court imposed a sentence of eleven and one-half to twenty-three
months of incarceration and two years of consecutive probation. Spinks
violated his probation; in October 2021, the court resentenced him to a term
of five to twenty-three and one-half months of incarceration followed by two
years of probation. Spinks again violated his probation and in December J-S34022-25
2022, the court imposed a sentence of eleven months to the balance of his
term, followed by two years of consecutive probation. See Order, 12/19/22.
Spinks committed a new crime in October 2024, and failed to complete
his required sexual offender treatment, and therefore committed direct and
technical probation violations. In March 2025, Spinks pled guilty to the new
offense. The trial court ordered the preparation of an updated pre-sentence
investigation report (“PSI”) and calculation of the resentencing guidelines. As
defense counsel acknowledged at sentencing, the standard range for Spinks’s
revocation sentence was between nine and sixteen months. See N.T., 4/3/25,
at 2. The court then imposed a standard guidelines range sentence of fourteen
months to four years of imprisonment to be served in a State Correctional
Institution and granted Spinks credit toward his sentence from October 16,
2024, to the present. See Order, 4/7/25.
Spinks timely appealed and he and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This appeal followed.
Spinks raises the following issue for our review on appeal:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence for [a] probation violation that did not account for the time already spent in jail on the same charge in light of the sentencing guidelines?
See Spinks’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Although Spinks appears to challenge the failure of the trial court to
properly credit him for time served, he argues his sentence “failed to take into
consideration” his prior incarcerations. Spinks’s Brief at 10. Although he does
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not do so in a Rule 2119(f) statement, Spinks asserts he raises a substantial
question concerning the discretionary aspects of sentence by claiming he
received an excessive sentence, and the sentencing court relied on an
impermissible factor by not accounting for his previous violations and service
of prior revocation sentences on this case. See Spinks’s Brief at 11-14.
Spinks also asserts his sentence was excessive because the trial court did not
properly consider his character and rehabilitative needs. See id. at 14-15.
Finally, Spinks claims the trial court abused its discretion by declining to
impose a local jail sentence particularly because a job was available for him
locally. See id. at 15-17.
A claim that a trial court failed to award credit for time served implicates
the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165,
1166 (Pa. Super. 2018). A defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent in
custody because of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed,
where that time has not been credited against another sentence. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9760.
However, Spinks does not state the periods for which he is allegedly
entitled to credit, nor whether those periods were served on this case or on
another sentence, which would constitute double credit to which he is not
entitled. See Barndt v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 902 A.2d 589,
595 (Pa. Commw. 2006) (establishing Section 9760 does not permit credit for
-3- J-S34022-25
time served to be awarded twice).1 Thus, the clear intent of Spinks’s
argument, as described above, is to challenge the discretionary aspects of his
sentence rather than a claim the trial court improperly failed to credit him for
time served. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760; Barndt, 902 A.2d at 595. It is that
claim we address.
There is no absolute right to challenge the discretionary aspects of a
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Before reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing claim, we must
determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–30 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of sentence are waived when
they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the
sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Bloom, 341 A.3d 752, 773-74
(Pa. Super. 2025); Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494, 502 (Pa.
Super. 2017). Additionally, a claim is waived when first raised in a 1925(b)
____________________________________________
1 This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court but such
decisions provide persuasive authority to which we may turn for guidance. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 590 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2019).
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statement or on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265,
284 (Pa. Super. 2024); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Spinks did not assert at sentencing, in a post-sentence motion, or in his
Rule 1925(b) statement his current claims the court failed to consider his prior
incarceration, returned an excessive sentence, considered an improper factor,
and/or did not properly weigh his mitigating circumstances. See N.T., 4/3/25,
at 1-8; Spinks’s 1925(b) Statement, 5/1/25.2 His sentencing challenge is thus
unreviewable. See Bloom, 341 A.3d at 773-74; Hutchison, 164 A.3d at
502.
Even if Spinks were able to overcome his failure to preserve his claim at
sentencing or in a post-sentence motion to modify sentence, he also failed to
preserve those claims in his 1925(b) Statement, which is an independent basis
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J-S34022-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYLER JACOB SPINKS : : Appellant : No. 547 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-50-CR-0000127-2018
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 26, 2025
Tyler Jacob Spinks (“Spinks”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed for his direct and technical violations of probation, asserting the
revocation court did not consider his time served and should have allowed him
to serve his sentence locally rather than in a State Correctional Institution.
We affirm.
The facts relevant to Spinks’s claim are as follows. In January 2019,
Spinks entered a guilty plea to statutory sexual assault, a felony of the second
degree. The court imposed a sentence of eleven and one-half to twenty-three
months of incarceration and two years of consecutive probation. Spinks
violated his probation; in October 2021, the court resentenced him to a term
of five to twenty-three and one-half months of incarceration followed by two
years of probation. Spinks again violated his probation and in December J-S34022-25
2022, the court imposed a sentence of eleven months to the balance of his
term, followed by two years of consecutive probation. See Order, 12/19/22.
Spinks committed a new crime in October 2024, and failed to complete
his required sexual offender treatment, and therefore committed direct and
technical probation violations. In March 2025, Spinks pled guilty to the new
offense. The trial court ordered the preparation of an updated pre-sentence
investigation report (“PSI”) and calculation of the resentencing guidelines. As
defense counsel acknowledged at sentencing, the standard range for Spinks’s
revocation sentence was between nine and sixteen months. See N.T., 4/3/25,
at 2. The court then imposed a standard guidelines range sentence of fourteen
months to four years of imprisonment to be served in a State Correctional
Institution and granted Spinks credit toward his sentence from October 16,
2024, to the present. See Order, 4/7/25.
Spinks timely appealed and he and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This appeal followed.
Spinks raises the following issue for our review on appeal:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence for [a] probation violation that did not account for the time already spent in jail on the same charge in light of the sentencing guidelines?
See Spinks’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Although Spinks appears to challenge the failure of the trial court to
properly credit him for time served, he argues his sentence “failed to take into
consideration” his prior incarcerations. Spinks’s Brief at 10. Although he does
-2- J-S34022-25
not do so in a Rule 2119(f) statement, Spinks asserts he raises a substantial
question concerning the discretionary aspects of sentence by claiming he
received an excessive sentence, and the sentencing court relied on an
impermissible factor by not accounting for his previous violations and service
of prior revocation sentences on this case. See Spinks’s Brief at 11-14.
Spinks also asserts his sentence was excessive because the trial court did not
properly consider his character and rehabilitative needs. See id. at 14-15.
Finally, Spinks claims the trial court abused its discretion by declining to
impose a local jail sentence particularly because a job was available for him
locally. See id. at 15-17.
A claim that a trial court failed to award credit for time served implicates
the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165,
1166 (Pa. Super. 2018). A defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent in
custody because of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed,
where that time has not been credited against another sentence. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9760.
However, Spinks does not state the periods for which he is allegedly
entitled to credit, nor whether those periods were served on this case or on
another sentence, which would constitute double credit to which he is not
entitled. See Barndt v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 902 A.2d 589,
595 (Pa. Commw. 2006) (establishing Section 9760 does not permit credit for
-3- J-S34022-25
time served to be awarded twice).1 Thus, the clear intent of Spinks’s
argument, as described above, is to challenge the discretionary aspects of his
sentence rather than a claim the trial court improperly failed to credit him for
time served. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760; Barndt, 902 A.2d at 595. It is that
claim we address.
There is no absolute right to challenge the discretionary aspects of a
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Before reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing claim, we must
determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–30 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of sentence are waived when
they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the
sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Bloom, 341 A.3d 752, 773-74
(Pa. Super. 2025); Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494, 502 (Pa.
Super. 2017). Additionally, a claim is waived when first raised in a 1925(b)
____________________________________________
1 This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court but such
decisions provide persuasive authority to which we may turn for guidance. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 590 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2019).
-4- J-S34022-25
statement or on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265,
284 (Pa. Super. 2024); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Spinks did not assert at sentencing, in a post-sentence motion, or in his
Rule 1925(b) statement his current claims the court failed to consider his prior
incarceration, returned an excessive sentence, considered an improper factor,
and/or did not properly weigh his mitigating circumstances. See N.T., 4/3/25,
at 1-8; Spinks’s 1925(b) Statement, 5/1/25.2 His sentencing challenge is thus
unreviewable. See Bloom, 341 A.3d at 773-74; Hutchison, 164 A.3d at
502.
Even if Spinks were able to overcome his failure to preserve his claim at
sentencing or in a post-sentence motion to modify sentence, he also failed to
preserve those claims in his 1925(b) Statement, which is an independent basis
for finding the claim waived. See Lawrence, 313 A.3d at 284; see also
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).3
2 In his 1925(b) Statement, Spinks asserted as grounds for relief he should
have received a local sentence “due to the standard range and credit he has already accrued,” and “a State issued [sic] sentence is harsh in light of his credit accrued.” See Spinks’s 1925(b) Statement, 5/1/25, at 2 (unnumbered).
3 Additionally, Spinks’s claim he should have received a county sentence rather than a state sentence could only state a substantial question where Spinks articulates a claim his sentence violates a particular provision of the sentencing guidelines. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 806 (Pa. Super. 2006). He makes no such assertion.
-5- J-S34022-25
Spinks’s claim would not merit relief even if it were reviewable. As the
trial court explains, Spinks’s sentence of fourteen months to four years of
incarceration was within the standard range of the Resentencing Guidelines
and the instant violations constituted his third violation of probation from his
original sentence and included a new crime (direct violation) and multiple
violations of the conditions imposed following his conviction of a sexual offense
(technical violations). See Trial Court’s Memorandum, 6/18/25, at 2-3.
Additionally, the court rejected as not credible Spinks’s assertion that he could
not complete sex offender counseling through no fault of his own; the court
noted Spinks’s failure to do so over a six year period. See id. at 4. Because
a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, see Commonwealth v. Moury, 992
A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010), and may only be vacated where clearly
unreasonable,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2), we perceive no basis upon which
Spinks may be granted relief from his standard-range sentence.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2025
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