Com. v. Sinclair, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 14, 2025
• Docket: 1072 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S14006-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL SINCLAIR : : Appellant : No. 1072 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 10, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000025-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2025

Appellant, Michael Sinclair, appeals from the April 10, 2024 judgment of

sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas following

his conviction after a stipulated bench trial of Possession with Intent to Deliver,

Conspiracy to Commit Possession with Intent to Deliver, Person not to Possess

a Firearm, and Firearms not to be Carried without a License. 1 Appellant

challenges the denial of his pretrial suppression motion claiming that police

lacked probable cause to stop him and then illegally extended the traffic stop.

After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On October 7,

2020, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Troopers Cody Simcox and Brian ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1), respectively. J-S14006-25

Tierney were patrolling Interstate 95 in a patrol vehicle driven by Trooper

Simcox and equipped with an MVR recording device.2 The troopers observed

a silver Kia sedan with a Texas license plate operated by a man later identified

as Appellant traveling southbound. After “pacing” Appellant’s vehicle with

their own vehicle’s calibrated and certified speedometer at a constant speed

of 65 MPH in a 55 MPH-zone and observing Appellant’s vehicle cross over the

lane designators at least once on both the right and left sides, the troopers

initiated a traffic stop.3

Appellant responded by pulling his vehicle onto the shoulder. Trooper

Tierney then exited the patrol vehicle, approached Appellant’s vehicle, and

noticed a male passenger in the front passenger seat. Trooper Tierney

requested Appellant’s identification, and Appellant eventually produced it.

Meanwhile Trooper Tierney noticed “a lot of abnormalities,” such as Appellant

taking a large bite of food as soon as Trooper Tierney approached, “to the

point where [Trooper Tierney] couldn’t really understand [Appellant]. N.T.

Suppression, 5/26/22, at 14. Appellant appeared to be nervous and avoided

making eye contact with Trooper Tierney. Appellant’s passenger also avoided

____________________________________________

2 The MVR device was in working order at the time of the troopers’ interaction

with Appellant.

3 In his role as driver of the vehicle, Trooper Simcox was responsible for safely

operating the vehicle and making sure the vehicle maintained a consistent distance behind Appellant’s vehicle. As passenger, Trooper Tierney was responsible for the speedometer.

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looking at Trooper Tierney at all, sitting almost sideways in his seat facing the

side window, while seeming nervous and restlessly bouncing his leg.

Officer Tierney also observed that Appellant’s vehicle, which Troopers

Tierney and Simcox determined was a rental, was full of trash and personal

belongings and a “bunch” of air fresheners hung from the rearview mirror,

which Trooper Tierney thought was unusual in a rental car. Id. at 15.

Trooper Tierney asked Appellant to provide him with the rental

agreement for the vehicle, but the documents Appellant provided were blank.

This, in addition to Trooper Tierney’s observations of the demeanors of

Appellant and his passenger, and the condition of the vehicle, prompted

Trooper Tierney to decide to question Appellant further. However, there was

heavy traffic and elevated road noise, and Trooper Tierney was very close to

the road, so for his own safety and to “get the things that I needed to

communicate with him effectively[,]” Trooper Tierney asked Appellant to exit

his vehicle and stand between the back of Appellant’s car and the front of the

patrol vehicle. Id. at 16.

Shortly after exiting his vehicle, Appellant showed Trooper Tierney an

electronic version of the vehicle rental agreement on Appellant’s phone, which

indicated that the rental agreement was in Appellant’s name and that

Appellant had recently rented the vehicle. Trooper Tierney’s experience and

“the things [he] observed on the traffic stop prompted him to believe that

there could be something additional going on.” Id. at 17. He, therefore,

asked Appellant about his travel plans and his passenger. Trooper Tierney

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thought it was unusual that Appellant claimed to have known his passenger

for four or five months but was unable to tell Trooper Tierney the passenger’s

name, where the passenger lived, or where Appellant had picked up the

passenger. To Trooper Tierney this was “indicative of, a lot of times, of what

I would consider a criminal voyage, that they’re - - that it’s a red flag so that

there may be something going on.” Id. With respect to their travel plans,

Appellant told Trooper Tierney that he and his passenger were on their way

to a State store in Delaware and the passenger indicated that they had only

been together for a brief period.

Trooper Tierney then spoke briefly with the passenger, before explaining

to Appellant that “there were a lot of things that I saw as a police officer that

led me to believe that there was criminal activity going on” and asking

Appellant for, and ultimately receiving, consent to search the vehicle. Id. at

20. Appellant and Trooper Tierney “spoke at length” and ultimately Appellant

consented to the search. Id. Trooper Tierney did not terminate the initial

traffic stop by informing Appellant that the traffic stop had ended, and that

Appellant was free to go before requesting permission to search.

Troopers Tierney and Simcox proceeded to search Appellant’s vehicle

and located a salt container on the ground of the rear of the vehicle containing

numerous bundles of heroin; they also found other packaged bundles of heroin

under the driver’s seat area. Following this discovery, the troopers handcuffed

Appellant and his passenger and placed them under arrest. PSP then towed

the vehicle to the local barracks, obtained a search warrant, and recovered

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additional drugs and a firearm. The Commonwealth charged him with the

above crimes.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress asserting generally that “[a]ll

physical evidence found was the result of an illegal search by a police officer

without the required search warrant or any exigent circumstances justifying

the failure to have a search warrant.” Motion, 9/9/21, at ¶ 4, 6.

The trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion on May 26,

2022, at which Trooper Tierney testified consistently with the above facts.

The Commonwealth also played for the court the MVR recording of the

interaction with Appellant, which showed Appellant, inter alia, crossing and

straddling the lines demarcating the lanes of traffic. Trooper Tierney, in

recorded contemporaneous narration, can be heard indicating that Appellant

was “swerving all over the place.” N.T. Suppression at 25.

On cross-examination, Trooper Tierney testified that he stopped

Appellant for multiple violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. He testified that

Appellant provided him with the rental agreement for the vehicle and his

identification within two minutes of stopping Appellant. He then testified that,

because he observed indicia of criminal activity and “reasonable suspicion

ha[d] been building up since the moment I walked up to his vehicle,” even

though Appellant had provided the requested documentation, Trooper Tierney

“was planning on continuing the line of questioning” regarding his travel plans.

Id. at 45.

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With respect to Appellant’s swerving, Trooper Tierney testified that

“furtive motions” can “play into [Appellant’s] motor vehicle violation”—

sometimes “the reason for [a] traffic violation in the first place is an indicator

that [a driver] is worried about a presence behind his vehicle.” Id. Trooper

Tierney testified that within five minutes of the traffic stop, had it not been for

the indicia of criminal activity, he could have given Appellant a ticket and let

Appellant leave, but because of the indicators he continued his investigation.

The MVR recording, played again during cross-examination, showed

Appellant, more than 12 minutes after the traffic stop began, repeatedly

asking Trooper Tierney “where’s my ticket?” Id. at 54. The video also showed

Trooper Tierney tell Appellant that he “absolutely does not have to let me

search his vehicle, that he has the right to say no.” Id. at 55. Trooper Tierney

testified that he informed Appellant that if Appellant did not give consent, he

would call the search canine.

On October 31, 2022, the suppression court denied Appellant’s motion

to suppress. On February 2, 2024, following a stipulated bench trial, the trial

court convicted Appellant of the above charges. On April 10, 2024, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 4 to 8 years of incarceration

followed by 4 years of probation.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following two issues for our review:

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1. Whether the stop of [Appellant’s] vehicle by police was undertaken in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and applicable provisions of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, in that the stop was not based on probable cause, reasonable suspicion[,] or any other lawful justification whatsoever, where the record fails to show the exact speed at which [Appellant’s] vehicle was travelling, or the extent to which [Appellant’s] vehicle crossed lane dividers?

2. Whether the warrantless search of [Appellant’s] vehicle, which revealed unlawful drugs, was undertaken in violation of [Appellant’s] right against unreasonable searches and seizures, granted by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in that police prolonged the traffic stop by asking questions of [Appellant] not related to the alleged Vehicle Code violation, where the information gathered did not justify continued detention of [Appellant], and police thereby extended the stop of [Appellant’s] vehicle beyond the time necessary to complete tasks tied to the traffic infraction and related safety concerns, amounting to the continued detention of [Appellant] not based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that [Appellant] was involved in criminal activity separate from the traffic violation, and [Appellant’s] consent to search the vehicle was the direct result of the said unlawful detention?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

We review the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress to

determine “whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are

correct.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). “Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when

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read in the context of the record as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted). “Our

scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing

record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.” Commonwealth v.

Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017).

We are highly deferential to the suppression court’s factual findings and

credibility determinations. See Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199,

1206 (Pa. Super. 2019). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.

Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

“[I]f the record supports the suppression court’s findings, we may not

substitute our own findings.” Bastista, 219 A.3d at 1206 (citation omitted).

However, we “give no deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions”

and review them de novo. Id. (citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section 8 of our state Constitution “protect citizens from unreasonable

searches and seizures.” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). “To

secure the right of citizens to be free from [unreasonable searches and

seizures], courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to

demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with

citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” Commonwealth v.

Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000).

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Our Supreme Court has defined three levels of interaction between

citizens and police officers: (1) mere encounter, (2) investigative detention,

and (3) custodial detention:

The first of these is a ‘mere encounter’ (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an ‘investigative detention’ must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or ‘custodial detention’ must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76-77 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

A traffic stop is a special kind of seizure, which a police officer may only

initiate if he has reason to believe that a violation of the traffic code has

occurred. Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super.

2013). The level of required suspicion turns on the kind of violation in

question: if it is the kind of violation that would require further investigation

to prove, the officer needs a reasonable suspicion; if it is the kind of violation

that is immediately apparent and would not require any further investigation,

the officer needs probable cause. Id. In either case, the officer’s authority

for the seizure extends only as long as is necessary to attend to the business

of the stop. Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super.

2016).

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***

In his first issue, Appellant claims that Trooper Tierney lacked probable

cause to effectuate a traffic stop because the record lacks evidence showing

(1) Appellant’s precise rate of speed, (2) that Trooper Tierney complied with

statutory law applicable to utilizing a speedometer to clock Appellant’s speed,

and (3) that Appellant violated the Vehicle Code by crossing over the lane

dividers in an unsafe manner. Appellant’s Brief at 13-19.

With respect to his claim that the record does not support the existence

of probable cause to stop Appellant for speeding, Appellant asserts that the

record reflects that Trooper Simcox told Appellant that he and Trooper Tierney

“did not know how fast [Appellant’s] vehicle was travelling.” Id. at 15 (citing

N.T. Suppression at 33). Appellant also contends that the MVR recorded an

officer inside the patrol car state “he’s got to be going 65,” indicating that the

troopers were merely “speculat[ing]” that Appellant was speeding. Appellant’s

Brief at 15 (citing N.T. Suppression at 35). Last, Appellant contends that the

record contains no evidence regarding the exact distance over which the

troopers clocked Appellant’s speed; therefore, the troopers violated 75 Pa.C.S.

§ 3368(a), which requires police to clock a vehicle suspected of speeding for

a minimum of three-tenths of a mile. Appellant’s Brief at 15.

Our review of the notes of testimony belies Appellant’s claim that the

Commonwealth did not present any evidence of Appellant’s speed. Trooper

Tierney explicitly testified that he and Trooper Simcox paced Appellant

“travelling at a consistent speed of 65 MPH.” N.T. Suppression at 11, 32.

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Although the record also reflects that Trooper Simcox told Appellant and his

passenger that Trooper Simcox did not know how fast Appellant’s vehicle had

been travelling, Trooper Tierney explained that, as the passenger in the patrol

vehicle, it was Trooper Tierney’s-and not Trooper Simcox’s-responsibility to

monitor the speedometer. Id. at 33-34. Therefore, the facts of record

support the suppression court’s determination that, even if Trooper Simcox

was unsure of Appellant’s rate of speed, Trooper Tierney credibly testified that

Appellant had been driving 10 miles over the speed limit before Trooper

Tierney stopped him. Thus, the suppression court properly found that the

troopers had probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop based on Appellant’s

violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.4

Our review also reveals that Appellant did not raise his claim that the

Commonwealth failed to offer evidence proving that the troopers complied

with Section 3368(a) either in his motion to suppress, at the suppression

hearing, or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Accordingly, he has waived this

claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)

(providing that issues not raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement are waived).

4 Because the record supports the suppression court’s conclusion that the troopers had probable cause to stop Appellant for speeding, we need not address Appellant’s claim that the stop was illegal because the Commonwealth did not present evidence that Appellant was changing lanes unsafely.

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In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress the drugs found in his vehicle because his

consent to search was the product of an unlawful detention. Appellant’s Brief

at 19-30.

“Where the purpose of an initial traffic stop has ended and a reasonable

person would not have believed that he was free to leave, the law

characterizes a subsequent round of questioning by the police as an

investigative detention or arrest.” Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180,

184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Thus, at the point where the

purpose of the initial traffic stop has concluded, the police must possess

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring in order to continue the

detention. Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Pa. Super.

2002). See also Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015).

Demonstrating reasonable suspicion requires that the detaining officer

“articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion

or hunch” that the defendant has engaged in criminal activity.

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted). In determining whether the Commonwealth has met this

burden, courts must make an objective inquiry into whether, based on “the

facts available to [the] police at the moment of intrusion[,]” a person “of

reasonable caution” would believe that the defendant has engaged in criminal

activity. Id. (citation omitted). At the moment a mere encounter becomes

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an investigative detention, police must already have the requisite reasonable

suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal activity to support that

detention. Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 232 (Pa. Super.

2017). “Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on information discovered after

the detention has begun.” Id.

In support of his claim that the troopers lacked reasonable suspicion to

extend the traffic stop, thus rendering his consent to search the vehicle

invalid, Appellant asserts that Trooper Tierney made clear that the purpose of

the traffic stop was to “address the alleged speeding and driving over the

dotted lines[,]” and within less than two minutes Trooper Tierney had all of

the information he needed to give Appellant a ticket for his violations of the

Motor Vehicle Code. Appellant’s Brief at 23, 27. However, rather than just

issue a ticket, Trooper Tierney used the next twenty minutes of the stop to

gain Appellant’s consent to search the vehicle to “address his hunch of criminal

activity.” Id. at 24. Appellant denies that the indicia of criminal activity

observed by Trooper Tierney constituted facts capable of supplying reasonable

suspicion to permit Appellant’s continued detention. Id. at 27-29.

Our review of the notes of testimony indicates that Trooper Tierney

provided extensive testimony found credible by the suppression court

regarding the facts that gave rise to his reasonable suspicion that Appellant

was engaged in criminal activity. As set forth above, these facts include that

Appellant and his passenger appeared nervous and avoided making eye

contact with Trooper Tierney and that Appellant took a large bite of food just

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as Trooper Tierney approached Appellant’s vehicle, rendering Appellant

unintelligible. N.T. Suppression at 14. Trooper Tierney also testified that the

rental vehicle driven by Appellant was full of trash and had numerous air

fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. Id. at 14-15. Trooper Tierney

also found it suspicious that even though Appellant admitted to having known

the passenger for months, Appellant was unable to tell Trooper Tierney the

passenger’s name, where the passenger lived, or where Appellant had picked

him up. Id. at 17. To Trooper Tierney this was indicative of “what I would

consider a criminal voyage.” Id. Given this testimony pertaining to the events

prior to the conclusion of the traffic stop, we conclude that the trial court did

not err when it determined that Trooper Tierney articulated more than an

unparticularized suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity and,

thus, did not impermissibly extend the legal traffic stop.5 Accordingly,

Appellant’s consent to search his vehicle was, contrary to his claim, not the

product of an unlawful detention. Appellant is, thus, not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

5 The notes of testimony reflect that there was video footage of the traffic stop

and the troopers’ interaction with Appellant that the court admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. See N.T. Suppression at 24, 61. The video, however, was not included in the certified record on appeal. We remind Appellant that it is his responsibility to ensure the completeness of the record. See Commonwealth v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (“Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court to perform its duty.”).

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Date: 5/14/2025

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