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Mr. Hassan testified that his usual route home consisted of walking westbound on
Fairmount Avenue, crossing 1 gth Street, then taking a shortcut by turning right onto Shirley Street
followed by a quick left onto Olive Street, which would put him on 19th Street, just a few houses
from his home. On the night at issue, while walking on Shirley Street just before Olive, he
encountered two males approaching from Francis Street -- one who was wearing a grey hoodie
with a front pocket, and the other wearing a dark blue track suit with white stripes on its sides.
As they crossed paths, one of the males said, "[WJhat's going on?", and Mr. Hassan responded,
"What's up?" The two males then turned westbound onto Olive Street -- i.e., the route Mr.
Hassan had intended to take -- so Mr. Hassan waited on the comer of Olive and Shirley Streets to
see where they would go. (See N.T. 12/08/15, pp. 38-45).
Mr. Hassan watched the two males meet up with approximately 4 other males toward the
end of Olive Street (closer to 19th). After a few seconds, one of the males stated, "[T]hat's your
check. Go get that." At that point, according to Mr. Hassan's testimony, a male (later identified
as Appellant) left the crowd and started walking directly toward Mr. Hassan:
Q. What happens at the point [you hear somebody say, "That's your check; go get that"?]
A. One of them who had joined from -- was in the second larger group, started heading towards me, and he was wearing a white T-shirt, a tight white T-shirt. He seemed shorter than everyone else in the group. He stood out and he walked out of the middle of the street out to the sidewalk and was coming towards me.
Q. How soon after you heard somebody say that's your check; go get that, did the man in the tight white shirt start walking towards you?
A. Pretty much right away like two or three seconds. Like right away.
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(See N.T. 12/08/15, pp. 45-47).
Fearing for his safety, Mr. Hassan made a sharp left turn onto (the angled portion of)
Shirley Street, and sprinted all the way to 19th Street. There, he looked to his left (southbound)
on 19th Street, to see if anyone from the large crowd was coming from Olive Street:
Q. When you get to this corner on Shirley and 19th, what do you do?
A. I like kind of half go around the comer,· and then in my head, I was thinking I only saw really one of them coming towards me. And there was still a large group, so I didn't want to come down here [toward Olive Street]. I wanted to see if anyone was going to come around [from Olive Street] before I made like the last quick dash to my house. I was kind oflike cornered. I didn't want to go further north, but I wanted to make sure I wasn't like being circled. So I stopped there to see what was going to happen next.
(See N.T. 12/08/15, pp. 48-49).
Instead of someone from the larger group, however, it was Appellant who emerged on
19th Street from Olive -- i.e., Appellant had circled back up Olive Street to 19th. At that point,
Mr. Hassan observed Appellant holding a black and silver handgun out in front of him. Mr.
Hassan and Appellant then made eye contact, after which Mr. Hassan retreated into his home and
shut the door. Mr. Hassan watched Appellant through the peephole of his front door; Appellant
first walked northbound on the other side of 19th street before returning to Mr. Hassan's side of
the street and walking by his residence a second time. Mr. Hassan then heard Appellant say,
"Where did he go? Did you see where the [boy] go?" (See N.T. 12/08/15, pp. 49-57).
Mr. Hassan testified that when he saw that Appellant returned, standing directly in front
of his front door with a gun, he called police:
Q. At what point did you call police?
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A. When he came back down. After I saw him walk· past on the other side of the street, I waited until he came back right in front of me, like literally like five feet in front of my eyes. And right after he passed when he said like "Where did he go? Did you see where the [boy] go?", at that point the gun was there. I was the only one out there, and whatever he was going to do, he was going to do to me. So that's when I called the cops.
(N.T. 12/08/15, p. 57).
Police arrived within two minutes, Mr. Hassan described the above events to the
responding police officer, Officer Holden; he also provided physical descriptions of Appellant
and the two males he initially encountered. Officer Holden asked him to "get in" the cruiser so
that they could search the immediate vicinity for the males he described. Within five minutes,
they encountered-the same group of males on a nearby street, namely, the 800 block of
Perkiomen Street. Mr. Hassan "immediately recognized" Appellant as his assailant, and told
Officer Holden, "Yes, that's definitely the guy with the white T-shirt I saw with the gun." The
officer then dropped off Mr. Hassan a couple blocks away so that he could stop Appellant and his
cohorts; back-up officers picked up Mr. Hassan and transported him back to Perkiomen Street,
where he once again positively identified Appellant without hesitation. He also positively
identified the black and silver handgun secured at the scene as the one wielded by Appellant.
(See N.T. 12/08/15, pp. 57-64).
Philadelphia Police Officer Jeffrey Holden testified next for the Commonwealth. In
relevant part, Officer Holden testified that he was approximately one minute away when he
received the radio call that took him to Mr. Hassan's residence. While obtaining descriptive
information from Mr. Hassan, Officer Holden took him in his police cruiser to try to find the
culprits. Officer Holden testified that within three or four minutes, he came upon a group of
males at 800 Pekiomen St.
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Q. Let's talk about what happened when you made it to the 800 block of Perkiomen Street? When you turned onto that block, what, if anything, occurred?
A. When I turned onto the 800 block of Perkiomen Street, there was a group of black males; some were on the left side of the street and some o [ n] the right side of the street. ... So instantly he sees the guy with the white shirt, which was Defendant Eric Shelley [Appellant]. He sees him and he was like, "That's the guy. That's the guy." I was like, "You sure?" He was like, "That's the guy. That's the guy."
(See N.T. 12/09/15, pp. 4-11).
Officer Holden testified that he took Mr. Hassan a few blocks away for his safety and
called back-up officers to meet Mr. Hassan. Officer Holden returned to Perkiomen Street to stop
and investigate the males. Back-up officers transported Mr. Hassan to Perkiomen Street, where
he positively identified Appellant, as well as the male in the grey hoodie. He was unable to
. unequivocally identify the male in the dark tracksuit. After the identifications, one of the males -
- Co-Defendant Lawrence Jones -- stated that since he's been cleared of any warrants and was not
identified by Mr. Hassan, "Can I just get my gun and go?" Officer Holden asked Co-Defendant
Jones ifhe had a gun license, to which he responded in theaffirmative. Co-Defendant Jones
went into an adjacent Toyota Camry -- which was owned by the father of the male in the grey
hoodie -- and retrieved a silver and black handgun, which he showed to the officer. Officer
Holden made the gun safe and showed it to Mr. Hassan, who positively identified it as the gun
used by Appellant approximately 30 minutes earlier. The gun, which was loaded with 14 live
rounds, was secured under property receipt.
(See N.T. 12/09/15, pp. 11-18, 44).
The Commonwealth next presented the testimony of Philadelphia Police Detective Neil
Goldstein. Detective Goldstein testified that, following his· interview of Co-Defendant Jones, he
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elected to release him from police custody and returned his registered firearm. Detective
Goldstein explained that his decision simply was a "blunder" on his part. (See N.T. 12/09/15, pp.
46-50).
Next, the Commonwealth called Philadelphia Police Detective James Waring to the stand.
Detective Waring testified that, following the inadvertent release of Co-Defendant Jones, he and
his team executed a warrant to search Jones' residence on July 25, 2014, which yielded a "gun
box" for the gun at issue, to wit, a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson handgun, model SW40DE,
· serial number RCA1642. Detective Waring also had obtained an arrest warrant, but Co-
Defendant Jones was not present at the time. Two hours later, he made contact with Jones, who
turned in himself and the handgun to detectives. (See N.T. 12/09/15, pp. 58-64).
Finally, the Commonwealth introduced stipulated evidence establishing that: (a)
Appellant did not have a valid license to carry a firearm; (b) Co-Defendant Jones did have a valid
license to carry a firearm; and (c) the subject handgun was test fired by the Firearms
Identification Unit, and determined to be operable. (See N.T. 12/09/15, p. 74).
Following the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Appellant moved for
judgment of acquittal on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of a robbery. This Court
denied relief and expressed its reasoning on the record:
THE COURT: In regard to the robbery charge [as] to both defendants, the statement, "That's your check. Go get that," whereupon [Appellant] immediately starts following the complaining witness and then rounds this corner and shows his gun, that's enough for an attempted theft. And that's all you need here is an attempt to commit a theft. That is enough to go to the jury. I agree it is completely circumstantial, but it is enough. So the judgment of acquittal [is] denied in regard to both defendants on the chargeof robbery.
(N.T. 12/09/15, pp. 82-83).
7 Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of Robbery,
Criminal Conspiracy, Firearms Not to Be Carried without a License and Carrying Firearms on
Public Streets in Philadelphia; it acquitted Co-Defendant Jones of all charges. On the same date,
following a bifurcated trial before this Court, Appellant was convicted of Persons Not to Possess
Firearms. Following a comprehensive pre-sentence investigation, this Court imposed sentence as
previously set forth.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1; The evidence presented at trial was insufficient, as a matter oflaw, to support the verdict of guilty of Robbery. There was insufficient evidence presented to make out multiple elements of the Robbery charge. There was insufficient evidence presented to prove that Appellant committed either Theft or Attempted Theft. Further, while theft, or attempted theft, is a necessary element of the Robbery charge, regardless of the lack of evidence on this point, there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that Appellant used force or threatened to use force against the complainant at any time. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Appellant had any intent to commit a Robbery.
2. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the verdict of guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. In addition to the arguments presented above, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Appellant agreed to commit a Robbery with anyone. There was insufficient evidence that there was any "meeting of the minds" between Appellant and anyone else to commit a Robbery.
3. The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's motion for [judgment] of acquittal on the charges of Robbery and Conspiracy for the reasons stated- above.
(Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement, 111-3).
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This Court will address Appellant's claims together.
DISCUSSION
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant claims that this Court erred by denying his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 1
and the jury's verdicts as to Robbery and Criminal Conspiracy were not supported by sufficient
evidence. These claims fail.
a. Judgment of Acquittal/ Sufficiency Standard
"A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
a conviction on a particular charge, and is granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth has
failed to carry its burden regarding that charge." Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 94 7 A.2d 800,
805 (Pa. Super. 2008). Therefore, the standard to be applied is the same as in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence. Id.
In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. It accepts as
· true' all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom
upon which the finder of fact could properly have based its verdict, in determining whether the
evidence and inferences are sufficient to support the challenged conviction. Commonwealth v.
Carroll, 507 A.2d 819, 820 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Pa.
1986); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000).
1 In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant claims that the Court erred by not granting his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on both the Robbery and Conspiracy charges. · At trial, however, Appellant only presented argument as to Robbery, and this Court noted same on the record. (See N.T. 12/09/15, p. 84). Putting aside the waiver of this issue, for the reasons discussed below; there was no error in permitting the Conspiracy charge go to the jury.
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"[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude
every possibility of innocence." Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. Super. 2005);
~ Commonwealth v. Rippy, 732 A.2d 1216; 1218-1219 (Pa. Super. 1999) (while conviction
must be based on more than mere speculation, "the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
mathematical certainty''). "Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by _the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances." Hutchinson, 947 A.2d
at 806 (emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Sneddon, 738 A.2d 1026, 1027 (Pa.
Super. 1999).
"The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence." Jones, 874 A.2d at 120.
Thus, the decision of the trier of fact will not be disturbed where there is support for the verdict
in the record. Commonwealth v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1982). When assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "may not weigh the evidence and substitute [its] judgment
for that of the fact-finder." Commonwealth v. Vetrini, 734 A.2d 404, 407 (Pa. Super. 1999).
"Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered." Hutchinson, 947 A2d at 806. "Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence." Id.
b. Specific Offenses
i. Robbery
A person commits the crime of robbery if, in the course of attempting a theft, he
'"threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury."'
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Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. §
3701(a)(l)(ii)). The robbery is complete upon commission or threat of violence, and thus
completion of the theft is not required. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 648 A.2d 315, 319
(Pa. 1999), overruled.in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744
A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000); Conunonwealth v. Natividad, 773 A.2d 167, 176 (Pa. 2001) ("There is no
requirement that the robbery be successful.").
11. Criminal Conspiracy
"The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common understanding, no matter how it came
into being, that a particular criminal objective be accomplished." Commonwealth v. Gibson, 668
A.2d 552, 555 (Pa. Super. 1995) (quoting Conunonwealth v. Volk, 444 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Pa.
Super. 1982)). "An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can seldom, if ever, be
proved and it need not be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost-invariably extracted from
the circumstances that attend its activities." Commonwealth v. Swerdlow, 636 A.2d 1173, 1177
(Pa. Super. 1994) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 453 A.2d 927, 929-930 (Pa. 1982)).
"An agreement sufficient to establish a conspiracy can be inferred from a variety of
circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of and
participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the
criminal episode." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 637 A.2d 997, 998 (Pa. Super. 1994) (en bane).
Applying the foregoing principles, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdicts. Appellant manifested a common understanding to commit Robbery when he acted
immediately on cue of "There's your check. Go get that", walking directly toward Mr. Hassan at
1 :00 a.m., and then circling back -- with gun in hand -- in pursuit of his loot. Appellant then
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immediately pursued Mr. Hassan. Even after Mr. Hassan secreted himself behind his door,
Appellant paced back and forth, calling "Where did he go?".
A Motion for Judgment of Acquittal will be granted where the Commonwealth's
evidence fails to show that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the elements of the crime
charged have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the evidence of Appellant's attempt
to commit Robbery were made out by the Appellant's response to "There's your check. Go get
that." The obvious and reasonable inference is the common understanding to commit a Robbery.
That there was no express agreement is of no import, as their seldom is. See Commonwealth v.
Swerdlow, 636 A.2d at 1177. Appellant's subsequent pursuit of Mr. Hassan with gun in hand
certainly could be viewed by a reasonable factfinder as evidence of his intent to commit a
Robbery.
In regard to Appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict
of guilt, the jury was free to accept or reject the direct, as well as the circumstantial evidence
based upon its evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. That Appellant was unsuccessful
in taking anything from Mr. Hassan is unavailing. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 648 A.2d
at 319. The evidence established a clear intention by Appellant to commit a Robbery. Indeed,
he was not doggedly pursuing Mr. Hassan with gun in hand at 1 :00 a.m. in order to exchange
dinner recipes. Rather, the plain, common sense inference was an attempted theft with the threat
of force -- which inference, given all the facts and circumstances, the jury was entitled to make.
As such, the jury's verdict should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth in the foregoing Opinion, this Court's judgment of
sentence should be affirmed.
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BY THE COURT: