J-A05013-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CLARENCE SAUNDERS : : Appellant : No. 3420 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 6, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005333-2005
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: Filed: July 8, 2021
Appellant, Clarence Saunders appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on September 6, 2019 following resentencing. We affirm.
As set forth by the trial court, the facts and procedural history of this
case are as follows:
On June 12, 2007, a jury convicted [Appellant of] one count of murder in the first-degree in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2502(a) and [] one count of firearms not to be carried without a license in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106. At the time of offense, [Appellant] was a [16-year-old] juvenile[.] The trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for [first-degree murder] and a consecutive [sentence of three-and-one-half to seven years of imprisonment for the firearm violation].
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-479 (2012), that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The ____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A05013-21
Court also determined a juvenile must receive a proportionate and individual sentence that considers the juvenile's hallmark features and circumstances surrounding the crime. Id. Furthermore, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-733 (2016), the Court made the holding in Miller retroactive on state collateral review.
Pursuant to the holdings in Miller and Montgomery, [the trial] court vacated [Appellant’s] previously imposed life without parole sentence and held a two-day resentencing hearing where both the Commonwealth and [Appellant] presented witnesses, expert testimony, and over 70 exhibits. On September 6, 2019, [the trial] court resentenced [Appellant] to [] 35 years to life imprisonment [for first-degree murder] and [a consecutive sentence of three] to [six] years [of] imprisonment [for the firearm conviction] for an aggregate sentence of 38 years to life [imprisonment].
On September 13, 2019, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of the [] sentence. The [trial] court denied the motion for reconsideration on November 15, 2019.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/2020, at *1-2 (unpaginated) (superfluous
capitalization omitted). This timely appeal resulted.1
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the aggregate sentence of 38 years to life [imprisonment] is a de facto life sentence, requiring, as mandated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) ("Batts II”), that the sentencing court find beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile was permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt or irretrievably depraved?
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1 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 26, 2019. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on December 9, 2019. Appellant complied timely after requesting and receiving an extension of time to file the Rule 1925(b) concise statement. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 16, 2020.
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2. Whether the sentencing court committed [an] abuse of its discretion in imposing sentence of [three] to [six] years [of imprisonment] for firearms not to be carried without a license, a minimum term of confinement in the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines, where the court failed to state reasons for the sentence in the aggravated range or identify aggravating circumstances?
3. Whether the aggregate sentence of 38 years to life [imprisonment] is an abuse of discretion, as it is unduly harsh and manifestly excessive, imposed as it was based entirely on the serious nature of the crime, without regard to mitigating evidence presented by [Appellant], and premised on an impermissible factor?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (superfluous capitalization omitted).
In his first issue presented, Appellant contends:
[his] sentence constituted a de facto life sentence, which cannot be imposed unless the trial court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt or irretrievably depraved. Because the trial court did not make any such factual finding, Appellant requests that this Court remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Id. at 23, citing Batts, II.
We have previously determined that a claim that the trial court imposed
an impermissible de facto life sentence in violation of Miller constitutes a
challenge to the legality of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Clary, 226
A.3d 571, 580 (Pa. Super. 2020). This Court has stated:
A claim challenging a sentencing court's legal authority to impose a particular sentence presents a question regarding the legality of the sentence. The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; an appellate court's standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is [de novo and our scope of review is plenary].
A trial court may not impose a term-of-years sentence on a juvenile convicted of homicide that equates to a de facto [life
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without parole (“LWOP”)] sentence unless it finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation.
Clary, 226 A.3d at 580–581 (internal citations omitted).
We further explained:
In Miller, the [United States] Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to impose mandatory LWOP sentences for defendants who committed their crimes while under the age of 18. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465[.] The Court nonetheless opined that a LWOP sentence is still a viable sentence for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” and a judge or jury must consider individualized characteristics and circumstances, including an offender's youth and attendant characteristics, before imposing this harshest possible penalty. Id. at 479-480, 483, 489[.] In Montgomery, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its decision in Miller, supra, applies retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 732. The Court “expressly left it to the States to determine how the holding in Miller was to be implemented in state court proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 432 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”) (citation omitted).
In Batts II, our Supreme Court concluded “that to effectuate the mandate of Miller and Montgomery,” it would provide a procedural safeguard to ensure that LWOP sentences “are meted out only to ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders’ whose crimes reflect ‘permanent incorrigibility’” by recognizing a presumption against the imposition of a LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender. Batts II, 163 A.3d at 415-16. Therefore, if the Commonwealth seeks a LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender “exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible.” Id. at 455 (quoting Montgomery, supra at 733) (emphasis omitted). If the Commonwealth satisfies its burden of proof, the sentencing court has discretion to impose a LWOP sentence upon the juvenile offender. Batts II, supra at 460.
When the Commonwealth requests a sentence of LWOP, the sentencing court must consider the Miller and [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 1102.1(d)[fn A] factors on the record, before imposing a sentence. Commonwealth v. Machicote, 206 A.3d 1110, 1120 (Pa. 2019); Batts II, supra at 459-60. If the court imposes the requested LWOP sentence, it “must find that the juvenile offender
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is permanently incorrigible and that rehabilitation would be impossible.” Batts II, supra at 459.[2]
However, if [] the court sentences “a juvenile offender to a life with the possibility of parole, traditional sentencing considerations apply,” and the court considers the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); Batts II, supra at 460 (citation omitted[)]. Section 9721(b) provides that the court shall fashion a sentence “that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
Thus, where [] the sentencing court rules in a defendant's favor by declining the Commonwealth's request to sentence the appellant to LWOP, on appeal, we need not review whether the court properly considered the Miller factors. Rather, we review the appellant's sentence as we would any other sentence imposed pursuant to Section 9721(b). See Batts II, supra at 460.
[fn A] [….T]he sentencing court is required to consider and make findings on the record related to the following factors:
(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and written victim impact statements made or submitted by family members of the victim detailing the physical, psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. A victim impact statement may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.
(2) The impact of the offense on the community. ____________________________________________
2 The United States Supreme Court recently abrogated Batts II in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021). The Jones Court confirmed that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility for juvenile offenders violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but held that sentencing schemes which allow the discretionary imposition of life sentences pass muster under the federal constitution and need not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility. See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1318–1319. As discussed below, we conclude that Appellant’s sentence does not amount to a de facto life sentence. We also note that while Appellant’s claim may continue to possess some merit under the Pennsylvania Constitution, it no longer states a viable theory of relief under the Eighth Amendment in light of Jones.
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(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the defendant.
(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant.
(5) The degree of the defendant's culpability.
(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Mental capacity.
(iii) Maturity.
(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant.
(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.
(vi) Probation or institutional reports.
(vii) Other relevant factors.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(d).
Clary, 226 A.3d at 577–578 (original brackets omitted).
Additionally, we have opined:
This [C]ourt has distinguished between [] sentences which constitute de facto LWOP sentences and those that do not. [See Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 438 (Pa. Super. 2018)].
In Foust, this Court concluded that a 150–year sentence is a de facto LWOP sentence and a 30 years to life sentence does not constitute a de facto LWOP sentence. Id.
For sentences that fall between the clearly constitutional and unconstitutional parameters, we have concluded that a sentence
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is not a de facto LWOP sentence where there is “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462, 467 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Thus, “it must at least be plausible that one could survive to the minimum release date with some consequential likelihood that a non-trivial amount of time at liberty awaits.” Id. at 468 (emphasis omitted). If there is no meaningful opportunity for parole, the sentence constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence. Id. We, therefore[,] consider the age the appellant would be eligible for parole to determine whether the new sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP. Id.
In Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 A.3d 40, 47-48 (Pa. Super. 2019), a post-Miller case, the appellant received a sentence of 50 years' to life imprisonment upon resentencing. [See Anderson,] 224 A.3d at 41-42. Because Anderson was 17 years old at the time he began serving his sentence, he would, thus, be eligible for parole at age 67. Id. at 46-47. We, therefore, concluded that his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Id. at 47-48[;] see also Bebout, supra at 468 (concluding the appellant's 45 years to life sentence in which he would be eligible for parole at the age of 60 was not de facto LWOP); Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 357-358 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that because the appellant's term of 45 years' to life imprisonment rendered him eligible for parole at the age of 62, it was not a de facto LWOP sentence); Foust, supra at 438, 441 (concluding that the appellant's two consecutive 30 year to life sentences were not a de facto LWOP sentence and noting that even considering [the a]ppellant's aggregate sentence, he had a chance of being released into society in his 70s).
Clary, 226 A.3d at 580-582 (ultimately concluding that, in view of Clary’s
eligibility for parole for his first-degree murder conviction at age 58, he had a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release and his sentence could not be
considered de facto life without the possibility parole).
Here, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 38 years to life
imprisonment. The trial court, recognizing that Appellant will be 54 years old
when he becomes eligible for parole, determined that its sentence, therefore,
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did not constitute an illegal, de facto life sentence. Trial Court Opinion,
7/16/2020, at *5 (unpaginated). We agree.
In this case, the trial court properly considered the age when Appellant
would be eligible for parole in order to determine that the new sentence was
not the functional equivalent of a de facto sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. Since Appellant will have a meaningful opportunity to
obtain his release, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that Appellant's
sentence cannot be considered de facto life without the possibility of parole.
As such, we need not consider whether the trial court errantly omitted a
finding of permanent incorrigibility.3 Thus, Appellant's first claim is without
merit.
In his second and third issues presented, which we will examine
together, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing an aggravated range sentence for his firearm conviction, consecutive
to the sentence for first-degree murder, without adequately stating its reasons
on the record and by considering impermissible factors. More specifically,
Appellant argues:
Appellant [] was sentenced for the crime of firearms not to be carried without a license to a term of confinement of not less than [three] nor more than [six] years, consecutive to a term of thirty[-]five years to life [imprisonment] for first[-]degree ____________________________________________
3 Regardless, as mentioned previously, the United States Supreme Court “has unequivocally stated that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under 18.” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1318–1319.
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murder. The applicable sentencing guideline standard range for firearms not to be carried without a license is 12 to 24 months [of incarceration], and the aggravated range limit is 36 months[’ imprisonment]. The sentencing court imposed [Appellant’s] sentence in the aggravated range without identifying any aggravating circumstances or otherwise stating on the record reasons for imposing sentence in the aggravated range, in violation of the sentencing guidelines[.]
Appellant’s Brief at 46 (superfluous capitalization and record citations
omitted). Moreover, Appellant contends:
The aggregate consecutive sentence of 38 years to life [imprisonment], consisting of 35 years to life for first[-]degree murder and a consecutive term of [three] to [six] years [of imprisonment] for firearms not to be carried without a license, is overly harsh and manifestly excessive, given the nature of the crime and the length of the term of confinement. The aggregate sentences were imposed based solely on the serious nature of the crime without regard to Appellant's remorse, his adolescence, the fact that Appellant was heavily influenced by an adult in the commission of the crime, Appellant's unsupportive home environment, Appellant's learning disability and the substantial progress Appellant has made towards rehabilitation during 15 years of confinement. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively based upon an impermissible factor, that is, to keep the sentences in line with the sentencing scheme imposed by the original sentencing judge.
Id. at 51-52 (superfluous capitalization omitted).
Appellant's claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Lee, 876 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. 2005) (claim that the
trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence is a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not
have an automatic right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for
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permission to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id. As this
Court has explained:
[t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E)]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Here, Appellant complied with the first three requirements above. Thus,
we examine whether Appellant presents a substantial question for review.
Generally, for an appellant to raise a substantial question that his sentence is
inappropriate under the Sentencing Code, an appellant must “advance a
colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were: (1) inconsistent with a
specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel,
629 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748
A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc), appeal denied, 759 A.2d 920 (Pa.
2000). As this Court has held, a claim that the sentencing court “failed to
consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public,
the gravity of the underlying offense and the rehabilitative needs” of the
defendant, does raise a substantial question under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2013) (a claim that
the trial court “failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the
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protection of the public, the gravity of the underlying offense and the
rehabilitative needs” of the defendant, raised a substantial question);
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)
(“we find that Appellant's claim that the sentencing court disregarded
rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the offense in handing
down its [consecutive, standard range] sentence presents a substantial
question for our review”); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-172
(Pa. Super. 2010) (“The imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent,
sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme
circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh,
considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.”);
Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 990 A.2d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal
denied, 14 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2010) (an appellant raises a substantial question
where he alleges that the trial court relied upon impermissible factors at
sentencing). Thus, we will address the merits of Appellant’s discretionary
sentencing claim.
With respect to our standard of review, we have held that “sentencing
is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, whose
judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001). “[A]
sentencing court generally has discretion to impose multiple sentences
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concurrently or consecutively[.]” Commonwealth v. Horning, 193 A.3d
411, 418 (Pa. Super. 2018). This Court has held:
An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court [has explained]: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it.
Moury, 992 A.2d at 169–170 (internal citation and brackets omitted).
We also adhere to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781, which provides, in pertinent
part:
(c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
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(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) and (d).
The trial court “shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open
court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the
sentence imposed” considering “the protection of the public, the gravity of the
offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the
community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b). The trial court “is not required to parrot the words of the
Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be considered under Section
9721(b)[,] [h]owever, the record as a whole must reflect due consideration
by the court of the statutory considerations” at the time of sentencing.
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing
Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 145 (Pa. Super. 2011). “A
sentencing court may consider any legal factor in determining that a sentence
in the aggravated range should be imposed.” Commonwealth v. Bowen,
975 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “In addition, the
sentencing judge's statement of reasons on the record must reflect this
consideration, and the sentencing judge's decision regarding the aggravation
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of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Furthermore, we have previously determined:
In deciding whether a trial judge considered only permissible factors in sentencing a defendant, an appellate court must, of necessity, review all of the judge's comments. Moreover, in making this determination it is not necessary that an appellate court be convinced that the trial judge in fact relied upon an erroneous consideration; it is sufficient to render a sentence invalid if it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon such a factor.
Commonwealth v. Scott, 860 A.2d 1029, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “[W]here the sentencing judge had the
benefit of a PSI report, it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the
relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 960 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Here, in resentencing Appellant, the trial court had the benefit of, and
explicitly relied upon, sentencing memoranda from both the defense and the
Commonwealth. Moreover, the Commonwealth also highlighted the facts of
the case at the beginning of the resentencing hearing. Multiple eyewitnesses
confirmed that Appellant shot the victim eight times while running away. The
murder occurred during the day while children were playing nearby. The
victim ultimately sustained three fatal wounds to the head, including one shot
that was fired from 10 inches away. The firearm and additional ammunition
were discarded in a nearby garage. See N.T., 8/27/2019, at 6-9. The trial
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court also heard victim impact testimony from the victim’s father and sister.
Id. at 38-65. The Commonwealth provided another written victim impact
statement for the trial court’s consideration. Id. at 65-66. Defense counsel
presented two correctional officers who testified about Appellant’s positive
behavior while imprisoned. Id. at 77-124. Defense counsel also presented
the testimony and report of a mitigation expert, Dr. Frank Dattilio, a clinical
and forensic psychologist. N.T., 8/28/2019, at 4-146. Appellant exercised his
right to allocution, exhibited remorse, and highlighted his positive strides
within the prison system. Id. at 149-152. Before imposing Appellant’s
current sentence, the trial court indicated that it reviewed 57 defense exhibits
and 23 exhibits submitted by the Commonwealth. N.T., 9/6/2019, at 6. It
also considered the factors under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(d), as set forth
above. Id. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Appellant’s use of a
firearm, for which he did not have a license to carry because he was a minor
at the time of the crimes, warranted a consecutive, aggravated range
sentence for his firearm conviction under the facts of the case. Trial Court
Opinion, 7/16/2020, at *3 (unpaginated).
We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment. The
record reveals that the trial court considered all relevant sentencing factors
and mitigation evidence presented by Appellant before resentencing. It
properly determined that Appellant’s illegal use of a firearm during the
commission of the murder warranted a consecutive, aggravated range
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sentence for Appellant’s firearm conviction. These findings were
well-supported by the record and reflect the exercise of sound judicial
discretion in resentencing Appellant. As such, Appellant’s second and third
issues lack merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/8/21
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