Com. v. Roman, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 186 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: King

Opinion

J-S42026-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAVION DWAYNE ROMAN : : Appellant : No. 186 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001842-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

Appellant, Javion Dwayne Roman, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following his

jury trial convictions for first degree murder, possession of firearm by a minor,

firearms not to be carried without a license, and two counts of recklessly

endangering another person.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned offenses in

connection with the shooting of M.B. (“Victim”). Appellant retained private

counsel to represent him. William Graff, Esquire, entered his appearance on

Appellant’s behalf on April 25, 2022. There were several procedural delays in

Appellant’s case due to pending motions. Specifically, Appellant filed a motion

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6110.1(a), 6106(a), and 2705, respectively. J-S42026-25

to transfer the matter to juvenile court because Appellant was 17 years old at

the time of the shooting. Upon Appellant’s request, the court ordered that

Appellant undergo a psychological evaluation prior to ruling on the motion to

transfer. After the evaluation was completed, the court conducted a hearing

and denied Appellant’s motion to transfer on March 13, 2023.

On April 17, 2023, Appellant requested a continuance to review further

discovery, which the court granted. On June 19, 2023, Appellant requested

another continuance for additional time to discuss a plea deal with the

Commonwealth. Again, the court granted a continuance. The court scheduled

a trial date certain to commence on February 12, 2024. On February 7, 2024,

the Commonwealth filed a motion requesting a status hearing, informing the

court that the shell casings involved in Appellant’s case were a potential match

to a gun recovered in another case. At the status hearing, Appellant requested

that trial be continued pending the results of additional lab testing on the shell

casings and the gun. The court granted Appellant’s request. On June 6, 2024,

the court scheduled a trial date certain to commence on October 21, 2024.

At a pretrial hearing on October 9, 2024, Attorney Graff informed the

court that he was ready and prepared to proceed to trial, but Appellant wished

to request a continuance so that he could hire another attorney. The court

asked Appellant to state his reasons for his request. Appellant stated that he

wanted to hire a new attorney but needed additional time to accumulate

sufficient funds to do so. The court noted that Appellant had sufficient time

to hire an attorney of his choice as his case had been pending for two and half

-2- J-S42026-25

years, and denied Appellant’s request for a continuance. On October 17,

2024, Appellant sent a handwritten motion to the court, asserting that

Attorney Graff failed to: properly communicate with Appellant, provide

Appellant with all relevant discovery, file any omnibus pretrial motions, and

develop a strategic plan for trial. Appellant further alleged that Attorney Graff

had behaved inappropriately with female members of Appellant’s family.

On October 21, 2024, prior to jury selection, the court addressed

Appellant’s request. The court allowed Appellant to state his concerns

regarding Attorney Graff’s representation on the record. Appellant stated that

he did not feel safe with Attorney Graff representing him and did not feel that

he was prepared to proceed to trial that day. The court noted that Appellant

had ample time to discuss his concerns with Attorney Graff, review the

evidence, and prepare for trial. Appellant responded that Attorney Graff had

not consistently met with Appellant to facilitate such preparation. The court

specifically inquired whether Attorney Graff had met with Appellant and

reviewed the case with him. Appellant acknowledged that Attorney Graff had

done so but stated, “that was probably the only time since this year, ever.”

(N.T. Trial, 10/21/24, at 6).

The court then asked Attorney Graff to respond to Appellant’s

allegations. Attorney Graff stated that he had met with Appellant a number

of times and discussed trial strategies with him. During these meetings,

Appellant had provided conflicting directives on which trial strategy he wished

to pursue. Nevertheless, Attorney Graff stated that he had reviewed the

-3- J-S42026-25

discovery, reviewed the case with Appellant, and was prepared to proceed to

trial. Attorney Graff further reported that he had sent Appellant all available

discovery in a timely manner. Attorney Graff specified that he emailed the

discovery in eight parts to Appellant on March 10, 2023 and March 11, 2023.

This did not include the reports from the subsequent lab tests that were

conducted. Attorney Graff emailed those reports to Appellant on October 14,

2024. The only discovery that Appellant had not received was a compilation

of video footage that Attorney Graff had only received a few days prior to trial.

The court then stated that Attorney Graff was privately retained and

Appellant could have fired him at any point if he was dissatisfied with Attorney

Graff’s representation. The court further noted that trial had been scheduled

for a date certain since July 6, 2024. Appellant responded that he was

unaware that trial was scheduled until the pretrial hearing on October 9, 2024.

The court inquired of Attorney Graff whether he had met with Appellant since

trial had been scheduled and Attorney Graff confirmed that he had. The court

asked Appellant what steps he had taken to replace Attorney Graff. Appellant

stated that he had been trying to procure enough funds to hire another

attorney. The court inquired whether Appellant had applied for an attorney

from the public defender’s office if he felt that he was unable to afford another

private attorney. Appellant acknowledged that he had not done so. The court

ultimately denied Appellant’s request for a continuance to find alternative

counsel. The court informed Appellant that trial would commence that day

and Appellant could elect to continue with Attorney Graff’s representation or

-4- J-S42026-25

proceed pro se with Attorney Graff as standby counsel. Appellant elected to

have Attorney Graff represent him at trial.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented witness testimony and video

evidence that Appellant fired multiple shots at Victim at a public park on March

23, 2022.2 Victim sustained a gunshot wound to the head and died as a result.

Appellant did not testify or present any witnesses in his defense. The jury

found Appellant guilty of all charges. On January 8, 2025, the court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate term of 38½ years to life imprisonment. After

acquiring new counsel, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on February

7, 2025. On February 11, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

and Appellant timely complied on March 4, 2025.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in denying [Appellant’s] request for a continuance to obtain new counsel for his trial on charges including first-degree murder, as the court fixated almost exclusively on the age of the case and moving forward denied [Appellant] the opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice and left him with irreconcilable differences with his counsel?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

Appellant asserts that when he asked for a continuance two weeks prior

to trial, the court focused solely on the length of time that the matter had

2 The details of the evidence set forth at trial are not relevant to the issues on

appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss them in detail here.

-5- J-S42026-25

been pending without adequately considering the basis for Appellant’s

request. Appellant claims that the prior continuances in Appellant’s case were

for legitimate and reasonable grounds and should not have been held against

Appellant. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to articulate any

reasons why a delay in the proceedings would have been prejudicial.

Appellant contends that the court failed to properly consider Appellant’s claims

that Attorney Graff had not communicated with him, had not prepared

adequately or developed a trial strategy. Appellant concludes that the court

abused its discretion in denying his pre-trial and day-of-trial requests for a

continuance, effectively depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

of his choice, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

“The matter of granting or denying a continuance is within the discretion

of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 671

(Pa.Super. 2013). “[T]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude

in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the

witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this

burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons.” Id.

(internal citation omitted). “Accordingly, a trial court exceeds its

constitutional authority only when it exercises its discretion to deny a

continuance on the basis of an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Id. at 671-72

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

-6- J-S42026-25

With respect to the right to counsel, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

has stated:

The right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition to guaranteeing representation of the indigent, these constitutional rights entitle an accused “to choose at his own cost and expense any lawyer he may desire.” Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 213, 150 A.2d 102, 109, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 882, 80 S.Ct. 152, 4 L.Ed.2d 118 (1959). The right to “counsel of one’s own choosing is particularly significant because an individual facing criminal sanctions should have great confidence in his attorney.” Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 307-08, 306 A.2d 283, 288 (1973).

We have held, however, that the constitutional right to counsel of one’s choice is not absolute. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 592–93 & n. 13, 364 A.2d 665, 674 & n. 13 (1976). Rather, “the right of the accused to choose his own counsel, as well as the lawyer’s right to choose his clients, must be weighed against and may be reasonably restricted by the state’s interest in the swift and efficient administration of criminal justice.” Id. at 592, 364 A.2d at 674 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, this Court has explained that while defendants are entitled to choose their own counsel, they should not be permitted to unreasonably “clog the machinery of justice or hamper and delay the state’s efforts to effectively administer justice.” Commonwealth v. Baines, 480 Pa. 26, 30, 389 A.2d 68, 70 (1978). At the same time, however, we have explained that “‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.’” Robinson, 468 Pa. at 593-94, 364 A.2d at 675 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)).

Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 541-42 (Pa.Super. 2009)

(quoting Commonwealth v. McAleer, 561 Pa. 129, 136-37, 748 A.2d 670,

673-74 (2000)).

-7- J-S42026-25

A defendant’s right to choose private counsel “must be exercised at a

reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.” Commonwealth v. Rucker,

563 Pa. 347, 350, 761 A.2d 541, 542-43 (2000) (citation and emphasis

omitted). In evaluating a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance to

obtain private representation, this Court must consider the following factors:

(1) whether the court conducted an extensive inquiry into the underlying causes of defendant’s dissatisfaction with current counsel; (2) whether the defendant’s dissatisfaction with current counsel constituted irreconcilable differences; (3) the number of prior continuances; (4) the timing of the motion for continuance; (5) whether private counsel had actually been retained; and (6) the readiness of private counsel to proceed in a reasonable amount of time.

Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Irreconcilable differences must be more than simply a “strained” relationship

with counsel, lack of faith in counsel, a difference of opinion regarding trial

strategy or a brevity of pretrial communications. Commonwealth v. Floyd,

937 A.2d 494, 497-98, 500 (Pa.Super. 2007). “Where … the defendant and

his counsel offer competing contentions as to the readiness of defense counsel

for trial, it is for the trial court to decide whose portrayal of defense counsel’s

degree of preparedness is more accurate.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 597

Pa. 572, 612, 952 A.2d 594, 618 (2008).

Instantly, the court examined Appellant’s reasons for wanting new

counsel and found that a continuance was not warranted at such a late stage

in the proceedings. In making this determination, the court did not solely

focus on the length of the case but considered it as a significant factor in the

-8- J-S42026-25

totality of the circumstances. At the pretrial hearing on October 9, 2024, the

court inquired of Appellant why he wished to seek new counsel and Appellant

reported that he was securing additional funds to acquire new counsel. In

response, the court noted that the case had been pending for two and a half

years and Appellant had more than adequate time to retain counsel of his

choosing. See Rucker, supra; Prysock, supra.

On October 17, 2024, four days before trial was scheduled to begin,

Appellant raised concerns about Attorney Graff’s representation in a letter sent

to the court. The court addressed these issues before jury selection. The

court permitted Appellant to assert his claims on the record and Appellant

reported that he did not feel Attorney Graff had adequately prepared for his

trial. Upon further inquiry, Appellant acknowledged that Attorney Graff had

met with him and reviewed the case with him. Further, Attorney Graff refuted

Appellant’s claims, stating that he had met with Appellant several times and

reviewed the discovery and trial strategies with Appellant. Counsel further

reported that he had sent Appellant all available discovery, specifying the

dates on which he sent the files to Appellant. Although Attorney Graff

acknowledged that the meetings with Appellant were often fruitless because

Appellant wanted to pursue conflicting trial strategies, Attorney Graff

reaffirmed to the court that he had reviewed Appellant’s case thoroughly and

was prepared to proceed to trial. The court credited Attorney Graff’s

statements and did not find that Appellant’s concerns about Attorney Graff

-9- J-S42026-25

amounted to irreconcilable differences.3 See Cook, supra; Floyd, supra.

The court further found that other factors weighed against granting

Appellant a continuance in the days before trial. See Broitman, supra.

Specifically, the case had been pending for two and a half years, and Attorney

Graff had been representing Appellant since its inception. The court had also

granted Appellant several continuances, including one continuing a prior trial

date certain. Regardless of the reasons for these continuances, Appellant had

more than adequate time to retain alternate counsel if he was dissatisfied with

Attorney Graff’s representation. Nevertheless, Appellant did not inform the

court until two weeks before trial of any dissatisfaction with Attorney Graff.

The court also did not find credible Appellant’s claim that he was unaware that

trial had been scheduled because Attorney Graff confirmed that he had met

with Appellant after the trial date certain was scheduled.

Additionally, Appellant failed to demonstrate that he had taken any

significant steps towards acquiring alternate counsel. Appellant explained that

he was attempting to gather sufficient funds to retain new counsel.

Nevertheless, knowing that trial was scheduled and he did not have sufficient

funds to retain alternate private counsel, Appellant failed to apply with the

3 In his letter, Appellant also alleged that Attorney Graff had behaved inappropriately with female members of Appellant’s family. While the court did not specifically inquire into this allegation, Appellant did not raise this issue or expound upon it when the court permitted Appellant to state his concerns regarding Attorney Graff on the record prior to jury selection. As such, there is no support for this claim on the record.

- 10 - J-S42026-25

public defender’s office to obtain its services. Based on the foregoing, the

court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a continuance to seek new

counsel. On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in

denying Appellant’s requests for a continuance. See Broitman, supra;

Sandusky, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

- 11 -