NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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CARLOS ESPINOZA RODRIGUEZ :
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Appellant : No. 1001 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008311-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: AUGUST 18, 2026 Appellant, Carlos Espinoza Rodriguez, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 15, 2024, in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence for harassment but affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.
Following a domestic dispute with his estranged wife on November 21, 2021, Appellant was charged by criminal complaint with possession of a controlled substance or contraband by an inmate, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a.2), simple possession, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), persons not to possess firearms – illegal alien 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(5), carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1); possession of an instrument of crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(b); terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3); and, harassment, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). Several delays prolonged the progression of this case; however, at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on November 17, 2022,1 the Commonwealth dismissed charges for possession of controlled substance or contraband by an inmate, simple possession, and persons not to possess firearms – illegal alien. All other charges were held for court.
On March 21, 2023, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion asserting, inter alia, that the Commonwealth violated his speedy trial rights by failing to bring this case to trial within the time prescribed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3). 2 Pertinent to this appeal, Appellant alleged in his first Rule 600 motion that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in securing his apprehension and that the resulting period of delay should be included in the Rule 600 calculation. The trial court convened a hearing on Appellant’s motion on April 6, 2023. After the hearing, the motions court determined that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence in attempting to locate and arrest
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1 After Appellant was originally charged on February 21, 2021, a preliminary
hearing was scheduled for December 9, 2021. This hearing was postponed when City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Valerie Donnelly (Officer Donnelly) contracted Covid-19. On December 28, 2021, the re-scheduled date of Appellant’s preliminary hearing, the complainant was not present, and the Commonwealth withdrew the charges. The Commonwealth re-filed the charges on February 18, 2022.
2 Using November 21, 2021, the filing date of the original criminal complaint,
to perform his Rule 600 calculation, Appellant argued that November 21, 2022 served as both the mechanical run date and the adjusted run date for purposes of his March 21, 2023 speedy trial motion. Since Appellant’s trial did not commence before November 21, 2022, Appellant asserted that the Commonwealth violated his prompt trial rights.
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Appellant between February 18, 2022, and November 7, 2022. Accordingly, the court excluded that period from its Rule 600 calculation and denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant’s jury trial was then scheduled to commence on June 20, 2023.
Several further postponements then ensued, and the trial court re-scheduled Appellant’s trial to commence on April 1, 2024. As that trial date approached, Appellant filed a second Rule 600 motion on March 27, 2024. Appellant’s renewed Rule 600 motion asserted that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in failing to secure a Spanish interpreter, leading to periods of delay between June 20, 2023 and October 30, 2023, and then again from February 6, 2024 through March 27, 2024.3 The trial court found that the delays were excludable under the circumstances because the court could not proceed without translators for both sides and the absence of the translators was beyond the Commonwealth’s control despite its exercise of due diligence. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/25, at 2. Accordingly, the court denied Appellant’s renewed Rule 600 motion prior to the commencement of trial on April 1, 2024.
At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of carrying a
firearm without a license, possession of an instrument of crime, terroristic
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3 Both Appellant and the victim are Hispanic and required interpreters. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/25, at 2. According to the trial court, the record showed that both above-referenced postponements were requested by the defense, which now claimed that this characterization constituted trial court error. See id.
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threats, and simple assault.4 On July 15, 2024, the trial court ordered Appellant to serve 11½ to 23 months’ incarceration for carrying a firearm without a license, 12 months’ probation for possession of an instrument of crime, 12 months’ probation for terroristic threats, and 12 months’ probation for simple assault. The trial court imposed Appellants’ probationary sentences to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to his sentence of total incarceration. No guilty verdict on harassment is recorded in the certified record; nonetheless, Appellant received a sentence of 90 days probation, to run concurrent with his other probationary sentences, for this offense. On August 14, 2024, Appellant filed the instant appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?
Whether the sentence imposed for harassment was unlawful because Appellant was never convicted of that offense?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court twice erred in denying separate Rule 600 motions alleging the Commonwealth violated his
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4 Defense counsel filed a post-verdict motion for a new trial on April 5, 2024. That motion was denied on April 12, 2024.
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prompt trial rights. Initially, we set forth our standard of review and then address Appellant’s motions in turn.
Our standard of review in evaluating speedy trial issues is whether the trial court abused its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court's findings and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will[,] ... discretion is abused.
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Rule 600 has the dual purpose of both protecting a defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights and protecting society's right to effective prosecution in criminal cases. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
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Rule 600 mandates, in relevant part, the following:
[(A)](2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
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(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.
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(D) Remedies
(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A), (C), (D) (emphasis added).
The Rule 600 analysis thus entails three steps:
First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. Second, we determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.
If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([D]). As we have explained, Rule 600[ ] encompasses a wide variety of circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any such period of delay results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[]
extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600 run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss the charges.
It is the Commonwealth's burden to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence to avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600.
Commonwealth v. Graves, 328 A.3d 1005, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal case citations omitted).
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Appellant’s first Rule 600 motion, filed March 31, 2023, covers the time period spanning November 21, 2021 (the filing date of Appellant’s first criminal complaint) through March 31, 2023, the filing date of Appellant's original speedy trial motion. Within this date span, Appellant maintains that all time periods should be included in the Rule 600 calculation because they involved the normal progression of the case, which are not excludable under Commonwealth v. Brandt, 337 A.3d 973, 979 (Pa. Super. 2025), or they represent delays attributable to the Commonwealth. As a result, Appellant claims that none of these periods can be excluded from the Rule 600 calculation without assessing the Commonwealth’s due diligence. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant reasons that, because the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence, no time period is excludable, and the mechanical run date and the adjusted run date are both November 21, 2022. Moreover, since March 31, 2023 fell after the mechanical/adjusted run date of November 21, 2022, Appellant maintains he is entitled to relief.
In examining the merits of his first Rule 600 motion, Appellant draws our attention to the period extending from February 18, 2022 through November 7, 2022, a 262-day span that is dispositive of Appellant’s first Rule 600 motion. This period corresponds to a timeframe during which charges had been filed against Appellant, but he had not been apprehended. If this period is included in the Rule 600 calculation, Appellant is entitled to relief; if
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not, the trial court’s order rejecting Appellant’s first Rule 600 motion should be affirmed.
To assess efforts aimed at apprehending criminal suspects who have been charged by criminal complaint, this Court recently explained:
The Comment to Rule 600 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
For purposes of determining the time within which trial must be commenced pursuant to paragraph (A), paragraph (C)(1) makes it clear that any delay in the commencement of trial that is not attributable to the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence must be excluded from the computation of time. Thus, the inquiry for a judge in determining whether there is a violation of the time periods in paragraph (A) is whether the delay is caused solely by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence. If the delay occurred as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth's control and despite its due diligence, the time is excluded. In determining whether the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, the courts have explained that due diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. (citations omitted and formatting altered).
“Under Rule 600(c)(1), time between the filing of the complaint and a defendant's arrest may be excluded from calculation of the trial commencement period, provided the defendant could not be apprehended because his whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence.” Commonwealth v.
McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 406 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Ingram, 591 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa. Super.
1991)). “It is the Commonwealth's burden to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence to avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600.” [Graves, 328 A.3d at 1009]. “The matters of availability and due diligence must be judged by what was done by the authorities rather than by what was not done.”
McNear, 852 A.2d at 406 (citation omitted and emphasis in original); see also Ingram, 591 A.2d at 737 (explaining that “lack of due diligence should not be found simply because
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other options were available or, in hindsight, would have been more productive” (citations omitted)).
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 349 A.3d 435, 441 (Pa. Super. 2025) (emphasis in original).
Appellant offers the following argument in support of his claim that his first Rule 600 motion should have been granted.
Instantly, Officer Donnelly failed to exercise due diligence. She went to [Appellant’s] old address [] and discovered that he had moved. She also knew that [Appellant] drove a red Ford Explorer with an Ohio license plate. When she was on patrol generally, she had a mental checklist of every vehicle of note in all the cases she was investigating; however, she made no other efforts to locate the red Ford Explorer other than noting that it was one of a list of vehicles on her “mental checklist.” Officer Donnelly only searched for [Appellant] on three occasions after the re-filing of charges [on February 18, 2022] until his arrest on November 7, 2022.
Notably, [Appellant] moved a mere two blocks away[.]
Additionally, he was still driving the red Ford Explorer and frequently parked it on the street in front of his new house.
Appellant’s Brief at 23-24 (record citations omitted).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s contentions. At the hearing on April 6, 2023, Officer Donnelly testified that she contacted the complainant as well as Appellant’s former housemates, but no one had seen him or knew his current whereabouts. According to Officer Donnelly, Appellant’s former housemates said he never returned to that residence. In addition, Appellant had no known work address and left no personal items at his former residence which might yield clues to his current location. Officer Donnelly entered Appellant’s information into a database for wanted individuals but never learned a specific address where Appellant might be located. Essentially,
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Appellant asks us to conclude that the Commonwealth’s efforts lacked diligence because Officer Donnelly could have pursued more productive, but unspecified, options. Our case law, however, holds that a lack of due diligence cannot be found on this basis alone.
Because the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in apprehending Appellant, the trial court properly excluded the 262-day period preceding Appellant’s arrest. When the 262-day period is added to the mechanical run date, the adjusted run date becomes August 10, 2023 and, since Appellant filed his first Rule 600 motion on March 31, 2023 (before the proper adjusted run date), the trial court correctly denied Appellant initial Rule 600 motion.
Appellant’s second Rule 600 motion covers the period from March 31, 2023, the filing date of Appellant’s first speedy trial motion, to March 27, 2024, the filing date of Appellant’s second Rule 600 motion. Here, Appellant’s primary contention is that the Commonwealth needed a translator for the complainant since she was a vital witness at Appellant’s trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 28. According to Appellant, the Commonwealth’s unexplained failure to secure a translator constituted a lack of due diligence which left it unprepared to proceed to trial, causing delays stretching from June 20, 2023 through October 30, 2023 and February 6, 2024 through March 27, 2024. See id. Appellant asserts that, when these periods are included in the Rule 600 calculation, the adjusted run date becomes February 3, 2024. See Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant thus concludes that since he was not
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brought to trial by that date, his judgment of sentence should be vacated, and his charges should be dismissed.
Appellant’s argument rests on his contentions that two periods of delay resulted from the Commonwealth’s failure to secure a translator for the complainant and that the Commonwealth did not produce evidence as to why it did not summon a translator for the complainant at Appellant’s trial.5 The trial court found, however, that both postponements were authorized by the trial court at Appellant’s behest. Because the postponements were requested by Appellant, he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under Rule 600.6 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (noting that for purposes of calculating an
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5 The Commonwealth disputes Appellant’s contention that it required a translator to proceed to trial. In fact, the Commonwealth attested to the trial court that it was prepared for trial on June 20, 2023 and February 6, 2024 because the son of Appellant and the complainant was present during this incident, was available to appear in court, spoke English, and did not require translation services. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 34. Moreover, the Commonwealth argues that, even if both parties asked for postponements, the time periods would still be subject to exclusion as joint continuances. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 292 A.3d 601, 611 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Continuances based on joint requests by the Commonwealth and the defendant are excludable time under [Rule 600].”).
6 Appellant also makes a passing claim that the Commonwealth lacked due diligence in failing to produce requested discovery for almost a year. See Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant cites case law holding that the Commonwealth’s failure to complete discovery can establish that it was unprepared to proceed with trial and, thus, failed to discharge its duty of due diligence. See Appellant’s brief at 28. Nevertheless, Appellant’s submission does not specify what materials were requested, what relevance they had for the defense, or how any alleged delay hampered the preparation of Appellant’s trial strategy. Given this lack of development, we are unable to assess this (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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adjusted run date, only periods of delay caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence.).
In his final claim, Appellant asserts that he received a sentence of 90 days’ probation for summary harassment where the record is devoid of any finding of guilt. Asserting that he can only be sentenced for offenses with which he has been charged and found guilty, Appellant maintains that his probationary sentence for harassment should be vacated. See Appellant’s brief at 30, citing Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 307 A.3d 1240, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2023).
The Commonwealth, for its part, admits there is nothing in the certified record that confirms a finding of guilt (either by the jury or the trial court) for the offense of harassment. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 37. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth suggests that Appellant may have waived his claim by failing to ensure that verdict forms completed by the jury were included in the record on appeal. See id. Appellant posits that the issue implicates the legality of his sentence and is therefore not subject to waiver. See Appellant’s Brief at 30, citing Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651, 655 (Pa. 2016)
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aspect of Appellant’s argument and, thus, find it waived. See Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 168 (Pa. 2015) (“Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
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(“courts are empowered to address illegal sentences regardless of issue preservation concerns”). Moreover, in his reply brief, Appellant explains that the summary offense of harassment was bifurcated from the felony and misdemeanor charges and that guilt was to be determined by the trial court. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-2. However, no verdict was rendered by the court on the harassment charge.
Here, the trial court imposed a 90-day probationary sentence for harassment, strongly suggesting that the court believed Appellant had been convicted of that offense. However, there is no confirmation that either the jury or the trial court found Appellant guilty of the harassment charge. Given this state of the record, we are unable, in the absence of a testimonial record, to determine whether a clerical omission occurred. We are aware that, “an obvious and indisputable clerical or transcription error can be corrected, even if time has passed, but only in extremely rare cases[.]” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 310 A.3d 76, 91 (Pa. 2024). Before a recorded verdict may be altered or amended, however, the moving party must establish that the verdict did not reflect the obvious intention of the trier-of-fact. See Commonwealth v. Huett, 341 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. 1975). Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the most prudent course of action is to remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing the court to convene a proceeding at which the parties will have the opportunity to establish whether or not the omitted verdict on harassment failed to reflect
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an obvious intention of the court serving as fact-finder, as expressed in its judgment of sentence. If the omission failed to reflect the court’s obvious intention with respect to Appellant’s culpability for harassment, then the court shall correct the verdict on the record. Accordingly, we shall vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence for harassment but otherwise leave Appellant’s judgment of sentence undisturbed, as the probationary sentence for harassment was imposed concurrently with other supervisory punishments.
Judgment of sentence for harassment vacated. Case remanded for limited proceedings in accordance with this memorandum. Judgment of sentence otherwise affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
DATE: 8/18/2026