J-S19040-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SAVOY S. ROBINSON : : Appellant : No. 2833 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered October 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0807931-2004
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED JUNE 17, 2025
Savoy S. Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals pro se from the order
dismissing his eighth petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).1 Because the petition is facially untimely and Robinson failed to
establish an exception to the statutory time bar, we affirm.
On July 12, 2004, the police arrested Robinson and charged him with
murder and possession of an instrument of a crime. A jury convicted him of
both crimes. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison plus two and a half
to five years of incarceration. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence
on November 14, 2006, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal on May 15, 2007. See Commonwealth v. Robinson,
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546 J-S19040-25
1676 EDA 2005 (Pa. Super. Nov. 14, 2006), appeal denied, 923 A.2d 1173
(Pa. 2007). Between 2007 and 2020, Robinson filed seven PCRA petitions, all
of which he either withdrew or a court dismissed.
Robinson filed the underlying PCRA petition, his eighth, on March 15,
2023. The PCRA court subsequently dismissed the petition. Robinson filed a
timely appeal. He presents the following questions for our review:
[1.] Whether the prosecutor denied [Robinson] his constitutionally protected right to procedural due process of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice?
[2.] Whether the prosecutor committed a misdemeanor of the second degree in violation of the crime codes title 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4114; 18 § 4911(a)(1)(2)(3); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 when the prosecutor obstructed the administration of law, breached official duties?
[3.] Whether trial counsel, direct appeal counsel and PCRA counsel rendered deficient performance/ineffective assistance constituting a miscarriage of justice?
[4.] Whether [Robinson’s] PCRA petition based on newly/after discovered evidence was timely filed pursuant to title 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)—(iii)?
Robinson’s Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted).
Before addressing the claims Robinson raises on appeal, the threshold
question we must address is whether he timely filed the instant PCRA petition
or, alternatively, whether he satisfied an exception to the statutory time bar.
See Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted). “The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in
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order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “As the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law, our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
A petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year of the
date the judgment of sentence becomes final unless the petitioner pleads and
proves that an exception to the time limitation is met. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1). The exceptions to the one-year time bar include:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
Id. A PCRA petition invoking one of the statutory exceptions must be filed
“within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id.
§ 9545(b)(2).
Robinson’s judgment of sentence became final on August 13, 2007, after
the time expired to appeal his conviction to the United States Supreme Court.
Id. § 9545(b)(3). Robinson filed this petition on March 15, 2023, well over
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one year after his judgment of sentence became final. Therefore, Robinson’s
petition is untimely on its face.
Although Robinson identified his satisfaction of a timeliness exception in
his statement of questions involved, Robinson does not address this claim
whatsoever in the argument section of his appellate brief or establish the
applicability of any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. See
Robinson’s Brief. Thus, he has waived his claims. See Commonwealth v.
Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa. 2023) (“Where an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to
develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim
is waived.”) (citation omitted).
Nonetheless, we note that Robinson invoked the newly-discovered fact
exception in his PCRA petition. PCRA Petition, 3/15/2023, at 3. In support,
Robinson stated the following: “The District Attorney’s Office, Lynne M.
Abraham, committed a misdemeanor of the second degree when the District
Attorney’s Office intentionally obstructed and impaired the administration of
law and governmental functions resulting in a trial for first[-]degree murder
and subsequently, a life sentence.” Id. Robinson continued: “On July 21,
2004, the High Court, Supreme Court, determine[d]/ruled that the murder
charge is dismissed for a lack of evidence, I was never re-arrested nor re-
charged for murder by the District Attorney’s, Lynne M. Abraham, Office
before I was tried for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.” Id. at 4.
-4- J-S19040-25
The newly-discovered facts exception requires the petitioner “to
demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and
could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). “Due
diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own
interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new
fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v.
Balestier-Marrero, 314 A.3d 549, 554 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Robinson’s claim appears to relate to the preliminary hearing held in
2004, after which charges, including first- and third-degree murder, were held
over for court, and a second-degree murder charge was dismissed for lack of
evidence. Preliminary Hearing Disposition, 8/17/2004. This does not
constitute a basis for PCRA relief.
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J-S19040-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SAVOY S. ROBINSON : : Appellant : No. 2833 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered October 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0807931-2004
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED JUNE 17, 2025
Savoy S. Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals pro se from the order
dismissing his eighth petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).1 Because the petition is facially untimely and Robinson failed to
establish an exception to the statutory time bar, we affirm.
On July 12, 2004, the police arrested Robinson and charged him with
murder and possession of an instrument of a crime. A jury convicted him of
both crimes. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison plus two and a half
to five years of incarceration. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence
on November 14, 2006, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal on May 15, 2007. See Commonwealth v. Robinson,
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546 J-S19040-25
1676 EDA 2005 (Pa. Super. Nov. 14, 2006), appeal denied, 923 A.2d 1173
(Pa. 2007). Between 2007 and 2020, Robinson filed seven PCRA petitions, all
of which he either withdrew or a court dismissed.
Robinson filed the underlying PCRA petition, his eighth, on March 15,
2023. The PCRA court subsequently dismissed the petition. Robinson filed a
timely appeal. He presents the following questions for our review:
[1.] Whether the prosecutor denied [Robinson] his constitutionally protected right to procedural due process of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice?
[2.] Whether the prosecutor committed a misdemeanor of the second degree in violation of the crime codes title 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4114; 18 § 4911(a)(1)(2)(3); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 when the prosecutor obstructed the administration of law, breached official duties?
[3.] Whether trial counsel, direct appeal counsel and PCRA counsel rendered deficient performance/ineffective assistance constituting a miscarriage of justice?
[4.] Whether [Robinson’s] PCRA petition based on newly/after discovered evidence was timely filed pursuant to title 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)—(iii)?
Robinson’s Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted).
Before addressing the claims Robinson raises on appeal, the threshold
question we must address is whether he timely filed the instant PCRA petition
or, alternatively, whether he satisfied an exception to the statutory time bar.
See Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted). “The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in
-2- J-S19040-25
order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “As the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law, our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
A petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year of the
date the judgment of sentence becomes final unless the petitioner pleads and
proves that an exception to the time limitation is met. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1). The exceptions to the one-year time bar include:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
Id. A PCRA petition invoking one of the statutory exceptions must be filed
“within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id.
§ 9545(b)(2).
Robinson’s judgment of sentence became final on August 13, 2007, after
the time expired to appeal his conviction to the United States Supreme Court.
Id. § 9545(b)(3). Robinson filed this petition on March 15, 2023, well over
-3- J-S19040-25
one year after his judgment of sentence became final. Therefore, Robinson’s
petition is untimely on its face.
Although Robinson identified his satisfaction of a timeliness exception in
his statement of questions involved, Robinson does not address this claim
whatsoever in the argument section of his appellate brief or establish the
applicability of any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. See
Robinson’s Brief. Thus, he has waived his claims. See Commonwealth v.
Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa. 2023) (“Where an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to
develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim
is waived.”) (citation omitted).
Nonetheless, we note that Robinson invoked the newly-discovered fact
exception in his PCRA petition. PCRA Petition, 3/15/2023, at 3. In support,
Robinson stated the following: “The District Attorney’s Office, Lynne M.
Abraham, committed a misdemeanor of the second degree when the District
Attorney’s Office intentionally obstructed and impaired the administration of
law and governmental functions resulting in a trial for first[-]degree murder
and subsequently, a life sentence.” Id. Robinson continued: “On July 21,
2004, the High Court, Supreme Court, determine[d]/ruled that the murder
charge is dismissed for a lack of evidence, I was never re-arrested nor re-
charged for murder by the District Attorney’s, Lynne M. Abraham, Office
before I was tried for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.” Id. at 4.
-4- J-S19040-25
The newly-discovered facts exception requires the petitioner “to
demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and
could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). “Due
diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own
interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new
fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v.
Balestier-Marrero, 314 A.3d 549, 554 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Robinson’s claim appears to relate to the preliminary hearing held in
2004, after which charges, including first- and third-degree murder, were held
over for court, and a second-degree murder charge was dismissed for lack of
evidence. Preliminary Hearing Disposition, 8/17/2004. This does not
constitute a basis for PCRA relief. He ignores that two murder charges were
held over for court and merely presents unsupported arguments that all of his
charges were dismissed and that the district attorney could not prosecute him.
Commonwealth v. Allison, 235 A.3d 359, 364 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding
that “a petitioner does not meet his burden of proving time[-]bar exception
where he offers only general allegations, unsupported by evidence”) (citation
omitted). Moreover, even if it could, Robinson did not plead why he could not
have ascertained the facts related to the 2004 preliminary hearing earlier with
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the exercise of due diligence, which is also fatal to his claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii), (2).2
Robinson failed to sufficiently plead and prove any exception to the
PCRA’s time bar. The PCRA court therefore did not have jurisdiction to decide
the merits of Robinson’s PCRA petition and we likewise lack jurisdiction to
consider the claims he raises on appeal.
Order affirmed.
Date: 6/17/2025
2 We further note that in his PCRA petition, Robinson generally cites to the statutory section setting forth the government interference exception in support of his claim. See PCRA Petition, 3/15/2023, at 8. Robinson, however, presents no argument, either in his PCRA petition or appellate brief, that government interference prevented him from raising a claim related to the alleged dismissal of his charges.
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