NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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ROBERT WILLIAM ROBINSON :
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Appellant : No. 846 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0002459-2021
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and LANE, J. MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: August 27, 2026 Robert William Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury convictions of two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”),1 and one count each of conspiracy to commit PWID, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 2 We affirm.
We glean the underlying facts, which Robinson does not generally dispute, from the trial transcript. Pennsylvania Probation and Parole Agent Max Soellner (“PO Soellner”), testified to the following. In October 2021, he was supervising Robinson on state parole. PO Soellner and with his partner, Agent Todd Yarnell (“PO Yarnell”), went to Robinson’s apartment for a “home
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1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32).
check.” N.T., 5/2/22, at 39. PO Soellner knocked on the exterior rear door of the apartment, identified himself, and heard the sound of “people moving from room to room[,] rustling around,” and one to two minutes later, Robinson opened the door. Id. at 40-41. Robinson “appeared nervous” and like he did not want the officers to “come past the entry door[,] which was unusual with meeting with [him] for over a year.” Id. at 42. The officers described the one-bedroom apartment as “small,” with a “12 by 12” foot living room. Id. at 45, 72. Robinson’s girlfriend, Bridget Bark (“Girlfriend”), also lived in the apartment and was present that day.
In the living room, PO Soellner observed a mattress, with a “spoon which was bent.” Id. at 46. The officer then observed an open “make-up bag,” which contained “a bundle of syringes.” Id. at 46-47. As these items were “suspicious,” PO Soellner decided to search the apartment, which was his “right as a parole agent.” Id. at 47. He contacted another parole agent, Nikalas Bailor (“PO Bailor”) to assist.
PO Soellner and PO Bailor searched the bedroom, which was large enough for a “bed and . . . a little bit of walking room,” and which he knew “from previous experience” was Robinson and Girlfriend’s room. N.T., 5/2/22, at 48, 82. There was male and female clothing, and their identification cards. In or on the nightstand, PO Soellner found “a cardboard watch box[ or] some kind of jewelry box,” which contained “wax packets commonly used for storing narcotics.” Id. at 49. Between the bed frame and mattress, PO Soellner
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found two more similar boxes, which contained “wax packets of suspected fentanyl based [on] the way they were packaged;” these packets were “banded” and inside “small Ziploc baggies.” Id. at 49, 55. “On the bed inside of [a] pillowcase,” there was a wallet containing $100. Id. at 49. PO Soellner also found “a plastic tub/jug that had rolled money that was rubberbanded.” Id. Finally, PO Soellner found a digital scale.
PO Bailor testified that in “an entertainment center,” he found a folder, containing “an envelope that had two bands of money.” Id. at 83. PO Bailor also found “a rolled up band of money” in a shoe organizer in the closet. Id. This cash was in “large denominations.” Id. PO Soellner stated there was $3,000 or $4,000 total found inside the apartment. See id. at 53.
Meanwhile, PO Yarnell searched the living room. On an air mattress, he observed a “clutch purse,” that had “some drug paraphernalia, glassine bags, hypodermic needle[s], and an ID belonging to [Holly Peck, who] was not there.” N.T., 5/2/22, at 72. PO Yarnell found a second “clutch purse,” that contained “some packaging material, glassine bags, some unknown substance that was wrapped in a rubber band,” and twenty to twenty-five blue containers, “about the size of an eraser,” with “a crystalline substance” and removable caps. Id. at 73. Based on the officer’s “training and experience [he] would commonly associate that with drugs.” Id.
The Commonwealth charged both Robinson and Girlfriend with drug offenses. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Before opening statements,
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Robinson made an oral motion in limine to preclude evidence that he was on state parole. He argued that the fact he was a parolee was not evidence of his alleged offenses, and would be “highly prejudicial,” as it would inform the jury he had a prior record and was “incarcerated for a lengthy amount of time above . . . a county sentence.” Id. at 4. The Commonwealth responded that it did not seek to present evidence about “why [Robinson] was on parole,” but “the jury [had] a right to hear exactly why the state parole agents went” to his apartment. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
Robinson also an made oral motion to preclude “untimely discovery”
provided by the Commonwealth, after jury selection, of color photographs of the evidence seized, as well as its expert witness’ report. The trial court denied both motions.
PO Officers Soellner and Bailor testified, as summarized above. The Commonwealth also presented an expert witness, who opined that, based on the packaging of the drugs and the presence of “used and unused packaging” and a digital scale, the evidence supported PWID, not merely possession of drugs for personal use. See N.T., 5/2/22, at 139, 142.
Furthermore, we note that during the Commonwealth’s direct examination of some witnesses, a juror or jurors stated aloud that they could not hear the testimony. The prosecutor responded directly to the juror, asking if they could now hear the testimony. At other times, the prosecutor asked the jurors, unprompted, if they could hear the testimony. On the second day
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of trial, at sidebar, Robinson asked the trial court “to limit the Commonwealth’s interaction with the jury.” N.T., 5/3/22, at 19. The court agreed and advised it would “handle” these types of issues, and noted that it had already directed the jurors to raise their hands if they could not hear. Robinson did not request any further relief. See id.
After the Commonwealth rested its case in chief, Robinson indicated that he intended to call Girlfriend to testify. The trial court advised Girlfriend, who appeared with her attorney, that she had a constitutional right to not answer questions that could be incriminating. Girlfriend then stated that, upon counsel’s advice, she would not testify. See id. at 32.
Robinson stated that he did not anticipate Girlfriend’s decision to not testify. He requested the trial court to declare Girlfriend unavailable to testify, and to admit a prior statement she made to police, via “the officer who took the taped statement.”3 Id. at 34. Specifically, Robinson wished to present Girlfriend’s statements that: she purchased drugs for her and Robinson’s personal use; “at least 50 of the bags belonged to her;” she sold “drugs to her
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3 In support, Robinson cited the statement-against-interest exception to the
general rule prohibiting hearsay. “Hearsay is defined as an out of court statement that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1)-(2). Statements that meet the definition of hearsay are not admissible, unless they fall within an established hearsay exception.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 357 A.3d 480, ___ (Pa. Super. 2026) (en banc). “A statement against interest is often considered trustworthy if it subjects the declarant to criminal liability and a reasonable person would not make the claim unless it was true.” Id. at ___; see also Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3)(A)-(B).
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mother and brother;” but Robinson merely used drugs and did not sell them. See id. at 37, 41. Robinson argued, however, that the court should preclude: (1) the officer’s question to Girlfriend of whether Robinson also sold drugs; and (2) Girlfriend’s response, “I’m sure he has, he’s been to jail before.” Id. at 41, 46. Following extensive argument, the court ruled that it would exclude any reference to Robinson’s prior incarceration, but all of Girlfriend’s other statements were admissible, including her statement that Robinson sold drugs. See id. at 37-48. Robinson then opted to not present Girlfriend’s statement to police at all.
Finally, Robinson testified in his own defense to the following. He and Girlfriend lived at the apartment together. They both had addictions to heroin, and Girlfriend used crack cocaine as well. They bought heroin that was packaged in wax bags, which were in turn inside Ziploc plastic bags. Robinson used fifteen to twenty bags of heroin per day, and Girlfriend used thirty bags. They kept “used bags” because, when they did not have drugs, they could scrape any drugs “sticking to the wax” in order “to stay well.” N.T., 5/3/22, at 19 at 55. Robinson denied that he and Girlfriend had an agreement to sell or distribute drugs. See id. at 71.
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The jury found Robinson guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance and PWID , and one count each of conspiracy to commit PWID and possession of drug paraphernalia.4 On July 22, 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven to fourteen years’ imprisonment with a concurrent one year’s probation.
Robinson filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Robinson filed a notice of appeal,5 and he and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Robinson presents six issues for our review:6
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Robinson’s] pretrial motion to preclude the Commonwealth from informing the jury that [Robinson]was on state parole, where such evidence was highly prejudicial, not necessary to establish any element of the offenses charged, and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
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4 Robinson initially filed a post-trial motion, which the trial court denied without prejudice for him to re-raise his issues after sentencing.
5 The trial court denied the post-sentence motion on November 23, 2022. Robinson had thirty days, or until Friday, December 23, 2022, to file a notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Robinson, however, did not file a notice of appeal until December 27, 2022. Nevertheless, we note that although the trial court properly advised Robinson of his post-sentence and appeal rights at the time of sentencing, its order denying the post-sentence motion did not do the same. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(b)(4)(a) (stating that “[a]n order denying a post-sentence motion . . . shall include notice to the defendant of . . . the right to appeal and the time limits within which the appeal must be filed”). We construe this failure to be a breakdown in the court’s operations, and we may overlook the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 499 (Pa. Super. 2007).
6 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief.
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II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and violated [Robinson’s] rights to due process and a fair trial by ruling that the unavailable co-defendant’s statement could be admitted only in its entirety — without redaction of references to [Robinson’s]
prior drug-dealing conviction — thereby forcing the defense to forgo otherwise exculpatory evidence to avoid impermissible propensity prejudice.
III. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Robinson’s] pretrial motion to exclude photographs and expert report untimely disclosed by the Commonwealth after the jury had been empaneled, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, where the late disclosure deprived the defense of a fair opportunity to prepare and resulted in prejudice to [Robinson].
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence, consisting of statutory maximum sentences imposed consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration, without properly considering the sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721(b).
V. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to engage in improper interaction with the jury, thereby undermining the fairness of the trial and depriving [Robinson] of due process.
VI. Whether [Robinson] is entitled to a new trial where the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and so contrary to the evidence as to shock the conscience.
Robinson’s Brief at 10-11.
In his first issue, Robinson avers the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he was on state parole at the time of the underlying incident. “We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 271 (Pa. Super. 2021).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
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(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that under Rule 404(b),
the Commonwealth cannot present evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts solely for the purpose of establishing the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes (i.e., because he did it once, he probably did it again). See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).
However, subsection (b)(2) clarifies that other bad acts evidence may be admissible if it is offered for another (legitimate)
purpose. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Rule 404(b)(2) includes a nonexclusive list of other purposes, permitting other bad acts evidence when it tends to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” . . .
Commonwealth v. Walker, 350 A.3d 54, 61-62 (Pa. 2026) (paragraph break added and footnote omitted).
In addition, our Supreme Court has stated:
Another “special circumstance” where evidence of other crimes may be relevant and admissible is where such evidence was part of the chain or sequence of events which became part of the history of the case and formed part of the natural development of the facts. This special circumstance, sometimes referred to as the “res gestae” exception to the general proscription against evidence of other crimes, is also known as the “complete story”
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rationale, i.e., evidence of other criminal acts is admissible “to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.”
Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1988) (citations omitted).
Robinson alleges that the evidence of his parole status “directly implicated that [he] was a convicted criminal and that [his] criminal convictions were serious enough that it resulted in incarceration,” and thus was “highly prejudicial.” Robinson’s Brief at 24, 25. Robinson contends that the evidence had “minimal probative value” and was not necessary to establish any element of the charged offenses. Id. Robinson further asserts that although the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could not refer to the length of time he had been on parole, PO Soellner testified that it was one year. Robinson acknowledges that the trial “court admonish[ed] the Commonwealth at sidebar, but” avers that it gave no curative instruction. Id. at 25. Finally, Robinson claims the court’s ruling violated Commonwealth v. Matthews, 783 A.2d 338 (Pa. Super. 2001), in which this Court held the prosecutor improperly “introduced the highly prejudicial testimony that a Commonwealth witness [was the] defendant’s parole officer.” Id.
In its opinion, the trial court reasoned:
In this matter it was integral to the Commonwealth’s presentation of evidence to explain how the controlled substances in the [Robinson’s] residence were discovered. In light of the fact that [Robinson’s] parole officers were conducting a search of [Robinson’s] residence, this Court believes that it was reasonable and relevant for the prosecution to explain who was in [Robinson’s] residence and why. We believe that the testimony concerning the witness[es]’s status as parole officers completed
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the story and explanation of the crime which was on trial and provided immediate context of the happenings near the time and place of the crime. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 5.
After review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting PO Soellner’s testimony that he was Robinson’s parole officer. See Gilliam, 249 A.3d at 271. Robinson’s underlying charges stem entirely from the parole officers’ search of his apartment and seizure of incriminating evidence. The search, therefore, was an integral part of the factual summary. On appeal, Robinson does not address, let alone dispute, the trial court’s reasoning that his parole status was relevant to explain why the officers were at his apartment in the first instance and why they came to search it. On this basis, we conclude Robinson has failed to explain why the trial court’s reasoning was in error. See Commonwealth v. Kepner, 34 A.3d 162, 166 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant”).
Furthermore, we determine the court did not abuse its discretion under the res gestae exception to the general Rule 404(b) prohibition of prior bad acts. See Lark, 543 A.2d at 497. We also reject Robinson’s claim that any prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence; none of the Commonwealth’s witnesses or evidence made reference to the nature of Robinson’s prior offenses, nor any other aspect of his criminal history.
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Finally, we reject Robinson’s claim that the trial court’s ruling was inconsistent with Matthews. In that case, the defendant entered the elderly victim’s home, held a screwdriver to her neck, demanded her purse, and fled. See Matthews, 783 A.2d at 338-39. In a subsequent interview with a detective, the defendant referred to “facts [about the incident that were] not circulating within the community,” which indicated his involvement in the crime. Id. at 339. At trial, the defendant presented the testimony of Robert DeSantis (“DeSantis”), in order to show that he learned of these facts from DeSantis. See id. The Commonwealth then sought to present evidence that DeSantis was the defendant’s parole officer, relying on an exception recognized in Commonwealth v. Saxton, 532 A.2d 352 (Pa. 1987), and Commonwealth v. Powers, 577 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super. 1990). This exception permitted “a defendant’s prior crimes in order to rebut statements which create improper or false inferences favorable to the defendant.” Id. at 339, 341. The Commonwealth argued the defendant’s “purpose in introducing DeSantis’ testimony was to falsely suggest to the jury that facts about the crimes were circulating within the community at large.” Id. at 339. The trial court agreed and admitted the evidence. See id. On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court erred. See id. We reasoned that the defendant had not, as argued by the Commonwealth, “falsely suggested to the jury through DeSantis’ testimony that facts about the crimes were circulating within the community at large.” Id.
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In the instant case, the trial court determined that Matthews “presented sufficiently different facts than the present matter.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 5. Despite this rationale, on appeal Robinson does not address the facts of Matthews nor explain why they correlate to this case. After our review, we agree with the trial court that Matthews is distinguishable and thus not binding on this appeal. That decision expressly addressed the Saxton and Powers exception, which permits “a defendant’s prior crimes in order to rebut statements which create improper or false inferences favorable to the defendant.” Matthews, 783 A.2d at 339, 341. No such exception is implicated here. For the foregoing reasons, no relief is due on Robinson’s first issue.
In his second issue, Robinson avers the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to redact, from Girlfriend’s prior statement to police, references to Robinson’s “prior conviction for drug dealing.”7 Robinson’s Brief at 28 (emphasis added). Robinson claims that this was “not offered to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake, or any other recognized exception” to Rule 404(b). Id. Instead, the evidence’s “only effect was to inform the jury that” Robinson previously sold drugs “ — precisely the inference Rule 404(b) forbids.” Id. Furthermore, “the Commonwealth’s case hinged on constructive
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7 We note that on appeal, Robinson makes no reference to the fact that Girlfriend was his girlfriend and they lived together at the apartment. Instead, he refers to her throughout his brief as “codefendant.” Robinson’s Brief at 10, 27-31.
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possession and intent to deliver,” and “evidence that [Girlfriend] admitted [to] selling the drugs . . .went directly to ownership, intent, and control,” and “could have materially altered [the jury’s] assessment of guilt.” Id. at 30 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Robinson contends that the court’s ruling “coerced” him to make “an untenable choice:” (1) introduce Girlfriend’s statement and thus “allow the jury to hear that [Robinson] previously sold drugs, effectively conceding the most damaging fact imaginable in a PWID prosecution; or” (2) not introduce Girlfriend’s statement, “thereby forfeiting powerful exculpatory evidence that [Girlfriend] admitted responsibility for the drugs.” Id. at 28, 29.
We determine Robinson has waived this issue for failure to include it in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. The statement presented the following issue: “whether refusal to limit the unavailable witness’ statement against interest as it related to [his] incarceration for drug delivery was in error.” Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1926(b) [sic], 1/26/23, at unnumbered 1-2 (emphasis added and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In its opinion, the trial court characterized Robinson’s claim as “inaccurate.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 6. It noted that it did exclude “specific references to his prior incarceration.” Id. at 7; see also N.T., 5/3/22, at 48.
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In his brief, Robinson does not address the trial court’s rationale, and instead presents a different claim — that the court erred in refusing to redact references to his prior conviction of drug dealing. Because he did not include this in his Rule 1925(b) statement, we determine he has waived it. See Interest of D.C., 263 A.3d 326, 335 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) for the principle that “issues not included in an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement are waived”).
Moreover, even if Robinson had not waived this claim, we would determine no relief is due. We note:
all evidence is necessarily prejudicial:
Probative value and prejudice are conjoined in the sense that if evidence is probative at all, it is necessarily prejudicial to one side or the other — if evidence has no probative value, it ought not be admitted in the first place, and this can usually be determined before trial. The balancing inquiry . . . is a fact- and context-specific one that is normally dependent on the evidence actually presented at trial.
The value of evidence is obviously a fluid notion, and the prejudicial effect of the evidence is likewise in flux as matters progress.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 245 A.3d 710, 722 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
At trial, Robinson sought to introduce Girlfriend’s prior statement that she sold drugs to her mother and brother. Robinson sought to exclude, however, both: (1) the officer’s question of whether Robinson also sold drugs; and (2) Girlfriend’s’ reply that he did. The Commonwealth responded that it
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would be unfair to allow the first statement, above, but disallow it from exploring the second statement. See N.T., 5/3/22, at 47. The trial court reasoned that Robinson could not “have it both ways,” and that it would be inappropriate “to allow portions of the statement to come in and then restrict the other party from presenting other portions of the statement.” Id. at 40, 48. The court reasoned:
[W]hat’s to prevent [Robinson from] arguing, [“T]the police never asked if he [sold drugs?”]
I mean, you’re precluding the Commonwealth from eliciting any response to what would have been a reasonable question under the circumstances. You’re putting it at issue that [the officer]
asked [Girlfriend] if she sold [drugs] so that you can get in that she’s the dealer[. B]ut you don’t want any responses to [the]
questioning [about Robinson].
Id. at 42.
When asked by the trial court for a “legal theory” for redacting that portion of Girlfriend’s statement, Robinson did not provide one. See id. Instead, he replied that he would not “say[] anything like the police didn’t ask her if he sells[.]” Id.
Similarly, on appeal, Robinson does not address the trial court’s rationale, that where the police officer asked Girlfriend whether she and Robinson both sold drugs, it would be inappropriate to allow only a portion of her response. See id. at 40. We reiterate that all of the Commonwealth’s evidence is prejudicial in nature. See Williams, 245 A.3d at 722. We would decline to hold that, in the particular circumstances of this case, that
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Girlfriend’s full response to the officer’s question would be unduly prejudicial. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude no relief is due on Robinson’s second issue.
Before addressing Robinson’s third issue, we first set forth the following relevant procedural history. At trial, before the parties gave their opening statements, Robinson made an oral motion “to preclude untimely discovery” provided by the Commonwealth approximately one week earlier, one “week after jury selection.” N.T., 5/2/22, at 1. First, the Commonwealth had provided sixteen color photographs, showing the evidence collected from the apartment: money, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Robinson conceded that the incident report stated that the police took photographs of the evidence and placed them “under this incident number,” but argued it was “not reflected under the properties in the incident report[,] where they list all the evidence.” Id. at 2-3. Robinson argued that: (1) he “decided to advance to trial [based on] the discovery provided by the Commonwealth,” but these photographs were not included; and (2) “any kind of visual aid in color . . . would be prejudicial.” Id. at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). When questioned by the trial court, however, Robinson stated that this evidence did not affect the strategy of his defense, nor his decision on whether to plead guilty. See id. at 4.
The trial court denied Robinson’s motion to preclude the evidence, finding that he was “not prejudiced by any late discovery,” and was not “able
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to articulate how [his] strategy would’ve changed as a result of the actual photographs of the evidence.” N.T., 5/2/22, at 10. In its opinion, the court further reasoned that Robinson had not “filed any motion to compel production of the photographs that . . . were referenced in the discovery material.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 7.
Second, Robinson averred that the Commonwealth untimely provided its expert’s report. Defense counsel acknowledged that “four days before jury selection,” she was aware the Commonwealth could call an expert witness. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, at the time of jury selection, Robinson indicated that he was prepared to move forward with jury section, and he had not requested any continuance due to the “notice of expert filing.” Id. at 9. Furthermore, Robinson conceded that he anticipated the expert would “be called to testify on the issue of whether . . . the drugs were possessed with intent to deliver as opposed to personal use.” Id.
The trial court similarly denied Robinson’s motion to preclude the expert’s report. It considered that, before jury selection, Robinson was aware of the expert witness as well as his anticipated testimony, but did not raise any challenge to the late notice. See id. at 10. Thus, the court found no undue prejudice to Robinson.
On appeal, Robinson avers the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude this untimely disclosed discovery. Robinson claims the Commonwealth violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(f), which requires it to
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disclose documents or photos, which it intends to use at trial, within a reasonable time prior to trial. Robinson maintains that he “had no meaningful opportunity to analyze [the] image clarity, chain of custody context, [or] authentication, [nor] seek expert review [sic] or potential objections.” Robinson’s Brief at 34-35. Robinson adds that the trial court erred in concluding he suffered no prejudice, where: (1) he “was forced to commit to trial and jury selection without knowing the Commonwealth would use visual evidence or . . . expert testimony;” and (2) “the late-disclosed evidence likely influenced the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 35-36, 37 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Robinson claims the photographs, “particularly in color,” altered the evidentiary weight of the Commonwealth’s case mid-stream [sic],” as “visual evidence of drugs and paraphernalia carrie[d] an inherent emotional and persuasive force that written descriptions and testimony do not.” Id. at 37 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We note: “The trial court has broad discretion in choosing the appropriate remedy for a discovery violation. Our scope of review is whether the court abused its discretion in not excluding evidence[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 200 A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573(B)(1)(f) provides:
In all court cases, on request by the defendant, and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney all of the following requested items or information, provided they are material to the instant case[:]
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(f) any tangible objects, including documents, photographs, fingerprints, or other tangible evidence[.]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(f). This Court has explained:
If a discovery violation occurs, the court may grant a trial continuance or prohibit the introduction of the evidence or may enter any order it deems just under the circumstances.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E)[]. The trial court has broad discretion in choosing the appropriate remedy for a discovery violation. . . .
A defendant seeking relief from a discovery violation must demonstrate prejudice. A violation of discovery “does not automatically entitle appellant to a new trial.” Rather, an appellant must demonstrate how a more timely disclosure would have affected his trial strategy or how he was otherwise prejudiced by the alleged late disclosure.
Brown, 200 A.3d at 993 (paragraph break added and some citations omitted).
After careful review, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See id. Robinson fails to address any of the trial court’s reasoning: that he was aware the police took and filed photographs of the evidence, but did not request them; and receipt of the photographs did not affect his defense strategy, nor decision on whether to plead guilty. With respect to the expert’s report, we reiterate that at trial, Robinson conceded he anticipated the expert to testify there was evidence “indicative of distribution,” “as opposed to personal use.” N.T., 5/2/22, at 9. We do not disturb the trial court’s conclusion that Robinson failed to establish prejudice. See Brown, 200 A.3d at 993. Thus, we conclude no relief is due on Robinson’s third issue.
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In his fourth issue, Robinson avers the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. He argues that the trial court imposed statutory maximum sentences to run consecutively, “without an adequate statement of reasons,” which resulted in a “grossly disproportionate” aggregate term of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration for nonviolent drug offenses.” Robinson’s Brief at 39-40, 43-44. Robinson avers the trial court did not meaningfully consider: (1) the 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) sentencing factors, including his individual background and rehabilitative potential; nor (2) mitigating factors, including the lack of violence, “lack of evidence of large-scale trafficking,” and his “level of addiction” and rehabilitative needs. Id. at 40, 41, 42. Instead, “the trial court focused almost exclusively on the seriousness of the offenses and the need for punishment.” Id. at 42. Robinson also contends he “will not be off parole until nearly his seventies, encroaching on his life expectancy [sic].” Id. at 41.
This Court has explained:
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
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“We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.”
Allowance of appeal will be permitted only when the
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appellate court determines that there is a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. . . .
Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1210 (Pa. Super. 2021) (some citations omitted).
Here, Robinson has filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved the above issues in his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. See Robinson’s Brief at 20-22. We determine that his challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentences, combined with his allegation that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial question invoking our review. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (holding that the defendant’s “challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs . . . presents a substantial question”). Robinson’s assertion, that the trial court failed to consider the section 9721(b) factors, also raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1002-03 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating “that claims that court failed to consider factors in Section 9721(b) and imposition of a manifestly excessive sentence raises a substantial question”). We thus proceed to consider the merits of these issues.
“When reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, we determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion.” Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770.
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When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 [Pa.C.S.] § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
And, of course, the court must consider the sentencing guidelines.
Id. at 768 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
This Court has also stated:
“[L]ong standing precedent . . . recognizes that [the Sentencing Code] affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. We will not disturb consecutive sentences unless the aggregate sentence is “grossly disparate” to the defendant’s conduct, or “viscerally appear[s] as patently unreasonable.”
Moreover, it is well-settled that when the trial court has the benefit of a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report, it is presumed that the court was both aware of and appropriately weighed all relevant information contained therein.
Brown, 249 A.3d at 1212 (paragraph break added and some citations omitted).
At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth pointed out that the conspiracy count and one count of PWID involved fentanyl, which affected the sentencing guidelines. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 3. The Commonwealth also summarized that: Robinson has “close to 25 years” of criminal behavior in Blair County, involving drugs and drug deliveries; he was on state supervision for two prior PWID cases at the time of his arrest; and he “was not even [permitted] to be around drugs or committing any types of crimes.” Id. at 4- 5. The Commonwealth argued there have been “multiple” attempts to
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rehabilitate Robinson, but they have been unsuccessful. Id. at 5. The Commonwealth requested sentences within the guideline ranges for the conspiracy and two PWID counts, all to run consecutively, for an aggregate minimum term around twelve to fourteen years. See id. at 4.
Robinson argued that the underlying charges did not involve a firearm, “controlled buys, search warrants,” nor “an ongoing investigation.” Id. at 7. Robinson cited his addiction to “an extremely addictive drug,” and argued that all of his criminal history was the result of drug use. Id. at 9. Robinson requested drug treatment, available to him at both “the county and state level.” Id. Robinson requested a sentence of fifteen months. See id. at 11.
The trial court imposed the following sentences: (1) five to ten years’
imprisonment for conspiracy; (2) five to ten years’ imprisonment for PWID of fentanyl, to run concurrently; (3) two to four years’ imprisonment for PWID of cocaine, to run consecutively; (4) one year’s probation for possession of drug paraphernalia, to run concurrently;8 and (5) no further penalty on the two possession of a controlled substance counts. The aggregate sentence was thus seven to fourteen years’ imprisonment with a concurrent one year’s probation.
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8 Recently, an en banc panel of this Court held “that the language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) (sentencing generally) clearly and unambiguously permits trial courts to impose concurrent terms of probation and total confinement.” Commonwealth v. Jennings, 351 A.3d 1215, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2026) (en banc).
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The trial court stated that it reviewed the PSI; thus, we presume it considered all the relevant information. See Brown, 249 A.3d at 1212. The court acknowledged that all of the sentences were within the standard range guidelines, which it “believe[d was] appropriate to follow in this particular case.” Order of Sentence, 7/22/22, at 5. The court considered “the mitigating circumstances contained in the [PSI] regarding [Robinson’s] family support and prior drug and alcohol condition.” Id. However, the court further noted “that this appears to be” his third felony drug conviction. Id. The court stated that although it imposed one sentence to run consecutively, it imposed the others to run concurrently. The court reasoned: “We believe that this sentence has appropriately balanced the factors that weigh in conformity of public safety and the principles of deterrence and retribution.” Id. at 6. Finally, the court requested the Board of Probation and Parole consider appropriate drug and alcohol treatment, and any psychological assessments necessary to reduce Robinson’s risk of recidivism. See id. at 4.
After careful review, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence. Contrary to Robinson’s claims, the court considered mitigating factors, including his family circumstances and his longtime drug addiction. The court also stated its reasons for directing that two imprisonment sentences run consecutively, while the remaining run concurrently. The court also properly considered the section 9721(b) factors — the protection of the public and Robinson’s rehabilitative needs. See 42
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Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Accordingly, we conclude no relief is due on Robinson’s fourth issue.
In his fifth issue, Robinson avers the trial court erred in permitting improper jury interaction by the Commonwealth. Generally, “[o]ur review of . . . an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, 260 A.3d 272, 281 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5 provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order;
(c) communicate with a juror . . . if:
(1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order; [or]
(d) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
Pa.R.P.C. 3.5 (a)-(c)(1), (d).
Robinson avers “the Commonwealth repeatedly engaged inappropriately with the jury . . . 14 times throughout the 2-day trial,” by asking “needless questions to gain rapport with, and influence, the jury in violation of Rule of
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Professional Conduct 3.5(a).”9 Robinson’s Brief at 46-47 (citing N.T., 5/2/22, at 30, 52, 54, 58, 59, 82, 98, 120, 141; N.T., 5/3/22, at 7, 18). Robinson acknowledges that the trial court sustained his objection “and directed a moratorium of the Commonwealth’s interactions with the jury,” but asserts the “court failed to intervene or provide curative instructions.” Id. at 47.
The trial court acknowledged that the Commonwealth “did on occasion look to the jurors and make comments asking . . . if they were able to hear and see certain evidence . . . presented during trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 5. The court also summarized that after Robinson objected, it directed the Commonwealth to refrain from such further interaction. The court did
not believe that the [Commonwealth] was seeking to improperly influence the jurors, nor . . . communicating with the jurors in an ex parte or inappropriate manner. Therefore, this Court finds no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct by the [Commonwealth] nor do we believe that there is any basis for granting a new trial for this reason.
Id.
After careful review, we determine Robinson is not entitled to a new trial. See Campbell, 260 A.3d at 281. As noted above, the Commonwealth’s
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9 Robinson cites Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(a)-(b), and not Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(a)-(b). See Robinson’s Brief at 46. We note he omits subsection (c) of the rule, which specifically addresses an attorney’s communication with a juror. Nevertheless, as the Model rule and Pennsylvania rule are identical, we review his argument under the Pennsylvania rule.
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comments to the jurors related to whether they could hear the witness examination or see the evidence. See, e.g., N.T., 5/2/22, at 52 (prosecutor asking the jury, “Can everybody hear him okay?”), 54 (“[C]an everyone see that okay?”); N.T., 5/3/22, at 18 (“Could you hear her? You couldn’t?”). Robinson does not claim that the Commonwealth made improper remarks regarding the evidence or proceedings.
Furthermore, we note that on the second day of trial, Robinson objected at sidebar, and the following exchange occurred:
[Robinson’s counsel:] Judge, I would just ask that the Court try to limit the Commonwealth’s interaction with the jury.
[Court:] I agree, [Commonwealth attorney.]
[Commonwealth:] I was just trying to make sure they could hear, Judge. I’m sorry.
[Court:] Yeah, that back-and-forth with you and the jury, you let me handle that. I mentioned that yesterday that they should raise their hand if they can’t hear.
[Commonwealth:] Okay. That’s fine.
N.T., 5/3/22, at 19.
Robinson did not make any further objection nor request for relief.
Accordingly, to the extent he now avers the trial court should have “intervene[d,] provide[d] curative instructions,” or taken any further action, he has waived such arguments for failure to raise them. Robinson’s Brief at 47; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”);
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Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett, 251 A.3d 811, 819 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that where appellant did “not point to where he asked the court to provide a curative instruction,” he waived the issue). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude no relief is due on Robinson’s fifth issue.
In his final issue, Robinson avers the jury’s guilty verdicts for PWID and conspiracy to commit PWID were against the weight of the evidence.10 We consider the applicable standard of review:
When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we review “the trial court’s exercise of discretion.” A reversal of a verdict is not necessary “unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” The fact-finder also has the responsibility of “resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility.”
We give great deference to the trial court’s decision regarding a weight of the evidence claim because it “had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented.”
Roane, 204 A.3d at 1001 (citations omitted).
“Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of [the trial court's] discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 351 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
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10 Robinson included this issue in his post-sentence motion, and thus has preserved it for our review. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(2).
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trial should be granted in the interest of justice.” Commonwealth v. Bright, 234 A.3d 744, 749 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). “[T]he Commonwealth ‘may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.’” Id.(citation omitted).
The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act11 defines the crimes of possession of a controlled substance and PWID as follows:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
****
(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance . . .
****
(30) . . . the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . ..
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30).
The Crimes Code12 defines the offense of conspiracy in pertinent part as follows:
. . . A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime[.]
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11 See 35 P.S. §§ 780-101 to 780–144.
12 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-9546.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1). This Court has explained:
“Proof of a conspiracy is almost always extracted from circumstantial evidence. The Commonwealth may present a ‘web of evidence’ linking the defendant to the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must, however, rise above mere suspicion or possibility of guilty collusion.” We have held that, “[a]mong the circumstances which are relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove a corrupt confederation are: (1) an association between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime;
and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy.”
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 873–74 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations omitted). “The defendant does not need to commit the overt act; a co-conspirator may commit the overt act.” Id. at 873 (citation omitted).
Robinson concedes the evidence supported the charges of simple possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. However, he avers the Commonwealth’s evidence, to establish PWID and conspiracy to commit PWID, was unreliable and contradictory. In support, Robinson asserts: (1) “the police conducted virtually no investigation before charging” him; (2) the evidence against him rested “on mere presence and joint access;” and (3) there was no evidence that he had an agreement to deliver controlled substances. Robinson’s Brief at 47-48. Robinson concludes that the jury’s failure “to follow proper instructions in deciding for the Commonwealth based on legally insufficient evidence . . . combined with the deprivation of” of his due process rights, “by permitting his status of state parole, untimely
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discovery, prejudicial prior-bad-acts and improper jury interaction,” require the overturning of his verdict. Id. at 49-50. Within these arguments, Robinson also asserts the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence.13 The trial court found that under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence supported the verdicts. The court reasoned:
[T]his case boils down to parole officers searching [Robinson’s]
residence and finding amounts of controlled substances that they allege were sufficient for a conclusion that [Robinson possessed]
the controlled substances with the intent to deliver. In addition to finding the controlled substances at [Robinson’s] residence, the Commonwealth's witnesses also testified that a substantial sum of money was located in the home and that [Robinson] did not have any credible source of income to explain the sum of money.
[T]he controlled substances were accompanied by material that the Commonwealth asserted was material for the packaging of the controlled substances for sale. In addition to the facts and circumstances testified to by the law enforcement officers, the
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13 We remind counsel:
[A] sufficiency of the evidence review does not include an assessment of credibility of testimony offered by the Commonwealth. Instead, such arguments are more properly characterized as challenges to weight of evidence. [A] claim that the jury erred in crediting a victim’s version of events over that of [the defendant] goes to the weight, not to the sufficiency of the evidence).
In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an “appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail[,]” where an appellant phrases an issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but the argument that the appellant provides goes to the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted).
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Commonwealth also presented expert testimony that the controlled substances were possessed with the intent to deliver.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 4.
After a review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on Robinson’s weight of the evidence challenge. See Roane, 204 A.3d at 1001. As noted above, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by circumstantial evidence, and with respect to conspiracy, “may present a ‘web of evidence’ linking the defendant to the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Vargas, 108 A.3d at 873; see also Bright, 234 A.3d at 749. The Commonwealth presented uncontradicted testimony that when PO Soellner knocked on Robinson’s door and identified himself, he heard “people moving from room to room[,] rustling around.” N.T., 5/2/22, at 41. Although the apartment was small, Robinson did not open the door for one to two minutes. He “appeared nervous” and like he did not want the officers to “come past the entry door[,] which was unusual” for him. Id. at 42. The officers found incriminating evidence throughout the apartment: baggies of drugs in the living room and in the bedroom, between the bed frame and mattress in the bedroom; and money from a wallet that was inside a pillowcase on the bed, in a plastic tub, in a folder in an entertainment center, and in a shoebox in the closet. Robinson and Girlfriend lived together and shared the bedroom. This circumstantial evidence supported the trial court’s denial of relief on this weight challenge. Accordingly, we conclude no relief is due on Robinson’s sixth issue.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence imposed against Robinson.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 8/27/2026