J-A20043-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARY ELLEN ROBERTS : : Appellant : No. 3171 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0001363-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2024
Appellant, Mary Ellen Roberts, appeals from the August 31, 2023
judgment of sentence entered by the Chester County Court of Common Pleas
following her convictions for Hindering Prosecution and Tampering with
Evidence.1 After careful consideration of Appellant’s challenges addressing
the sufficiency of the evidence, corpus delicti, and hearsay, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
The following is the relevant factual and procedural history relating to
Appellant’s convictions for destroying evidence to protect her son, Michael
Roberts (“Son”), from prosecution for drug crimes. In late June and early July
2021, West Chester Borough Police Detectives investigated Son for drug
trafficking in coordination with the Chester County High Intensity Drug
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5105(a)(3), 4910(1). J-A20043-24
Trafficking Area Task Force’s investigation of a multi-state drug trafficking
organization, of which they believed Son was a part. During the investigation,
officers observed Son making multiple hand-to-hand transactions and
engaging in seven controlled sales of “suspected Fentanyl compressed pills”
to confidential informants. Trial Ct. Op., 2/21/24, at 5. Officers believed
Appellant stored his supply in the house he shared with Appellant because he
was able to fill the confidential informants’ requests within 30 minutes, without
leaving the house. Id. at 7-8.
On July 9, 2021, police officers arrested Son for selling suspected
Fentanyl pills immediately following a controlled buy. After his arrest, officers
secured the house in which he lived with Appellant, while waiting for a search
warrant for the house. Appellant arrived at the home after Son’s arrest but
prior to the issuance of the warrant.
While Appellant was still outside the house, she spoke with Detective
Oscar Rosado and Detective Sergeant Jeremy Rubincan, who told her that Son
had been arrested for selling controlled substances. Detective Sergeant
Rubincan informed Appellant that Son was “working for some dangerous
individuals[,]” that the investigation of Son was part of a larger investigation
into an “organization” supplying pills that had caused overdose deaths in
Chester County, and that the officers “were attempting to take down this
organization and stop the overdoses.” N.T., 6/1/23, at 174, 194. The
detective stated that this conversation occurred prior to the issuance of the
search warrant. Id.
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After instructing her not to tamper with evidence, the officers allowed
Appellant to enter the house to put away groceries, take care of her pets, and
obtain her computer so that she could work on the back porch in view of the
officers. Officers eventually permitted her to work inside the house, where
officers could see her through a window. Officers subsequently determined
that at some point Appellant had entered the house “without the
accompaniment of the detective.” Id. at 177.
After officers obtained the warrant, they searched the house and found
“nothing of significance,” which surprised the officers in light of Son’s drug
sales in the weeks prior and on the day in question. Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Officers
had hoped to recover Son’s pills to determine Son’s relationship with the larger
drug trafficking organization based upon the quantity, branding, and
packaging of the pills. Following the initial search, the officers left the house.
Soon after, Detective Sergeant Rubincan spoke with Son, and then
directed Detective Jonathan Shave and Detective Rosario to return to the
house for a second search, because he “had a feeling that there was
something that [they] missed. N.T., 6/1/23, at 180-81. The second search
also revealed nothing.
Following the second search, Detective Rosado asked Appellant “if she
had discarded any evidence.” Id. at 103. Appellant admitted that she had
flushed the pills down the toilet. Id. at 103-06
Later in the day, Appellant repeated the same information to Detective
Shave during a recorded and subsequently transcribed interview. Id. at 142-
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143; Interview of Appellant, 7/9/21, at 4. During the interview, Appellant
presented a small black plastic container to Detective Shave along with a
plastic “bag corner” with residue. Interview of Appellant at 4-5. She explained
that the pills had been inside the bag which was inside the black container.
Subsequent testing detected Fentanyl on the plastic bag and the container.
Appellant stated that she found the container on Son’s bedside table and that
she flushed the pills down the toilet about “20 minutes” before the detectives
arrived to conduct the search. Id. at 4, 6.
During the recorded interview with Detective Shave, Detective Sergeant
Rubincan called Appellant, a call which was also recorded and transcribed.
The detective sergeant explained to Appellant that they needed to determine
how many pills she had flushed because Son “still owe[d] someone for that”
and Son didn’t “know exactly what was there” Id. at 2-3. After Appellant
estimated that she had thrown out approximately 20 pills, the detective
sergeant stated that Son “thought there was around 40.” Id. at 3.2
Approximately a week later, Detective Sergeant Rubincan spoke to
Appellant again, when she admitted that “she knew what she was doing when
she flushed the pills[,] and she was willing to answer for that.” N.T., 6/1/23,
at 183.
On March 15, 2022, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
Hindering Prosecution and Tampering with Evidence. Relevant to the grading ____________________________________________
2 Before this Court, Appellant raises challenges addressing this specific portion
of the interview, which we will reference as the “pill-quantity discussion.”
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of the Hindering Prosecution charge, the Commonwealth charged Son with
Possession with Intent to Deliver, an ungraded felony, Dealing in Proceeds of
Unlawful Activities, a first-degree felony, and subsequently with participating
in a Corrupt Organization, which is also a first-degree felony.3 “If [detectives]
had located pills in the search of the house on July 9, 2021, additional charges
of possession with intent to deliver and dealing in unlawful proceeds may have
been charged.” Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10.
On October 26, 2022, Appellant filed a motion in limine seeking, inter
alia, to exclude “all information acquired by police investigators” from Son as
violative of the rule against hearsay. Appellant’s Motion in Limine, 10/26/22,
at 4 (unpaginated). Appellant did not specifically reference the pill-quantity
discussion in the recorded interview. The trial granted Appellant’s motion in
part, prohibiting introduction of “out-of-court statements [Son] made to police
officers” but permitting testimony “about the actions they took based on what
they learned from [Son].” Order, 12/8/22.
The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce at trial
Appellant’s statements admitting to flushing the pills, including the recorded
interview, as statements of a party opponent. The Commonwealth also
asserted that Appellant’s statements were permissible under the corpus delicti
rule. Appellant opposed the admission of the inculpatory statements based,
inter alia, on the corpus delicti rule. Appellant argued that the Commonwealth ____________________________________________
3 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5111(a)(1), 911(b)(3), respectively.
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could not demonstrate corpus delicti by relying on hearsay that the detectives
received from Son. Appellant’s Brief in Opp., 11/22/22. On December 8,
2022, following two hearings, the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion
to admit Appellant’s statements.
At trial, the detectives testified to the facts set forth above. During their
testimony, the court permitted officers to testify regarding Appellant’s
conversations with the detectives in which she admitted to destroying the pills
and allowed the jury to hear the recorded interview, over counsel’s objection.
Notably, counsel objected “for the grounds previously stated as to the
interview . . . and the recording of the interview[,]” without specifying the
nature of the objection. N.T., 6/1/23, at 145.
On June 5, 2023, the jury found Appellant guilty of Hindering
Prosecution and Tampering with Physical Evidence, and specifically indicated
on the Verdict Slip, in relation to the Hindering Prosecution charge, that Son
participated in the crime of “a corrupt organization” and was involved in the
crime of “delivery of a controlled substance and/or possessing a controlled
substance with intent to deliver.” Verdict Slip, 6/5/23.
On August 31, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to three years of
probation and 64 hours of community service on the charge of Hindering
Prosecution and a concurrent sentence of two years of probation for
Tampering with Evidence. On September 7, 2023, Appellant filed post-
sentence motions, which the trial court denied on November 13, 2023.
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On December 1, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, after which
the trial court and Appellant complied with Rule 1925.
Appellant raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motions for judgment of acquittal on the charged felony violation of [Hindering Prosecution] (18 Pa.C.S. § 5105), where the evidence was insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at a relevant time before acting, defendant knew that [Son] was liable to be charged with conduct that would constitute a felony of the first or second degree?
2. Did the trial court err in ruling, by pretrial Order based on proffers including inadmissible testimonial hearsay, that [Appellant’s] statement to police officers would be admitted at trial as an admission of a party opponent in violation of the corpus delicti rule?
3. Did the trial court err in admitting [Appellant’s] statements at trial, in violation of the corpus delicti rule, because the evidence properly admitted at trial was insufficient to establish a prima facie case that [Appellant] had committed a crime without consideration of her statements?
4. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in admitting and relying on testimonial and nonverbal hearsay to establish that police officers had learned that drugs should have been found in the initial search of [Appellant’s] home?
Appellant’s Br. at 3-4 (some capitalization removed).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant’s first claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her
conviction of Hindering Prosecution, graded as a felony. “A claim challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.” Commonwealth v.
Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). “We review claims regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether, viewing all the evidence
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admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640
(Pa. Super. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he
trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence” and may
rely entirely on circumstantial evidence. Id. A reviewing court “may not
weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.” Id.
In relevant part, Hindering Prosecution occurs when a person “with
intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of
another for [a] crime . . . , conceals or destroys evidence of the crime[.]” 18
Pa.C.S. § 5105(a)(3). “The gradation of the aider’s offense is keyed to [her]
knowledge of how the aided individual has been, or is liable to be, charged.”
Commonwealth v. Lore, 487 A.2d 841, 854 (Pa. Super. 1984). Hindering
Prosecution constitutes a third-degree felony only if the actor knows that the
person she seeks to aid “has been charged or is liable to be charged” with
conduct that “would constitute a felony of the first or second degree[.]” 18
Pa.C.S. § 5105(b). In all other cases, the offense should be graded as a
misdemeanor of the second degree. Id. The focus is not on the crime
eventually charged against the aided person but rather on the charges that
the aider knew to be “liable to be charged at the time the [aider] was acting
in violation of [S]ection 5105.” Lore, 487 A.2d at 854 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Appellant limits her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to the
grading of the conviction of Hindering Prosecution as a felony. Appellant’s Br.
at 14-17. She asserts that the Commonwealth did not demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that she knew that Son’s conduct made him liable to be
charged with first- or second-degree felonies, such as Corrupt Organizations,
rather than merely ungraded felonies for drug deliveries, at the time she
destroyed the pills. Id.
After careful review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, was sufficient “to show that [Appellant] knew that the conduct
[Son] was committing and would likely be charged with would constitute a
felony of the first or second degree.” Trial Ct. Op. at 43. The trial court
recounted that Detective Sergeant Rubincan explained to Appellant that their
investigation of Son was “important because it was part of a larger ongoing
investigation into dangerous people in a corrupt organization that were
supplying pills that resulted in a number of overdose deaths in Chester
County.” Trial Ct. Op. at 43-44. The detectives relayed this information to
Appellant before Appellant entered the house, and thus before she destroyed
the evidence. From this testimony, the jury could conclude that Appellant
“knew that [Son] was under investigation for participating in a corrupt
organization of drug trafficking, and he would likely be charged with those
crimes, which would constitute a felony of the first or second degree.” Id. at
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44. Accordingly, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence regarding
the grading of the Hindering Prosecution offense as a third-degree felony.
Corpus Delicti
In her second and third issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s
corpus delicti determinations relating to her admissions to destroying the pills.
We review challenges to the trial court’s corpus delicti determinations for
abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 A.3d 1147, 1154 (Pa.
Super. 2017). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but
is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-
will, or partiality, as shown by the evidence or the record.” Commonwealth
v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Corpus delicti, or the “body of the crime,” requires the Commonwealth
“to establish that a crime has actually occurred before a confession or
admission of the accused connecting [her] to the crime can be admitted.”
Murray, 174 A.3d at 1154 (citation omitted). “This rule is rooted in the
hesitancy to convict a person of a crime solely on the basis of that person’s
statements.” Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1117 (citation omitted). Application of
the corpus delicti rule occurs in two phases:
(1) In the first phase, the court determines whether the Commonwealth has proven the corpus delicti of the crimes charged by a preponderance of the evidence. If so, the confession or extrajudicial statement of the defendant is admissible;
(2) In the second phase, the rule requires that the Commonwealth prove the corpus delicti to the factfinder’s satisfaction beyond a
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reasonable doubt before the factfinder is permitted to consider the confession or extrajudicial statement in assessing the defendant’s innocence or guilt.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
As applied to the instant case, Appellant’s second and third issues
address the first phase, regarding the court’s decision to permit the jury to
consider Appellant’s confession. Appellant’s Br. at 18-26. Appellant initially
challenges the trial court’s decision to address the corpus delicti issue pretrial
via a motion in limine. Id. at 18-24. Appellant contends that in Pennsylvania
“[t]he corpus delicti rule is an evidentiary sufficiency rule applied at trial and
not an evidentiary rule that can be decided as a ‘preliminary question’ prior to
trial.” Id. at 18. In conjunction with this argument, Appellant faults the
Commonwealth, in its motion in limine, for relying on Son’s inadmissible
hearsay statements regarding the location of the pills as evidence of corpus
delicti, rather than relying solely on evidence admissible at trial. Id. at 19-
20. Finally, in her third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
determining that the properly admitted evidence established the corpus delicti
of the crimes by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient to allow the jury
to consider Appellant’s inculpatory statements. Id. at 24-26.
In response to Appellant’s argument, the trial court acknowledged that
the order granting the motion in limine should have expressly stated that the
Commonwealth would have to establish corpus delicti at trial for Appellant’s
inculpatory statements to be admissible, nevertheless the court explained that
that is what “happened at trial[:] “The Commonwealth circumstantially
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established that a crime occurred prior to [Appellant’s] statement being
considered by the jury.” Trial Ct. Op. at 48. Moreover, the court emphasized
that the jury was properly instructed regarding the required proof of corpus
delicti as “[b]oth counsel addressed the corpus delicti rule in their closing
arguments and [the trial court] instructed the jury that they could not consider
[Appellant’s] statement until after they determined that a crime was
committed.” Trial Ct. Op. at 48; N.T., 6/5/23, at 19-20, 39-40, 49-51.
After review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the Commonwealth met its corpus delicti
burden by a preponderance of the evidence, such that it could present
Appellant’s inculpatory statements to the jury. Specifically, the
Commonwealth proffered evidence that Son engaged in drug trafficking, that
he kept the pills in the house, that the pills were not found in the house during
the lawful search, and that Appellant handed the empty container and the
plastic bag with Fentanyl residue to a detective following the search. As the
Commonwealth states, “[a] reasonable person would not expect these drugs
to magically vanish but rather could be sufficiently convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed to cause the drugs to be taken
or destroyed.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 16. We agree and further emphasize
that the proof was based solely on the officer’s observations without reference
to Son’s statements to detectives. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in finding that the Commonwealth provided ample evidence that
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Appellant disposed of the pills to satisfy the corpus delicti rule and permit the
jury to consider Appellant’s inculpatory statements at trial.
Hearsay
In her final issue, Appellant claims that the court improperly allowed the
admission of hearsay. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including
rulings relating to hearsay, for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth
v. Walter, 93 A.3d 442, 449 (Pa. 2014). “Hearsay is an out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Hearsay generally is
inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 492 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).
Appellant challenges “statements and assertive questions from
investigators containing and assuming the truth of facts relayed to them by
[Son,]” who did not testify at trial, as violative of the rule against hearsay.
Appellant’s Br. at 27. For example, Appellant challenges detectives’ testimony
that they had “occasion to learn that there might have been drugs in that
house” on the day of the search. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). She also
challenges Detective Sergeant Rubincan’s statement during his recorded pill-
quantity discussion with Appellant that Son thought that approximately 40
pills were in the container. Id. Appellant seeks a new trial, which would bar
the testimonial hearsay statements of Son.
We reject Appellant’s claim. Instead, we agree with the trial court,
which determined, after summarizing the testimony in detail, that the
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detectives testified without referencing Son’s statements in all but “two brief”
instances. Trial Ct. Op. at 51. Addressing the first reference, the court noted
that Detective Rosado testified that he “told [Appellant] that [Son] ha[d]
provided information." Id. at 52 (quoting N.T., 6/1/23, at 103). The court,
however, emphasized that it sustained counsel’s objection to this statement,
which also did not reveal what information Son provided. Id. We agree that
no error occurred related to this instance.
The court next addressed the pill-quantity discussion between Detective
Sergeant Rubincan and Appellant during which the detective told Appellant
that Son thought there were approximately 40 pills left. Id. at 53. The court
observed that “[d]efense counsel objected to the admission of the interview
based on the corpus delicti rule but did not object to the reference to [Son’s]
statements” as hearsay Id. The court emphasized that if Appellant had raised
a hearsay objection, then the court could have redacted those statements.
Id.
Upon review of the record, we agree and reject Appellant’s claim that
she preserved the objection through her motion in limine, which did not
specifically mention the pill-quantity portion of the recorded interview.
Appellant’s Br. at 28 n.4. While a motion in limine “is sufficient to preserve
[an] issue for appeal, without renewal of the objection” at trial, the litigant
must first have “stat[ed] the specific ground of objection.” Trach v. Fellin,
817 A.2d 1102, 1108 n.3. (Pa. Super. 2003). In the instant case, Appellant
fails to direct this Court to any place in the record where she specifically
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objected to the pill-quantity discussion based on hearsay. Thus, we agree
with the trial court that Appellant waived her objection to the admission of
that portion of the interview.
Accordingly, as we reject all of Appellant’s claims, we affirm the
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/13/2024
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