Com. v. Peralta, R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 3, 2019
• Docket: 2219 EDA 2018
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S49009-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

RAPHAEL PERALTA,

Appellant No. 2219 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 13, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013157-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 03, 2019

Raphael Peralta appeals from the post-conviction court’s July 13, 2018

order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

On July 2, 2015, Appellant was convicted of arson, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301,

aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702, conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, and

various other offenses based on evidence that he and an unidentified cohort

threw “a bottle with a burning wick and filled with an accelerant” into a home

in which two people were present, causing extensive damage to the residence.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 12/6/18, at 3. On September 4, 2015, Appellant

was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6 to 12 years’ incarceration. He filed

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S49009-19

a timely appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence in part, and

reversed it in part. See Commonwealth v. Peralta, 158 A.3d 183 (Pa.

Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum).1 Appellant did not file a petition

for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

On February 21, 2017, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition,

which underlies the present appeal. Counsel was appointed and an amended

petition was filed on Appellant’s behalf. On June 8, 2018, the PCRA court

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition

without a hearing. Appellant did not respond, and on July 13, 2018, the court

issued an order dismissing his petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of

appeal, and he also complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, Appellant states

two issues for our review:

I. Whether the court erred in denying [] Appellant’s PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the amended PCRA petition regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness[?]

II. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA petition alleging counsel was ineffective[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

1 Specifically, we reversed Appellant’s sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, concluding that the trial court had erred by imposing that sentence in addition to a sentence for Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit arson. We did not remand for resentencing, however, as our decision did not upset the court’s overall sentencing scheme. In all other respects, we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

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Preliminarily, we note that “[t]his Court’s standard of review from the

grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited to examining whether the

lower court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and

whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516,

520 (Pa. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4

(Pa. 1995)). Where, as here, a petitioner claims that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court has stated that:

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth- determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes prejudice when he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” … [A] properly pled claim of ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the underlying legal issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner from counsel’s act or omission.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009) (citations

omitted).

Appellant argues that his trial counsel acted ineffectively “for failing to

file or argue post[-]trial motions that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence[,] precluding Appellant from raising this issue before the Superior

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Court[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 21. He further avers that the PCRA court erred

by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on this ineffectiveness claim.

In assessing Appellant’s arguments, we have reviewed the certified

record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law. Additionally, we have

considered the thorough and well-crafted opinion of the Honorable Daniel D.

McCaffery of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We conclude

that Judge McCaffery’s extensive, well-reasoned opinion accurately disposes

of the issues presented by Appellant. See PCO at 3-9. Accordingly, we adopt

his decision as our own and affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition for the reasons set forth therein.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/3/19

-4- Circulated 11/08/2019 12:30 PM