J-A26029-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JARMAR PEARSON : : Appellant : No. 418 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 16, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001155-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: January 17, 2025
Jarmar Pearson (“Pearson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)
following his convictions for two counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”)
and associated summary traffic offenses. Pearson asserts that the sheriff who
effectuated the traffic stop was unauthorized to do so, thus requiring
suppression of all evidence. We affirm.
On January 3, 2022, Deputy Zachary Weaver of the Allegheny County
Sheriff’s Office observed a vehicle swerve into the opposing lane of traffic,
almost striking an oncoming vehicle. Deputy Weaver checked the vehicle’s
registration and learned that it had expired. Based on the traffic violations,
he stopped the vehicle and spoke to Pearson, the sole occupant. Deputy
Weaver believed that Pearson was intoxicated and asked him to submit to field
sobriety tests. Pearson agreed, and based on his performance was arrested. J-A26029-24
He consented to a blood draw; testing established that his blood contained
Fentanyl and its metabolites. The Commonwealth thereafter charged Pearson
with two DUI violations and two summary traffic violations.
Pearson sought to suppress all evidence on the basis that sheriffs lack
both statutory and common law authority to enforce the Vehicle Code
violations cited by Deputy Weaver as the basis for the stop. The trial court
denied the suppression motion. Subsequently, following a bench trial, Pearson
was found guilty and sentenced to three to six days of incarceration and a six-
month period of probation. He timely filed a notice of appeal, raising the same
suppression issue in his concise statement.
The trial court filed its Rule 1925 opinion, concluding that Deputy
Weaver was authorized to seize the vehicle under two sources of power. First,
the trial court noted that “Allegheny County is a second-class county,” and
sheriffs therein are statutorily defined as police officers authorized to enforce
the Vehicle Code. Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2024, at 4 (pagination supplied).
Alternatively, the trial court determined that Deputy Weaver validly seized
Pearson’s vehicle under a common law power to address breaches of the
peace. Id. at 5. On appeal, Pearson contends that the trial court erred and
that it should have granted his motion to suppress. Pearson’s Brief at 7.
“The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the
record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law,
however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.” Commonwealth
-2- J-A26029-24
v. Coles, 317 A.3d 659, 663 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). We apply a de novo standard to questions of law. Id.
Preliminarily, we agree that Pearson would be entitled to suppression of
all evidence as a matter of law if Deputy Weaver lacked authority to seize the
vehicle. That the traffic stop would be constitutionally permissible if observed
by a police officer authorized to enforce the Vehicle Code is irrelevant. See
Commonwealth v. Price, 672 A.2d 280, 284 (Pa. 1996) (concluding that FBI
agent Mark Sites was not authorized to make a traffic stop that led to DUI
charges, and finding that “[t]he fact that [Price] could have lawfully been
arrested by someone other than Agent Sites is clearly inconsequential to a
determination of whether Agent Sites’ actions warrant the remedy of
exclusion”).
Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Deputy Weaver was
authorized by the General Assembly to enforce the Vehicle Code, which
permits “police officers” to seize a vehicle if he or she reasonably suspects a
vehicular violation. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). “Police officer” is defined as “[a]
natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law.” Id. §
102. The legislative branch has elsewhere defined “police officer” in two
contexts that are pertinent to our analysis. Section 103 of the Crimes Code
defines the term “police officer,” in relevant part, to “include the sheriff of a
county of the second class and deputy sheriffs of a county of the second class
who have successfully completed the requirements under ... the Municipal
-3- J-A26029-24
Police Education and Training Law [MPETL].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 103.1 The MPETL2
sets forth standards all municipalities must follow for training police officers,
and it again defines a “police officer” as, inter alia, “[a] deputy sheriff of a
county of the second class.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2162(2). A county of the second
class is defined as those “having a population of at least 1,000,000 but less
than 1,500,000 inhabitants.” 16 Pa.C.S. § 310(2). Allegheny County meets
that criterion.3
In support of his claim of error, Pearson relies on Commonwealth v.
Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, (Pa. 2013), a case involving sheriffs from Warren
and Forest Counties establishing temporary sobriety checkpoints. The
Marconi Court acknowledged that section 102 of the Vehicle Code “facially ...
applies broadly to anyone with a power of arrest.” Id. at 1041. The Court
declined to read that language literally, as citizens also retain a common-law
____________________________________________
1 Deputy Weaver testified that to become a sheriff he was required to complete
a six-and-a-half month training at the Allegheny County Police Training Academy. N.T., 1/19/2023, at 4.
2 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2161–2172.
3 The “classification of counties shall be ascertained and fixed according to population by reference to the Federal decennial census.” 16 Pa.C.S. § 311(a). There is a certification process for reclassifications, as “it is the intent of this section that the classification of a county may not be changed because its population has decreased at the time … but rather only after the change is demonstrated by two Federal decennial censuses ….” Id. § 311(c). The 2020 census lists Allegheny County as having a total population of 1,250,578. https://data.census.gov/profile/Allegheny_County,_Pennsylvania?g=050XX0 0US42003 (last visited Jan. 7, 2025).
-4- J-A26029-24
arrest power and courts “presume that the General Assembly did not intend
unreasonable results.” Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that the definition
“refers to some form of legal authorization beyond a mere common-law power
shared among Pennsylvania citizens.” Id. “Since such shared power
represents the extent of sheriffs’ arrest authority as determined by prevailing
precedent (and in the absence of specific expansion by the Legislature), we
conclude that sheriffs and their deputies are not ‘police officers’ under the
Vehicle Code.” Id.
In reliance on Marconi, Pearson contends that “[t]he Court ... held that
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J-A26029-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JARMAR PEARSON : : Appellant : No. 418 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 16, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001155-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: January 17, 2025
Jarmar Pearson (“Pearson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)
following his convictions for two counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”)
and associated summary traffic offenses. Pearson asserts that the sheriff who
effectuated the traffic stop was unauthorized to do so, thus requiring
suppression of all evidence. We affirm.
On January 3, 2022, Deputy Zachary Weaver of the Allegheny County
Sheriff’s Office observed a vehicle swerve into the opposing lane of traffic,
almost striking an oncoming vehicle. Deputy Weaver checked the vehicle’s
registration and learned that it had expired. Based on the traffic violations,
he stopped the vehicle and spoke to Pearson, the sole occupant. Deputy
Weaver believed that Pearson was intoxicated and asked him to submit to field
sobriety tests. Pearson agreed, and based on his performance was arrested. J-A26029-24
He consented to a blood draw; testing established that his blood contained
Fentanyl and its metabolites. The Commonwealth thereafter charged Pearson
with two DUI violations and two summary traffic violations.
Pearson sought to suppress all evidence on the basis that sheriffs lack
both statutory and common law authority to enforce the Vehicle Code
violations cited by Deputy Weaver as the basis for the stop. The trial court
denied the suppression motion. Subsequently, following a bench trial, Pearson
was found guilty and sentenced to three to six days of incarceration and a six-
month period of probation. He timely filed a notice of appeal, raising the same
suppression issue in his concise statement.
The trial court filed its Rule 1925 opinion, concluding that Deputy
Weaver was authorized to seize the vehicle under two sources of power. First,
the trial court noted that “Allegheny County is a second-class county,” and
sheriffs therein are statutorily defined as police officers authorized to enforce
the Vehicle Code. Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2024, at 4 (pagination supplied).
Alternatively, the trial court determined that Deputy Weaver validly seized
Pearson’s vehicle under a common law power to address breaches of the
peace. Id. at 5. On appeal, Pearson contends that the trial court erred and
that it should have granted his motion to suppress. Pearson’s Brief at 7.
“The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the
record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law,
however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.” Commonwealth
-2- J-A26029-24
v. Coles, 317 A.3d 659, 663 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). We apply a de novo standard to questions of law. Id.
Preliminarily, we agree that Pearson would be entitled to suppression of
all evidence as a matter of law if Deputy Weaver lacked authority to seize the
vehicle. That the traffic stop would be constitutionally permissible if observed
by a police officer authorized to enforce the Vehicle Code is irrelevant. See
Commonwealth v. Price, 672 A.2d 280, 284 (Pa. 1996) (concluding that FBI
agent Mark Sites was not authorized to make a traffic stop that led to DUI
charges, and finding that “[t]he fact that [Price] could have lawfully been
arrested by someone other than Agent Sites is clearly inconsequential to a
determination of whether Agent Sites’ actions warrant the remedy of
exclusion”).
Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Deputy Weaver was
authorized by the General Assembly to enforce the Vehicle Code, which
permits “police officers” to seize a vehicle if he or she reasonably suspects a
vehicular violation. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). “Police officer” is defined as “[a]
natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law.” Id. §
102. The legislative branch has elsewhere defined “police officer” in two
contexts that are pertinent to our analysis. Section 103 of the Crimes Code
defines the term “police officer,” in relevant part, to “include the sheriff of a
county of the second class and deputy sheriffs of a county of the second class
who have successfully completed the requirements under ... the Municipal
-3- J-A26029-24
Police Education and Training Law [MPETL].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 103.1 The MPETL2
sets forth standards all municipalities must follow for training police officers,
and it again defines a “police officer” as, inter alia, “[a] deputy sheriff of a
county of the second class.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2162(2). A county of the second
class is defined as those “having a population of at least 1,000,000 but less
than 1,500,000 inhabitants.” 16 Pa.C.S. § 310(2). Allegheny County meets
that criterion.3
In support of his claim of error, Pearson relies on Commonwealth v.
Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, (Pa. 2013), a case involving sheriffs from Warren
and Forest Counties establishing temporary sobriety checkpoints. The
Marconi Court acknowledged that section 102 of the Vehicle Code “facially ...
applies broadly to anyone with a power of arrest.” Id. at 1041. The Court
declined to read that language literally, as citizens also retain a common-law
____________________________________________
1 Deputy Weaver testified that to become a sheriff he was required to complete
a six-and-a-half month training at the Allegheny County Police Training Academy. N.T., 1/19/2023, at 4.
2 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2161–2172.
3 The “classification of counties shall be ascertained and fixed according to population by reference to the Federal decennial census.” 16 Pa.C.S. § 311(a). There is a certification process for reclassifications, as “it is the intent of this section that the classification of a county may not be changed because its population has decreased at the time … but rather only after the change is demonstrated by two Federal decennial censuses ….” Id. § 311(c). The 2020 census lists Allegheny County as having a total population of 1,250,578. https://data.census.gov/profile/Allegheny_County,_Pennsylvania?g=050XX0 0US42003 (last visited Jan. 7, 2025).
-4- J-A26029-24
arrest power and courts “presume that the General Assembly did not intend
unreasonable results.” Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that the definition
“refers to some form of legal authorization beyond a mere common-law power
shared among Pennsylvania citizens.” Id. “Since such shared power
represents the extent of sheriffs’ arrest authority as determined by prevailing
precedent (and in the absence of specific expansion by the Legislature), we
conclude that sheriffs and their deputies are not ‘police officers’ under the
Vehicle Code.” Id.
In reliance on Marconi, Pearson contends that “[t]he Court ... held that
deputy sheriffs are not ‘police officers’ for purposes of the [ ] Vehicle Code.”
Pearson’s Brief at 20. However, his argument does not account for a “specific
expansion by the Legislature” pertinent to sheriffs in counties of the second
class. Marconi, 64 A.3d at 1041. Indeed, the Marconi Court stated that its
decision “does not address the circumstances of sheriffs or deputies who may
be accorded general police powers or denominated ‘police officers’ by the
General Assembly, as is the situation in counties of the second class.” Id. at
1044 n.8.
The Marconi case is therefore readily distinguishable because Deputy
Weaver’s powers to enforce the Vehicle Code were not confined to the section
102 definition. Instead, the combination of the MPETL and section 103 of the
Crimes Code definitively establishes that the General Assembly intended for
sheriffs of counties of the second class to have the power to enforce violations
of the Vehicle Code. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 2162(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 103. Notably,
-5- J-A26029-24
the Crimes Code’s definition of “police officer” does not simply copy the
definition provided by 53 Pa.C.S § 2162. Instead, it references the training
conducted under the MPETL, which includes training on enforcement of the
Vehicle Code. See id. § 2167(a) (“All municipalities of this Commonwealth ...
shall be required to train all members of their police departments pursuant to
this subchapter prior to their enforcing criminal laws, enforcing moving traffic
violations under Title 75 (relating to vehicles) or being authorized to carry a
firearm.”).
Reading the plain language of these provisions, they establish that the
General Assembly intended for deputy sheriffs of a county of the second class
to enjoy the same powers as city law enforcement officers. See 1 Pa.C.S. §
1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.”). See also Allegheny Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v.
Pennsylvania Lab. Rels. Bd., 41 A.3d 839, 845 (Pa. 2012) (“[T]he
legislature’s view of deputy sheriffs of counties of the second class as police
officers substantially on a par with traditional municipal police could not be
made more plain.”).
Thus, contrary to Pearson’s argument, the Marconi decision simply
does not apply to Allegheny County sheriffs. Accordingly, we find that Deputy
Weaver was a “police officer” for purposes of 75 Pa.C.S. § 102, and had the
authority to effectuate the traffic stop. In light of this conclusion, we need not
address whether the specific infractions constituted a “breach of the peace.”
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The trial court did not err in denying Pearson’s motion to suppress, and we
therefore affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
1/17/2025
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