J-S25042-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRANDON PATTERSON : : Appellant : No. 1881 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 24, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000123-2018
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023
Brandon Patterson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following the
revocation of his probation pursuant to a 2018 negotiated guilty plea to one
count each of robbery and conspiracy.1 On appeal, Appellant contends the
trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to a term of five to 15
years’ incarceration without considering his rehabilitative needs. After review,
we affirm.
We glean the underlying facts of Appellant’s 2018 guilty plea from the
trial court opinion:
[O]n October 10, 2017, [Appellant was arrested] on charges of kidnapping, robbery and related offenses, arising from conduct occurring on September 14, 2017. [It was alleged that Appellant, ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903(c). J-S25042-23
“in the course of committing a theft, . . . in concert with another person, threatened or intentionally put another in fear of serious injury by approaching the complainant, [ ] and threatening to shoot him while taking his wallet/debit card and attempting to withdraw money from the [complainant’s] bank account and also forcing the complainant to travel a substantial distance into a nearby store and to sell his phone to a kiosk so the defendant could take the proceeds without permission.”]
On November 30, 2018, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea on charges of robbery, as a felony of the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery also as a felony of the first degree[.] Appellant was sentenced to [concurrent terms of] one to three years incarceration on each conviction, followed by two years of probation on each conviction. [T]he probationary periods were consecutive to the sentences of incarceration, but concurrent to each other. [The court also imposed the following conditions to be completed during Appellant’s incarceration: participation in educational programming, vocational training, life-skills training, and anger management. See Order — Negotiated Guilty Plea, 11/30/18.]
Trial Ct. Op., 11/17/22, at 1-2, 1 n.1.
While on probation, Appellant was charged with robbery for an incident
that occurred on March 29, 2021, where three persons stole two video game
consoles after arranging a meeting with the seller to purchase them. Trial Ct.
Op. at 2; see N.T. VOP h’rg Vol 1, 6/24/22, 14, 16-18. Appellant was
subsequently charged with robbery, conspiracy, and violations under the
Uniform Firearms Act related to the March 29th incident. Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
Following a preliminary hearing, the charges were held for court and an
information was issued at Criminal Docket CP-51-CR-0000123-2018. On
November 15, 2021, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the charges arising
from the March 29th incident. Trial Ct. Op. at 2. The trial court denied the
Commonwealth’s request to lift the nolle pros. Id.
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On May 27 and June 24, 2022, the trial court held a bifurcated violation
of probation (VOP) evidentiary hearing regarding the March 29, 2021,
robbery. See N.T. VOP h’rg Vol. 1, 5/27/22, at 11. Over the course of the
hearings, the Commonwealth presented Mahanad Nasralla (Victim), who
stated he listed two PlayStation 5 consoles for sale on an app called “OfferUp.”
N.T., 6/24/22, at 7. After speaking with a potential buyer through the app
and text messages, Victim drove to an address given to him by the buyer to
complete the sale. Id. at 10-11, 14. When Victim arrived, he “was
approached by two men from the back[,]” and he showed them the game
consoles he was selling. Id. at 14. A third male, later identified as Appellant,
approached Victim, lifted his hoodie, revealing a firearm, and said “Are you
lost? Get the fuck off my block.” Id. at 14, 16. Appellant’s two cohorts then
took the PlayStation 5 consoles and all three men “ran in the opposite
direction[.]” Id. at 17-18, 27. Victim drove off and called the police. Id. at
18-19. At the June 24th hearing, Victim identified Appellant as the assailant
who threatened him with a firearm. Id. at 7.
The Commonwealth also presented Appellant’s probation officer, Tanelle
Griffin, who testified that she recommended Appellant “be supervised under
the Intensive Case Load Unit when he is released” with a GPS monitor. N.T.,
5/27/22, at 11-12. Officer Griffin noted Appellant had issues maintaining
employment and housing in the past and requested that before his release he
have a “viable home plan.” Id. at 12. The Commonwealth also offered Officer
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Griffin’s “report”2 into evidence. Id. at 5-6. The trial court declined to release
Appellant due to his “history while under supervision[.]” See id. at 12.
Appellant invoked his right to allocution at both hearings. At the May
27, 2022, hearing, he read a letter to the trial court where he asked the court
to see him as an “individual[ and] a human being . . . who . . . made some
poor decisions in life,” but “is able to reflect and learn from [those]
decisions[.]” N.T., 5/27/22, at 18. He also stated he had “taken the time to
do some cognitive restructuring” and has taken a “new direction in life[.]” Id.
at 18-19. The trial court then responded that it did “consider [Appellant]
human[.]” Id. at 19. At the June 24th hearing, Appellant asserted his
innocence, telling the court he was implicated in the crime due to “mistaken
identity.” See N.T., 6/24/22, at 44. He then stated that he “used [the time
he was in custody waiting for the VOP hearing] to get better” through
“spirituality, mentally, dealing with things [him]self, [and] reading more self-
help books.” Id. Appellant also noted that he had “a couple of jobs” before
being arrested for this incident but was fired after his employer completed a
background check. See id. at 44-45. Appellant’s mother also spoke on his
behalf, saying Appellant “was trying to do better[ and] applied for a couple of
jobs.” Id. at 41. ____________________________________________
2 The trial court, parties, and witness do not specify what kind of report the
officer provided to the court. Moreover, the document was not identified as an exhibit at the hearing. However, based on a review of the record and statements at the hearing, it appears the document was a “Pretrial Investigation Report.”
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At the conclusion of the June 24, 2022, hearing, the trial court found
Appellant was in a technical violation and revoked his probation. See N.T.,
6/24/22, at 37. It noted the report from the Office of Probation and Parole
showed a “history” of Appellant doing “horribly on state parole before he even
began serving . . . probation[.]” See id. at 39. The court also stated: (1) it
mandated “a number of conditions” as part of Appellant’s 2018 sentence, but
it did not “seem like [he] pursued most of them and instead proved to be a
very difficult person to supervise due to his assaultive behavior[;]” (2) it
imposed Appellant’s 2018 sentence based on his “age[ and] thinking that
maybe [his behavior] was a phase[,]” but it was now “clear [that Appellant
was] not going through a phase” as he had “continued to act the way that he[
had] been acting[;]” (3) Appellant’s statement at the proceedings were not
persuasive and he “show[ed] a continued lack of contrition[;]” (4) one of the
conditions on his underlying sentence was that he “have no access to firearms
or replicas” and yet, he used a firearm to threaten serious bodily injury; and
(5) Appellant “continue[d] to be not amenable to supervision[ and was] a
serious threat to the safety of the community.” Id. at 46-47. The court then
imposed two concurrent terms of five to 15 years’ incarceration — one for
each of his 2018 convictions, robbery and conspiracy. It also imposed the
following conditions:
While in custody, [Appellant] should complete programs in vocational training, life skill training, anger management, individual counseling, as well as educational programs. All of these must be completed in order for him to be eligible for parole ....
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Id. at 48.
Appellant’s counsel then asked if the trial court said “something about
drug treatment” for Appellant. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 50. The court replied it
did not “have anything indicating [Appellant] ha[d] a drug problem[,]” but
asked counsel if she would like to include treatment in the sentencing order.
Id. Appellant’s counsel did not request drug treatment. See id.
While imposing sentence and before the court informed Appellant of his
appeal rights, Appellant caused a disturbance and was removed from the
courtroom for “safety” reasons. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 48-49. The court held
a subsequent proceeding on June 27, 2022, solely to inform Appellant of his
appeal rights on the record. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/27/22, at 4-5.
Appellant’s counsel also read another letter from Appellant, in which he
apologized for his conduct at the June 24th proceeding, asserted his
innocence, and stated he obtained employment, was “on the right track” and
“better[ed him]self” while incarcerated and awaiting sentencing. Id. at 6-8.
At the June 27, 2022, proceeding, the trial court stated it would make
notation of the fact that Appellant was searching for employment and reported
to the office of probation himself after the March 29, 2021, robbery. See N.T.,
6/27/22, at 8-9. It also recognized Appellant was “young” and it would “likely”
recommend that if Appellant committed no infractions while incarcerated and
completed the prescribed programs in his sentence, that he would be released
on his minimum date because “that [would] indicate [Appellant is] serious
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about making a change.” Id. at 9. The court then informed Appellant of his
right to appeal as follows:
You have ten days from today’s date within which to ask me to reconsider your sentence. You have 30 days from today’s date within which to appeal the finding of technical violation and/or the sentence. . . .
Id. at 10 (emphases added).
Appellant filed a timely post sentence motion for reconsideration of his
sentence, which the trial court denied on July 11th.3 Appellant then filed a
notice of appeal on July 27th. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a
concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but did issue a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion on November 17, 2022, which addressed the issues raised in
Appellant’s post-sentence motion.4
On October 12, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause order to
explain why Appellant’s appeal should not be quashed as untimely. See
Order, 10/12/22. We explained that Appellant’s probation revocation
sentence was imposed on June 24th, and he had 30 days from that date to
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3 Post-sentence motions must be filed no later than ten days from the imposition of sentence after revocation. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). Herein, the tenth day following the imposition of sentence was Monday, July 4, 2022, which was a national holiday. Therefore, Appellant’s post-sentence motion, that was filed on July 5th, was timely. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for computations of time, if the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday, Sunday, or a on a legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from the computation).
4 As will be discussed below, Appellant only raises two of his post-sentence issues on appeal and addresses them together.
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file a notice of appeal, which he did not do. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of
appeal shall be filed within 30 days after imposition of sentence); Pa.R.Crim.P.
708(E) (filing of a motion to modify a VOP sentence will not toll the 30-day
appeal period). Appellant responded that the trial court informed him the time
in which he had to file post-sentence motions and a notice of appeal began on
June 27th, the day the court informed him of his appeal rights. See
Appellant’s Response to the Court’s Intent to Quash Appellant’s Direct Appeal
as Untimely, 10/18/22, at 2 (unpaginated). Thus, Appellant asserted his
notice of appeal was timely. The rule to show cause order was discharged and
the matter was referred to the merits panel. Therefore, we first address the
timeliness of Appellant’s appeal.
This Court cannot extend the time in which a petitioner may file an
appeal, however when there is a “breakdown in the courts[,]” we may grant
limited relief to excuse the late filings. See Commonwealth v. Patterson,
940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court has held that such a
breakdown occurs “where the trial court, at the time of sentencing, either
failed to advise [a petitioner] of his post-sentence and appellate rights or
misadvised him.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, the trial court imposed
Appellant’s sentence on June 24, 2022. However, it was unable to inform
Appellant of his appellate rights at that time as he needed to be removed from
the courtroom. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 48-49. The court informed Appellant
of his right to appeal three days later, on June 27th. It also advised Appellant
he had 30 days from the date of the hearing to file a notice of appeal. See
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N.T., 6/27/22, at 10. As per the trial court’s instructions, Appellant then filed
his notice of appeal within 30 days of that date. We conclude this conduct
amounted to a breakdown of court processes, which excuses the untimeliness
of his notice of appeal. See Patterson, 940 A.2d at 498. Thus, we may
proceed with our review.
Appellant raises one issue on appeal:
Because it is a fundamental sentencing norm that every defendant be given a sentence with consideration of their rehabilitative needs, where the revocation court gave no consideration to [Appellant’s] need for employment, housing, and drug treatment, was the sentence excessive, violative of the Sentencing Code, and the norms that underlie the sentencing process?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant’s argument challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. This Court has stated:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
It is well established that such a challenge does not entitle an appellant
to “review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768
(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted). Rather,
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[b]efore this Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an appellant must comply with the following requirements:
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E) regarding post-sentence motions after revocation]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d
1030, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (“[R]eview of a discretionary
sentencing matter after revocation proceedings is encompassed by the scope
of this Court’s review.”); Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289
(Pa. Super. 2008) (“when a court revokes probation and imposes a new
sentence, a criminal defendant needs to preserve challenges to the
discretionary aspects of that new sentence either by objecting during the
revocation sentencing or by filing a [motion to modify] sentence”). “A
substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable
argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Caldwell, 117
A.3d at 768 (citation omitted).
In the present case, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion
raising the issue sub judice and we have accepted his notice of appeal as
timely filed. See Patterson, 940 A.2d at 498. In addition, his brief includes
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the requisite concise statement of reasons relied upon for appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief at 9-11. Thus, we must determine
whether he has raised a substantial question justifying our review.
Appellant alleges that the trial court “put nothing on the record to
indicate that it considered [Appellant’s] challenges, nor his rehabilitative
needs” and imposed an “excessive sentence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 10. This
assertion amounts to a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (“[A]n excessive
sentence claim — in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to
consider mitigating factors — raises a substantial question.”) (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super.
2013) (concluding a challenge that the trial court did not consider
rehabilitative needs raises a substantial question).
Though Appellant has raised a substantial question, we conclude that he
is not entitled to relief. When imposing a sentence, the trial court must
consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.§ 9721(b), which includes “the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on the victim
and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth
v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 960 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). First, we
address Appellant’s contention that the court did not consider his “challenges”
or rehabilitative needs. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 16.
Preliminarily, we note
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following revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statutes in question. Simply put, since the defendant has previously appeared before the sentencing court, the stated reasons for a revocation sentence need not be as elaborate as that which is required at initial sentencing. The rationale for this is obvious. When sentencing is a consequence of the revocation of probation, the trial judge is already fully informed as to the facts and circumstances of both the crime and the nature of the defendant . . . .
Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted; See also Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199 A.3d 964, 970 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (A “lengthy discourse” is not required of the sentencing court to
explain why it imposed a specific sentence where the record reflects the
court’s consideration of “the facts of the crime and character of the
offender.”).
Here, the trial court concluded it carefully considered all relevant factors,
including Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9, 11.
Specifically, it highlighted that “Appellant was the beneficiary of a generous
plea deal” and instead “of taking advantage of the opportunity, [he]
demonstrated an inability to abide by rules” during his parole and probation.
Id. at 11. We agree that the trial court considered the necessary factors
before imposing a sentence.
Over the course of two hearings, Appellant admitted he made “poor
decisions[,]” but learned from them, had since taken “a new direction in life[,]”
and “used [his time in custody] to get better[.]” See N.T., 5/27/22, at 18-
19; N.T., 6/24/22, at 44. After hearing from Appellant, the trial court
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reminded him that it originally imposed a shorter sentence with conditions
such as classes in anger management, vocational skills, education, and life
skills — which Appellant failed to pursue — due to his age and the court’s
belief his conduct was a “phase.” See N.T., 6/24/22, at 46-47. It emphasized
that Appellant was a difficult person to supervise and used a firearm to commit
the subsequent offense, which violated one of those conditions. Id. at 47. It
then noted Appellant’s statements during the hearings, wherein he claimed he
was taking a “new direction in life[,]” were not persuasive and his actions
proved, instead, he was “not amenable” to supervision. See id.; N.T.
5/27/22, at 19.
The trial court not only had the information provided to it during the
VOP hearings, but also had knowledge of Appellant’s character and
rehabilitative needs because it presided over the earlier proceedings related
to his underlying 2018 offenses. See Pasture, 107 A.3d at 28. As such, a
“lengthy discourse” explaining the court’s rationale behind the sentence was
unnecessary. See id.; Rominger, 199 A.3d at 970. Still, though, the record
reflects the court carefully considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and
challenges when it thoughtfully imposed a sentence including individual
counseling and programs in vocational training, education, life-skills, and
anger management. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 48. The record also reflects the
court would recommend Appellant for parole after serving his minimum
sentence if he completed the classes and did not have any infractions. See
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id.; N.T., 6/27/22, at 9. The court commented that this would establish
Appellant was “serious about making a change[.]” See N.T., 6/27/22, at 9.
We also note that in Appellant’s question presented, he asserts the trial
court did not consider his need for drug treatment. See Appellant’s Brief, at
3. While he did not provide a specific argument regarding this concern, we
remind Appellant that during the June 24, 2022, hearing, the court noted it
was not aware of Appellant having a drug abuse problem and asked counsel
if Appellant needed drug treatment. See N.T., 6/24/22, at 50. Counsel did
not answer the court’s question in that regard or request drug treatment for
Appellant. Id. Accordingly, the record again demonstrates the court
considered Appellant’s challenges and rehabilitative needs before imposing a
sentence. As Appellant cannot establish the court abused its discretion or
ignored the law in imposing his sentence, no relief is due. See Zirkle, 107
A.3d at 132.
Appellant also alleges his sentence is excessive. Appellant’s Brief at 17.
By way of background, after a court determines a defendant is in technical
violation of their probation, “the resentencing guidelines shall be the same as
the initial sentencing guidelines[.]” 204 Pa. Code. § 307.3(a). At the time of
Appellant’s 2018 guilty plea, the offense gravity score for robbery was 10 and
for conspiracy was nine. Appellant’s Brief at 17; 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.3(c)(1),
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303.15.5 Appellant’s prior record score at that time was a zero. Appellant’s
Brief at 17. The guidelines provide a standard range of 22 to 36 months’
incarceration, plus or minus 12 months for robbery and 12 to 24 months’
incarceration, plus or minus 12 months for conspiracy. Id.; 204 Pa. Code §
303.16(a). Therefore, Appellant’s minimum sentence of five years’
incarceration was above the aggravated range but within the statutory
maximum for first-degree felonies. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1) (statutory
maximum, sentence for first-degree felonies is 20 years’ incarceration).
Returning to Appellant’s argument, he avers his five-year minimum
sentence exceeds the standard range guidelines as well as the aggravated
range guidelines for sentencing. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant also
contends the sentence was excessive because it failed to consider his
rehabilitative needs. Id. at 18.
Section 9781(c) of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code dictates that this
Court should vacate a sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court
where the defendant was “sentenced outside the guidelines and the sentence
was unreasonable.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 567 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (emphasis added), citing 42 Pa.C.S. 9781(c)(3). What
constitutes an “unreasonable” sentence is not strictly defined. However, ____________________________________________
5 Neither the completed Pennsylvania Sentencing Guideline forms nor the transcript from Appellant’s 2018 guilty plea sentencing were included in the certified record. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth and the trial court do not contradict Appellants’ statements regarding offense gravity scores and prior record score. Therefore, we will rely on Appellant’s statements in his brief.
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a sentence may be found to be unreasonable after review of Section 9781(d)’s four statutory factors[ — which are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant; (3) findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the sentencing guidelines.]
[I]n addition a sentence may also be unreasonable if the appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed without express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721, i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the community; and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
Moreover, even though the unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise boundaries, we are confident that rejection of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds would occur infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges, especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is conducted using the proper standard of review.
Id. at 567-68 (some citations omitted & paragraph breaks inserted). Further,
“[a] trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in imposing a
seemingly harsh post-revocation sentence where the defendant originally
received a lenient sentence and then failed to adhere the conditions imposed
on him.” Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court stated Appellant’s sentence was not manifestly
excessive or unreasonable. Trial Ct. Op. at 12. Specifically, it noted:
The record demonstrates that the court carefully considered the testimony of Appellant’s mother, Appellant’s allocution, the nature of the original offense for which he was on probation, Appellant’s record which is “replete with serious violations” and that “he did horribly” while under supervision[,] the nature of the
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violative conduct, and Appellant’s lack of contrition. [See NT 6/24/22, at 39, 41, 43-48.]
After considering all the evidence before it, the court did not sentence irrationally, but instead imposed a sentence that was the product of the court’s application of its sound judgment to the record before it. The result was a sentence that was neither manifestly excessive, nor unreasonable.
Trial Ct. Op. at 12.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a
sentence above the aggravated range. Appellant merely argues that his
sentence was excessive due to the trial court’s failure to consider his
rehabilitative needs. Appellant’s Brief at 18. However, the record establishes
the court imposed a sentence outside of the sentencing guideline ranges
because of the nature of the offense, Appellant’s prior history, the threat he
posed to the community, and his rehabilitative needs. See N.T., 6/24/22, at
45-47. We reiterate that after hearing from Appellant, his mother, and his
probation officer, the court was thoughtful in the details of imposing his
sentence. The court required Appellant to undergo individual counseling, and
required him to complete programs in vocation skills, life-skills, education,
and anger management. See id. at 48. The court then advised Appellant
that if he completes those classes and had no infractions during his
incarceration, the court was likely to recommend him for parole on his
minimum release date. See N.T., 6/27/22, at 9. Appellant failed to establish
the court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence above the
aggravated range, and as such, no relief is due. See Smith, 206 A.3d at 567;
Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132; Schutzues, 54 A.3d at 99.
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Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed
Appellant’s probation revocation sentence, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/14/2023
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