Com. v. Parker, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: 2857 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A18037-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JENNIFER ANN PARKER, : : Appellant : No. 2857 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 22, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002877-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2025

Appellant, Jennifer Ann Parker, appeals from the April 22, 2024

judgment of sentence entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas following her conviction by a jury of Accidents Involving Death and

Driving Under the Influence—Controlled Substance (“DUI”), and by the trial

court of three summary driving offenses.1 Appellant challenges the trial

court’s denial of her motion to bifurcate, the weight of the evidence, and the

discretionary aspects of sentencing. After careful review, we affirm on the

basis of the trial court’s opinion.

On February 17, 2023, at approximately 9:00 PM, Appellant struck and

killed a pedestrian while driving her Honda Pilot SUV on Butler Pike in

Whitemarsh Township and then fled the scene. On March 23, 2023, the ____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3742(a), 3802(d)(1)(i), 3744(a), 3746(a)(1), and 3714(b),

respectively. J-A18037-25

Commonwealth charged Appellant with the above crimes. The trial court set

forth the relevant facts underlying the charges in its December 18, 2024

opinion and we adopt its recitation for purposes of this appeal. See Trial Ct.

Op., 12/18/24, at 1-14.

Appellant filed numerous pretrial motions, including a motion to

bifurcate the DUI charge from the Accidents Involving Death charge,

contending that the DUI charge was prejudicial and misleading because the

jury would automatically assume Appellant was impaired. Following a hearing

on the motion, the trial court determined that “there was nothing inherently

prejudicial about the DUI [charge] to warrant bifurcating that charge.” Id. at

15. The court further determined that the “DUI charge was part and parcel of

the criminal episode and it was permissible for the Commonwealth to argue

that leaving the scene of the accident was based, at least in part, on Appellant

knowing she had marijuana in her system.” Id.

After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Appellant of Accidents

Involving Death and DUI. The court held the adjudication of the summary

offenses for sentencing and deferred sentencing pending preparation of a pre-

sentence investigation (“PSI”) report.

At the April 22, 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court convicted

Appellant of the summary driving offenses. Then, after considering the

arguments of counsel, victim impact testimony and written statements,

Appellant’s statement, the PSI report, and the sentencing guidelines, the court

imposed a term of 3½ to 10 years of incarceration for the Accidents Involving

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Death conviction and a consecutive term of 72 hours to 6 months of

incarceration for the DUI conviction.2 The court stated on the record that it

was imposing a sentence greater than the mandatory minimum of three years

because “any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of this crime

and would not appropriately take into account the severity of [Appellant’s]

actions, all of them, not just leaving the scene, but the actions that followed.

And the incredible, terrible impact that this crime had on the victim’s family

and community.” N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/24, at 38-39. Appellant did not file

a post-sentence motion or timely notice of appeal from her judgment of

sentence.

On June 12, 2024, Appellant successfully petitioned for reinstatement

of her appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant then filed a post-sentence

motion asserting, inter alia, that her Accidents Involving Death conviction was

against the weight of the evidence and that her sentence was excessive. The

trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. ____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s prior record score was zero and the offense gravity score for Accidents Involving Death—a second-degree felony—is nine. See N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/24, at 5. A standard range sentence for Accidents involving Death is 12 to 24 months plus or minus 12 months, and 36 months in the aggravated range. Id. at 35. However, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(b)(3)(i), a conviction of that offense carries a mandatory minimum sentence of three years. Thus, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of Accidents Involving Death “for a term[,] which shall be fixed by the court at not more than ten years.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(2); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(b)(3)(1).

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Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:

1. Did the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to bifurcate the charge of [DUI] in light of the prosecution’s subsequent use of the charge in closing argument to [imply] that [Appellant] fled the scene due to consciousness of guilt as to impairment?

2. Is [Appellant] entitled to an arrest of judgment and/or new trial [] on the ground that the jury’s verdict of guilty with respect to Count 1: Accidents Involving Death or Personal Injury was against the weight of the evidence since the Commonwealth’s case failed to establish that [Appellant] was aware her vehicle struck a human being since, (1) the evidence was consistent with a “no escape” situation, (2) the evidence was inconsistent with a roof vault scenario, (3) the Commonwealth’s human factor testing was flawed due to the advance notice that a pedestrian was present, thereby resulting in longer sight distances being recorded, (4) that no testing was performed with a truck in front of the vehicle, and (5) the Commonwealth’s reconstruction of the accident omitted factors such as oncoming headlights or a truck being in front of [Appellant’s] vehicle?

3. Was the lower court’s aggregate sentence of 3½ to 10 years imprisonment imposed at Count 1 contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process in that it was unduly harsh since the length of the sentence exceeded the mandatory minimum sentence and was six months over the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and was based exclusively on the facts of the instant case, while failing to give adequate consideration to mitigating evidence presented at sentencing and in the pre-sentence report including but not limited to, (1) [Appellant’s] genuine display of remorse, (2) her lack of prior record, (3) the fact that she was the sole caretaker for three daughters, (4) her exceptional work history, and (5) her substantial ties to the community?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.

***

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In her first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her

motion to bifurcate the DUI and Accidents Involving Death charges. Id. at

19-25. In particular, she argues that admitting evidence of her DUI charge

prejudiced her because it improperly suggested that intoxication played a role

in the accident and that Appellant fled in an attempt to hide her impairment.

Id. at 25

On appeal, this court will not reverse the trial court’s order denying a

motion to sever charges absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.

Renninger, 269 A.3d 548, 563 (Pa. Super. 2022). “The critical consideration

is whether the appellant was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision not to

sever. The appellant bears the burden of establishing such prejudice.”

Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 901 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583 provides, in pertinent part, that:

The court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.

Comment: This rule provides the procedure whereby the court may, because of prejudice to a party, order separate trials of offenses or defendants that otherwise would be properly tried together under Rule 582. A defendant may also request severance of offenses or defendants on the ground that trying them together would be improper under Rule 582.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583

Rule 582 applies to offenses charged in separate informations and

permits those offenses to be tried together:

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(a) [if] the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or

(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1)(a), (b). The court may order separate trials if the

standards set forth in Rule 582(A)(1)(a) and (b) are not met, or pursuant to

Rule 583.

In the context of Rule 583, prejudice occurs if the evidence presented

tended to convict a defendant only by her “propensity to commit crimes, or

because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence[,] or could not

avoid cumulating the evidence. [T]he admission of relevant evidence

connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a natural consequence of a

criminal trial, and is not grounds for severance by itself.” Commonwealth

v. Gray, 296 A.3d 41, 48 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

After a thorough review of the record, briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion of the trial

court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Appellant’s motion to bifurcate. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the

trial court’s opinion which explained that: (1) the DUI and Accidents Involving

Death charge were part of the same criminal episode, (2) the evidence related

to the DUI charge was directly related to the Accidents Involving Death charge

as an explanation for why Appellant left the scene, and (3) the trial court

provided the jury with an instruction that the evidence was admitted for the

limited purpose of showing consciousness of guilt; and concluded that (1) the

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jury was able to distinguish the evidence of each charge, and (2) Appellant

suffered no prejudice. See Trial Ct. Op. at 20-21.

In her second issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence in

support of her Accidents Involving Death conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 25-

27. She claims that the Commonwealth failed to establish that she was aware

that she had hit a person with her vehicle and not an inanimate object. Id.

She argues that the jury improperly weighed the evidence in the

Commonwealth’s favor when it determined that the accident presented a

“wrap with roof vault” scenario where the victim was vaulted over the roof of

the vehicle after first landing on the hood, as the Commonwealth’s expert

testified, instead of an unavoidable “no escape” situation, as her expert

testified at trial. Id.

“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the

credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403,

408 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). A trial court reviewing a challenge to the

weight given the evidence may grant relief only if “the jury’s verdict is so

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of

a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to

prevail.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation

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The trial court’s denial of a weight claim “is the least assailable of its

rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 880 (Pa. 2008); see also

Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating

that because trial court is in best position to view the evidence presented, an

appellate court will give that court “the utmost consideration” when reviewing

its weight determination). On appeal, this Court may not consider the

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence, and is instead limited to evaluating only the trial court’s exercise of

discretion in denying that claim. Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80,

91 (Pa. 2014). As our Supreme Court has made clear, reversal is only

appropriate “where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable abuse of

discretion[.]” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion of the trial

court, we conclude that there is no merit to Appellant’s weight of the evidence

claim. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 23-27 ((1) setting forth the conflicting testimony offered by

the Commonwealth’s expert and Appellant’s expert, as well as the instruction

the court gave the jury regarding its duty to determine the credibility of

witnesses; (2) finding that the credit the jury gave to the Commonwealth’s

witness was reasonable and the verdict not shocking in light of the evidence

presented; and (3) concluding that the court properly exercised its discretion

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in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the

evidence).

In her final issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 26-32. In particular, she asserts that the

sentence was unduly harsh because it exceeded the mandatory minimum

sentence and was six months over the aggravated range of the sentencing

guidelines, and the court failed to give adequate consideration to the

mitigating evidence she presented at the hearing and that the PSI report

contained. Id. at 29, 31. The mitigating factors she contends the court did

not afford sufficient weight include her work history, her expression of

remorse, her status as the sole caregiver for three children, her clean criminal

record, and her substantial ties to the community. Id. at 28-29, 32.

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence “are not appealable

as of right.” Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super.

2015). Instead, an appellant must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by (1) filing

a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or

in a motion to reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying with

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the brief setting forth

a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal; and

(4) presenting “a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).” Id. (citation

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Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, preserved her claim that the

court failed to consider mitigating factors, and included a Rule 2119(f)

statement in her brief. We, thus, consider whether Appellant has raised a

substantial question for our review.

In regard to the fourth criteria, “[a] substantial question exists only

when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant has claimed that her sentence is excessive and that the

court abused its discretion in imposing it because the court failed to consider

adequately her mitigating factors. Appellant’s Brief at 28-32. “[A] claim that

the sentence is manifestly excessive, inflicting too severe a punishment, does

present a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216,

227 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted), see also Commonwealth v.

Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[A]n excessive sentence

claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider

mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”). Thus, Appellant’s claim

raises a substantial question.

Turning to the merits of Appellant’s sentencing challenge, this Court has

repeatedly observed that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on

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appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Bowen,

55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012). To demonstrate an abuse of

discretion, the defendant must “establish, by reference to the record, that the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly

unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

In sentencing a defendant, a trial court should consider the following

factors: “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). When the

sentencing court has the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, “we

presume that [it] was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors”

when imposing the sentence. Commonwealth v. Sexton, 222 A.3d 405,

422 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

We defer to the sentencing court’s assessment of the sentencing factors

as it is “in the best position to measure factors such as the nature of the crime,

the defendant’s character, and the defendant’s display of remorse, defiance,

or indifference.” Summers, 245 A.3d at 696 (citation omitted). Instead, our

“review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is confined by the statutory

mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d).” Commonwealth v. Macias, 968

A.2d 773, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2009).

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The sentencing court retains discretion to sentence outside the

guidelines, so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory

maximum sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 621

(Pa. 2002) (plurality); Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 675 A.2d 268, 277

n.17 (Pa. 1996).

When a defendant alleges that the sentencing court “failed to consider”

or “did not adequately consider” facts of record, they are effectively requesting

this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1989). “As

long as the trial court’s reasons demonstrate that it weighed the [guidelines]

with the facts of the crime and the defendant’s character in a meaningful

fashion, the court’s sentence should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018-19 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion of the trial

court, we conclude that Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing her sentence for the Accidents Involving Death

conviction fails. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

See Trial Ct. Op. at 30-32 ((1) recounting each of the factors the court

considered in fashioning Appellant’s sentence; (2) noting it had placed its

reasons for the sentence on the record; and (3) concluding that it properly

exercised its discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence above the

mandatory minimum).

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In sum, having found each of Appellant’s claims meritless, we affirm the

judgment of sentence. The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial

court’s December 18, 2024 opinion to all future filings.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 9/2/2025

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