Com. v. Nikonowicz, T.

2025 Pa. Super. 243

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 2708 EDA 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A16013-25

2025 PA Super 243

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYLER NIKONOWICZ : : Appellant : No. 2708 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004301-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2025

Tyler Nikonowicz appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Delaware County, deeming him incompetent to be tried and

involuntarily committing him to a facility for treatment. After careful review,

we reverse.

During the pendency of this appeal, the trial court granted the

Commonwealth’s request to nolle pros the underlying criminal charges. We,

therefore, simply note that the affidavit of probable cause alleged the following

events. On May 18, 2023, Media Borough Police Department officers stopped

Nikonowicz on the street after he called 911 approximately nine times in eight

minutes. Nikonowicz reported each time that he had been raped in his sleep

before abruptly ending the call. The dispatcher reported that Nikonowicz

sounded as if he were under the influence. Officers located Nikonowicz, who

acted aggressively and accused them of being pedophiles and rapists. The J-A16013-25

officers believed that Nikonowicz may have been mentally ill and, ultimately,

arrested him for, among other crimes, false reports and resisting arrest.

On August 7, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a petition for involuntary

commitment pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S.

§§ 7101–7503. The petition stated that, on August 1, 2023, Marc Gramatges,

M.D., interviewed Nikonowicz at the local correctional facility. Doctor

Gramatges reported that Nikonowicz “lacked sufficient psychological and

cognitive capacity to proceed to trial and should be considered incompetent.”

Petition, 8/7/23, at ¶ 2. The trial court held a competency hearing on

September 12, 2023, with Dr. Gramatges testifying as an expert witness. The

trial court granted the petition and ordered Nikonowicz committed to a

psychiatric inpatient facility.

Nikonowicz filed a timely notice of appeal, asserting that the instant

order is appealable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Nikonowicz filed a

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement errors complained of on

appeal. The trial court filed an opinion on December 14, 2023, and

transmitted the record to this Court. While this appeal was pending, the trial

court held a status hearing to review Nikonowicz’s treatment. On March 13,

2024, the trial court deemed Nikonowicz competent to proceed and the

criminal proceedings resumed. The Commonwealth filed a criminal

information on February 1, 2025. Ten days later, the Commonwealth

-2- J-A16013-25

requested permission to nolle pros the charges, which the trial court granted.1

Nikonowicz raises two issues for our review.

1. Whether the procedure by which the competency evaluation was ordered, and a finding of incompetence made, violated the [MHPA] and [Nikonowicz]’s Due Process rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, inasmuch as the competency evaluation was ordered by a magisterial district judge in the absence of a hearing and the lower court exceeded the time frame within which a determination of competency could be made?

2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that [Nikonowicz] was incompetent, such that the finding of incompetence violated the [MHPA] and [Nikonowicz]’s Due Process rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

We begin by addressing two threshold matters: whether this Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal and whether the termination of criminal charges

against Nikonwicz has mooted the issues. The two points are related, as the

Commonwealth maintains that the lack of a pending prosecution is relevant

to our jurisdiction. We begin with a brief statutory discussion of the pertinent

provisions of the MHPA.

Article IV of Chapter 15 of the MHPA applies to the examination and

treatment of persons charged with a crime. Treatment is authorized for

“incompetent defendants” who are defined as persons whom the trial court

determines “to be substantially unable to understand the nature or object of

____________________________________________

1 It is unknown if the order granting the Commonwealth’s motion barred the

Commonwealth from refiling charges.

-3- J-A16013-25

the proceedings against [them] or to participate and assist in [their]

defense[.]” 50 P.S. § 7402(a) (section 402). Section 402(b) permits the

court to “order involuntary treatment of a person found incompetent to stand

trial but who is not severely mentally disabled, such involuntary treatment not

to exceed a specific period of 60 days.” Id. at § 7402(b). The court did so

here. See Order, 9/12/23 (“Pursuant to . . . [section 402(b)], [Nikonowicz]

is hereby committed . . . for treatment and evaluation for a period not to

exceed 60 days[.]”). In turn, this finding triggered “a stay of the prosecution

for so long as such incapacity persists[.]” 50 P.S. § 7403(b) (section 403).

An incompetent individual is entitled to counsel while charges are pending,

and “the person charged shall be reexamined not less than every 90 days by

a psychiatrist appointed by the court and a report of reexamination shall be

submitted to the court and to counsel.” Id. at § 7403(c). Notably, neither

section 402 nor 403 includes a mechanism for judicial review.

With that background in mind, we first address whether this Court has

jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. By rule, “an appeal may be taken as of

right from any final order of a government unit or trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341.

“Final orders are those that dispose of all claims and all parties, are explicitly

defined as final orders by statute, or are certified as final orders by the trial

court or other reviewing body.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243,

248 (Pa. 2011). The instant order is not a final order, as the prosecution

remained pending.

-4- J-A16013-25

“In limited circumstances, however, we may consider interlocutory

appeals. One type of interlocutory appeal is that involving a collateral order.”

Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 308 (Pa. Super. 2016). A

collateral order is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the

main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied

review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until

final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P.

313(b). “Whether an order is appealable under Rule 313 is a question of law.

As such, our review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771,

781 (Pa. 2014).

Our Supreme Court has directed that Rule 313 “is to be construed

narrowly, and we require every one of its three prongs be clearly present

before collateral appellate review is allowed.” Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral

Dirs. Ass’n, 977 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Pa. 2009). We do so “to avoid ‘undue

corrosion of the final order rule,’ and to prevent delay resulting from

‘piecemeal review of trial court decisions.’” K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 778

(Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). We do not apply a “whole order” approach.

Instead, following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, we apply an

“issue-by-issue approach” and restrict appeal to “those issues which

independently satisfy the collateral order test, rather than permitting whole

order review of an entire case once one issue crosses the collateral order

threshold.” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1128. In this case, the two issues present

identical considerations; thus, we will treat them as one overarching issue.

-5- J-A16013-25

The Commonwealth agrees that the first prong is met, as “the court’s

determination of incompetence is separable from the underlying question of

criminal guilt.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11. It, however, disputes the

second and third prongs, citing as support for both arguments the absence of

an ongoing prosecution. Thus, in its view, the “right involved” is not important

because it “cannot be said to even impact [Nikonowicz]” since both his

commitment and the prosecution have ended. Id. at 12. Similarly,

addressing whether Nikonowicz’s claim will be forever lost, the Commonwealth

asserts that “his claims are already ‘lost’” since the charges have been

withdrawn. Id.

We disagree with the Commonwealth that events following the filing of

the notice of appeal bear on our analysis of the three prongs. For the sake of

uniformity, we conclude that the Rule 313 analysis must be tied to the moment

in time the notice of appeal was filed. The doctrine is framed in terms of

whether the order is “immediately appealable,” which textually suggests the

assessment is made at the time of appeal without reference to subsequent

events. K.C., supra at 777 (“Otherwise known as the collateral order

doctrine, Rule 313(b) provides that an interlocutory order is collateral and,

therefore, immediately appealable, if . . . .”). Furthermore, assessing the

circumstances as of the day of appeal is consistent with the fact that the

collateral order doctrine tends to employ a categorical approach with respect

to the discrete legal issue. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d

243, 249 (Pa. 2011) (stating orders requiring disclosure of confidential

-6- J-A16013-25

information generally qualify as collateral, as “[o]nce putatively privileged

material is in the open, the bell has been rung, and cannot be unrung by a

later appeal”). While that approach is “tempered by an appreciation that the

collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed in order to buttress the

final order doctrine,” Shearer v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 858 (Pa. 2018), the

salient point is that the assessment of whether an interlocutory order qualifies

as a collateral order focuses on the substantive legal issue. In this respect,

the points raised by the Commonwealth fall under the rubric of justiciability,

not jurisdiction. See Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers

Ass’n, 901 A.2d 991, 1002 (Pa. 2006) (“Mootness poses a question of

justiciability and is related to the concepts of standing and ripeness; all three

are concerned with the proper timing of litigation.”). The flaws with the

Commonwealth’s position are evident when one considers the fact that its

arguments suggest this order may have qualified as collateral had this Court

been able to review the claims on an expedited basis the day after the trial

court filed its opinion. The bench and bar would have little guidance on

whether an order qualifies as collateral if the “when” is analyzed instead of

the “what.”

We now analyze the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.

Beginning with the first, we agree with the Commonwealth that the issue of

whether Nikonowicz was lawfully involuntarily committed is separable from

and collateral to the main cause of action, i.e., Nikonowicz’s culpability. In

Commonwealth v. Nuzzo, 284 A.3d 1243, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2022), counsel

-7- J-A16013-25

for defendant Marc Nuzzo filed a petition for a competency determination but

sought to seal the petition. The trial court declined the request to seal on the

basis that the petition qualified as a public document. Nuzzo filed a notice of

appeal and asserted that appeal was as-of-right pursuant to Rule 313. We

agreed that the order qualified as collateral under Rule 313; with respect to

the first prong, we stated:

There is little dispute that [Nuzzo] raises a claim that is separable from the main cause of action since the confidential status of the competency petition is capable of review without consideration of the main substantive issues in this criminal proceeding. More specifically, we may adjudicate [Nuzzo]’s privacy interest in his medical and mental health records without a determination of his competency to stand trial or an adjudication of his criminal responsibility for the alleged offenses, which are inquiries critical to the pre-trial and trial phases of this case. As such, the instant appeal is separable from the merits of the underlying criminal prosecution, including the underlying issue of [Nuzzo]’s culpability.

Id. at 1250.

Similarly, the legality of Nikonowicz’s involuntary commitment is

separable from his culpability and does not require any analysis of whether he

was guilty of the alleged crimes. Thus, the first prong is met.

Turning to the second prong—the importance of the interest involved—

“we weigh the interests implicated in the case against the costs of piecemeal

litigation.” Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 552 (Pa. 1999). Nikonowicz

asserts a broad due process-based liberty interest in not being confined

without sufficient evidence of incompetency and strict compliance with

procedural protections. He also raises an interest in the existence of the

-8- J-A16013-25

records generated as a result of the commitment. See Appellant’s Brief, at

22 (“[T]he finding of incompetency must be vacated, otherwise any future

examiner could inquire of the records from the September 12, 2023 order[.]”).

Involuntary commitment constitutes a serious deprivation of liberty, but

it is not clear that it qualifies as worthy of immediate review since “the rights

involved must implicate more than just the individual parties in the matter[]

and, instead, must be deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the

particular litigation at hand.” J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425, 431 (Pa. 2023)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Criminal defendants routinely face

long periods of incarceration pending trial and must await final judgment to

appeal issues such as suppression of critical evidence. We, therefore, do not

agree that “commitment to an inpatient psychiatric facility is too important to

be denied review” based solely on the fact of commitment. Appellant’s Brief,

at 2. Concerns regarding an invalid commitment or lengthy suspension of

charges2 can be challenged via an “allowance of appeal from an interlocutory

order by permission, and we have concluded that [the] discretionary process

would be undermined by an overly permissive interpretation of Rule 313’s

limited grant of collateral appeals as of right.” Rae, 977 A.2d at 1126.

However, we agree that the records created due to the commitment

favor immediate review. As a preview of sorts concerning the mootness issue,

2 The stay of criminal proceedings could have been extended, subject to the

required review every ninety days, up to the maximum sentence of confinement or ten years, whichever is less. See 50 P.S. § 7403(f).

-9- J-A16013-25

we have reviewed involuntary commitment orders despite their mootness on

the grounds that “a live controversy still exists since involuntary commitment

orders involve important liberty interests over which it behooves us to

maintain appellate vigilance[.]” In re S.O., 492 A.2d 727, 733 (Pa. Super.

1985). The liberty interest is partly rooted in the difficulty of adjudicating

such issues in a timely fashion, as “[a]ppeals from orders for involuntary

commitment rarely reach this Court” before the maximum period of

commitment expires. In re Ann S., 421 A.2d 370, 372 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1980).

Beyond that difficulty, our Supreme Court has held that involuntary

commitment implicates reputational interests protected by the Pennsylvania

Constitution. See Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. 1978) (“[A]

person who has been unlawfully committed to a state mental hospital has a

right to the destruction of the hospital records which were created . . . . The

continued existence of the hospital records pose[s] a threat to [Wolfe]’s

reputation.”). Accordingly, the need to maintain “appellate vigilance” over

this constitutional right implicates an important policy beyond Nikonowicz’s

interest in the litigation. See Shearer, 177 A.3d at 859 (distinguishing, for

purposes of assessing whether a right involves an issue deeply rooted in public

policy, constitutional rights from mere rule-based rights). Relatedly, we

conclude that “the interests that would go unprotected without immediate

appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final

order rule.” Williams, 86 A.3d at 782.

- 10 - J-A16013-25

The final prong is whether the claim will irreparably be lost if review is

postponed until final judgment. A criminal defendant wishing to appeal a

determination that he or she is competent to proceed to trial does not satisfy

the criteria for an appeal as of right, because the defendant is free to challenge

the “determination of competence following trial.” Commonwealth v.

Reagan, 479 A.2d 621, 622 (Pa. Super. 1984). See also Commonwealth

v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. 1996) (reviewing on direct appeal

claim that “the trial court erred by deeming him competent to stand trial”). It

stands to reason that this claim could be raised on direct appeal if the case

had proceeded to final judgment.

Nikonowicz argues that his claims will be irreparably lost if deferred to

final review because “the question of whether [he] was deemed incompetent

and committed in violation of his due process rights will never be definitively

answered.” Appellant’s Brief, at 3. We disagree. In cases that proceed to

final judgment, resolution will be significantly delayed but could still be

reviewed on appeal. Furthermore, as the Commonwealth highlights, these

claims were lost by its decision to terminate prosecution. A defendant’s claims

are definitionally “irreparably lost” any time a case is resolved without a

conviction.

However, the reputational interest involved here is unique and

implicates interests beyond the criminal matter. The fact that Nikonowicz

faced criminal charges is distinct from the commitment issue. Indeed, the

procedures under Chapter 15 of the MHPA are civil in nature. See 50 P.S. §

- 11 - J-A16013-25

7401(a) (“Whenever a person who is charged with crime, or who is undergoing

sentence, is or becomes severely mentally disabled, proceedings may be

instituted for examination and treatment under the civil provisions of this act

in the same manner as if he were not so charged or sentenced.”).

Commitment proceedings “were never meant to supplant the operation of the

criminal system, but were structured as completely collateral proceedings

which could exist contemporaneously with criminal prosecution.”

Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 A.2d 1041, 1047 (Pa. Super. 1984), aff'd,

510 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1986). We deem that point dispositive because it appears

that, as a practical matter, an immediate appeal may be the only way to

guarantee that a defendant’s reputational interest is protected when he is

involuntarily committed while facing criminal charges. 3

Presently, the parties have not addressed the availability of another

mechanism to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence justifying the

incompetency finding or the associated procedural claims raised by

Nikonowicz. As previously noted, the applicable sections of the MHPA do not

supply a right to judicial review, and we have not found any case addressing

this issue. Typically, appellate review of involuntary commitments takes the

form of a direct appeal from a pure civil commitment or from petitions to

expunge records in connection with requests to obtain firearms as specifically

3 The fact that Nikonowicz’s charges were dismissed following the appeal illustrates the conundrum. However, our analysis would not have differed if the prosecution remained ongoing.

- 12 - J-A16013-25

authorized by statute. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) (allowing persons

involuntary committed by physician pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302 to seek review

of sufficiency of evidence supporting commitment and expungement). As

Nikonowicz was committed under section 402, that statute does not apply.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in In re J.M.Y., 218 A.3d 404 (Pa. 2019),

suggests that Nikonowicz would have forfeited appellate review absent this

appeal. There, J.M.Y. was committed for involuntary treatment by a physician

pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302 on September 22, 2012, after he attempted to

harm himself. Such commitments are valid for a maximum of 120 hours. His

attending psychiatrist applied to extend the commitment for twenty days, as

authorized by 50 P.S. § 7303(a). On November 24, 2014, J.M.Y. filed a

petition to vacate the commitment and expunge all records, raising various

due process challenges to the procedures resulting in his commitment.

Ultimately, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Court observed that J.M.Y.’s

continued commitment required the certification of a mental health officer.

Notably, section 303 permits judicial review of the hearing officer’s

certification.

(g) Petition to Common Pleas Court.--In all cases in which the hearing was conducted by a mental health review officer, a person made subject to treatment pursuant to this section shall have the right to petition the court of common pleas for review of the certification. A hearing shall be held within 72 hours after the petition is filed unless a continuance is requested by the person’s counsel. The hearing shall include a review of the certification and such evidence as the court may receive or require. If the court determines that further involuntary treatment is necessary and

- 13 - J-A16013-25

that the procedures prescribed by this act have been followed, it shall deny the petition. Otherwise, the person shall be discharged.

50 P.S. § 7303(g).

J.M.Y. did not challenge the certification under that procedure and, thus,

could not file an appeal to this Court. See also In re Ryan, 784 A.2d 803,

807 (Pa. Super. 2001) (addressing appeal from trial court’s review under 50

P.S. § 7303(g)). The J.M.Y. Court observed that J.M.Y. “seem[ed] to be

arguing that, because he is raising due process challenges to his [s]ection 303

commitment procedure, such challenges may be brought at any time, and in

the manner he chose. We reject such a notion.” Id. at 417.

J.M.Y. does not address the commitment procedures involved in this

appeal, but we are unaware of any statute that would permit a challenge to

the trial court’s decision at some later date. Accordingly, in the absence of

any overriding statutory language, the default appellate provisions of the

Judicial Code presumably apply. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5571(b) (“an appeal from

a tribunal or other government unit to a court . . . must be commenced within

30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”). As an

immediate appeal is the only way to guarantee that Nikonowicz can appeal

the commitment order to vindicate his reputational interests, we find that the

third prong is met as well. Cf. Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294,

310 (Pa. Super. 2016) (concluding claim would be irreparably lost if review

were postponed until trial “in light of the privilege issues in play and because

there is no effective mechanism” for raising the claim on direct appeal)

(emphasis added).

- 14 - J-A16013-25

Having concluded that the order is appealable under Rule 313, we

readily dispose of the Commonwealth’s argument that this appeal is moot. As

set forth by our Supreme Court in Wolfe, a committed individual has a

reputational interest that extends beyond the period of commitment.

We now proceed to the issues raised on appeal. The first issue raises

two separate procedural claims concerning Nikonowicz’s commitment. For the

following reasons, we agree that the trial court’s failure to hold the hearing

within the mandated period requires reversal. Accordingly, we need not reach

the remaining issue.4

The key provision is set forth within section 402: “The determination of

the competency of a person who is detained under a criminal charge shall be

rendered by the court within 20 days after the receipt of the report of

examination unless the hearing was continued at the person’s request.”

50 P.S. § 7402(g) (emphasis added). The trial court and Commonwealth

agree that this provision was violated because the report was completed on

4 Nikonowicz argues that there was no authority for Dr. Gramatges to conduct the August 1, 2023 interview, as it was apparently prompted by a magisterial district judge’s recommendation in connection with his/her bail determination. The Commonwealth responds that this was merely a psychological evaluation and not an incompetency examination. The Commonwealth’s argument overlooks that its petition directly sought involuntary commitment, not an incompetency examination. But see 50 P.S. § 7402(c) (“Application to the court for an order directing an incompetency examination may be presented by an attorney for the Commonwealth[.]”). We decline to address this argument, as we conclude Nikonowicz is entitled to relief in any event. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Nikonowicz preserved an objection. The remaining claim argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that he was incompetent.

- 15 - J-A16013-25

August 4, 2023, and the hearing took place more than one month later.

However, both suggest that Nikonowicz waived any complaint by requesting

a postponement.

We respectfully disagree. The competency hearing was initially

scheduled for August 22, 2023, which was within twenty days of the August

4, 2023, report. At the August 22 hearing, Nikonowicz argued that the trial

court could not grant the petition since Dr. Gramatges was not present. The

trial court then sua sponte rescheduled the hearing. In its opinion, the trial

court states that it “continued the hearing . . . based on defense counsel’s

objection[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 12/14/23, at 7.

We do not agree that Nikonowicz requested that the hearing be

rescheduled. His objection merely argued that the Commonwealth’s failure to

secure Dr. Gramatges’ appearance precluded the trial court from committing

him. The trial court did not have to accept this argument. 5 Thus, while it is

correct that Nikonowicz objected, in context that objection was to the

sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court was free to disagree with the

argument. Alternatively, the court could have ordered another evaluation.

Indeed, at the rescheduled commitment hearing, Nikonowicz reiterated his

procedural objection and argued that the trial court could remedy the violation

by ordering a new examination. He cited 50 P.S. § 7402(g) and stated, “We

have objected to this from the beginning. . . . . Now as far as the remedy for ____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth argued, “You can make a finding that he is not competent based on his presentation today.” N.T. Hearing, 8/22/23, at 7.

- 16 - J-A16013-25

that. I think the only remedy is likely another evaluation,” followed by a

hearing within twenty days from the report. N.T. Competency Hearing,

9/12/23, at 41.6

We now address whether this procedural violation was fatal. As with

the collateral order analysis, we have not found any authority directly on point.

In In re A.J.N., 144 A.3d 130 (Pa. Super. 2016), we aptly summarized the

caselaw emphasizing the importance of strict compliance with other

procedural sections of the MHPA:

Our decision in In re Chiumento, [] 688 A.2d 217 ([Pa. Super.] 1997), likewise addressed the scenario where the specific due process protections provided to a person under MHPA were ignored. We stated, “[b]ecause the specific procedural protections and mandates delineated in the MHPA were not followed,” the involuntary commitment in question was improper, the appellant had to be discharged, and the record of the involuntary commitment had to expunged. Id. at 218. We concluded that a mental health patient’s need for treatment cannot trump compliance with the due process requirements outlined in the MHPA, even when the due process violation appears to be minimal. See Commonwealth v. C.B., [] 452 A.2d 1372 ([Pa. Super.] 1982) (C.B. was not given a copy of a petition three days in advance of hearing held pursuant to § 7304 (relating to court-ordered involuntary treatment not to exceed ninety days), as required by MHPA; C.B. was entitled to expungement of all records of commitment). See also In re Condry, [] 450 A.2d 136, 137 ([Pa. Super.] 1982) (vacating an order that upheld an involuntary commitment because “the statutory requirements [of the MHPA] were not strictly adhered to”); Cf. In re J.M., [] 726 A.2d 1041 ([Pa.] 1999) (holding proceedings valid where county ____________________________________________

6 Nikonowicz argued that a reexamination was particularly appropriate because his condition had improved. In fact, on cross-examination, Dr. Gramatges agreed that Nikonowicz “is doing a lot better today.” N.T. Competency Examination, 9/12/23, at 24.

- 17 - J-A16013-25

administrator issued warrant before person was taken to facility for involuntary treatment and where warrant supported the finding that there was a reasonable probability that patient was in need of emergency involuntary commitment under [section] 302). Thus, the case law uniformly mandates expungement and destruction of records when the procedural, due process requirements of the MHPA are violated during a commitment proceeding.

Id. at 138–39.

We see no reason not to extend this same logic to the violation here. 7

The General Assembly mandated that the incompetency determination be ____________________________________________

7On this basis, alone, we conclude that Nikonowicz is entitled to relief. However, we are compelled to note that it appears Nikonowicz’s commitment was unlawfully extended.

The trial court committed Nikonowicz to Norristown State Hospital on September 13, 2023, for 60 days, which, as previously noted, is the maximum period allowed by statute. The docket reflects that Nikonowicz was transported from Norristown to the county jail on January 26, 2024, which is 135 days from September 13, 2023. Accepting arguendo that additional periods of involuntary treatment are authorized without resort to 50 P.S. § 7406, there is no indication on the public docket that any party sought to extend the commitment. In this regard, section 7406 separately permits, after a finding of incompetency under section 7403, an order directing involuntary treatment under 50 P.S. § 7304. Again, nothing indicates that this statute was invoked.

Finally, section 7403 requires a reexamination of any person deemed incompetent “not less than every 90 days by a psychiatrist appointed by the court[.]” 50 P.S. § 7403. It appears that the only review of Nikonowicz’s commitment was sometime around February 15, 2024, when the trial court ordered a competency evaluation, followed by the March 13, 2024 order deeming Nikonowicz competent to proceed.

We believe that the Commonwealth and the trial court acted in good faith. However, the restraints on Nikonowicz’s liberty are significant and we remind (Footnote Continued Next Page)

- 18 - J-A16013-25

made within twenty days of receipt of the report unless Nikonowicz requested

a postponement. Because he did not, the trial court violated his procedural

rights. Nikonowicz is, thus, entitled to expungement of all records since his

commitment was unlawful. Id.

Order reversed. Nikonowicz’s September 12, 2023, involuntary

commitment is to be expunged and all records of that commitment are to be

destroyed upon remand. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/28/2025

the parties and the trial court of the need to strictly follow the General Assembly’s statutory directives.

- 19 -