Com. v. Mercado, M.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 25, 2017
DocketCom. v. Mercado, M. No. 1444 EDA 2016
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Mercado, M. (Com. v. Mercado, M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Mercado, M., (Pa. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

J-S18013-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

MALIK MERCADO

No. 1444 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered April 18, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0023918-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED April 25, 2017

On August 1, 2015, Appellee Malik Mercado was stopped at a sobriety

checkpoint on East Allegheny Avenue in the 25th Police District in

Philadelphia. The police officers operating the checkpoint arrested him and

charged him with driving while under the influence of marijuana (“DUI”). The

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas affirmed the Philadelphia Municipal

Court’s conclusion that the DUI checkpoint was unconstitutional and

suppressed the evidence gathered from the stop. The sole issue in this

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S18013-17

Commonwealth appeal1 is whether the police chose the location of the DUI

checkpoint in compliance with the Tarbert/Blouse2 guidelines and the body

of law contained in this Court’s application of those guidelines. After careful

review, we affirm.

The Commonwealth contends that the Court of Common Pleas erred in

its application of the Tarbert/Blouse guidelines.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, this Court may consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. In our review, we are not bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law, and we must determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. We defer to the suppression court’s findings of fact because, as the finder of fact, it is the suppression court’s prerogative to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Myers, 118 A.3d 1122, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation omitted).

The Tarbert/Blouse guidelines were promulgated to allow the

government to pursue its legitimate interest in preventing the “carnage”

caused by DUI, Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 304 (citation omitted), while

protecting “the individual from arbitrary invasions at the unfettered

1 The Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the suppression order would terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution of Mercado, thereby perfecting our jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). 2 Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1987) and Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1992).

-2- J-S18013-17

discretion of the officers in the field,” Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1178 (citation

omitted). The guidelines set forth five general requirements that the

Commonwealth must establish substantial compliance with in order to

ensure the constitutionality of a DUI checkpoint. See Commonwealth v.

Garibray, 106 A.3d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). Here, only one

part of the fourth requirement, that the choice of location for the checkpoint

be based on experience as to where intoxicated drivers are likely to be

driving, is at issue.

The essential facts of this case are undisputed and may be

summarized as follows. The 25th Police District of Philadelphia suffered the

highest number of DUI arrests in the city during the years 2013 and 2014.

See N.T., Suppression hearing, 1/7/16, at 24, 29-32. The district covers

approximately 2.3 square miles. See id., at 30. The data used by the police

in this case was not broken down further to specific locations or streets

within the district. See id.

Reacting reasonably to this data, the police sought to curb DUI in this

district by establishing a DUI checkpoint. See id., at 29. Complicating

matters was the fact that a checkpoint requires a large operation, involving

“18 police officers, two police cruisers and one large processing center. It’s

about the size of a firetruck.” Id., at 25. As a result, the police were also

reasonably concerned with safety considerations, ruling out smaller, more

residential side streets. See id.

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The Court of Common Pleas concluded that under Commonwealth v.

Blee, 695 A.2d 802 (Pa. Super. 1997), and Garibray, the police had not

provided sufficient evidence to prove that “the DUI checkpoint in question

substantially complied with the Tarbert/Blouse location requirement

because” the evidence was not specific to the location of the DUI checkpoint.

See Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/16, at 6. It therefore affirmed the Municipal

Court’s order that found the stop unconstitutional.

On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of Common Pleas

misapplied Blee and Garibray.3 The Commonwealth believes that

Commonwealth v. Fioretti, 538 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. 1988), is controlling.

After reviewing these cases, we agree with the Court of Common Pleas that

there is significant unresolved tension between the holdings of Blee and

Fioretti.

In Fioretti, a panel of this Court was presented with circumstances

similar to the present case. The appellant was one of several defendants

who had been arrested at a DUI checkpoint in Williamsport. The location for

the checkpoint had been chosen after determining that the thirteenth (of

fifteen) police district in Williamsport had been the location of a high number

3 The Commonwealth also argues that the stop was voluntary. While there was testimony to support this position, our review of the record reveals that the Commonwealth never presented this argument to the Court of Common Pleas or the Municipal Court. It is therefore waived for purposes of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

-4- J-S18013-17

of DUI arrests over a recent six-month period. See Fioretti, 538 A.2d at

576. However, the specific location within the thirteenth district had been

chosen “for its safety features[.]” Id., at 576-577.

The suppression court held that the checkpoint did not comply with the

Tarbert guidelines. The Fioretti panel disagreed, noting that “the location

of the roadblock was chosen based on a statistical analysis of which district

had the highest number of [DUI] arrests or accidents[.]” Id., at 549. It

therefore reversed the suppression order and remanded for further

proceedings.

Similarly, the Blee panel reviewed the placement of a DUI checkpoint

in Luzerne County. It summarized the relevant evidence as follows:

Deputy Chief William Barrett of the Wilkes-Barre Police Department testified that he was responsible for determining the site of the checkpoint. He decided to locate the checkpoint on Route 11 approximately one-quarter mile south of Main Street, near the shopping center in Edwardsville.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Fioretti
538 A.2d 570 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)
Commonwealth v. Tarbert
535 A.2d 1035 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
Commonwealth v. Blouse
611 A.2d 1177 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1992)
Commonwealth v. Garibay
106 A.3d 136 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2014)
Commonwealth v. Myers
118 A.3d 1122 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2015)
Commonwealth v. Menichino
154 A.3d 797 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)
Commonwealth v. Blee
695 A.2d 802 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)

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