OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
NIX, Chief Justice.
The instant appeals present a common issue, namely, whether the police may set up systematic roadblocks for the purpose of stopping and observing drivers to determine whether they are operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035, a panel of the Superior Court held that such roadblocks violated Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In Commonwealth v. Dannaker, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035, a different panel of the Superior Court held that section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), prior to its amendment in 1985, did not authorize the police to conduct such roadblocks.
I.
A. Tarbert
The police department of York Township, York County, established a roadblock on a county road in the early morning hours of July 30, 1983. The purpose of the roadblock was to check all motorists travelling in either direction on the road to determine if they were driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The two police officers assigned to the roadblock were in uniform and had [280]*280driven to the site in marked police cars. Their procedure was to stop a vehicle, ask to see the operator’s license and registration, and attempt to ascertain the existence of any clues that would lead them to believe that the driver might be under the influence of alcohol. When appellee Joseph D. Tarbert was stopped, the police officer who had stopped him noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from Tarbert’s vehicle and observed that Tarbert’s eyes were slightly bloodshot. The officer also observed that Tarbert appeared confused and that he took several seconds to produce his license and registration. The officer asked Tarbert to pull off the highway and park beside a police car. After Tarbert emerged from his car the officer approached Tarbert’s vehicle and noticed an open bottle of beer near the driver’s seat. The police officer then asked Tarbert to submit to three field-sobriety tests, two of which he failed. As a result, Tarbert was placed under arrest and taken to the police station where he was advised of his rights and given a breathalyzer test. The breathalyzer reading was .12 percent. Tarbert signed a copy of the test results and was released. After a jury trial before the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Tarbert was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level of .10 percent or more in violation of section 3731(a)(4) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4) (Supp.1987). He was sentenced to thirty days to twelve months’ imprisonment and assessed a fine and the costs of prosecution. On direct appeal a panel of the Superior Court reversed the judgment of sentence, holding that the stop of Tarbert’s vehicle pursuant to the roadblock violated Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa.Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985). This Court subsequently granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal.
B. Dannaker
On April 7, 1984, pursuant to a discussion among six or seven officers and the police chief, and after consultation with the district attorney, the police department of Brookhaven Township, Delaware County conducted a drunk driving [281]*281roadblock on a main artery which had been the site of prior accidents and arrests for drunk driving. The assigned police officers were in uniform and wearing orange reflection vests. The lighting in the area of the roadblock was adequate and fifteen to twenty flares had been set up along the road. Three drivers at a time were directed to an observation area where a flashlight was shined in their eyes and they were informed of the nature of the roadblock and given pamphlets concerning driving under the influence. Other traffic was permitted to pass while each group of three vehicles was being detained. Appellee William T. Dannaker, III, was among the drivers stopped for observation. The police officer who approached Dannaker’s vehicle observed that Dannaker’s eyes were bloodshot and the smell of alcohol was on his breath. When Dannaker was asked to step out of his car, the officer noticed that Dannaker’s speech was slurred and he was having difficulty maintaining his balance. As a result of these observations Dannaker was placed under arrest and transported to police headquarters, where the officer advised him of his rights and administered a breathalyzer test. Dannaker’s blood alcohol level was registered as .11 percent. In pre-trial motions Dannaker challenged the legality of the stop of his vehicle under section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted Dannaker’s motion to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test and dismissed the charges against him. The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the suppression order. Commonwealth v. Dannaker, 352 Pa.Super. 611, 505 A.2d 1030 (1985). We granted the Commonwealth’s request for allocatur.
II.
We granted review in the instant cases to determine an issue of first impression and far-reaching significance: whether police roadblocks designed to detect persons driving under the influence of alcohol are legally valid. To resolve that question we are called upon to determine whether such roadblocks are violative of this state’s consti[282]*282tutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, or, in the alternative, whether such roadblocks are unlawful for want of specific statutory authorization.
Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
§ 8. Security from searches and seizures
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8.
The role of this Court in interpreting the above constitutional protections was recently explained in Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983):
While minimum federal constitutional guarantees are “equally applicable to the [analogous] state constitutional provision,” see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 260 n. 2, 312 A.2d 29, 31 n. 2 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974), the state has the power to provide broader standards than those mandated by the federal Constitution:
It is well settled that a state may provide through its constitution a basis for the rights and liberties of its citizens independent from that provided by the Federal Constitution, and that the rights so guaranteed may be more expansive than their federal counterparts. Prune-Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-82, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Ware, 405 U.S. 987, 92 S.Ct. 1254, 31 L.Ed.2d 453, subsequently vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. [283]*2831606, 31 L.Ed.2d 821 (1972) (“it appearing that the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground”). This Court has on numerous occasions recognized the Pennsylvania Constitution to be an alternative and independent source of individual rights. See, e.g. Willing v. Mazzocone, 482 Pa. 377, 393 A.2d 1155 (1978); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); Commonwealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70„ 73 n. 3 327 A.2d 19, 20 N. 3 (1974); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 451 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961). Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 169-70, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387-1388 (1981).
This Court has not hesitated to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution as affording greater protection to defendants than the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated, 414 U.S. 808, 94 S.Ct. 73, 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974).
Id., 504 Pa. at 63-64, 470 A.2d at 466-467.
While we are mindful of the limited nature of the protections guaranteed by the federal Constitution, we nonetheless find the large body of federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence instructive and will accord weight to federal court decisions in interpreting Pennsylvania’s constitutional protections where those decisions “are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees,....” Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, 502 [284]*284(1977), quoted, in Commonwealth v. Sell, supra, 504 Pa. at 49, 470 A.2d at 459.
It is no longer open to question that the stopping of an automobile and the detention of its occupants is a seizure subject to constitutional restraints. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 331 A.2d 414 (1975); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). However, “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. at 3084. Moreover, “[ajutomobiles, unlike homes, are subject to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Despite the fact that the vehicle and its use are subject to such regulations, the driver and passengers do not forfeit all reasonable expectation of privacy, and may not be subjected to unfettered governmental intrusion. Delaware v. Prouse, supra.
As the text of Article I, section 8 of our state constitution makes clear, the citizens of this Commonwealth may not be subjected to “unreasonable searches and seizures.” The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Fourth Amendment’s identical phrase, has indicated that a finding of “reasonableness” may, in limited circumstances, be predicated upon less than the traditional requirement of probable cause.
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of “reasonábleness” upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order “ ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against [285]*285arbitrary invasions....'" Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 [98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 [87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930] (1967). Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Implemented in this manner, the reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against “an objective standard,” whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test. In those situations in which the balance of interests precludes insistence upon “some quantum of individualized suspicion,” other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not “subject to the discretion of the official in the field,” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 532 [87 S.Ct. at 1733]. See id., at 534-535 [87 S.Ct. at 1734]; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, [436 U.S.] at 320-321 [98 S.Ct. at 1824-25]; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-323 [92 S.Ct. 2125, 2139, 32 L.Ed.2d 752] (1972) (requiring warrants).
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 653-655 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
The balancing-of-interests approach to the determination of Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” finds its origin in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), a case involving a challenge to an ordinance permitting the code-enforcement inspection of residences. The Camara Court identified the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment as the protection of the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Id. at 528, 87 S.Ct. at 173. In assessing the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion, the Court considered the strength of the public interest in effectively combatting the problem, and the ability to achieve acceptable results by other means, weighed against [286]*286the extent of the invasion of the citizen’s privacy. Id. at 537, 87 S.Ct. at 1735.
In our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987), this Court explicitly approved, for some circumstances, the balancing-of-interests approach for determining reasonableness under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 That case involved the warrantless deployment of a narcotics detection dog to perform a “sniff-search” in a building where the police suspected illegal drugs were being stored. We noted that the considerable utility of this law enforcement procedure would be lost if traditional warrant requirements were imposed, and found the procedure’s intrusiveness to be minimal provided the police had articulable and reasonable grounds for their suspicion and were lawfully present at the site of the search:
[A] canine sniff-search is inherently less intrusive upon an individual’s privacy than other searches such as wiretapping or rummaging through one’s luggage; it is unlikely to intrude except marginally upon innocent persons; and an individual’s interest in being free from police harassment, annoyance, inconvenience and humiliation is reasonably certain of protection if the police must have a [287]*287reason before they may, in the circumstances of this case, utilize a narcotics detection dog.
Id., 515 Pa. at 466, 580 A.2d at 79-80 (footnote omitted). This Court has never had occasion to pass on the constitutionality of a police roadblock. The leading case in this area is United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra. In that decision the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Border Patrol’s routine stopping of a vehicle for brief questioning of its occupants at a permanent checkpoint set up as part of a program to apprehend illegal aliens. The Court, applying the Camara balancing test, rejected the contention that some reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contained illegal aliens was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite for a Border Patrol stop. After describing the magnitude of the illegal immigration crisis, the Court identified surreptitious entries as the most formidable obstacle to the government’s efforts to stem the flow of illegal entrants across the Mexican border. Id. at 551-552, 96 S.Ct. at 3080. The Court found the public interest in the practice of routine stops at permanent checkpoints to be substantial, and stressed that the detection of this illegal activity would be severely hampered by the imposition of a “reasonable suspicion” requirement:
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border. We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice which the Government identifies as the most important of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for United States in No. 74-1560, pp. 19-20. These checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavi[288]*288ly traveled, slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 883-885 [95 S.Ct. at 2581-82].
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.
Id. at 556-557, 96 S.Ct. at 3082-83 (footnote omitted). The Martinez-Fuerte Court next considered the nature of the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests posed by routine checkpoint stops. As to the checkpoint’s objective intrusion, the Court stressed that the stop and questioning were brief and that neither the occupants nor the vehicle were subjected to more than a visual inspection. Id. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. The Court found that the subjective intrusion, i.e., “the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travellers,’’ resulting from a checkpoint stop was slight in comparison to that of random discretionary stops by roving patrols. Id. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. The Court noted several important distinctions between the two types of vehicle stops:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public [289]*289interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.
Id. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 8083-84 (footnote omitted).
The Martinez-Fuerte Court also rejected the alternative argument that routine stops at a checkpoint were permissible only if the location and the procedure employed at a particular checkpoint were judicially authorized by a warrant. The Court concluded that the traditional purposes served by a warrant were inapplicable. Id. at 565-566, 96 S.Ct. at 3086.
A systematic police roadblock to check for drivers under the influence of alcohol, frequently called a “DWI roadblock” or a “sobriety checkpoint,” shares many of the features of the checkpoint considered in Martinez-Fuerte. One commentator has described a typical DWI roadblock as follows:
Although state and local procedures governing the conduct of DWI roadblock stops vary considerably, several basic features of the roadblock stop are identifiable. Roadblock stops are almost always conducted to achieve police objectives that cannot be met without some form of traffic control. DWI roadblocks are temporary checkpoints, unlike the permanent immigration checkpoints used by the United States government for the detection of illegal aliens. The site of the roadblock and the time of its operation are usually determined by administrative officers in the law enforcement department of the juris[290]*290diction. These officers decide where and when to locate a DWI roadblock based on empirical data indicating that drunk drivers pose a particular problem at the respective location and time. Law enforcement officials usually do not attempt to secure prior judicial approval for either the location of the roadblock or the conduct of the stops.
A sign indicating that the motorist is about to be stopped and suggesting the nature of the stop may provide advance warning of the roadblock. Furthermore, checkpoint operations usually are marked by flashing lights, police vehicles, and the presence of uniformed officers. Field officers conducting the roadblock may stop all traffic, or they may use other neutral formulae for deciding which vehicles to stop. For example, the officers might detain every fifth or tenth car that approaches the roadblock. Additionally, officers may wave backed-up traffic through the roadblock if the traffic stoppage poses safety problems.
After a vehicle is stopped, the officer usually requests that the motorist produce his license and registration, and may ask the motorist a few questions to observe him and detect signs that he is under the influence of alcohol. Based on his observations of the motorist and his vehicle, the police officer will either wave the motorist through the roadblock or direct him to a secondary area for further investigation. In the latter case, the officer may order the driver out of the vehicle and require submission to roadside sobriety tests or a breathalyzer test. If the motorist fails these tests the officer will arrest the driver for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 Geo.L.J. 1457, 1460-63 (1983), quoted in 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.8(d), at 69-70 (2d ed. 1987).
In determining whether such a law-enforcement procedure would offend the Pennsylvania Constitution’s proscription against unreasonable seizures, we are convinced [291]*291that a balancing test analogous to that employed under the Fourth Amendment is appropriate. Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnston, supra. We undertake our inquiry, however, with the caveat that the privacy interest guaranteed by Article I, section 8 must be accorded great weight. We observe also that our government is charged with the responsibility of protecting the safety of its citizens.
The Commonwealth obviously has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the danger posed by drunk drivers. We have observed that drunk driving exacts “terrible costs in human life, injury and potential....” Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 313, 495 A.2d 928, 936 (1985). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 249, 470 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1983) (800 killed and 19,499 seriously injured in alcohol-related traffic accidents in Pennsylvania in 1982); Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa.Super. 49, 58, 519 A.2d 984, 989 (1986) (950 killed in alcohol-related traffic accidents in Pennsylvania in 1981). The problem posed by drunk drivers gives rise to a governmental interest much stronger than the problem of illegal immigration, whose consequences are primarily economic in nature. It is also clear that the public interest in removing from the highways drivers operating vehicles under the influence of alcohol from the highways cannot adequately be met by more traditional law enforcement procedures.
[A] rather strong argument can be made that mere patrol and stoppings based upon the Terry standard do not produce what the Camara Court referred to as “acceptable results.” For one thing, even if a patrolling officer is fortunate enough to be in the vicinity where a drunk driver is operating his vehicle, it does not necessarily follow that the driver will at that particular time drive his car in such a fashion as to create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. And the chances of such observation in the first place are rather slight, given the substantial number of intoxicated drivers on the roads. As properly noted by a concurring Justice in (State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 633 P.2d 992 (1983) ]: [292]*292The traditional system has left us far short of achieving the law’s objective. * * * It is only fortuitous that an officer happens to be in a position to see a drunk entering the freeway on the off-ramp before that drunk happens to kill some innocent person. We are not likely ever to achieve the situation where there will be police officers available at closing time on a Labor Day weekend night at each of the locations where patrons shuffle from their favorite saloon to the parking lot, nor, I think, would we ever desire to have that many officers available.
It is by no means surprising, therefore, that it has been reliably estimated that only one of every 2,000 drinking drivers is apprehended.
4 W. LaFave, supra, § 10.8(d), at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, even if there were sufficient police manpower available to observe traffic for telltale signs of drunk driving, many impaired drivers would escape detection.
A 1984 safety study by the National Transportation Safety Board indicated that without sobriety checkpoint programs, many alcohol impaired drivers believe they can avoid police detection by driving carefully. However, with the use of sobriety checkpoints, the general public’s perception of the probability of detection and sanction is increased. [This] public perception has a strong basis in fact. While those drunk drivers arrested by roving patrols average a .169 to .20 blood alcohol content (BAC) level, drunk drivers arrested at Delaware sobriety checkpoints averaged a .14 BAC level. In light of the fact that a driver with a .10 BAC level has a six times greater likelihood of causing an accident than a sober driver, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in detecting and removing drunk drivers with dangerous but significantly lower BAC levels is significant.
Commonwealth v. Leninsky, supra [360 Pa.Super.] at 60-61, 519 A.2d at 990-991 (footnotes omitted).
[293]*293The intrusiveness, both objective and subjective, of a drunk-driving roadblock can be reduced to a constitutionally acceptable degree by the manner in which it is managed and conducted. In this regard the Martinez-Fuerte decision is instructive. For example, the conduct of the roadblock itself can be such that it requires only a momentary stop to allow the police to make a brief but trained observation of a vehicle’s driver, without entailing any physical search of the vehicle or its occupants. To avoid unnecessary surprise to motorists, the existence of a roadblock can be so conducted as to be ascertainable from a reasonable distance or otherwise made knowable in advance. The possibility of arbitrary roadblocks can be significantly curtailed by the institution of certain safeguards. First, the very decision to hold a drunk-driver roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time and place, should be matters reserved for prior administrative approval, thus removing the determination of those matters from the discretion of police officers in the field. In this connection it is essential that the route selected for the roadblock be one which, based on local experience, is likely to be travelled by intoxicated drivers. The time of the roadblock should be governed by the same consideration. Additionally, the question of which vehicles to stop at the roadblock should not be left to the unfettered discretion of police officers at the scene, but instead should be in accordance with objective standards prefixed by administrative decision.
In our view, a drunk-driver roadblock conducted substantially in compliance with the above guidelines would reduce the intrusiveness to a degree which, when balanced against the compelling public interest in apprehending such drivers, would not violate Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Cf. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984) (upholding similar roadblocks under state and federal constitutions); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985) (same); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985) (same). However, notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, there remains the question of whether our state legislature had statutorily [294]*294restrained the power of the police to conduct roadblocks in connection with enforcing the motor vehicle laws.
III.
Prior to this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973), the authority of police officers to stop motor vehicles was virtually unlimited. The legislative declaration of that broad authority was as follows:
Any peace officer, who shall be in uniform, and shall exhibit his badge or other sign of authority, shall have the right to stop any vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of inspecting the said vehicle, as to its equipment and operation, or manufacturer’s serial number or engine number, and securing of such other information as may be necessary.
Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 1221(B),- 75 P.S. § 1221(B) (repealed 1976).
The language of that statute was clearly sufficiently expansive to permit roadblocks for the enforcement of any law pertaining to motor vehicles. In Swanger, however, this Court, in disapproving a random stop made pursuant to the above statute, held that the police could not constitutionally stop a motor vehicle in the absence of probable cause to believe there had been a violation of the Vehicle Code. We explicitly reserved judgment on the issue of systematic stops or roadblocks for the detection of violators. Swanger, supra, 453 Pa. at 110, 307 A.2d at 877. In apparent response to Swanger, the legislature repealed the 1959 statute and enacted in its place section 6308(b) of the 1976 Vehicle Code, which initially provided as follows:
(b) Authority of police officer. — Any police officer may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of inspecting the vehicle as to its equipment and operation, or vehicle identification number or engine number, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
[295]*29575 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (1976).
Section 6308(b) was subsequently amended in 1983 to require, as the legal basis for stopping a vehicle, “articulable and reasonable grounds” to suspect a violation of the motor vehicle laws. As amended, the section stated:
(b) Authority of police officer. — Whenever a police officer has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon request on signal, for the purpose of inspecting the vehicle as to its equipment and operation, or vehicle identification number or engine number, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (as amended to July 22, 1983) (emphasis added).
The version of section 6308(b) which resulted from the 1983 amendment was the one in force when the roadblocks here in issue were conducted. By the express language of that provision the legal power of the police to stop vehicles, even for the purpose of enforcing the motor vehicle laws, was limited to circumstances in which the police officer in question had “articulable and reasonable grounds” to suspect a violation of those laws. Given the terms of that provision, the absence of the requisite “articulable and reasonable grounds” would preclude the police from ordering even a momentary stop of a vehicle.
The Commonwealth argues that section 6308(b) as then written was not intended to bar systematic vehicle stops. For that proposition, the appellant relies on the fact that the provision does not mention stops of that nature. However, for us to accept the appellant’s argument, we would have to engraft upon the 1983 amendment an exception to the stated restriction. That, we may not do. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may not, under the guise of construction, add matters the legislature saw fit not to include at the time. Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 88 A.2d 730 (1952); Altieri v. Allentown Officers’ and Employes’ Retirement Board, 368 Pa. 176, [296]*29681 A.2d 884 (1951); Kusza v. Maximonis, 363 Pa. 479, 70 A.2d 329 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40 A.2d 30 (1944); see Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 213 A.2d 277 (1965). It is certainly within the legislature’s province to restrict the authority of police officers, even if such a restriction shows a more scrupulous regard for private rights than constitutional principles demand. This is what the legislature did by the terms of the 1983 amendment of section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code. That enactment, in requiring “articulable and reasonable grounds” to justify a police-ordered stop, withheld by necessary implication the power to stop a vehicle simply because the police decided to hold a roadblock, regardless of how inobtrusively or systematically conducted.
A more recent amendment to the Vehicle Code provides additional evidence that the General Assembly did not contemplate that the statute in force when the instant cases arose permitted investigatory roadblocks. In 1985, after these cases arose, the legislature further amended section 6308(b) of the Code as follows:
(b) Authority of police officer. — Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (italicized language added by Act of June 19, 1985, P.L. 49, No. 20, § 10, effective in 60 days). With this amendment the legislature specifically addressed, for the first time, police authorization to conduct systematic stops without individualized suspicion of illegal activity.2
[297]*297It cannot be doubted that the police powers of this Commonwealth are particularly broad in matters pertaining to highway safety. E.g., Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939); see Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979). Pursuant to its police powers the state may, by substantially complying with the guidelines set forth in this opinion, conduct systematic roadblocks for the purpose of removing drunk drivers from the highways. However, it is for the legislature to determine whether or not to exercise the full allowable scope of its powers in that regard. Although the legislature in 1985 specifically enacted a statute permitting police to systematically check vehicles and drivers — even in the absence of grounds to suspect a violation of the motor vehicle laws— the fact remains that in 1983, when the instant cases arose, the legislature’s delineation of police authority was not such as to permit such stops.
We must conclude, therefore, that as to Tarbert and Dannaker each roadblock stop was unlawful. The illegality arises in those instances because the exercise of the police power therein exceeded the statutory parameters then in force. It is therefore the restraint upon the police power imposed by the General Assembly that requires our rejection of the procedures employed in these cases without a consideration of the constitutionality of that conduct. Since in each instance the breathalyzer test was the fruit of an unlawful seizure, the results of the tests were properly suppressed in the ensuing criminal prosecutions.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the order of the Superior Court in each of the instant cases is affirmed.3
[298]*298ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ., file concurring opinions.
FLAHERTY, J., concurs in the result.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion.
HUTCHINSON, Former J., did not participate in the decision of this case.