Com. v. Mayers, N.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 9, 2021
• Docket: 361 EDA 2021
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S23008-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NELSON ALEXANDER MAYERS : : Appellant : No. 361 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 4, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002743-2018

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 9, 2021

Nelson Alexander Mayers appeals from the order, entered in the Court

of Common Pleas of Northampton County, denying his petition filed pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After

careful review, we affirm on the basis of the opinion authored by the Honorable

Jennifer R. Sletvold.

On May 16, 2019, Mayers entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count

of driving under the influence—third offense, graded as a misdemeanor of the

first degree. That same day, the court sentenced Mayers to a term of one to

five years’ incarceration. Mayers did not file post-sentence motions or a direct

appeal.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S23008-21

On January 27, 2020, Mayers, acting pro se, filed a timely first PCRA

petition. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition, in which

Mayers alleged ineffectiveness of plea counsel. Specifically, Mayers claimed

that his plea was unlawfully induced by counsel, resulting in an unknowing

and involuntary plea. Mayers further alleged that counsel failed to conduct

any investigation, failed to file a requested pre-trial motion to suppress blood

evidence, failed to meet and consult with him, and failed to pursue defenses

requested by Mayers. The court held a hearing on September 24, 2020. On

January 4, 2021, the court denied relief. Mayers filed a timely notice of

appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal.

Mayers raises the following claim for our review: “Whether the PCRA

court erred in denying the requested relief where ineffective assistance of

counsel caused Mayers to enter an involuntary and unknowing plea?” Brief of

Appellant, at 4.

Our well-settled standard of review for an order denying a PCRA petition

is as follows:

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the

-2- J-S23008-21

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted). The PCRA court’s credibility findings are binding on the appellate

courts where such determinations are supported by the record.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 2015).

Our Supreme Court has explained that:

To obtain PCRA relief, appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence [that]: (1) his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the errors enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2); (2) his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, id., § 9543(a)(3); and (3) “the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial . . . or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic[,] or tactical decision by counsel[,]” id., § 9543(a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the highest appellate court in which appellant could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” Id., § 9544(a)(2). “An issue is waived if appellant could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” Id., § 9544(b).

To be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA petitioner must establish [that]: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, [] 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 ([Pa.] 2011) ([citing] Commonwealth v. Pierce, [] 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 ([Pa.] 1987)). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Ali, [] 10 A.3d 282, 291 ([Pa.] 2010). Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Jones, [] 912 A.2d 268, 278 ([Pa.] 2006). Finally, because a PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to be entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim fails

-3- J-S23008-21

under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on that basis.

Treiber, 121 A.3d at 444-45 (brackets and footnote omitted).

Additionally, our Supreme Court has reiterated that:

Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused [A]ppellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. In determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and intelligently, a reviewing court must review all of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently. Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super.

2016). “Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea

was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of

proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa.

Super. 2018). Where an appellant affirms on the record at the plea colloquy

hearing that he is satisfied with his attorney’s services in connection with his

plea, the appellant is then precluded from contradicting himself in collateral

proceedings and claiming he was coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. See

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002),

citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Super. 1996);

see also Kpou, 153 A.3d at 1024, citing Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832

A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound

by the statement he makes in open court while under oath and he may not

-4- J-S23008-21

later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements

he made at his plea colloquy.”).

During a plea colloquy, a trial court is required to elicit the defendant’s

understanding of six areas to ensure that the defendant comprehends the full

impact and consequences of his plea: (1) the nature of the charges to which

he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) the right to a trial

by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible range of

sentences; and (6) the court’s power to depart from any recommended

sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. See also Kpou, 153 A.3d at

1023. A written colloquy signed by the defendant may supplement an oral

colloquy as long as there is some on-the-record examination of the defendant.

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.

Here, we have reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the

applicable law, and conclude that the well-written and thorough opinion

authored by Judge Sletvold correctly disposes of Mayers’ claim on appeal.

Specifically, Judge Sletvold notes that she engaged in a lengthy oral colloquy

in which Mayers acknowledged: (1) that he was neither promised anything in

exchange for his plea, nor forced or threatened in order to induce the plea;

(2) that counsel answered all of his questions and he was satisfied with her

representation; (3) the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty,

i.e. DUI—third offense; (4) the factual basis for his plea; (5) the range of

possible sentences; (6) his right to a jury trial; (7) the presumption of

innocence; and (8) that he understood, completed, and initialed the written

-5- J-S23008-21

guilty plea colloquy.1 See Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/21, at 4-7, quoting N.T.

Guilty Plea/Sentencing Hearing, 5/16/19, at 1-6.

Additionally, Judge Sletvold credited the testimony of Mayers’ plea

counsel, who testified at the PCRA hearing that: (1) she routinely reviews

with her clients discovery, potential defenses, and plea offers; (2) Mayers

never requested that she file pre-trial motions; (3) she saw nothing in the

record to warrant the filing of pre-trial motions; (4) Mayers’ desire was to

quickly resolve the matter and receive inpatient treatment; (5) Mayers never

indicated that he did not wish to proceed with his plea; (6) Mayers never

sought to withdraw his plea after sentencing; and (7) “based on the discovery,

including video from the DUI center, there is nothing that would have cause[d]

her to change her course of action in this matter.” Id. at 8-9, citing N.T. PCRA

Hearing, 9/24/20, at 28.2

1 In addition, the written plea colloquy confirmed Mayers’ understanding that

the court would not be bound by the terms of the plea agreement. See Guilty Plea Statement, 5/16/19, at ¶ 28.

2 Further, in his written plea colloquy, Mayers affirmed that: (1) he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, see id. at ¶ 42; (2) he had sufficient time to consult with his attorney before entering his plea, see id. at ¶ 43; (3) his attorney reviewed with him possible defenses to the charges and potential witnesses to call, see id. at 44; and (4) he had not asked his attorney to do anything for him in connection with the charges that the attorney had not done, see id. at 45.

-6- J-S23008-21

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief on the basis

of Judge Sletvold’s opinion and direct the parties to attach a copy of that

opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2021

-7- Circulated 07/28/2021 09:56 AM