Com. v. Mariney, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Mariney, J.

DecidedDecember 31, 2018

Docket3305 EDA 2017

StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Mariney, J. (Com. v. Mariney, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Com. v. Mariney, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2018).

Pincite

Opinion

J-S59036-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JERICK MARINEY : : Appellant : No. 3305 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005261-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2018

Jerick Mariney appeals from the judgment of sentence1 imposed on

September 5, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

following his conviction by a judge on the charges of burglary, criminal

trespass, conspiracy, attempted theft and criminal mischief.2 Mariney

received an aggregate sentence of 34½ to 69 months’ incarceration followed

by five years of probation. In this appeal, Mariney challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence of all crimes as well as a claim the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. After a thorough review of the certified record,

submissions by the parties and relevant law, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Mariney’s direct appeal rights were reinstated by order of the PCRA court on September 17, 2017.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(4), 3503(a)(1)(ii), 903, 901, and 3304(a)(2), respectively. J-S59036-18

We quote the factual history from the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion of the

trial court.

It was shortly after midnight on April 2, 2013, when Philadelphia Police Officer Brendan Donahue responded to a motorcycle/dirt bike shop at 2008 Clifford Street in Philadelphia. As he pulled up, Officer Donahue observed a running white van parked in near the shop. He blocked the van with his marked police patrol car and approached the van. Although it was running, there was no one in the van.

Officer Donahue then approached the garage doors to the motorcycle shop when he noticed flashlights moving around inside. He proceeded to hug the wall and pull his gun. The first door that he came to was missing a window, and there was broken glass on the ground. As he moved along the wall toward the garage door, it started to lift up, whereupon the officer encountered three males, one of whom was [Mariney]. Several ATV or dirt bikes were lined up in the area of the three men as they opened the door.

Officer Donahue identified himself, whereupon all three men fled. Two of the men fled eastbound on Montgomery Avenue, while [Mariney] ran past the officer and fled west on Montgomery, then south on 31st Street. Officer Donahue gave chase and apprehended [Mariney] after about a block, just as backup officers arrived on the scene. One of those backup officers was Milor Celce, who coincidentally was also a frequent customer of the business, where he had work done on his own motorcycle.

Upon returning to the shop area, Officer Donahue noted pry marks and missing paint on another door to the property, located about twenty to thirty feet from where the running van was parked. The back door was damaged and appeared to have been forced. He also examined the van and found it to have an open cargo area behind the two front seats.

Officer Celce, the back-up officer, also examined the property and observed damage to the rear door and that one of the front glass panes was broken out. He confirmed that two bikes were right at the opened garage door, not where they would ordinarily be stored based on his familiarity with the operation of the shop.

-2- J-S59036-18

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2017, at 2-3.

Against this backdrop of evidence, Mariney argues there was insufficient

evidence to convict him of burglary, conspiracy and criminal trespass.

Specifically, he claims the only thing the Commonwealth proved was that he

was in the shop after hours and all other facts needed to convict were merely

rank speculation.

When addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, we are mindful that:

A claim impugning the sufficiency of the evidence presents us with a question of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000). Our standard of review is well-established:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-44 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010)). “This standard is equally applicable to cases

-3- J-S59036-18

where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Commonwealth v. Sanders, 426 Pa.Super. 362, 627 A.2d 183, 185 (1993)). “Although a conviction must be based on ‘more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gainer, 7 A.3d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Badman, 398 Pa.Super. 315, 580 A.2d 1367, 1372 (1990)).

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014).

The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion has accurately described the

elements of the crimes and analyzed Mariney’s claims, finding no merit to

them. Our review confirms the trial court’s determinations and we rely on the

trial court’s opinion in this respect. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2017, at 3-

7. Although we rely on the trial court’s opinion, we highlight aspects of that

decision.

The circumstantial evidence against Mariney was substantial. He was

discovered in a business, after hours, in the middle of the night, using a

flashlight to navigate his way though the building. He and his companions had

left a van, capable of transporting stolen vehicles, running outside the

building. Merchandise was lined up near the garage door, as if being readied

for transport. A window was broken out and a door had pry marks on it,

clearly suggesting, along with all of the other relevant facts, entry was not by

permission.

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