Com. v. Landers, G.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 14, 2023
Docket129 EDA 2022
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Landers, G. (Com. v. Landers, G.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Landers, G., (Pa. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

J-S40005-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GERALD LANDERS : : Appellant : No. 129 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 24, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002982-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2023

George Landers appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after

the trial court convicted him of aggravated assault and other crimes based on

allegations he threw bricks at a vehicle being driven by his neighbor, Brittany

Pugh. On appeal, Landers claims there was insufficient evidence to establish

that he had the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to support his

conviction for aggravated assault. We disagree and therefore affirm.

For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are undisputed. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 5-8. Landers and Pugh were neighbors living on the same

street in Philadelphia. On March 26, 2021, Landers began shouting threats at

Pugh with statements such as “count your days” and “I got people on your

head. And they’re watching you, and they’re going to kill you.” N.T., waiver

trial, 9/21/21, 16, 18. Pugh called the police and, since the police had not yet J-S40005-22

arrived, she loaded her children into her SUV and attempted to drive away.

See id., at 18-20.

Pugh stopped at a traffic light at the end of the street where Landers

continued to pursue and harass her. See id., at 20-21. After Pugh told Landers

to leave her alone, he began throwing bricks in the direction of Pugh who was

seated in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. See id., at 21. Pugh was hit by three

bricks; one struck her hand and two in the stomach. See id., at 21-22. Other

bricks hit the vehicle breaking a window, a mirror and denting the exterior.

See id., at 27-28.

Attempting to flee, Pugh drove erratically around a construction zone

and onto the sidewalk. See id., at 22-23. The attack ended when Pugh’s

family came outside in response to her screams for help and Landers walked

away from the scene continuing to shout threats at Pugh: “I’m still going to

get you. This ain’t over. Watch your back.” Id., at 29-30. Pugh did not suffer

serious physical injuries as a result of being hit by the bricks. See id., at 27.

Ultimately, Landers was arrested and, following a bench trial on

September 21, 2021, he was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of

an instrument of crime ("PIC"), terroristic threats, simple assault, criminal

mischief, and recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"). He was

sentenced to two and a half years to five years of confinement for aggravated

assault, three concurrent sentences of two years of probation for PIC,

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terroristic threats, and REAP, and a concurrent sentence of one year of

probation for criminal mischief.

On appeal, Landers claims that the evidence was insufficient to find that

he had the intent to inflict serious bodily harm on Pugh and, instead, showed

his intent to instill fear in her. Therefore, he argues that his conviction for

aggravated assault is not sufficiently supported by the evidence.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view the

evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. See Commonwealth

v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa. Super. 2000). In cases of criminal

convictions, each element of the crime must be sufficiently evidenced beyond

a reasonable doubt but, “the Commonwealth need not preclude every

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be

resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined

circumstances." Id.

“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: attempts to cause serious

bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or

recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value

of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is “Bodily

injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of

any bodily member or organ." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

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Since it is undisputed that Pugh did not suffer serious bodily injury, “the

charge of aggravated assault can be supported only if the evidence supports

a finding of an attempt to cause such injury." Commonwealth v. Fortune,

68 A.3d 980, 985 (Pa. Super. 2013). An attempt requires the defendant take

an intentional and substantial step towards the commission of a crime. See

Id.

The court must evaluate a defendant’s intent to inflict serious bodily

injury on a “case-by-case basis” and with consideration of the “totality of the

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa.

2006). Relevant factors that may shed light on a person’s intent may include,

“any restraint on the defendant preventing him from escalating the attack,

the defendant’s use of a weapon or other implement to aid his attack, and his

statements before, during, or after the attack which might indicate his intent

to inflict injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Landers argues the evidence proved he had the intent to instill

fear in Pugh, not the intent to inflict serious injury. Therefore, he claims the

evidence only supported a verdict of simple assault, not aggravated assault.

First, Landers argues his threats to have the victim killed were evidence

that he only intended to instill fear in Pugh. Landers suggests, since the

inherent intent of a threat is to instill fear, he continued with that intent by

throwing bricks at Pugh’s car to scare her. Once Landers took the overt action

of pursuing Pugh’s car and throwing multiple bricks, the threats directed at

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Pugh before, during, and after throwing bricks, served as evidence of

Landers’s intent. This evidence was sufficient to allow the fact-finder to infer

that Landers intended to seriously injure Pugh.

Next, Landers claims he threw bricks to cause damage to the car, not

to strike Pugh. Landers argues the damage to the vehicle was evidence

supporting that his only intended target was the vehicle, and some of the

bricks struck Pugh unintentionally. However, given Landers’s threats to Pugh’s

personal safety, as well as the fact that three bricks struck Pugh, the factfinder

was entitled to infer that Landers intended to hit Pugh. See Commonwealth

v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Intent can be proven by

direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or

from the attendant circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

Landers cites to a dissenting opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

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Related

Commonwealth v. Holley
945 A.2d 241 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2008)
Commonwealth v. Hennigan
753 A.2d 245 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2000)
Commonwealth v. Matthew
909 A.2d 1254 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Fortune
68 A.3d 980 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)

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