Com. v. Jones, S.

Opinion

J-S17006-25 & J-S17007-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SELASSI JONES : : Appellant : No. 982 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 6, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002220-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : SELASSI JONES : : No. 983 EDA 2024 Appellant

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 6, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002221-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : SELASSI JONES : : No. 984 EDA 2024 Appellant J-S17006-25 & J-S17007-25

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 6, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002222-2019

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2025

In these consolidated appeals, Selassi Jones (Appellant) appeals, nunc

pro tunc, from the order dismissing his first petition for relief filed pursuant to

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, Michael I. McDermott, Esquire (Attorney

McDermott), has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and accompanying

brief purportedly in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).1 After

careful review, we grant Attorney McDermott’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the dismissal order.

In 2019, the Commonwealth charged Appellant, at three separate

docket numbers, with indecent assault and related offenses. The charges

arose from his indecent assault of three women on December 4, 2018, in the

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1 Because the instant cases are nunc pro tunc appeals from the PCRA court’s

dismissal order, Attorney McDermott was required to file a Turner/Finley no- merit letter to accompany his motion to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). However, “[b]ecause an Anders brief provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter.” Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011).

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area surrounding City Hall in Philadelphia. Upon motion by the

Commonwealth, the trial court consolidated the three cases.

On July 29, 2019, Appellant entered an open guilty plea at all three

docket numbers.2 At No. 2220-2019, Appellant pled guilty to one count of

indecent assault – without complainant’s consent. 3 At No. 2221-2019,

Appellant pled guilty to one count of indecent assault by forcible compulsion. 4

Finally, at No. 2222-2019, Appellant pled guilty to one count of indecent

assault by forcible compulsion. On November 22, 2019, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 2½ to 5 years in prison, followed by 2

years’ probation. The court also notified Appellant of his 25-year sexual

offender registration and notification requirements as a Tier II offender under

the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9799.14(c)(1.3), 9799.15(a)(2). Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

On May 5, 2020, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely PCRA petition.5

Appellant argued that police had obtained video surveillance from

2 Appellant was represented by Douglas Dolfman, Esquire (Attorney Dolfman),

throughout his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(2).

5 Appellant titled his filing a “Motion to Open, and Vacate Order/Sentence Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 and to Proceed Pro Se.” The PCRA court properly addressed Appellant’s pro se filing as a PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2022) (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Philadelphia’s Center City, where the assaults occurred. See First PCRA

Petition, 5/5/20, at 3 (unnumbered). Appellant claimed this video evidence

would have established his innocence. Id. According to Appellant, however,

Attorney Dolfman and the prosecutor “colluded” to deny the existence of any

surveillance video. See id. at 3-5 (unnumbered). Relatedly, Appellant

asserted Attorney Dolfman improperly advised Appellant to plead guilty. See

id. at 5-7 (unnumbered). Appellant also stated his desire to proceed pro se.

See id. at 9 (unnumbered).

The PCRA court appointed Jules N. Szanto, Esquire (Attorney Szanto),

as Appellant’s PCRA counsel. Attorney Szanto subsequently requested

permission to withdraw from representation pursuant to Turner/Finley.

On January 28, 2021, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant

filed a pro se response. On March 11, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s first PCRA petition. On the same date, the PCRA court granted

Attorney Szanto permission to withdraw from representation.

On September 8, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Though

the appeal was facially untimely, Appellant claimed he had not received notice

(“[R]egardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the PCRA.”).

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of the PCRA court’s dismissal order.6 On appeal, this Court concluded the

PCRA court’s March 11, 2021, dismissal order was not properly entered on the

docket and served on Appellant in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)

and 907(4).7 Accordingly, on December 28, 2022, this Court quashed the

appeal and directed the clerk of courts to serve Appellant with the PCRA court’s

dismissal order and note such service on the docket.

Thereafter, on January 6, 2023, the clerk of courts re-entered the PCRA

court’s dismissal order on the docket. The docket also reflects service to

Appellant via certified mail. Appellant did not file an appeal following the re-

entry of the dismissal order.

Appellant filed a third pro se PCRA petition on January 10, 2023,

advancing the same arguments he included in his first PCRA petition. See

6 Approximately one week prior to filing a notice of appeal, Appellant filed a

second pro se PCRA petition. See Second PCRA Petition, 9/1/21. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second petition in light of the instant pending appeal.

7 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 114(C)(2) provides that an order is

properly entered on the docket by indication thereof of “(a) the date of receipt in the clerk’s office of the order or court notice; (b) the date appearing on the order or court notice; and (c) the date of service of the order or court notice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2). Rule 907(4) requires the PCRA court, upon entry of an order dismissing a PCRA petition without a hearing, to “advise the defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the right to appeal from the final order disposing of the petition and of the time limits within which the appeal must be filed. The order shall be filed and served as provided in Rule 114.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4).

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Third PCRA Petition, 1/10/23.8 In its letter brief, the Commonwealth stated it

would not oppose reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights, nunc pro

tunc. See Letter Brief, 1/4/24, at 1-4. The Commonwealth emphasized that

the dismissal order, when it was refiled, “mistakenly stated that [Appellant]

had 30 days from the original dismissal order filing date of March 11, 2021[,]

to appeal the dismissal—a date which had long since passed—rather than 30

days from the January 6, 2023[,] refiling of the dismissal order….” Id. at 4.9

By an order entered on March 8, 2024, the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s

appeal rights from the dismissal of his first PCRA petition.

8 Appellant attached to his PCRA petition a copy of the Philadelphia Police Department’s investigation report, as well as an affidavit prepared by David Lusick (Mr. Lusick), the founder of Legal-Eagles.org. Pertinently, in the “Actions Taken” section of the investigation report, action item 8 states “Surveillance video obtained from Center City District.” Third PCRA Petition, 1/10/23, Exhibit 1 (Investigation Report). In the affidavit, Mr. Lusick avers that he spoke to a police lieutenant in the Special Victims Unit concerning the investigation report. Id., Exhibit 3 (Lusick Affidavit); see also id. (explaining Mr. Lusick was unable to speak to the investigating detective). According to Mr. Lusick, the lieutenant informed him that if surveillance video was identified as an action item, a video had been obtained. Id. However, Mr. Lusick also alleged that he spoke to a Philadelphia Law Department investigator, who indicated he was unable to find a surveillance video. Id.

9 In its letter brief, the Commonwealth stated it had recently searched the District Attorney’s Office files and was unable to locate any video evidence pertaining to Appellant’s case. Letter Brief, 1/4/24, at 8 n.5; see also id. (the Commonwealth alleging it searched available databases and contacted several officers, in various departments, in an attempt to locate the purported surveillance video).

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Appellant, with the assistance of Attorney McDermott, filed a timely

notice of appeal.10 On March 28, 2024, the PCRA court entered an order

directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal within 21 days. Attorney McDermott did not file a

Rule 1925(b) concise statement, nor did he file a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement

of intent to withdraw in lieu of a concise statement. Attorney McDermott filed

a motion to withdraw in this Court on December 13, 2024.

10 Appellant filed a single notice of appeal listing all three docket numbers. Concluding Appellant’s notice of appeal did not comply with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) (requiring appellants to file separate notices of appeal when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket), this Court issued an order directing Appellant to file amended notices of appeal within 14 days. See Order, 5/17/24. Appellant filed amended notices of appeal at Nos. 2221-2019 and 2222-2019—albeit beyond the 14-day time frame designated by this Court.

However, Appellant did not file an amended notice of appeal at 2220- 2019. On June 24, 2024, this Court issued an additional order at No. 2220- 2019, directing Appellant to file an amended notice of appeal within 7 days. See Order, 6/24/24; see also id. (cautioning Appellant that failure to comply with this Court’s orders may result in quashal of the appeal). To date, Appellant has not filed an amended notice of appeal at No. 2220-2019 to correct the Walker defect. On August 30, 2024, this Court discharged the rule to show cause and referred the issue to the merits panel.

Upon merits-panel review, this Court issued an order on May 13, 2025, granting Appellant a final opportunity to file an amended notice of appeal at No. 2220-2019. Appellant timely complied. Additionally, in a previous memorandum decision, we consolidated the appeal docketed at 982 EDA 2024 (No. 2220-2019) with the previously consolidated appeals. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 982, 983 & 984 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 1721061 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum).

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Previously, we concluded Attorney McDermott complied with the

procedural requirements for withdrawal under Turner/Finley. See Jones,

982, 983 & 984 EDA 2024 (unpublished memorandum at 7-8) (Attorney

McDermott served Appellant with a copy of the motion to withdraw and

Anders brief—which provides greater protection than a Turner/Finley no-

merit letter; stated he made a conscientious examination of the record; filed

an Anders brief, identifying claims Appellant wishes to raise; and provided to

this Court a copy of the letter he sent to Appellant, advising Appellant of

Attorney McDermott’s intent to withdraw, and explaining Appellant’s right to

raise additional claims by proceeding pro se or retaining private counsel).11

We noted, however, that Attorney McDermott did not comply with the

PCRA court’s concise statement order. Instead, Attorney McDermott filed a

motion to withdraw and accompanying Anders brief, in this Court, on

December 13, 2024, approximately eight months after the deadline for filing

a concise statement or Rule 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to withdraw in the

PCRA court. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 9). We therefore remanded

for Attorney McDermott to file an appropriate statement under Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) or (c)(4). Id. (unpublished memorandum at 11) (citing

Commonwealth v. McBride, 957 A.2d 752, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(“[A]bsent the proper filing of any statement of record by counsel, this Court

11 Appellant did not retain private counsel or file a pro se appellate brief.

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cannot properly consider counsel’s request to withdraw.”)). Attorney

McDermott has since complied with our remand directive by filing a statement

of his intent to withdraw.

As these preliminary matters have been satisfied, we now turn to the

merits of Appellant’s claims, and “conduct [our] own independent evaluation

of the record” to discern whether counsel correctly concluded the PCRA

petition is without merit. Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In the Anders brief, Attorney McDermott

identifies the following issues:

I. Whether [Attorney] Dolfman [] promise[d] to [Appellant] that if he pled open [sic] to the three charges of indecent assault … that he would receive a county sentence with probation[?] Did this promise fall below the standard of reasonableness and induce [Appellant] to enter an open guilty plea?

II. Whether prior to the guilty plea, did [Attorney] Dolfman [] explain to [Appellant] how the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines were taken into consideration and how the court would sentence within the guidelines[,] and exactly what the guidelines were recommending?

III. Whether the guilty plea was unlawfully and irresponsibly induced by defense counsel, which became obvious at the sentencing hearing[,] and as such[,] did the court abuse its discretion in accepting [Attorney Szanto’s Turner/]Finley letter without conducting a hearing and taking the testimony of [Attorney Dolfman]?

Anders Brief at 5 (some capitalization modified).

We review the denial of PCRA relief to determine “whether the PCRA

court’s findings of fact are supported in the record, and whether its conclusions

of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35,

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45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA

court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the

party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

Initially, we observe the argument presented in the Anders brief does

not correspond to any of the issues raised in the statement of questions

presented.12 Instead, Appellant argues, as he did in his first pro se PCRA

petition, that Attorney Dolfman was ineffective for failing to investigate the

existence of a purported video recording, which Appellant believes was in the

Commonwealth’s possession. Anders Brief at 20. Appellant claims the video

would have exonerated him, or “at the very least provide him with information

which would make it possible for [Appellant] to make an intelligent decision

about whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial.” Id.13

12 Generally, failure to include an issue in the statement of questions involved

results in waiver of the claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); see also Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 254 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2016) (deeming waived issues not raised in the appellant’s statement of questions involved). However, because Attorney McDermott’s request to withdraw requires us to conduct an independent review of the record, see Reed, supra, we nevertheless address this claim.

13 Relatedly, Appellant contends the Commonwealth’s suppression of the video

evidence constituted a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process prohibits the prosecution from suppressing evidence material to guilt or punishment). Because Appellant could have raised a Brady claim in a direct appeal, but failed to do so, this claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 609 (Pa. 2013) (concluding PCRA petitioner waived his Brady claim by failing to raise it at trial or on direct appeal). We note briefly that while Appellant did not file a direct appeal, he (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Each of Appellant’s claims challenges Attorney Dolfman’s effectiveness

in connection with Appellant’s guilty plea. Preliminarily, we presume that

counsel is effective; the appellant bears the burden of proving otherwise.

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). The appellant

must demonstrate that: “(1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit;

(2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis

designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that

there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s

error.” Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citation omitted). Failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test

requires rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d

79, 88 (Pa. Super. 2016).

“Counsel has a duty to undertake reasonable investigations or to make

reasonable decisions that render particular investigations unnecessary.”

Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 735 (Pa. 2000). “Failure to

conduct a more intensive investigation, in the absence of any indication that

such investigation would develop more than was already known, is simply not

has never claimed that his failure to do so was the result of abandonment by counsel.

Further, Appellant did not—in either his pro se PCRA petition or in the Anders brief—couch his Brady claim in terms of prior counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise such a claim previously. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (“[A] claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

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ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 847 (Pa.

2014).

Instantly, at the close of the sentencing hearing, Appellant stated, “In

my discovery it says they [the police] obtained video surveillance.” N.T.,

11/22/19, at 35. Attorney Dolfman responded, “I’ll put that on the record. I

spoke with the Commonwealth and asked if there was any video in this case[,]

and I was informed that there was not.” Id. The parties did not discuss the

matter further, nor did Appellant indicate he wished to withdraw his guilty

plea.

From the record, there is no clear indication that video surveillance

footage was ever recovered from the area in which the indecent assaults

occurred. Further, Attorney Dolfman stated on the record during the

sentencing hearing that he had, in fact, inquired about any possible video

surveillance. See id. We decline to deem Attorney Dolfman ineffective for

failing to investigate the purported video surveillance footage, where the

evidence seemingly does not exist. Further, despite claiming video

surveillance could exonerate him, Appellant accepted responsibility for the

indecent assault by tendering a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Reid,

117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating an appellant is bound by the

statements he makes during a guilty plea colloquy). 14

14 We discuss the validity of Appellant’s guilty plea infra.

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We next consider the validity of Appellant’s guilty plea, which is

implicated in each of the issues Appellant identified in the statement of

questions involved.15 Appellant claims Attorney Dolfman unlawfully induced

him to plead guilty by promising Appellant that he would receive a county

sentence with a probationary tail. Anders Brief at 5. Appellant also argues

Attorney Dolfman failed to explain the applicable sentencing guidelines. Id.

As this Court has explained,

[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the plea- bargaining process are eligible for PCRA review. Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012-13 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “To prove prejudice, [an] appellant

must prove he would not have pled guilty and would have achieved a better

outcome at trial.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 807 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102,

105 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc) (stating that “the defendant must show that

15 These issues were not developed in the argument section of the Anders brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). We will nevertheless address the validity of Appellant’s guilty plea as part of our independent review. See Reed, 107 A.3d at 140.

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counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice … by facilitating

entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea.” (citations

omitted)).

“The law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome

of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that appellant’s

decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”

Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 528-29 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “[A] guilty plea colloquy

must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what the plea

connoted and its consequences.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997,

1002 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further,

[a] valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis for the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any recommended sentence.

Morrison, 878 A.2d at 107 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt.).

Instantly, Appellant entered an open guilty plea, without any

agreement as to the sentence or the Commonwealth’s sentencing

recommendation. During the guilty plea hearing, Appellant expressly agreed

that he was satisfied with Attorney Dolfman’s representation. N.T., 7/29/19,

at 9. Appellant agreed to the factual basis underlying each offense. N.T.,

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7/29/19, at 11-14. Appellant also completed a written guilty plea colloquy, 16

which detailed the permissible range of sentences for his crimes. See Written

Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/29/29; see also Reid, 117 A.3d at 782 (“[A] written

plea colloquy that is read, completed and signed by the defendant and made

part of the record may serve as the defendant’s plea colloquy when

supplemented by an oral, on-the-record examination.” (citing Pa.R.Crim.P.

590, Cmt.)). In the written colloquy, Appellant also confirmed he was not

threatened or forced to plead guilty, nor was he promised anything in

exchange for his plea. Id.; see also N.T., 7/29/19, at 11 (Appellant

acknowledging, during the oral colloquy, that he was not coerced or

threatened, and he was not promised anything in exchange for his plea).

During the subsequent sentencing hearing, Appellant further confirmed

his guilt, stating, “Honestly, I accept all responsibility, I do, because I did it,

you know.” N.T., 11/22/19, at 35-36. We reiterate that Appellant is bound

by the statements he made on the record during the plea colloquy and

sentencing hearing. See Reid, 117 A.3d at 783. Based upon the foregoing,

it is clear Appellant entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea.

Appellant’s claim that Attorney Dolfman unlawfully induced his plea by

promising a county sentence with a probationary tail is belied by the record.

The record also establishes that Appellant was appropriately informed of the

16 Appellant completed a separate written guilty plea colloquy at each docket

number.

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sentencing guidelines and permissible range of sentences. As his underlying

challenge to the voluntariness of his plea lacks merit, Appellant’s ineffective

assistance claim fails.17 See Roane, 142 A.3d at 88 (explaining that the

failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test defeats an

ineffectiveness claim).

Moreover, our independent review of the certified record does not reveal

any other meritorious issues. See Reed, 107 A.3d at 140. Accordingly, we

grant Attorney McDermott’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Motion to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Date: 10/14/2025

17 As this claim lacks arguable merit, Appellant’s claim that the PCRA court improperly permitted Attorney Szanto to withdraw from representation must also fail.

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