Com. v. Jones, S.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 1370 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Stabile

Opinion

J-S34007-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHERESE LYNN JONES : : Appellant : No. 1370 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 14, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0003770-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 17, 2026

Appellant, Sherese Lynn Jones, appeals from her judgment of sentence

of two to six years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(1) and two years’ probation for conspiracy to commit simple

assault. Appellant requests a new trial based on after-discovered evidence,

an alleged recantation by co-defendant Iris Ortiz. We affirm.

Appellant and two codefendants, Ortiz and Philip Whitted, were charged

with assaulting the victim, Shonda Seals. Appellant, Ortiz and Whitted were

tried together before a jury.

The evidence adduced during trial establishes that on the evening of

July 17, 2021, Seals went out with friends and relatives in Lancaster to

commemorate the anniversary of her brother’s death. Seals and her family

eventually made their way to Prince of Subs, where they stayed until closing

time around 1:30 a.m. J-S34007-25

At Prince of Subs, Seals observed Whitted arguing with a woman. This

argument continued outside of the bar. Seals said something to Whitted about

arguing with women, at which point Whitted became upset with Seals. At the

same time, Seals was entering her vehicle and saw her daughter, Jasmine,

having a confrontation with Ortiz. Seals struck Ortiz because Seals believed

Ortiz was preparing to strike her daughter. At this point, Appellant swung at

Seals’ daughter. General argument ensued among the two groups. Ortiz

pulled up in her silver four-door vehicle with Whitted in the passenger seat.

Appellant entered the backseat of Ortiz’s vehicle, and Ortiz drove away. N.T.

139-48.

A second confrontation took place slightly over one hour later. Seals

returned to the area of her home, drove around looking for a parking spot,

and eventually parked around the corner from her home on Marshall Avenue

in Lancaster. At 2:45 a.m., while parking her car, Seals was on the phone

with a friend. At this moment, Ortiz’s vehicle pulled up next to Seals’ vehicle.

Ortiz was driving the car and was accompanied by Appellant and Whitted. The

window was down in Ortiz’s vehicle. Seals heard Ortiz state, “got you, got

you” and laugh. Id. at 149-53.

Seals testified that Appellant exited the vehicle and came towards Seals,

and a fistfight began between Appellant and Seals. Seals did not see anything

in Appellant’s hands during the fight; nor did Seals hear Appellant yell to Ortiz

or Whitted or ask them to join the fight. About two minutes after Appellant

and Seals began fighting, Ortiz and Whitted exited the vehicle and joined the

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fight. Seals fell and hit her head, and Appellant, Ortiz and Whitted were on

top of her and hitting her. At this point, Seals felt a pain from “something

other than … a punch.” She felt this pain when all three defendants were

standing over her. Id. at 154-55, 197-98.

Seals began walking towards her daughter and could feel that her leg

was wet. She put her hand on her leg and saw her hand covered in blood.

Seals’ daughter called 911 while Seals sat on the steps of her home. Seals

could hear her blood coming down her leg and falling on the ground. Deciding

that Seals could not wait for an ambulance to arrive, Seals’ daughter drove

her to the hospital. Seals was unable to tell which defendant stabbed her, but

she testified that all three defendants were in close proximity to her at the

time she was stabbed. Id. at 157-64.

The court admitted Dr. John Lee, a surgeon at Lancaster General

Hospital, as an expert witness in the fields of trauma surgery and trauma

medicine. Dr. Lee testified that he treated Seals at the hospital on July 18,

2021 for two lacerations on her buttock and back right upper thigh. Dr. Lee

explained that the size of the wounds established that Seals was stabbed

rather than slashed. Dr. Lee considered Seals to be at the highest level of

trauma due to the mechanism of her injury and her low blood pressure. His

immediate assumption was that Seals was bleeding to death. He also believed

that Seals had a life-threatening injury because her blood pressure was low.

Due to her low blood pressure, Seals was required to undergo a blood

transfusion. Id. at 378-92.

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Ortiz testified in her defense. Ortiz testified that on the night of July 17,

2021, she was partying at a bar in Lancaster until around 1:30 a.m. and left

the bar alone in her 2007 Chrysler Sebring. She drove past Prince of Subs

and saw Whitted arguing with a group of women. She exited her vehicle and

approached Whitted, began arguing with Seals’ daughter, and was struck by

a hard object, causing her head to bleed. She returned to her car with Whitted

and Appellant. The three left Prince of Subs and drove around Lancaster trying

to decide where to take Whitted. While driving, Ortiz saw Seals and pointed

her out to Whitted and Appellant. Appellant jumped out of Ortiz’s vehicle and

began fighting Seals. Ortiz testified that she immediately exited her vehicle

and joined in the fight.1 The fight lasted for about 45 seconds, and Ortiz

admitted punching Seals’ face and upper body. Ortiz denied stabbing Seals,

having a knife, or seeing a knife that night. Ortiz admitted, however, that she

never saw Appellant get behind Seals. After the fight, Ortiz drove Appellant

home but could not remember where she dropped off Whitted. She claimed

that she did not find out that Seals had been stabbed until the police contacted

her. Id. at 431-52.

Whitted testified that he saw Seals hit Ortiz in the face with a shoe

outside Prince of Subs. After leaving Prince of Subs, Ortiz, Whitted and

Appellant drove around, and Ortiz was very upset about being hit by Seals.

____________________________________________

1 Ortiz’s testimony on this point differed from Seals’ testimony. Seals testified that Ortiz did not leave the vehicle until two minutes after Appellant exited the vehicle.

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Whitted testified that he wanted Ortiz to drop him off, but Ortiz told him to

wait. Whitted then saw Ortiz and Appellant fighting Seals and saw Seals on

the ground during the fight. Following the fight, he heard Ortiz and Appellant

saying “yeah, we fucked that bitch up.” He did not see who stabbed Ortiz,

but he testified that he never saw Appellant get behind Seals. Id. at 479-

523.

On the final day of trial, the Commonwealth argued that each defendant

could be found guilty for aggravated assault either as an accomplice or as a

co-conspirator. The court charged the jury that it could find each defendant

guilty of aggravated assault on either or both of these theories of liability. Id.

at 648-50. On the separate charge of conspiracy, the court instructed that if

the jury found any defendant guilty of conspiracy, it should specify on the

verdict slip whether the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit

aggravated assault or conspiracy to commit simple assault. Id. at 656-57.

The jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault (causing serious

bodily injury) and conspiracy to commit simple assault. The jury found Ortiz

guilty of the same offenses, and it acquitted Whitted of all charges. On August

14, 2024, the court entered sentence.

Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions in which she attached a

letter from Ortiz that stated, “Reese Jones [Appellant] did not aggravatedly

assault Shonda Seals. I took it upon myself to assault Shonda in the same

sense that she assaulted me.” Post-Sentence Motions, 8/26/24, exhibit A.

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Appellant contended that Ortiz’s letter constituted after-discovered evidence

that entitled her to a new trial.

On September 11, 2024, the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence

motions. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court, and both Ortiz and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal, “Did the trial court err

when it denied [Appellant’s] post-sentence request for a new trial based on

after-discovered evidence where the new evidence is the recanted testimony

of a key Commonwealth witness?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.

When we examine a trial court’s decision to deny a new trial based on

after-discovered evidence, “we ask only if the court committed an abuse of

discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case.”

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 361 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Bonaccurso, 625 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 1993)).

In order to obtain a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, the

defendant must prove that the evidence could not have been obtained prior

to the end of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; the evidence is

not merely corroborative or cumulative; it will not be used solely to impeach

the credibility of a witness; and it would likely result in a different verdict if a

new trial were granted. Padillas, 997 A.2d at 292. The test is conjunctive,

and the defendant must prove each factor by a preponderance of the evidence

in order to obtain relief. Id.

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To determine whether the after-discovered evidence would likely have

resulted in a different outcome if a new trial were granted, we should consider

“the integrity of the alleged after-discovered evidence, the motive of those

offering the evidence, and the overall strength of the evidence supporting the

conviction.” Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1179 (Pa. Super.

2022).

The jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(1), which provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if

he “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id. The court instructed the

jury that it could find Appellant guilty under Section 2702(a)(1) as an

accomplice. “A person is an accomplice, and equally liable for the acts of

another[,] if he acts with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission

of an offense and agrees, aids, or attempts to aid such other person in either

planning or committing that offense.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 339 A.3d

493, 503 (Pa. Super. 2025). The “least degree of concert or collusion in the

commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as

an accomplice.” Id. “An accomplice may be found guilty without proof that

the accomplice actually performed any criminal act.” Commonwealth v.

Wagaman, 627 A.2d 735, 740 (Pa. Super. 1993). The Commonwealth may

prove accomplice liability with evidence that the defendant aided in the

commission of the offense. Jones, 339 A.3d at 503.

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The court properly denied Appellant’s motion for new trial because the

alleged after-discovered evidence, Ortiz’s letter, would not have resulted in a

different verdict in a new trial. The statements in Ortiz’s letter—Appellant “did

not aggravatedly assault” Seals, and Ortiz “took it upon [her]self to assault

Seals”—do not explicitly identify the person who stabbed Seals. For purposes

of this memorandum, we will assume that Ortiz meant that she, not Appellant,

stabbed Seals. Even if we construe Ortiz’s statements in this manner,

however, that would not undermine the evidence that Appellant acted as

Ortiz’s accomplice.

The evidence demonstrates that regardless of who stabbed Seals,

Appellant was an accomplice to the stabbing. On the night of the stabbing,

Appellant, Ortiz and Whitted had an altercation with Seals and others at Prince

of Subs in Lancaster. Appellant, Ortiz and Whitted drove away from Prince of

Subs in Appellant’s car. Over one hour later, while Ortiz was driving around

Lancaster with Appellant and Whitted as passengers, they saw Seals in her

car on Marshall Avenue, and Ortiz exclaimed “got you, got you.” These facts

indicate they had been searching for Seals after leaving Prince of Subs.

Appellant immediately jumped out of Appellant’s car and violently attacked

Seals. Ortiz also exited the car and joined in the attack, although it is unclear

whether Ortiz exited the vehicle at the same time as Appellant or two minutes

later. Whitted joined the fray at some point as well. Seals was stabbed twice

from behind. Appellant drove Ortiz home after the attack, and they

congratulated each other by saying “yeah, we fucked that bitch up.”

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Even if Appellant was not the individual who stabbed Seals, the evidence

demonstrates that Appellant, Ortiz and Whitted searched together for Seals,

found Seals together, attacked Seals together, and left the scene together,

pleased with the outcome. This chain of events demonstrates that Appellant

acted in concert with Ortiz and is liable for Seals’ stabbing as an accomplice.

See Ortiz, 339 A.3d at 503 (the “least degree of concert” is sufficient to prove

accomplice liability). Stated another way, the evidence fulfilled the elements

of accomplice liability because Appellant “acted with the intent of promoting

or facilitating the commission of [the stabbing]” and “agree[d], aid[ed], or

attempt[ed] to aid [Ortiz] in … committing that offense.” Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 2025 WL 845106, *1, 4-5 (Pa. Super., Mar.

18, 2025) (non-precedential)2 (evidence supported conviction for aggravated

assault on basis of accomplice liability, where defendant accompanied

codefendant to victim’s house, codefendant demanded that victim repair wall

that victim had damaged while defendant stood by silently, codefendant shot

victim, and defendant and codefendant ran away together).

Thus, the statement in Ortiz’s letter, construed to mean that Ortiz

stabbed Seals, would not likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were

granted because of the “overall strength of the evidence” that Appellant acted

as an accomplice. Crumbley, 270 A.3d at 1179. Since Appellant cannot

2 We may cite this Court’s unpublished memoranda filed after May 1, 2019 for

their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

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satisfy this prong of the test for after-discovered evidence, she is not entitled

to relief even if she satisfies the other prongs. Padillas, 997 A.2d at 292.

For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 02/17/2026

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