Com. v. Johnson, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 2007 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Panella

Opinion

J-A08041-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DAONNA TAREL JOHNSON : : Appellant : No. 2007 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000294-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 27, 2026

Daonna Tarel Johnson appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

after the court found she violated conditions of her county parole. Johnson

asserts the trial court erred in finding she violated her parole because the

court relied upon inadmissible hearsay. After careful review, we are

constrained to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new

revocation hearing.

Johnson was charged with driving under the influence of a controlled

substance (“DUI”)1 and related charges after police stopped her vehicle on

August 21, 2021. The Commonwealth later agreed to amend the charge of

DUI to a lesser subsection and withdrew all other charges in exchange for her

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2). J-A08041-26

guilty plea to DUI, general impairment, as a third offense.2 The trial court

sentenced Johnson to 10 days to 24 months of incarceration in the Monroe

County Correctional Facility. Thereafter, Johnson sought to have her parole

transferred to North Carolina. The court granted this request on April 28,

2023. North Carolina accepted the transfer on May 10, 2023.

On April 1, 2025, the Commonwealth sought to revoke Johnson’s parole

and filed a petition noting Johnson violated multiple conditions of her parole.

The court held a hearing on May 15, 2025. At that hearing, the court was

appropriately concerned about the Commonwealth’s request to admit reports

received through the Interstate Compact Offender Tracking System

(“ICOTS”). The court continued the hearing and ordered the parties to submit

briefs addressing the admissibility of reports under the Interstate Compact.

On July 2, 2025, the court reconvened the hearing. The court began by

noting its belief that the reports could be admitted under the exception to the

hearsay rule of records of a regularly conducted activity, often called the

business record exception, if the Commonwealth met the requirements of the

exception. The Commonwealth called two Monroe County Probation/Parole

officers to testify regarding Johnson’s transfer of parole to North Carolina and

their receipt of the ICOTS reports. The court found the reports admissible over

Johnson’s hearsay objection.

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1).

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Officer Alyscia Hill described receiving progress reports from North

Carolina regarding Johnson. All reports were submitted and received through

ICOTS. Officer Hill testified that the reports were created and maintained in

the regular course of business. To log into the system, a two-factor

authentication was required. Officer Hill explained that the reports were

generated by the parole officer overseeing the offender (here, Johnson), then

sent to their supervisor who then uploaded them to ICOTS where Officer Hill

was able to download them. After receiving numerous reports of Johnson’s

violations, Officer Hill wisely decided to submit a petition of violation seeking

to revoke Johnson’s parole. Officer Hill then detailed the serious violations,

including failing to report for scheduled office visits multiple times, receiving

new criminal charges in North Carolina, leaving North Carolina without

permission, testing positive for THC and methamphetamine, attempting to

falsify her drug tests, and failing to complete both drug and alcohol treatment

and the alcohol highway safety classes. Officer Hill testified that all reports

were made at or near in time to the violations they detailed.

Officer Jennifer Dalton testified that, when uploading documents or

entering any information into ICOTS, you must check a box certifying that the

information is true and correct to the best of your knowledge. Officer Dalton

further confirmed that the records in Commonwealth’s exhibit 1 were kept in

the normal course of probation and parole’s functions and operations.

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At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Johnson in violation,

removed her street time, and sentenced her to be incarcerated at the Monroe

County Correctional Facility for the balance of her term, specifically, until

December 28, 2025.

Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the court’s

order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court

authored its Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 11, 2025.

Johnson raises one question for our review:

Whether the VOP [c]ourt erred when it found [Johnson] in violation of her parole based entirely upon hearsay not falling within any exception and admitted without first showing good cause?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Johnson argues the trial court erred in admitting the ICOTS reports into

evidence as they were hearsay without an exception and the court did not find

good cause for allowing the reports to be admitted. See Appellant’s Brief, at

20, 26, 30-32. Johnson further asserts that the admission of the reports

violated her right of confrontation. See id. at 17. According to Johnson, the

only evidence of her violations were the erroneously admitted reports,

therefore the court erred in finding her in violation of her parole. See id. at

35-36.

We begin with our standard of review regarding the admission of

evidence:

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The admissibility or exclusion of evidence [is] subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. The party challenging the trial court’s evidentiary ruling carries a heavy burden in establishing that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court abuses its discretion only if it misapplies the law, or its exercise of judgment is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Nabried, 327 A.3d 315, 321 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

The following standards regarding hearsay and its admission at

revocation proceedings are well-established.

Hearsay is a statement: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions set forth at Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803.

One such exception is the business records exception, which provides:

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

…

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any form) of any act, event or condition if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes business, institution, association, profession,

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occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Pa.R.E. 803(6).

Similarly, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act provides, in pertinent part, that

A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(b).

… To satisfy the business record exception the testifying witness need not be the custodian of the record or have personal knowledge of the facts reported in the business record. Instead, as long as the authenticating witness can provide sufficient information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness of the business records of a company, a sufficient basis is provided to offset the hearsay character of the evidence.

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Nabried, 327 A.3d at 321-22 (quotation marks, brackets, and some citations

omitted).

At a parole revocation hearing, a parolee is entitled to:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation or parole; (b) disclosure to the probationer or parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation or parole.

… Lastly, hearsay is not admissible at a [revocation hearing] absent a finding of good cause for not allowing confrontation.

Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 969 A.2d 1236, 1240-41 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

In 2014, this Court observed that “good cause in this context (probation

and parole revocation hearings), has not been legislatively defined and the

scant case law on the subject reflects an individual determination based on

the facts of each case.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1040 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). This

Court then turned to the Commonwealth Court for guidance on defining “good

cause.” See id. In doing so, this Court endorsed the Commonwealth Court’s

view that “good cause to admit hearsay when the declarant is unavailable may

be based upon a finding of some intrinsic indicia of reliability and corroboration

by other evidence of record.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and

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citation omitted). As such, the Commonwealth was required to establish both

“indicia of reliability” and “corroboration by other evidence of record” for the

North Carolina reports to be admissible.

In Nabried, a police officer was permitted to authenticate cell phone

records obtained from AT&T. See Nabried, 327 A.3d at 322. The officer was

a qualified person with knowledge even though he was neither the custodian

of the records nor worked for AT&T. See id. The same applies here.

Officer Hill and Officer Dalton testified to their personal knowledge of

how ICOTS operates and what must be done to upload any documents. Their

combined testimony established the required elements of the business record

exception. In Colon, the court found an “indicia of reliability” simply by

meeting the hearsay exception of an excited utterance. See Colon, 102 A.3d

at 1041. Therefore, the first requirement of good cause has been met because

the Commonwealth established the hearsay exception of a regularly

conducted business record.

This does not end our inquiry, however, as the Commonwealth was also

required to establish “corroboration by other evidence of record.” Id. at 1040.

In Colon, the defendant was accused of violating his probation when he

received new simple assault charges for punching the victim in the face. See

id. at 1036. At the probation violation hearing, the victim did not testify. See

id. at 1041. The Court in Colon found corroboration by other evidence of

record in that an officer testified that he observed the victim crying, yelling,

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upset, and frantic right after the assault occurred. See id. at 1036. The officer

further observed “visibly fresh injuries to [the victim’s] face[.]” Id. at 1041.

As there was non-hearsay evidence in the officer’s testimony that

corroborated the statements made by the non-testifying victim, the Court

found the Commonwealth met the good cause standard for admission of the

victim’s out-of-court statements. See id.

Here, there was absolutely no corroboration. Johnson did not admit to

violating any conditions of her parole, and the only testimony was from two

parole officers who did not personally observe any of the violations. The

entirety of their information came from the uncertified reports received from

North Carolina.

Despite this, the Commonwealth understandably argues the good cause

standard was met because the potential witnesses were from North Carolina

and there would be considerable expense in bringing them to Pennsylvania. 3

See Appellee’s Brief, at 11. The Commonwealth relies on Sanders v.

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 958 A.2d 582 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2008), to support its position. See id. We do not find Sanders supports this

argument.

3 We note that Johnson appears to waive her right to in-person confrontation

by citing to Pa.R.Crim.P. 119 (use of two-way simultaneous audio-visual communication in criminal proceedings) and agreeing that out-of-state witnesses’ appearance by audio-video “is permissible under the Rules.” Appellant’s Brief, at 20.

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In Sanders, the defendant transferred his parole to Georgia. Sanders,

958 A.2d at 582. The Board received a report from Georgia alleging Sanders

violated a number of conditions of his parole. See id. at 583. The Board issued

a warrant for his arrest and Sanders was arrested. See id. After his arrest,

Sanders signed a waiver that included an admission to violating his parole.

See id. at 584. The Court found the admission in the waiver was valid and

permitted the Board to revoke Sanders’ parole. See id. at 586. The language

the Commonwealth relies upon is the following: “Presumably, holding a

hearing or requiring a waiver in the receiving state is to make the Compact

workable by avoiding the expense of parole agents coming to the sending

state to testify.” Id. However, this language is mere dicta and not binding on

this Court. In any event, Sanders admitted to being a parole violator by

signing a waiver that included his admission. The Commonwealth Court did

not hold that the mere expense of traveling is a basis to find good cause for

allowing hearsay as the sole basis for revoking one’s parole. Instead, they

found that Sanders admitted to violating his parole and revoked his parole on

that basis. See id. at 586.

As stated above, we are therefore constrained to find that the

Commonwealth here did not establish good cause to admit the hearsay

evidence. While we find that there was an “indicia of reliability” of the reports

based upon meeting the standard for the business record exception, there was

no “corroboration by other evidence of record.” The only evidence here of

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Johnson’s parole violations were the uncertified hearsay reports from North

Carolina. As we have no other evidence to support the violations, we must

vacate the judgment of sentence.

The proper remedy is to remand for a new revocation hearing.4 See

Commonwealth v. Mullins, 918 A.2d 82, 86 (Pa. 2007). As such, we vacate

the judgment of sentence and remand for a new revocation hearing consistent

with this memorandum.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: May 27, 2026

4 If the in-person appearance of the North Carolina witnesses is necessary in

this serious parole violation case, the costs of their transportation may be added to Johnson’s court costs if she is found in violation of her parole. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(g).

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