Com. v. Harley, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 1988 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S27001-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JUVELLE HARLEY : : Appellant : No. 1988 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0007429-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2025

Appellant, Juvelle Harley, seeks review of the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court). In

2023, Appellant was found guilty after a non-jury trial of unlawful restraint,

simple assault, and reckless endangerment. All three offenses were

committed against Appellant’s ex-wife, Rockiea Harley (the victim). The trial

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three to six months of

incarceration, followed by five years of probation. On appeal, Appellant

argues that the judgment of sentence must be vacated because the evidence

of his guilt was legally insufficient, the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence, and the sentence was excessive. Finding no merit in any of these

claims, we affirm.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S27001-25

Our review of the record reveals that the case facts were detailed by the

victim in several pre-trial statements which she later recanted or claimed not

to remember. According to the victim’s initial account, the underlying incident

took place on the morning of May 7, 2022. She and Appellant had met in

Philadelphia and socialized at a bar, where they drank alcohol and talked about

their two children late into the night. The victim asked Appellant to drive her

to her sister’s home, and Appellant agreed. But instead of doing so, he took

them to a remote wooded area.

When they arrived, Appellant repeatedly punched the victim in the head

and then forcibly removed her from the vehicle. As the victim lay on the

ground, Appellant kicked and punched her, rendering her unconscious. He

then drove away.

The victim managed to reach a nearby gas station, where she was

treated by an emergency medical technician (EMT) at about 2:00 a.m. She

was then moved to a trauma center, and she received further treatment for

numerous injuries, including a facial contusion, lip lacerations, shoulder

abrasions, and a broken blood vessel in the frontal lobe of her brain.

On May 19, 2022, police detectives met with the victim for an interview.

The detectives memorialized the victim’s responses to their questions in a

written statement in which she averred that Appellant had assaulted her on

May 7, 2022. This statement was signed by the victim, and each page was

initialed. The victim corroborated the written statement with photographs and

medical records of her extensive injuries.

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Later, the victim testified at Appellant’s hearing before the Pennsylvania

Parole Board on July 29, 2022. Appellant had been serving parole since 2004

as part of his sentence for a third-degree murder conviction. The victim was

questioned at the parole hearing about whether Appellant had assaulted her

on May 7, 2022. The victim testified that she had been truthful to police on

May 19, 2022, when she alleged in her signed written statements that

Appellant had assaulted her.

For a third time, at Appellant’s preliminary hearing in the present case

held on October 18, 2022, the victim again identified Appellant as the person

who had assaulted her earlier that year.

The victim thereafter refused to make any further statements that would

incriminate Appellant. At Appellant’s non-jury trial held on June 29, 2023, the

victim testified that she did not recall ever identifying Appellant as the

perpetrator of an assault against her on May 7, 2022. See generally id., at

13-28.

She testified at trial that on the date of the subject incident, she had

been drinking alcohol and taking several prescribed medications, including

Xanax, Gabapentin, and Suboxone. See id., at 29. Further, the victim

testified that she suffered from occasional memory lapses, and that the only

reason she had appeared at the non-jury trial was that she did not want to

return about $12,000, which had been paid to her by the District Attorney’s

Office. See id., at 28.

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The victim offered no explanation for her injuries, or the fact that she

had previously attributed them to an assault perpetrated by Appellant. She

also stated that she had taken her prescribed medications earlier in the day,

prior to trial. See id., at 30.

To prove Appellant’s guilt, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence

the victim’s signed statement from May 19, 2022, the transcripts of the notes

of testimony from Appellant’s preliminary hearing, and the victim’s medical

records which documented her injuries. The Commonwealth also

corroborated the victim’s pre-trial statements against Appellant by presenting

the testimony of the officer who interviewed her on May 19, 2022 (Detective

George Williams ), as well as the EMT who treated her (Matthew Jarszewski).

The detective testified in line with the victim’s written statement that

she had identified Appellant as the person who had inflicted the injuries she

had sustained on the date in question. See id., at 43-45. The victim also

had relayed to the detective that she had lost consciousness at some point

and could not remember how she had gotten to the hospital. See id., at 45.

The EMT testified that the victim told him on the night of the incident

that she had fled her house after being attacked. According to the EMT, the

victim appeared to be intoxicated, and she did not report having lost

consciousness that night. See id., at 53.

At the conclusion of the trial, Appellant was found guilty of unlawful

restraint (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1)); simple assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. §

2701(a)(1)); and REAP (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705). He was acquitted on the

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charge of aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1)). The trial court

sentenced Appellant as outlined above, having done so with the benefit of a

presentence investigation report (PSI report).

On September 27, 2023, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion,

asserting only that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See

Post-Sentence Motion, 9/27, 2023, at para. 4. The motion was denied by

operation of law. See Trial Court Order, 1/29/2024. A timely appeal was not

filed on Appellant’s behalf.

On May 20, 2024, Appellant sought post-conviction relief, requesting

the trial court to reinstate his appellate rights, thereby allowing him to file a

notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc. The trial court granted such relief on June

28, 2024.1 A notice of appeal was filed on July 25, 2024.

Additionally, on July 7, 2024, Appellant filed a second post-sentence

motion in which he asserted that the evidence of his guilt was legally

insufficient because the victim’s testimony was not credible. On that same

ground, Appellant reiterated the claim that the verdict was against the weight

of the evidence. In a third claim, Appellant argued that the trial court had

abused its discretion by imposing a sentence “that was not based upon the

gravity of the violation, the extent of [Appellant’s] record, his prospect of

rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and aggravating factors as

1 This relief was granted in accordance with the Post Conviction Relief Act (42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546).

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noted in 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 9721 of the Sentencing Code.” Post-Sentence Motion,

7/7/2024, at para. 8.

The trial court denied Appellant’s second post-sentence motion,

explaining that his “post sentence motion rights were not reinstated as part

of the . . . relief granted on June 27, 2024.” Trial Court Order, 7/22/2024.

Appellant then submitted a 1925(b) statement of issues complained of

on appeal, raising three grounds:

1. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a Conviction as a matter of law. The complainant, Rockeia Harley, acknowledged that she was under the influence of narcotics at the time of the alleged incident, as well as during her testimony. Her admitted intoxication at the time of the alleged incident rendered her incapable of remembering the events or details alleged by the Commonwealth. Further, her intoxication at the time of her testimony severely undermines her reliability as a witness, destroys her credibility, and definitively created reasonable doubt.

2. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In addition to the overwhelming lack of credible testimony from the [victim] based on her intoxication at the time of the alleged incident and during her [trial] testimony, the Commonwealth offered no physical evidence to corroborate the inconsistent testimony. As the fact-finder, the trial [court’s] decision to give credence to the complainant, without additional corroboration, shocks the conscience and must be vacated.

3. The trial court abused its discretion by entering a manifestly excessive sentence that was not based upon the gravity of the violation, the extent of [A]ppellant’s record, his prospect of rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and aggravating factors as noted in 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 9721 of the Sentencing Code.

Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, at 1-2.

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The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion giving its reasons why

the judgment of sentence should be upheld. As to Appellant’s sufficiency

claim, the trial court found the issue to be entirely waived because Appellant

had not identified any specific elements of any specific crimes which were

being challenged. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 11/19/2024, at 3. The

trial court added that the sufficiency claim had not been properly raised

because Appellant’s only contention – regarding the victim’s lack of credibility

– goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its legal sufficiency. See

id., at 4.

As to the merits of Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial

court reasoned that the victim’s pre-trial identifications of Appellant were

credible despite her purported intoxication and inconsistencies in her account.

The trial court referred to the ample evidence of the victim’s injuries, as well

as her repeated statements describing how Appellant assaulted her. See id.,

at 4-5.

In his brief, Appellant now raises the following three issues for our

consideration:

1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish each and every element of the crimes for which [A]ppellant was convicted.

2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

3. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence that was not based upon the gravity of the violation, the extent of [A]ppellant’s record, his prospect of rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the

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mitigating and aggravating factors as noted in [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721] of the Sentencing Code.

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

Appellant’s first claim is generally that the evidence of his guilt is legally

insufficient.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires this Court to

“determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense.”

Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[T]o

sustain a conviction, the facts and circumstances which the Commonwealth

must prove, must be such that every essential element of the crime is

established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. All doubts regarding guilt must

be resolved by the finder of fact “unless the evidence is so weak and

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from

the combined circumstances.” Id. “[I]t is for the fact-finder to make

credibility determinations, and the finder of fact may believe all, part, or none

of the witness’s testimony.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1029

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

To preserve a sufficiency challenge, an appellant's 1925(b) statement

“must state with specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant

alleges that the evidence was insufficient[.]” Commonwealth v. Cox, 231

A.3d 1011, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2020). This requirement is especially important

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where an appellant “was convicted of multiple crimes, each of which contains

elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id.

In the present case, Appellant failed to preserve the sufficiency claims

in his brief because, as noted by the trial court, he did not specify in his

1925(b) statement any of the elements or offenses he was challenging. See

Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 11/19/2024, at 3. Moreover, much of Appellant’s

argument is predicated on the supposed lack of credibility in the victim’s pre-

trial statements. Such matters go to weight, not legal sufficiency. The

credibility of a witness is a determination for the finder of fact – here, the trial

court – who was free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony presented

at trial. See Lee, 956 A.2d at 1029. The trial court was therefore permitted

to determine that the victim was telling the truth in her pre-trial statements

when she identified Appellant as the person who assaulted her. Thus, no relief

is warranted as to Appellant’s sufficiency claims. 2

2 In the argument section of his brief ostensibly raising his sufficiency claims,

Appellant makes several other contentions for the first time. He argues, for example, that the trial court could not rely on medical records and photographic evidence of the victim’s injuries because the evidence was not authenticated, and that his acquittal on the aggravated assault count precluded conviction on the count of unlawful restraint. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-17. These issues are waived, as they have been raised for the first time on appeal and have not been preserved for appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

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Appellant’s second claim is that the verdict was against the weight of

the evidence.

A claim alleging that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence “is

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64

A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013). A post-sentence motion must be granted at

the trial level if the defendant has shown that the evidence is “so tenuous,

vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.”

Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003). Relief

is not due on this ground merely because there is conflicting evidence, or a

different judge faced with the same facts would have arrived at a different

conclusion. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa.

2000).

Appellate review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused

its discretion in denying defendant’s post-sentence motion, and not whether

the verdict was in fact against the weight of the evidence. See

Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003); see also

Commonwealth v. Williams, 854 A.2d 440, 445 (Pa. 2004) (explaining that

the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are determinations only

for the fact-finder).

Here, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is predicated entirely on

the victim’s lack of credibility. Appellant points to the fact that the victim

appeared to be intoxicated on the night of the subject incident, as well as the

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victim’s recantations at trial. He argues further that the victim had given

conflicting accounts as to whether she was rendered unconscious by Appellant,

and whether Appellant abandoned her in a wooded area. See Appellant’s

Brief, at 18-19.

The record in no way suggests that the trial court abused its discretion

in assessing the credibility of witnesses, assigning weight to the evidence, and

ultimately determining that Appellant was guilty of the subject offenses. The

trial court was able to observe the testimony of the victim, the EMT who

treated the victim’s injuries, and the detective who interviewed the victim

about how those injuries were sustained. The trial court also viewed

photographic evidence and medical records of the victim’s significant injuries.

Any inconsistencies in the evidence were for the trial court to resolve.

The trial court was therefore free to believe the victim’s pre-trial statements

implicating Appellant, and to disbelieve her dubious claims at trial that she

could “not remember” identifying Appellant as her attacker. See

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1081 (Pa. 2017)

(“[I]nconsistencies in eyewitness testimony are not sufficient to warrant a new

trial on grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.”).

Similarly, the trial court was permitted to weigh the import of the victim’s

alleged intoxication and the discrepancies between the versions of her account

given to the EMT and police detective. Thus, we find that the trial court did

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not abuse its discretion in denying the weight of evidence claim in Appellant’s

post-sentence motion.

Appellant’s third and final claim is that the trial court erred by imposing

a manifestly excessive sentence. More specifically, he contends that the trial

court failed to consider “the gravity of the violation[s], the extent of

[A]ppellant’s record, his prospect of rehabilitation, [and] an assessment of the

mitigating and aggravating factors as noted in [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721] of the

Sentencing Code.” Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

We find that this claim is waived. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence

motion on September 27, 2023, asserting only that the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence. He did not raise an excessive sentence claim until

after the trial court granted him nunc pro tunc relief, reinstating his appellate

rights.

To preserve a claim in a post-sentence motion, it must be timely filed

within 10 days after the sentence was imposed. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1).

“An untimely post-sentence motion does not preserve issues for appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(same).

The reinstatement of appellate rights does not entitle a defendant to

subsequently raise additional claims beyond the period for filing a post-

sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa.

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Super. 2004) (holding trial court erred in addressing defendant's post-

sentence motion nunc pro tunc where reinstatement of the right to file a post-

sentence motion was not requested or expressly granted by the trial court);

see also Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1128-29 (Pa. Super.

2003) (en banc) (explaining that a request for nunc pro tunc relief to file a

direct appeal is distinct from the right to file an untimely post-sentence

motion). Additionally, an excessive sentence claim implicates a discretionary

aspect of the sentence, and such issues must be preserved by way of a timely

post-sentence motion. See Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); see Cartrette, 83 A.3d at

1042.

The excessive sentence claim Appellant now asserts was not preserved

for merits consideration on appeal because it was untimely raised in his second

post-sentence motion filed on July 7, 2024. This was well beyond the filing

deadline for the motion, which was 10 days after the sentence was imposed,

on September 18, 2023. The trial court’s reinstatement of Appellant’s right

to file a notice of appeal did not excuse the untimeliness of the second post-

sentence motion.

Even if Appellant had preserved this sentencing claim, we would find it

to be meritless. Excessive sentence claims implicate the discretionary aspects

of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa.

Super. 2022). “[A] sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest

abuse of discretion.” Id. “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is

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granted broad discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper

penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual

circumstances before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917

(Pa. Super. 2020). To prevail on an excessive sentence claim, an appellant

“must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored

or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”

Bankes, 286 A.3d at 1307 (citation omitted).

A trial court has presumably considered all appropriate sentencing

factors and adequately given the reasons for the sentence on the record where

the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report. See Commonwealth v.

Snyder, 289 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2023); Commonwealth v. Moury,

992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also Commonwealth v.

Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2023) (rejecting defendant's

challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence where record reflected the trial

court considered the circumstances of the crime, the PSI report, arguments

of counsel, and sentence was within statutory guidelines). An appellate court

may only disturb a standard-range sentence within the statutory guidelines if

the circumstances rendered the application of the guidelines “clearly

unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2).

In this case, the record shows that, at sentencing, the trial court

considered a PSI report, and the testimony of several of Appellant’s family

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members. The trial court then imposed a sentence of three to six months of

incarceration, followed by five years of probation. Notably, the trial court

rejected the statutory guidelines recommendation that Appellant receive a

prison term of 12 to 18 months.

On these facts, Appellant’s below-guidelines sentence was neither

excessive nor unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244,

1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (defendant's sentences were neither unreasonable

nor excessive where “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully

considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.”). Thus,

even if properly preserved for purposes of appellate review, Appellant’s

excessive sentence claim would not merit relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 12/22/2025

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