J-S51028-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TAROUN HAND, : : Appellant : No. 2272 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 5, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009972-2014
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018
Appellant Taroun Hand appeals from the judgment of sentence following
a bench trial and convictions for aggravated assault by vehicle while driving
under the influence,1 driving under the influence of a controlled substance or
metabolite,2 driving under the influence of a controlled substance – impaired
ability,3 recklessly endangering another person,4 and simple assault.5
Appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress the
evidence of his blood test results. We affirm.
____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1(a). 2 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1). 3 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). 4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. 5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a). J-S51028-18
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the trial court’s
opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/16/18, at 1-4. Appellant timely appealed and
timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. He raises the
following issues:
1. Did not the [trial] court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence where Appellant was subjected to coercive warnings before he consented to have his blood drawn?
2. Did not the [trial] court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence where, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the police failed to obtain a warrant to draw Appellant’s blood?
3. Did not the [trial] court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence where probable cause did not exist?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
We summarize Appellant’s arguments together.6 He primarily asserts
that the suppression court erred in finding exigent circumstances existed to
justify the warrantless blood draw. Id. at 16-17. Appellant discusses
Commonwealth v. Trahey, 183 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal
granted, No. 232 EAL 2018 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2018),7 and contends that the instant
6 We note that Appellant argued that his consent was invalid under Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). The suppression court agreed with that argument, but denied Appellant’s motion to suppress because it found exigent circumstances. 7 We note that Trahey was decided eight months after Appellant filed his appeal. Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Trahey defendant’s petition for allowance of appeal on the issue of whether “the facts and circumstances in [Trahey] justify a warrantless blood draw under the
-2- J-S51028-18
facts, unlike the facts in Trahey, do not support a finding of exigency. Id. at
18-19. Appellant also suggests that the police could have obtained a warrant
earlier than it did. Id. at 20-21. He maintains that the police lacked probable
cause to arrest him and therefore the results of any blood test was fruit of the
poisonous tree. Id. at 22. Appellant challenges the police testimony that he
was under the influence of drugs as internally contradictory. Id. at 23-24.
The standard of review follows:
When reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, we must determine whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We may only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing. . . . We may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from the facts are in error.
Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167 A.3d 716, 718 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]e are limited to considering only
the evidence of the prevailing party, and so much of the evidence of the non-
prevailing party as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the
record as a whole.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation and
footnote omitted).
After careful consideration of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the trial
court’s opinion, we perceive no error in the trial court’s legal conclusions based
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.” Trahey, 232 EAL 2018 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2018) (order).
-3- J-S51028-18
upon the record before it. See Ennels, 167 A.3d at 718. Therefore, we affirm
on the basis of the trial court’s reasoning. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-11.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/26/2018
-4- Circulated 10/29/2018 04:14 PM
---,.. ...... . ....
FILED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS J?lRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA Z,018.HAR J 6 PH z: 37 TRIAL DIVISION -CRIMINAL SECTION . OFFICE: Of Jl/0/C/;\l RE. o1vrs10JORos t: :-HRft1ri�(1L I lh.,T.JU(iJC)AL Of P!:J�r•i:-yL11u''l"rRIC �· . T COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0009972-2014 .�.. ,ANIA .
v. TAROUNHAND 2272 EDA 2017
. .. - _ . - . .... .. OPINION ' . ......, :' CP·51-CR.ooo9972,2014 Colr,n. v.Haod, Taioon Op'l\ion
I II I LANE,J, March 16, 2018
ltl1ll\lllll \11111\1 8083421711 .'-.:... .....
OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURAL llISTORY
On April 5, 2017, Taroun Hand (herein "Defendant"), was found guilty after a waiver trial
of Simple Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701 (a), two counts of Recklessly Endangering another Person,
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, Driving under the Influence ("DlJI"); Controlled Substance or Metabolite P1
Offense, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(I), Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While DUI, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3735.1, and Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance- Impaired Ability, 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). Defendant was sentenced to five to ten years of confinement on the
§3735,1 conviction, two years of probationafter release on the § 270 I (a), $1 ,000.00 in fines, a
twelve-month license suspension, seventy-two hours to six months of concurrent confinement for
the§ 3802(d)(2), Alcohol Highway Safety classes, and Drug and Alcohol Assessment; Defendant
also received credit for time served. The§ J802(d)( I) conviction merged with (d)(2) for sentencing
purposes.
On June S, 2017, Defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion. This court denied the
post-sentence motion at a hearing on June 23, 2017. On July 18, 2017, Defendant riled a timely Cont. v. Taroun Hand appeal. On July 19, 2017, the trial court ordered Defendant to file a Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one days. Defense counsel requested an extension to file
Defendant's Statement of Errors after the Notes of Testimony were transcribed. The court ordered
that a statement be filed within twenty-one d�ys of receiving the transcripts. A Statement of
Matters Complained on Appeal pursuant to the 1925(b) Order was filed on October 20, 2017.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
a. Did the court err in denying the Motion to Suppress wh�n it found that probabJe cause existed to stop, transport, and arrest, Mr. Hand for driving under the influence and subsequently draw his blood for potential prosecution? b. In light of recent decisions foltowing Birchfield v, North Dakota, namely Commonwealthv. Myers, did the court err in denying the Motion to Suppress where the police failed to obtain a warrant to draw the defendant's blood, where exigent circumstances were not present and specific [sic] Mr. Hand's right to privacy, and where the police read coercive warnings to Mr. Hand to obtain his consent to a blood draw? c. Did the trial court err at sentencing when it considered defendant's illegally obtained chemical test results and applied enhanced DUL sentencing penalties? .
FACTS
. On July 9, 2014, at approximately 4: 14 PM, emergency medical 1echnicians and police
responded to a four-car accident in the area of 700 W. Lehigh-Avenue, (N.T. 6/01/16 at p. 6). It
was a clear and sunny day (Id, at 10). Several witnesses had observed as Defendant drove his car
into the wrong lane of traffic, a public bus, two parked cars, and finally into two children who had
been standing on the sidewalk with their mother. (Id. at 31-32).
Upon arrival at the scene, police were met by a SEPTA (Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority) bus driver, who reported that she had been driving her bus eastbound
when suddenly Defendant had driven into oncoming traffic, swerved, hit the passengerareaof her
bus, and conti'nued to drive away. (N.T. 6/01/16 at p. 31),
Com. 11. Taroun Hand 2 Police were next met by two more witnesses who identified Defendant as the driver of a
burgundy 1998 Dodge Caravan. (N.T. 6/01/16 at p. 32; N.T. 4/05/17 at p, 62). The first witness
pointed to Defendant and to Defendant's van and stated Defendant was driving the van at a high
rate of speed and recklessly, (N.T. 6/01 /16 at p. 9). The second witness also identified Defendant
as the driver. (Id. at 9-IO). Both witnesses told police that Defendant continued to travel in the
wrong lanes, driving westbound in the eastbound lanes. (Id at 31-32). Defendant.then struck two
parked vehicles: a Jeep Liberty and a Toyota Camry. (Id.). Both Defendant's van and the Jeep
Liberty ended up on the sidewalk. (Id.). The witnesses explained that the Jeep was· pushed by
Defendant's car into twochildren, (Id.).
N.T. (thirteen years old) and E.F. (seven years old) had been standing on the sidewalk with
theirmother when the accident occurred. (N.T. 4/05/17 atpp, 61-62; N.T. 11/03/14 at p, 19). When
the car hit them, N.T. flewinto the alr, hit a wall, and lost consciousness. (N.T. 4/05/17 at pp. 6 l-
62). E.F. was trapped under the Jeep with only her feet visible. (ld.; N.T. 11/03/14 at p. 20). The
girls' mother believed that E.F. was dead; however, she was eventually rescued from under the car
through the combined efforts offamily members and neighbors. (N.T. 4/05/17 at p. 62).
After speaking with Defendant at the scene briefly, Officer McCarthy noted that Defendant
did not smell like alcohol but that he had red eyes and slurred speech to the point where he was
incoherent. (N.T. 6/01/16 at pp. 11-12, 18). Based on sixteen years of police experience, Officer
McCarthy determined that Defendant was under the influence ofnarcotics and was unfit to operate
a motor vehicle safely. (Id at 14-15). Officer McCarthy arrested Defendant and police-escorted
medics transported Defendant to the hospital. (N·,T. 6/01/16 alp. 24).
At the hospital, Accident Investigation District ("AID") Officer Mark Minke read
Defendant his O'Connell warnings and 75-43 9 Form, which outlined his rights and the effects of
Com; v. Taroun Hand 3 refusing to submit to a blood draw. (N.T. 6/10/16 at pp. 6-7). After going over the warnings with
Officer Minke, Defendant consented to a blood draw. (Id. at 9). Forensic toxicologist Dr. Richard
Cohn then tested Defendant's blood for drugs and found Clonazeparn (a schedule IV narcotic) and
Oxycodone (a schedule H narcotic). (N .T. 4/5/17 nt p. 69). He concluded that it was reasonably
scientifically certain that Defendant was impaired by these drugs and was unfit to operate a motor
vehicle safely on the highway at the time of the accident. (Id. at 69- 70).
Aftertheaccident the children N.T. and E.f'. were taken to St. Christopher's Hospital. (N.T.
4/05/17 at pp. 66-68). N.T. was treated for abrasions and minor injuries arid was discharged from
the hospital that night. (Id. at 66-67). She had soreness in her neck and head after this accident
(Id. at 67). E.F. sustained the most serious injuries from this accident, including a broken pelvis, a
broken leg, and a lacerated liver from the impact of the vehicle. (rd. at 67-68). She spent
approximately three weeks in the hospital. (Id,). She then spent another three weeks on bedrest at
her home. (Id at 68). The middle of her body and her right leg were' placed into full casts. (Id).
She continued physical therapy throughout the following school year and was on crutches for the
majority of that school year. (Id.).
DISCUSSION
[, The trial court did not err in denying the Motion to Suppress when lt found that probable cause existed to stop and arrest Defendant.
Defendant first contends that the court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because
the police had no probable cause to arrest him. In reviewing the denial of a motion for suppression,
the court is limited to considering the suppression hearing record and has the following standard
of review:
We are bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo, Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we Com. v. Taroun Hand 4 may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v, Smith, 2017 Pa. Super. 416, 2 (Pa. Super. Ct.2017) (citations omitted).
Police need to have probable cause before making an arrest and before asking for a blood
sample. In re J.G., 145 AJd 1179, 1185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Aiello, 675 A2d
1278, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). The Supreme Court has laid out a "well-established legal
standard" for determining probable cause;
Probable cause is made out when "the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime." ... [We] require only a "probability, and not a prima fade showing, of criminal activity}' In determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). In addition
probable cause only requires criminality to be one possible reasonable inference from the
circumstances: criminality does not even need to be the most likely inference. Commonwealth v.
Salter, 12 l A.3d 98 7, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (citin:g Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271,
1275(Pa, Supe�200S».
In the present case, the court did not err when it ruled that the police had probable cause to
stop and arrest Defendant, who had just caused a multi-car "major accident." (N.T. 6/01/16 at p.
19). When pollce arrived, Defendant's car was up on the sidewalk, and he was immediately
identified to policeby bystanders as the man who had just been driving extremely recklessly. (Id.
at 9). There was no other obvious reason besides intoxication why Defendantwas continuously
driving erratically this way down the street oh a clear and sunny afternoon. (Id at 10-14).
Bystanders also identified Defendant as responsible for the destruction at the scene, which Com. v, Taroun Hand
·' included grievously injured children and wrecked cars. (id at 9-10, 32); The police observed that
Defendant was incoherent and had red eyes ai;i,d sl�rred speech. (Id. at 11-12, 18). The officer who
arrested Defendant had sixteen years of police experience and training dealing with drug DUls and
based on his observations, concluded that Defendant had been driving while under the influence
of drugs. (Id at l 4-15). After observing the totality of the circumstances, police could reasonably
conclude that Defendant could have been driving under the influence or recklessly endangering . .
the Jives ofothers, The totality of the evidence is more than sufficient to stop, arrest, and request
blood from Defendant.
IL The trial court did not err when fr denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress based on a warrantless blood draw, because there were exigent circumstances.
Both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super.
Ct. io12). One search that mustbe reasonable is the drawing of blood performed atthe direction
of a police officer. Com. v, Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992). "A search conducted without a
warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an
established exception applies." Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000). If a search is unreasonable, it should be suppressed and on appeal should be governed by the standard
set forth in Smith, discussed supra. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889; Smith, 2017 Pa. Super. at 2.
A. Bircldield negates Defendant's affirma'tive consent.
One accepted exception to a warrant!ess search is voluntary consent by the person whose
blood is to be drawn. Commonwealth V; Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1173, 1180 (Pa. 2017) (also
holding that in cases such as this one, PA's implied consent statute does not negate a need for
positive, voluntary consent from a defendant). In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court
concluded that "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to subrn it to a blood test on pain of Com. v. Taroun Hand 6 . committing a criminal offense." 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (U.S. 2016). This decision led to the
issuance of Commonwealth v; Evans by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that "[ejven
though Pennsylvania's implied consentlaw does not make the refusal to submit to a blood testa
crime in and of itself," the law "undoubtably" imposed criminal· penalties to the point where
Birchfield controlled. 153 A.3d 323, 3:3 l (Pa. 2016). The decision Commonwealth v. Ennels
followed, which held that the prior decisions applied to drug-related DUls in addition to alcohol-
based DU1s, 167 A.3d 716, 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). Thus in cases where defendants had signed
Pennsylvania's pre-Birchfield consent form, defendant's consent now had to be re-evaluated.
Evans, J 53 A.3d at 33 J. The court also held that in Pennsylvania it is not an excuse that police
issued the pre-Birchfield consent form in good faith relying on former law. Commonwealth v.
Kurtz, i 72 A.3d 1153, 11 S9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). This applied retroactively to cases stUJ open at
the time that Birchfield was decided if the issue was preserved at all stages. Commonwealth v.
Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
In the case at bar, Defendant signed a consent form and agreed to have blooddrawn. (N.T.
6/10/16. at pp. 6-9). However, he signed a pre-Birchfield consent form, (N.T. 4/0SJl 7 at p. 8).
Although Defendant's arrest occurred before Birchfield was decided, the case still applies, since
Defendant's case was open at the time of decision and he properly moved to suppress his blood
results.both before and after the Birchfield decision. Therefore, Defendant's affirmative consent
to have his blood drawn has been negated by Birchfield and its progeny.
B. Specific exigent circumstances allowed for a warrantless blood .draw in this case,
Another accepted exception to a warrantless search occurs when, due to exigent
circumstances, the needs of law enforcement are "so compelling that [a] warrantless search is
objectively reasonable." Missouri v, Mctieely, 569 U.S. 141, 148-49 (U.S. 2013) (quoting
Com. v. Taroun Hand 7 Kentucky v. King)563 U.S. 452, 460 (U.S. 2011)). This exception applies to controlled substance
DUis as well as drug DUls. Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167 A.3d 716, 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
Though the Supreme Court declined to create a per se rule for exigent circumstances in
DUI cases, it emphasized that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood" still supports
findings of exigency in specific cases. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156; see also Ennels, l 67 A.3d at 721
(noting case-specific exigencies apply for drug cases). "To determine whether a law enforcement
officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant," the court must conduct a "case-
by-case" inquiry in which it looks to the "totality of circumstances." McNeely at 1556, 1559. The
specific exigent circumstances should be presented before the court. See Commonwealth v, Myers,
164 A.3d 1162, 1182 (Pa. 2017) (affirming the trial court's finding of no exigent circumstances
where the Commonwealth failed to address the issue or demonstrate how there were any exigent
circumstances in that specific situation). One factor the court may consider is whether there is "a
likelihood that evidence will be destroyed ff police take the time to obtain a warrant."
Commonwealth v, Wright; 961 A.2d l]9, 137 (Pa; 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Roland, 637
A.2d 269, 271 (Pa. 1994)); see also Ennels, 167 A.3d at 721 (explaining a warrantless blood draw
is allowed for drug DU!s when "time does not allow" officers to secure a warrant).
The Supreme Court referenced Commonwealth v. Schmerber as an example of a DUI case
where the dissipation of drugs or alcohol in the blood stream was enough to invoke the exigency
exception. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156. In Schmerber, defendant was arrested after having caused a
car accident and his blood was drawn without a warrantor voluntary consent. 384 U.S. 757 (U.S.
t 966). The court held that the blood 'draw was valid because the police officer involved "might
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary
Com. v. Taroun Hand 8 to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction ofevidence.?' Id. at 770
(citation omitted).
The necessity for a blood draw in the Instant.matter is analogous to Schmerber, if not more
emergent. Here, Defendant had just caused a multi-car accident by driving down the wrong side
of the street, swerving back and forth, and careening up onto the sidewalk in broad daylight on a
clear summer day, (N.T. 6/01/16 at pp. 31*32). He did not stop after he hit a public bus nor when
he hit two more cars. (Id.) He did not even help after he ran over two children in front of their
mother. (Id) As there was no other obvious explanation for the incident besides intoxication and
defendant showed clear signs of drug use, the urgent need for a blood draw to confirm these results
was apparent. (Id. at 11 • l i, 1 8)
To show that there was exigency in the case at bar, the Commonwealth offered a
Philadelphia police officer (0 fflcer William Lackman) who specialized in major crashes and DUls.
(N.T. 4/05/17 at p. 10). He testified that, after reviewing the record in this specific case, there
would not be enough time to get a warrant for a blood draw. (Id. atlJ), The DRUGSCAN test that
would check Defendant's blood (or traces of drugs only goes back up to six hours pre-blood draw.
(Id. at38-40). However, based on his personal experience obtaining warrants, it would have taken
at least six hours to obtain one in this type of situation from the time the crash occurred. (Id. at 14);
He testified that this case would be especially difficult because of all of the victims and witnesses,
because of the commotion at the accident scene, and because there was an Aggravated Assault by
DUl charge. (Id. at 13�16).
Officer Lackman explained in detail why a warrant would take too long to secure in this
case. (N.T, 4/05/17 at pp. l0-40). First, on the day of the incident, police arrived at the scene and
interviewed witnesses (which took an hour and a fifteen minutes here). (Id. at l 0). Then, the officer
Com. v. Taro1111 Hand 9 responsible for getting the warrant would hnve to approach the scene and find the reporting officer
who would brief him (which would be lengthy here due to the large number of injuries and
witnesses). (Id. at 16-17). That officer would then travel twenty minutes away to Temple Hospital.
(Jd. at 17, 29). Then the officer would have to observe Defendant (for around ten minutes) to "see
what he was doing, see what he. looked J ike, et cetera." (Id. at 17}. Next, the officer at the scene
would brief him as to observations and medications, (Id. at 18). He would then travel back to his
office to "try and verify through Penn DOT files registration information that I was provided for
the crash itself for four _vehicles" and driver license information. (Id.). Next> he would verify the
level of injury of the child victims in the .accldent as that would also be necessary for the warrant
(he would try calling but because of HIP AA hemay additionally have to travel to St, Christopher's
Hospital to get this information). (Jd at 18, 35). Only then would he feel he had enough
information to realistically get a warrant and type up an affidavit of probable cause (which may
take around forty-five minutes). (Id. at 18, 35-36).
At that point his affidavit would be sent through the proper channels at the District
Attorney's Office and the officer would request an expedited review. (N.T. 4/05/17 at p. 18-19,
36). An ADA would review it, choose whether to approve or deny lt, add amendments, and send
it back. (Id). Then the actual warrant would need to be typed, the officer would need to find a
supervisor to approve it, and the warrant would need to be entered into the Philadelphia tracking
system and assigned a number. (Id at 19-20). Then that warrant would need to be taken to the
court building to be reviewed and signed by the arraignment magistrate. (Id.). Assuming that it is
signed, he would have to. take it from court back Jo the hospital, find Defendant, and explain to his
medical staff the circumstances which brought him there. (Id at 20-21). Once the blood is secured,
it is taken back to police headquarters, placed on a property receipt, and sent off to be analyzed.
Com. v, Tarouu Hand 10 (Id. at 22); Officer Lackman testified that when calculating the total time this would take he
considered only the most optimistic scenarios and did not take into account common time-
consuming possibilities, such as that the DA's office would not immediately approve his warrant
or that the Temple Hospital staff would refuse to take blood and send him to the hospital's legal
department. (Id. at 13, 19, 21).
Officer Lackman testified that this would take around four hours and forty-five minutes
from the blood draw (measured by the time when AID Officer Minke came into contact with
Defendant) and in this case, six hours from the accident overall (because it took around an hour
and fifteen minutes for Defendant in this case to get from the crash to the blood draw). (N.T.
4/05/17 at pp. 13-14, 22, 24). The realistic result of this lengthy process would be that the blood
draw would take place too late for the six-hour DRUGSCAN test to pick up on Defendant's
intoxication levels at the actual time of the accident. (Id. at 38-40). Sufficient evidence was
presented in this case to demonstrate that there were exigent circumstances. Cf Myers, 164 A.3d
at 1182 (finding no exigent circumstances when the Commonwealth did not present any additional
evidence of exigency). For those reasons, under the totality of circumstances, exigency existed in
this particular case and the needs of the police in investigating this multi-car, multi-victim accident
were sufficiently compelling to sanction a warrantless blood draw.
III. The trial conrt did not err when it applied enhanced DUI sentencing penalties.
A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing because it ls in the "best position to
measure" the record as well as the defendant's character. Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 AJd 780,
786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). A sentence will not be disturbed on appeal "absent a manifest abuse of
discretion." Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 808 (Pa. Super, Ct. 2015), appeal denied,
140 A3d 12 {Pa.2016). Additionally, unless a sentence is "clearly unreasonable," Pennsylvania
Com. v. Taroun Hand 11 law will give deference to sentences that fall within state sentencing guidelines. Commonwealth v,
Coulverson, 34A.3d 135, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2)). When
considering the reasonableness of a sentence, a court should focus on the nature of the offense, the
defendant's history, observations.of the defendant, the trial court's findings, and the sentence's
similarity to the guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 978J(d). An unreasonable sentence would be one that
has been imposed by a.judge "irrationally." Riggs, 63 A.3d at 786.
Here, the sentence at issue-five to ten years of Incarceration for the charge of Aggravated
Assault by DUI-fits neatly within Pennsylvania's suggested guidelines. (N.T. 6/05/17 atpp. 21,
25). Based on Defendant's offense gravity score and prior record score, the minimum suggested
sentencing guideline for this conviction would be four to five years ofincarceration (plus or minus
a year) and the maximum would be ten years of incarceration. (Id. at 3-4). In deciding upon a
sentence, court considered these guidelines and reviewed all reports that had been prepared for
sentencing. (Id. at 3-4, 20). The court also listened to several family members speaking on behalf
of Defendant and considered their arguments, while noting that "unfortunately some of il Wasn't
as helpful for [Defendant.]" (kj, at 20-21 ). The court finally considered the victim impact
statements by the two children who were injured by Defendant, noting that they were really hard
to hear and thatI'their lives were, really impacted by this accident!' (Id. at p. 20). The court then
handed down a sentence that is almostidenticalto the Pennsylvania suggested sentence. (Id. at 21,
25). Therefore the sentence was well-thought out and reasoned.
Finally, Defendant assert� that the sentence was incorrect because the court considered
Defendant's "illegal" blood results. First, this goes more towards determinatlon of guilt than
sentencing. Second, the court asserts; 'supra, that these blood results were not illegal under the
exigency requirement. Assuming arguendo that the blood results should not have been considered
Com. 11. Taroun Hand 12 (and even if the Section 3802(d�(l) our charge is reversed), this is harmless error in terms of
sentencing. The sentence of incarceration at issue is one for Aggravated Assault by DUI. For an
Aggravated Assault byOUI vi elation and sentence, there simply needs to have been any violation
of75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802 (in addition to an assault). 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735. I. An accepted violation
of section J 802 for the purposes of an Aggravated Assault by DUI charge is a 3&02(d)(l) violation,
where no blood results are needed and a conviction can be found based on observation alone:
Analogously to subsections 3802(a)(2), (b), and (c) (or alcohol intoxication, subsection J802(d)(l) requires a measurement to determine if any amount of a Schedule I, 11, or Ill controlled substance ls detectable in the defendant's blood. Second, and analogously to subsection 3802(a)(l) for alcohol intoxication, subsection 3802(d)(2) prohibits driving if one is "under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs io a degree which impairs [one's] ability to safelydrlve.t' This provision by its plain text does not require that a drug be measured in the defendant's blood, nor does it specify any particular manner by which the Commonwealth is required to prove that the defendant was under the influence of a drug. Like subsection 3802(a)(l)j [ ... ] subsection 3802(d)(2) does not limit, constrain, or specify the type of evidence that the Commonwealth can proffer to prove its case.
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.Jd 1231: 1239 (Pa. 20J l) (quoting 7 5 Pa.C.S.A. § 3 802). Though
Defendant was also convicted of a J802(d)( I) charge which would usually require a blood test, he
received no sentence for that 3802(d)( l) charge (as it merged into his 3802(d)(2) conviction). Since
Defendant was convicted of3802(d)(2) where no blood results are needed and that is an acceptable
basis for an Aggravated Assault by DUI conviction, on which Defendant's sentence is based, the
blood results are merely cumulative and Defendant's argument is without merit.
Com. v. Taroun Hand 13 CONCLUSION
After reading the applicable statute, case laws, and rules, the trial court was correct in
denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress his chemical test results and in sentencing him
accordingly. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
HONORABLE TIMIKA R, LANE
Com. v, Taroun Hand 14