J-S45043-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : ABRAHAM GARCIA, JR. : : Appellant : No. 283 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-CR-0003875-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., MUSMANNO, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2018
Appellant, Abraham Garcia, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, following his jury trial
convictions for one count each of robbery,1 aggravated assault attempting to
cause serious bodily injury,2 aggravated assault -- bodily injury to another
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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii). 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S45043-18
with a deadly weapon,3 and harassment4 and two counts each of theft by
unlawful taking and simple assault.5 We affirm.
At about 4:00 P.M. on July 27, 2016, at the 500 block of Penn Street in
Reading, Michael Fornwald’s former girlfriend, Alyx Mazaika, warned him that ____________________________________________
3 For the second count of aggravated assault, Count 3 overall, the Information, filed on September 22, 2016, states that Appellant was charged pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4): “attempt to cause or intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to MICHAEL FORNWALD with a deadly weapon.” However, during the final jury charge for Count 3, the trial court only instructed on the “intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury” portion and not on the “attempt to cause” portion of this statute. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 194- 95 (trial court instructing: “aggravated assault, causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon,” where the jury must find “that the defendant caused bodily injury to another person”). The verdict slip lists Count 3 as “Aggravated Assault (attempt or knowingly cause bodily injury to Michael Fornwald with a deadly weapon).” Verdict of the Jury, dated 10/25/2017, filed 10/30/2017, at 1.
However, Appellant concedes that he caused bodily injury to the victim, Michael Fornwald, Appellant’s Brief at 26; hence, the attempt clause is immaterial, which aligns with the jury instructions for this count. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 194-95. “The law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted), reargument denied (Apr. 18, 2018).
Additionally, for reasons explained below, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant acted intentionally, which is the required mens rea for either an attempt to cause or intentionally causing bodily injury, and we therefore do not need to consider whether Appellant knowingly caused bodily injury. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4); Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“the Commonwealth does not have to prove that the serious bodily injury was actually inflicted but rather that the Appellant acted with the specific intent to cause such injury”). 4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1) 5 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3921(a) and 2701(a), respectively.
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the Appellant was looking for him. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 45-51, 54,
85-86, 89, 132. Fornwald and his current girlfriend, Mari Cornelsen, ignored
the warning and walked to a nearby bus stop. Appellant approached Fornwald
from behind, placed a knife against the lower left side of Fornwald’s throat,
and demanded Fornwald empty his pockets. Appellant “told [Fornwald] that
[Fornwald] had robbed from his girlfriend so he was going to rob from
[Fornwald].” Id. at 50.
Fornwald pushed away the knife by grabbing the blade with his left
hand, cutting his left thumb and pointer finger and wounding his shoulder.
Id. at 51-57, 74, 89-91, 128; Commonwealth’s Exs. 2-6, 8-11. Several
witnesses called the police, and Appellant left the scene with Fornwald’s wallet
and cellular telephone.
Fornwald testified at Appellant’s preliminary hearing and trial. See id.
at 45-81.6 During direct examination at trial, Fornwald stated that Appellant
held “a knife against my throat” and that, following Appellant’s demand, he
had emptied his pockets himself. Id. at 50, 54-55. Fornwald also admitted
that he had two prior convictions for misdemeanor theft, less than a year
before trial. Id. at 60.
During cross-examination, defense counsel indicated to Fornwald that,
on page 7 of the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing on
August 26, 2016, he had said that Cornelsen had been the one to reach into ____________________________________________
6 The notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing on August 26, 2016, are not in the certified record.
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his pockets; Fornwald admitted his mistake and clarified that Cornelsen had
been the one to empty his pockets. Id. at 70. Defense counsel also showed
Fornwald the portion of the preliminary hearing transcript where Fornwald had
said that he was facing Appellant “at this point[,]” which defense counsel took
to mean when Cornelsen emptied Fornwald’s pockets, and Fornwald explained
that he meant that he faced Appellant after his pockets were emptied. Id. at
75-76.
Mazaika also testified that she witnessed Appellant demand money from
Fornwald while holding a knife to Fornwald’s throat but that “the sharp part of
the blade was facing outwards away from” Fornwald’s neck. Id. at 88, 90;
see also id. at 89 (“the blade was facing out”), 100 (same). She continued
that Cornelsen reached into Fornwald’s pockets, “pulled out the money and
gave it to [Appellant,]” which Appellant grabbed then left the scene. Id. at
90-91. She further testified that, when she saw Appellant later that day, he
had Fornwald’s cellular telephone and wallet with $15.00 in cash with him.
Id. at 94.7
In addition, Officer Robert Crowley of the City of Reading Police
Department testified at trial. Id. at 122-23. Officer Crowley testified that,
when Appellant was located, Fornwald’s cellular telephone and wallet were in
7Fornwald’s wallet was distinctive: it was red and black, with a chain, and had a picture of the Marvel character, Deadpool, on the front flap. Commonwealth’s Ex. 10.
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his possession; the wallet still contained Fornwald’s driver’s license. Id. at
128; see also Commonwealth’s Exs. 6, 8-11.
The jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned charges on
October 25, 2017, and the trial court sentenced him on November 1, 2017.
On November 13, 2017, Appellant filed a post-sentence “motion for new trial
as the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.” Mot. for Post-
sentence Relief, 11/13/2017, at ¶ II.8 The trial court denied the motion on
January 18, 2018, and Appellant’s timely appeal followed on February 6, 2018.
Appellant timely filed a court-ordered statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the trial court filed a responsive
opinion.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant possessed the requisite mens rea to commit both counts of aggravated assault.
[2.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion when permitting a guilty verdict that was against the weight of the
8 Appellant thereby satisfied the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) to preserve a weight of the evidence claim:
(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or
(3) in a post-sentence motion.
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evidence, particularly a verdict that relied on testimonial evidence that lacked credibility.
Appellant’s Brief at 8 (trial court’s answers and Appellant’s suggested answers
omitted).
Appellant first contends that the Commonwealth failed to provide
sufficient evidence that he possessed the proper mens rea to commit
aggravated assault. Id. at 15.9
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is as follows:
Whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. . . . Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Fortson, 165 A.3d 10, 14–15 (Pa. Super.) (citation and
internal brackets omitted) (some formatting), appeal denied, 174 A.3d 558
(Pa. 2017).
Here, Appellant specifically asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for aggravated assault attempting to cause serious
bodily injury, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), because the
Commonwealth did not establish that he had the specific intent to attempt to
9Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish any other element of either of his two aggravated assault convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 14-29.
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cause serious bodily injury. Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. Appellant contends
that his declaration to rob Fornwald and the direction that he held the knife –
facing outward – demonstrate that he did not intend to harm Fornwald. Id.
at 19-20.
According to 18 Pa.C.S § 2702(a)(1): “A person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he . . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury[10] to another[.]”
In order to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault, the Commonwealth does not have to prove that the serious bodily injury was actually inflicted but rather that the Appellant acted with the specific intent to cause such injury. Further, where the victim does not sustain serious bodily injury, the Commonwealth must prove that the appellant acted with specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. The Commonwealth may prove intent to cause serious bodily injury by circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal
brackets and citation omitted) (some formatting).
“[I]t is well settled the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the
body is sufficient to establish a specific intent to kill. Clearly, a specific intent
to cause serious bodily injury can be inferred from the same circumstances.”
Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181, 184–85 (Pa. Super. 1997)
(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 956 A.2d 926, 933 (Pa.
2008), the use of a knife on the victim’s “neck — a vital part of her body --”
was found to be sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the appellant
10 “Serious bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
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“acted with the specific intent to kill[.]” See also Commonwealth v.
Raybuck, 915 A.2d 125, 128 (Pa. Super. 2006) (knife is a deadly weapon);
Commonwealth v. Scullin, 607 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Super. 1992) (same).
Here, two witnesses – Fornwald and Mazaika – testified that Appellant
used a knife against Fornwald’s neck. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 50-51,
54, 89. As the use of a knife against a victim’s neck/throat is sufficient to
establish a specific intent to kill, Montalvo, 956 A.2d at 933, and since
circumstances where a specific intent to kill is found would also support a
finding of a specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, Nichols, 692 A.2d
at 184–85, Appellant’s use of a knife against Fornwald’s throat, N.T. Trial,
10/24-25/2017, at 50-51, 54, 89, is sufficient for a jury to find that Appellant
possessed a specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to Fornwald.
As for Appellant’s argument that Mazaika’s testimony that the sharp end
of the knife’s blade was facing away from Fornwald’s neck demonstrates that
he did not specifically intend to injure Fornwald, Appellant’s Brief at 20, the
jury could have concluded that the Appellant mistakenly held the blade the
wrong way and that the direction of the blade did not demonstrate a lack of
intent to cause serious bodily injury. Moreover, the only witness to testify
that the sharp side blade was turned away from Fornwald’s throat was
Appellant’s current girlfriend, id. at 88-89, 100, and the jury may have found
her testimony on this point to be self-serving and dubious without
corroboration.
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Appellant’s declaration that he intended to rob Fornwald, id. at 50, also
fails to eliminate his intent to cause serious bodily injury, as a robbery can
include the infliction of serious bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1). If
anything, Appellant’s announcement of his plan to rob Fornwald suggests that
Appellant intended to harm Fornwald, not the opposing inference.
Accordingly, we find that Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction for aggravated assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S
§ 2702(a)(1) merits no relief.
Additionally, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for aggravated assault causing bodily injury with a
deadly weapon, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4), because, although he
concedes that Fornwald suffered bodily injury,11 the evidence did not establish
that he intentionally or knowingly caused said bodily injury. Appellant’s Brief
at 15, 25-26.
According to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4): “A person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he . . . attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]”
(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when:
11 “Bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
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(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id. § 302(b)(1)-(2).
As we have established above that Appellant had the specific intent to
cause serious bodily injury, this conclusion incorporates a finding that
Appellant had the intent to cause bodily injury, and we do not need to
separately analyze Appellant’s mens rea for Section 2702(a)(4). The evidence
was thereby sufficient to establish both counts of aggravated assault, and
Appellant’s first challenge in its entirety is without merit.
Appellant next maintains that “inconsistent and unreliable testimony”
from Fornwald,12 who had crimen falsi convictions for theft less than a year
12 In his weight of the evidence argument, Appellant only challenges Fornwald’s credibility, not that of any other witness, including Mazaika, who admitted to multiple crimen falsi convictions, including three theft convictions. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 92.
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before the trial, “renders the robbery conviction[13] against the weight of the
evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 29, 31. Specifically, Appellant cites to
Fornwald’s inability to recall if he or Cornelsen emptied his pockets.
Appellant’s Brief at 11, 30 (citing N.T., 8/26/2016, at 7; N.T. Trial, 10/24-
25/2017, at 54-55, 69-70, 90). Furthermore, Appellant insists that “[t]here
were numerous differences in [Fornwald]’s rendition of events between the
preliminary hearing and the jury trial”: during the preliminary hearing,
Fornwald testified that he faced the Appellant while retrieving items from his
pockets; during trial, Fornwald testified that Appellant was behind him at all
times. Id. at 30-31 (citing N.T., 8/26/2016, at 11; N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017,
at 75-76).
Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
as follows:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
13 Appellant does not contend that Fornwald’s allegedly “inconsistent and unreliable testimony” renders any of his other convictions against the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-32.
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Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545–46 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted) (some formatting).
“[I]n order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the
evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the
verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172
A.3d 632, 643 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2018).
All of the inconsistencies between Fornwald’s preliminary hearing
testimony and his trial testimony were known by the jury, as were his prior
crimen falsi convictions. N.T., 10/25-26/2017, at 60, 70, 75-76,14 90. Armed
with this knowledge, the jury made their credibility determinations and still
concluded that Appellant was guilty of robbery. The trial court reasoned that
the jury “decided to believe all or at least part of Fornwald’s testimony.” Trial
Court Opinion, filed April 5, 2018, at 5. All credibility determinations are the
prerogative of the jury as fact-finder, and we cannot and will not substitute
our judgment for that of the jurors. See Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545–46.
Assuming arguendo that the jury found Fornwald not to be credible, it
still could have convicted Appellant of robbery based upon other evidence
presented at trial. Appellant was convicted of robbery pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
14 We note that Fornwald’s preliminary hearing and trial testimony about the direction in which he was facing may not actually be in conflict. During his trial testimony, Fornwald clarified his statement from the preliminary hearing that he was facing Appellant “at this point[ in time,]” explaining that “at this point” referred to after his pockets were emptied, not while they were being emptied. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 75-76.
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§ 3701(a)(1)(ii): “A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing
a theft, he . . . threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of
immediate serious bodily injury[.]”
“The Commonwealth need not prove a verbal utterance or threat to
sustain a conviction under subsection 3701(a)(1)(ii). It is sufficient if the
evidence demonstrates aggressive actions that threatened the victim’s
safety.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(internal brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, even without Fornwald’s testimony, the jury could have convicted
Appellant of robbery, because Mazaika’s testimony established that Appellant
committed a theft when he demanded Fornwald’s money, then took
Fornwald’s property. N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 90-91, 94. The theft was
corroborated when police found Fornwald’s cellular telephone and wallet with
his driver’s license inside in Appellant’s possession. Commonwealth’s Exs. 6,
8-11; N.T. Trial, 10/24-25/2017, at 128. Mazaika’s testimony also established
that Appellant threatened Fornwald’s safety through the aggressive action of
holding a knife against Fornwald’s neck. Id. at 89. Thus, for argument’s
sake, even if the jury found Fornwald completely incredible and, consequently,
wholly disregarded his testimony, the jury still could have concluded that other
evidence at trial established that, while in the course of committing a theft,
Appellant threatened Fornwald with immediate serious bodily injury and hence
committed robbery. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
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Therefore, whether the jury believed all, part, or none of Fornwald’s
testimony, its decision to convict Appellant of robbery does not shock the
conscience. See Hansley, 24 A.3d at 416; Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545–46.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and no error in the trial
court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion for a new trial based upon the
weight of the evidence. Appellant’s second issue on appeal thus merits no
relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/6/2018
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