Com. v. Figueroa, J.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 25, 2015
Docket1591 MDA 2014
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Figueroa, J. (Com. v. Figueroa, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Figueroa, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

J-S31015-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

JOSUE FIGUEROA,

Appellant No. 1591 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 2, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002942-2012 CP-22-CR-0002962-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 25, 2015

Appellant, Josue Figueroa, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of

sentence of life imprisonment, imposed after a jury convicted him of second-

degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, and false

reports to law enforcement authorities. On appeal, Appellant raises one

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and argues that the evidence

was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After careful review, we affirm.

Appellant and his co-defendant, Juan Serrano-Torres, were arrested

and charged with, inter alia, robbery, conspiracy, and criminal homicide after

they plotted to rob Francisco Oquendo-Nieves, who was shot and killed by

Serrano-Torres during the course of that robbery. Appellant and Serrano-

Torres were tried by a jury on August 6 and 7, 2013. At the conclusion J-S31015-15

thereof, Appellant was found guilty of the above-stated offenses.1 Appellant

was sentenced that same day to life imprisonment for his second-degree

murder conviction. He also received concurrent terms of five to ten years’

incarceration for his robbery conviction, five to ten years’ incarceration for

his criminal conspiracy conviction, and one to two years’ incarceration for his

false reports conviction.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. However, Appellant’s counsel

did not timely file a docketing statement as required by Pa.R.A.P. 3517.

Accordingly, on October 31, 2013, this Court issued a per curiam order

dismissing Appellant’s appeal.

Appellant filed a timely pro se petition for relief under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, alleging, inter alia,

that his appellate counsel was ineffective for allowing his direct appeal to be

dismissed. Appellant sought the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights

nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended

petition on Appellant’s behalf. On September 2, 2014, the PCRA court

issued an order reinstating Appellant’s direct appeal rights. Appellant, who

is still represented by his post-conviction counsel, filed a nunc pro tunc

notice of appeal on September 22, 2014. He then timely complied with the

____________________________________________

1 Serrano-Torres was also convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, and carrying firearm without a license.

-2- J-S31015-15

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Herein, he raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in his representation of [] Appellant?

2. Whether the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial to establish each element of the crimes?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In Appellant’s first issue, he alleges that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to call witnesses on his behalf. We cannot review

Appellant’s claim, as this is his direct appeal. In Commonwealth v.

Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior

holding in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), that,

generally, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to

PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon

post-verdict motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct

appeal.” Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576. We acknowledge that the Holmes Court

created two limited exceptions to Grant: first, for “extraordinary circumstances,” [Holmes, 79 A.3d] at 577, “where the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, determines that a claim (or claims) of ineffectiveness is both meritorious and apparent from the record so that immediate consideration and relief is warranted,” id.; and, second, for “good cause,” permitting review of “multiple, and indeed comprehensive, ineffectiveness claims if such review is accompanied by a waiver of PCRA rights appropriately tailored ...,” id. at 578.

Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 763 n.7 (Pa. 2013).

-3- J-S31015-15

Here, Appellant did not raise his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

until he filed his Rule 1925(b) statement; therefore, the trial court did not

have the opportunity to determine if his assertion “is both meritorious and

apparent from the record so that immediate consideration and relief is

warranted....” Holmes, 79 A.3d at 577. Additionally, there is no indication

in the record that Appellant waived his PCRA rights. Accordingly, Appellant

must wait to raise his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness until PCRA

review.

In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the Commonwealth did not

present sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 132-133 (Pa. Super 2012)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Quel, 27 A.3d 1033, 1037-1038 (Pa. Super.

-4- J-S31015-15

2011)).

In the present case, we begin by noting that in Appellant’s statement

of the issue, he claims to be challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain all of his convictions. However, his discussion involves only the

adequacy of the evidence to support his conviction of second-degree

murder. Specifically, Appellant contends that “no witness identified [him] as

the shooter/killer[,]” and “there was no evidence or testimony provided at

trial that proved [] Appellant knew or conspired with his co-defendant to

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