Com. v. Dridi, M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided June 23, 2020·No. 723 EDA 2019·Unpublished

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MOHAMED DRIDI :

:

Appellant : No. 723 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 23, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008768-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2020 Mohamed Dridi (Dridi) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on January 23, 2019, by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) following his jury trial convictions for one count of disseminating child pornography, fifteen counts of possession of child pornography, and one count of criminal use of a communication facility.1 Dridi challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant. We affirm.

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(c), 6312(d), & 7512(a).

I.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. On April 10, 2016, Special Agent Eric Barlow (Agent Barlow) of the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (OAG) utilized the office’s peer-to-peer file sharing program to download a file containing known child pornography. Agent Barlow identified the Internet Protocol (IP) address that had shared the file and obtained a subpoena for the subscriber information. Verizon’s records indicated that Dridi was the owner of the IP address and provided his address. The OAG confirmed through PennDOT and other records that Dridi was the resident of the address in question.

Subsequently, on August 2, 2016, Agent Barlow applied for a search warrant for the address. In the Affidavit of Probable Cause (Affidavit) attached to the search warrant application,2 Agent Barlow described his investigation in detail. He explained that peer-to-peer file sharing programs “allow groups of computers, using the same file sharing network and protocols, to transfer digital files from one computer system to another while connected to a network, usually on the Internet.” Affidavit at 1. The peer-to-peer file sharing programs allow users to make their digital libraries available to other users and are commonly used to disseminate child pornography. Id. Peer-to-peer

2The full search warrant and Affidavit was attached as Exhibit B to Dridi’s Motion to Suppress. See Motion to Suppress, 8/14/17, Exhibit B.

file sharing programs can download a single file from multiple computers; however, the program used by the OAG downloads an entire file from a single computer and identifies that device’s IP address for investigation. Id. at 2.

During his investigation, Agent Barlow made a direct connection to a device at an identified IP address and downloaded a file containing child pornography. Id. at 3. The device was using uTorrent 3.4 software to share the file. Id. Agent Barlow’s software logged the start and end time for the download, the file name and size, and the IP address for the computer sharing the file. Agent Barlow then used the American Registry of Internet Numbers to determine that the IP address was provided by Verizon and issued a subpoena for the subscriber information. As noted above, Verizon complied with the subpoena and identified Dridi as the subscriber and provided his home address and contact information.

The Affidavit further explained that files may be stored in “free space or slack space” on a hard drive long after it has been deleted by a user, and a computer may also keep records of deleted data and files that were viewed through the internet. Id. at 4. Thus, it is possible for investigators to recover files and data that had been deleted or viewed months or years prior. Id. Agent Barlow averred that “searching computerized information for evidence or instrumentalities of crime commonly requires investigators to seize all of a computer system’s input/output peripheral devices, related software, documentation, and data security devices (including passwords) so that a

qualified computer expert can accurately retrieve the system’s data in a laboratory or other controlled environment.” Id. at 5. It was necessary to search not just computers, but all magnetic storage devices, external storage devices, and “computing systems sometimes referred to as central processing units (CPU).” Id.

Based on all of this information, the application for the search warrant specified the items to be searched for and seized as follows:

All computer hardware, including, but not limited to, any equipment which can collect, analyze, create, display, convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic, optical or similar computer impulses or data. Any computer processing units, internal and peripheral storage devices (such as fixed disks, external hard disks, discs, backup media, flash media, and optical storage devices), peripheral input/output devices (such as keyboards, printers, scanners, video displays, switches, and disc/media readers), and related communication devices such as network/internet devices, cables, and connections, recording equipment, as well as any devices, mechanisms, or parts that can be used to restrict access to computer hardware. These items will be seized and then later searched for evidence relating to the possession and/or distribution of child pornography.

Search Warrant, 8/2/16, at 1-2. Agents from the OAG executed the search warrant and seized three laptop computers and four cell phones3 from the residence. These items were seized from a room in the house that Dridi identified to agents as his bedroom.

3 These cell phones were all smartphones. “A smartphone is a modern day cellular telephone with computer-like capabilities.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 136 A.3d 170, 171 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Videos, images, internet search history terms, and other indicia of child pornography were recovered from one of the laptops and three of the cell phones. Several of the images of child pornography were synced across multiple cell phones through a shared Gmail account. The laptop identified Dridi as the system owner, with “Ali PC” as the laptop name and “Ali” as the username. The laptop also contained a picture of Dridi’s green card and Social Security card. All images and videos were located in “unallocated space” on the devices, indicating that the user had deleted the files from the allocated space on the devices but they had been retained elsewhere by the system. The uTorrent 3.4 software that uploaded the video in April 2016 was not found on any of the devices.

Following a jury trial, Dridi was found guilty of the above-mentioned crimes. After a presentence investigation and report, the trial court sentenced Dridi to an aggregate of five to ten years’ incarceration, followed by seven years of probation. Dridi timely filed a notice of appeal, and he and the trial court have complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925.

II.

On appeal, Dridi raises two claims of error regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress:

1. Did not the suppression court err in denying [Dridi’s] motion to suppress evidence where the search warrant lacked the constitutionally required particularity as it authorized only the seizure of computers and related hardware but never mentioned cell phones?

2. Did not the suppression court err in denying [Dridi’s] motion to suppress physical evidence where the search warrant did not contain probable cause to seize cell phones?

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Com. v. Dridi, M., (Pa. Ct. App. 2020).

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