Com. v. Denison, R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 471 WDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Ford Elliott

Opinion

J-S36043-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ROBERT LEE DENISON : : Appellant : No. 471 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0001075-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: January 21, 2026

Appellant, Robert Lee Denison, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County after a trial court found

him guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), driving an unregistered

vehicle, and careless driving.1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence,

the weight of evidence, and the denial of his suppression motion regarding his

DUI conviction. Upon review, we affirm in part and vacate in part, vacating

only Appellant’s sentence for his failure to use a seatbelt conviction.2

On March 5, 2023, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Pennsylvania State

Police Trooper Creston Jenkins and his partner were on patrol in a police car ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1), 1301(a), and 3714(a), respectively.

2 See 75 Pa.C.S. § 4581(a)(2)(ii). J-S36043-25

around Altoona, Pennsylvania. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 3/27/24, at 4.

Trooper Jenkins noticed a vehicle coming too close to the curb and then it

swerved back onto the roadway. See id. He conducted a record check on the

vehicle, and its registration came back expired. See id. Upon receiving that

information, Trooper Jenkins turned on his car’s lights and siren to conduct a

traffic stop. See id.

Appellant drove past several places he could have pulled off before

making a right turn on a two-lane street. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 13. He

pulled up to a stop sign and then stopped in the middle of the road. See id.

at 14. Trooper Jenkins exited his car and approached the driver’s side of the

vehicle. See id. at 15. While talking to Appellant, Trooper Jenkins noticed he

had a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, a slight slur of speech, and his

eyes looked glassy. See id. at 15-16. Trooper Jenkins requested Appellant to

get out of his vehicle, which he did. See id. at 16.

Appellant was able to complete the first field-sobriety test; however,

Appellant had a cane and stated he could not perform a one-legged turn or

walk due to medical reasons. See id. at 17. Appellant told Trooper Jenkins he

was coming from home and then corrected himself and said he came from a

bar. See id. at 19. Appellant reported he had three drinks and was additionally

confused about his vehicle registration being expired, thinking it was his

vehicle inspection sticker. See id. at 20-21. Since Appellant was unable to

perform the standard field sobriety test, Trooper Jenkins told Appellant he was

going to be taken to a nearby hospital for a blood draw. See id.

-2- J-S36043-25

When Appellant got in the police car, Appellant apparently assumed he

was going to jail. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 21. Appellant randomly laughed

and sporadically changed his behavior throughout the short ride. See id. at

23. Trooper Jenkins asked Appellant for his phone number, which he could not

remember. See id. at 24. After they arrived at the hospital, Trooper Jenkins

read Appellant a DL-26B form, complying with the law to read the form’s four

designated lines to someone from whom the police were trying to collect

blood. See id. at 26-27; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit 2 (DL-26B Form).3

Appellant refused to let the troopers take his blood, and repeatedly said he

wanted to speak to an attorney. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 28.

After his refusal for the blood draw, Appellant agreed to have the

troopers take him home. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 30. However, he

struggled to explain where he lived and began to sing “God Bless America”

during the ride. See id. at 30, 41. The troopers passed Appellant’s vehicle,

and Appellant failed to comprehend why they left his vehicle, asking the

troopers to write down the location. See id. at 31-32, 40. Originally, Appellant

told the troopers the wrong home address but eventually corrected himself

and he was dropped off at his home. See id. at 29, 43.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with driving under the influence,

careless driving, driving an unregistered vehicle, and not wearing a seatbelt.

____________________________________________

3 See 75 Pa.C.S § 1547(b)(2) (stating “duty of police officer” to inform individual of the consequences of blood draw refusal).

-3- J-S36043-25

See Criminal Complaint, 4/20/23. On August 2, 2024, Appellant filed a motion

to suppress, alleging that there was no probable cause for the troopers to

conduct the traffic stop. See Motion to Suppress, 8/2/23. A hearing was held

on March 27, 2024, where Trooper Jenkins testified. See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 3/27/24, at 1-13. Afterwards, the suppression court denied

Appellant’s motion. See Order and Opinion (denying motion to suppress),

4/2/24. Appellant requested a non-jury trial. See Order, 5/28/24, at 1 (stating

trial court will schedule half-day bench trial).

On October 2, 2024, Appellant proceeded to trial where Trooper Jenkins

again testified. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 1-43. The Commonwealth provided

evidence that Appellant’s vehicle registration expired in November 2022. See

id. at 10-11 (establishing Appellant’s vehicle registration was almost four

months expired); Commonwealth Trial Exhibit 1 (Certified Vehicle

Registration). The Commonwealth also provided dashcam footage that

recorded video of the front of the trooper’s car and recorded audio inside the

car. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 34-35; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit 3 (MVR

Footage). Appellant chose to testify and was cross-examined by the

Commonwealth. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 61-71. The trial court found

Appellant guilty of three out of the four charges and ordered a pre-sentence

investigation report. See id. at 89-90.

On January 8, 2025, Appellant was sentenced to six months of probation

for his DUI conviction and fines and court fees for his summary offense

convictions. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 1/8/25, at 2-3; Order of Sentence,

-4- J-S36043-25

1/8/25, at 1-2. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, challenging the

weight and sufficiency of the trial evidence, which the trial court denied. See

Post-Sentencing Motion, 1/10/25, ¶¶ 3-4; Order and Opinion (denying post-

sentence motion), 4/1/25. Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely notice of

appeal, and he and the court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925. See Notice of Appeal, 4/21/25, at 2; Concise Statement of

Matters Complained Upon Appeal, 4/30/25; Rule 1925(b) Opinion, 5/19/25.4

Appellant raises the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the trial court’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence[,] as no evidence was provided to show that [Appellant] was incapable of safe driving[?]

II. Whether the trial court’s verdict was sufficient to support the conviction in light of the fact that there was no evidence that [Appellant] was incapable of safe driving[?]

III. Whether the trial court erred by denying the pre-trial [m]otion to [s]uppress based upon the lack of probable cause to initiate the traffic stop[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

First, we will address Appellant’s sufficiency issue as a grant of relief on

that claim negates any remand on the remaining claims presented. See

4 Three different judges presided over the various proceedings which included

the suppression hearing, the trial, the sentencing hearing, and the denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion. See Appellant’s Brief at 8. The Rule 1925(b) opinion prepared by the trial judge incorporated the order and opinion of the suppression court and the order and opinion of post-sentence court. See Rule 1925(b) Opinion, 5/19/25, at 3; see also Order and Opinion (denying motion to suppress), 5/6/24; Order and Opinion (denying post- sentence motion), 4/1/25.

-5- J-S36043-25

Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 33 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)

(“Because a successful sufficiency of the evidence claim warrants discharge

on the pertinent crime, we must address this issue first.”). Appellant argues

that since he refused blood alcohol testing, the only evidence the

Commonwealth could provide to prove incapacity to drive is testimony about

his driving. See Appellant’s Brief at 19.

Our standard of review for a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain a criminal conviction is well-settled:

We must determine whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder unless it is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 889-90 (Pa. Super. 2011).

To sustain a conviction for DUI-general impairment, the Commonwealth

must establish that the defendant was: (1) operating a motor vehicle; and (2)

did so after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that he was rendered

incapable of safely operating a vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Clemens,

-6- J-S36043-25

242 A.3d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. 2020); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). Our

sufficiency standard of review applies equally where the Commonwealth’s

evidence is circumstantial. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d

1217, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2018). In Commonwealth v. Luberto, our Court

stated that, to sustain a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), the

Commonwealth may rely on the totality of the circumstances, including “[the

defendant’s] actions and behavior, including manner of driving and ability to

pass field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the investigating officer;

physical appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of

intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech.” Commonwealth v.

Luberto, 344 A.3d 41, 47 (Pa. Super. 2025) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa. 2009)).

Appellant argues that he displayed no observable indications of

intoxication while operating his car. See Appellant’s Brief at 17. He suggests

that Trooper Jenkins only testified about his behavior and attitude, in order to

claim that he was incapable of safe driving. See id. He avers that the only

evidence suggesting he was unfit to drive was his expired vehicle registration.

See id. at 18. Therefore, he reasons that the trial court abused its discretion

by overlooking the evidence presented and concluding that he was incapable

of safe driving. See id. at 20. As a result, he asserts there was insufficient

evidence to sustain his DUI conviction. See id. We disagree.

Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the

Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction

-7- J-S36043-25

under Section 3802(a)(1). See Order and Opinion (denying post-sentence

motion), 4/1/25, at 3-4; Clemons, supra. Trooper Jenkins observed

Appellant’s vehicle drift close to the curb before swerving back to the roadway,

prompting a traffic stop after a record check revealed his expired vehicle

registration. See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 7-10. After Appellant failed to

immediately stop, he stopped in the middle of the roadway. See id. at 14.

Furthermore, Trooper Jenkins detected a strong odor of alcohol on Appellant

and observed that he had glassy eyes and slurred speech. See id. at 16, 31;

Luberto, supra. Appellant refused to have his blood drawn. See N.T. Trial,

10/2/24, at 28; Mobley, supra. Then, Appellant was unable to recall his own

phone number, and exhibited confusion when troopers passed his parked

vehicle, asking them to write down its location. See id. at 24, 29-31. During

that ride, Appellant made erratic statements, inexplicably sang “God Bless

America,” and initially provided the troopers with an incorrect home address.

See N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 30-31. Therefore, viewed in the most favorable

light to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence here supported

the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant was substantially impaired by alcohol

and incapable of safe driving. See Opinion and Order (denying post-sentence

motion), 4/1/25, at 4; 1925(b) Opinion, 5/19/25, at 2.

In his next issue, Appellant challenges the weight of evidence. See

Appellant’s Brief at 10. When reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial

based on the weight of the evidence, we apply the following standard of

review:

-8- J-S36043-25

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

Any conflicts in the evidence or contradictions in testimony are

exclusively for the fact-finder to resolve. See Commonwealth v. Roane, 204

A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019). Our Court gives great deference to the trial

court’s decision regarding the weight of evidence because it had the

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented. See Commonwealth v.

Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. 2018). Furthermore, “[i]n order for

a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of evidence, the evidence

must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks the

conscience of the court.” See Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301,

311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

Appellant avers that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence

because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that he was incapable

of safe driving. See Appellant’s Brief at 10. In doing so, Appellant relies on

-9- J-S36043-25

the same reasoning as his argument for challenging the sufficiency of

evidence. See id. at 17-18. He concludes that his guilty verdict for DUI was

against the weight of the evidence and would shock a reasonable person’s

conscience, given the lack of substantiating evidence from the

Commonwealth. See id. at 18-19.

Here, Appellant conflates weight and sufficiency of the evidence by

addressing a lack of evidence, which is the focus of a sufficiency challenge,

rather than assessing the credibility of the testimony presented by the

Commonwealth, which is the focus of a weight challenge. See

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-53 (Pa. 2000) (explaining

distinctions between claim challenging sufficiency of evidence and claim

challenging weight of evidence). Appellant’s entire argument for his weight

claim is unavailing because a weight claim concedes that the Commonwealth

presented sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. See Commonwealth

v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2022). Therefore, Appellant’s

weight claim alleging the lack of evidence to sustain the DUI conviction is

meritless. See Commonwealth v. Mead, 326 A.3d 1006, 1012 (Pa. Super.

2024) (addressing Mead’s claim that verdict was against the weight of the

evidence as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence where Mead’s

argument was there was insufficient evidence to prove the elements of the

offense).

Even if we construed Appellant’s instant claim as a weight challenge, it

still lacks merit. The trial court explained that, while Appellant’s trial testimony

- 10 - J-S36043-25

sought to explain his impairment, it is the sole discretion of the fact-finder to

determine the credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence procedure. See

Opinion and Order (denying post-sentence motion), 4/1/25, at 4; 1925(b)

Opinion, 5/19/25, at 2. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his

weight claim. See Cramer, supra.

In his final issue, Appellant argues that the suppression court erred by

denying his motion to suppress based upon the lack of probable cause to

initiate a traffic stop. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. Our review of “a challenge

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth

v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010). Our Court is limited to reviewing

“[o]nly the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.” Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208

A.3d 497, 499 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “It is within the

suppression court’s sole province as fact[-]finder to pass on the credibility of

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The suppression court

is free to believe all, some[,] or none of the evidence presented at the

suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Duke, 208 A.3d 465, 470 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “This Court is bound by the suppression

court’s factual findings that are supported by the record, but we are not bound

by its legal conclusions, which we review de novo.” Commonwealth v.

Camacho, 325 A.3d 685, 689 (Pa. Super. 2024).

- 11 - J-S36043-25

Appellant argues that the troopers did not have probable cause for a

traffic stop to be initiated. See Appellant’s Brief at 23. Specifically, Appellant

argues that the troopers were not on a special duty vehicle safety check, nor

was he violating any traffic laws. See Appellant’s Brief at 23. He contends that

Trooper Jenkins testified that, although his driving was the initial reason for

the stop, during the suppression hearing, Trooper Jenkins indicated that the

reason for the stop was only the expired registration, not his driving. See id.

Based on the testimony of the trooper at both the suppression hearing and at

trial, Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth lacked probable cause to

initiate the traffic stop and therefore all evidence found after the initiation of

the stop must be suppressed. See id. at 24. Without that evidence, he argues

the charges against him must be dismissed. See id. We disagree.

A police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he has

reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code has

taken place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary information to enforce the

provisions of the code. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). However, if the violation requires

no additional investigation, the officer must have probable cause to initiate

the stop. See Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 312 (Pa. Super.

2023); (citing Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super.

2010) (en banc)).

Upon review of the suppression hearing testimony, we agree with the

court’s finding that the car stop was properly conducted based on Appellant’s

violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1301(a), driving an unregistered vehicle, after some

- 12 - J-S36043-25

observed careless driving.5 See Order and Opinion (denying motion to

suppress), 5/6/24, at 4-5. Trooper Jenkins testified that he initially observed

Appellant’s vehicle swerving outside its lane of travel and almost hit a curb.

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 3/27/24, at 4. As a result of these

observations, Trooper Jenkins followed Appellant’s vehicle and ran his

registration. See id. Upon learning Appellant’s vehicle registration expired

almost four months prior, he initiated a traffic stop. See id. Accordingly,

Trooper Jenkins had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle. See

Commonwealth v. Richards, 238 A.3d 522, 527 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(concluding that police had probable cause to conduct traffic stop upon

discovering Richards’ car was unregistered after the officer checked the

registration status after observing Richards’ failure to use a turn signal and

the officer did not activate his lights and siren until he learned that the vehicle

was unregistered). Therefore, Appellant’s third claim is meritless.

Although Appellant does not raise any issue concerning the legality of

his sentence, we note that the trial court found him not guilty of the summary

offense of driving without a seatbelt, see N.T. Trial, 10/2/24, at 89; Order

(verdict), 10/2/24, at 1, but nevertheless still sentenced him for that offense

by ordering him to pay prosecution costs and a ten-dollar fine. See N.T.

5 Section 1301(a) states: “No person shall drive or move[,] and no owner or

motor carrier shall knowingly permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle which is not registered in this Commonwealth unless the vehicle is exempt from registration.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1301(a).

- 13 - J-S36043-25

Sentencing Hearing, 1/8/25, at 3; Order of Sentence, 1/8/25, at 2. Because

an illegal sentence may be corrected sua sponte, we must vacate the seatbelt

offense sentence as illegal where it is not supported by a related guilty verdict.

See Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“[A]

challenge to the legality of the sentence can never be waived and may be

raised by this Court sua sponte.”). Since this correction does not disturb the

trial court’s sentencing scheme, no remand for resentencing is required. See

Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569-70 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(explaining that an appellate court need not remand for resentencing when it

can vacate illegal sentence without upsetting trial court's overall sentencing

scheme). Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence

imposing a ten-dollar fine and court fines for the summary offense of driving

without a seatbelt and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Judgment of sentence with respect to “Count 4, Failure to Use Safety

Belt,” vacated. Judgment of sentence affirmed in all other respects.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

- 14 - J-S36043-25

DATE: 1/21/2026

- 15 -