Com. v. Camacho, C.

2024 Pa. Super. 204, 325 A.3d 685

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 10, 2024
• Docket: 62 EDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-S25010-24

2024 PA Super 204

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CARLOS ANDRES CAMACHO : : Appellant : No. 62 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000458-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2024

Carlos Camacho (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

of 4½ to 10 years’ incarceration imposed after the court found him guilty of

one count each of Persons Not To Possess Firearms, Firearms Not To Be

Carried Without A License, Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement, Simple

Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Possession of a Small

Amount of Marijuana for Personal Use, Use or Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia, Driving While Operating Privilege is Suspended or Revoked,

Driving Within Single Lane, Turning Movements and Required Signals, and

Careless Driving.1 He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress,

asserting that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not supported by

exigent circumstances. After careful review, we reverse the order denying ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 5104, 2701(a)(1), and 2705; 35 P.S.

§§ 780-113(a)(31) and 780-113(a)(32); and 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543(a), 3309(1), 3334(a), and 3714(a), respectively. J-S25010-24

suppression, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for further

proceedings.

A. We glean the following relevant background from the certified record,

including the audio/videotape recorded by the police vehicle’s dash camera.

On October 9, 2020, Pennsylvania State Troopers Steven Gentile and Richard

Sentak were patrolling on Route 13 in Bucks County when they observed

Appellant driving erratically, including by driving along the right shoulder for

an extended period of time, straddling the center line, and nearly colliding

with another vehicle as he pulled onto Route 63-Woodhaven Road. The

troopers turned on their vehicle’s overhead lights to signal Appellant to pull

over. Appellant continued to drive for two- to three-tenths of a mile during

which time the troopers observed him moving within the car and hunching

over at one point.

After Appellant pulled his vehicle onto the shoulder, Trooper Gentile

approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and noticed the smell of alcohol

and marijuana. He asked Appellant for his driver’s license, and Appellant told

him he did not have one. At the same time, Trooper Sentak approached the

passenger side where Appellant’s girlfriend, Rasheeda Clark, was sitting in the

front seat. Trooper Sentak noticed through the passenger window that

Appellant had an empty firearm holster attached to his ankle. When Trooper

Gentile asked Appellant if there were any weapons in the vehicle, Appellant

-2- J-S25010-24

replied that there were none. Trooper Gentile directed Appellant to exit the

vehicle, and he complied while Trooper Sentak remained outside the

passenger side of the car. Trooper Gentile conducted a pat-down search and

felt a small tubular object in Appellant’s pocket. When Trooper Gentile asked

what it was, Appellant pulled it out of his pocket and said it was marijuana.

During the pat-down, Trooper Gentile also found the empty ankle holster

strapped to Appellant’s leg and asked where the gun was. Appellant said,

“there is no gun.” N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 23.

At that point, Trooper Gentile told Appellant that he was detaining him

for marijuana possession. When the troopers began to pull Appellant’s arm

behind his back to handcuff him, Appellant struggled and grabbed onto the

open car door. Trooper Gentile then pulled Appellant backwards out of the

car and onto the ground, and both troopers rolled on the ground to the front

of the car where Appellant tried to get away. At the same time, Trooper

Gentile yelled at Ms. Clark to keep her hands visible, and she complied. An

off-duty police officer passing by noticed the scuffle and pulled over to assist.

After several minutes, the three officers were able to put two sets of handcuffs

on Appellant, and Trooper Sentak relayed into the radio that they had “one

detained.” Suppression Hr’g-Video CD, Ex. CS 1, at 9:28.

Trooper Sentak and the off-duty police officer detained Appellant on the

ground, and other police officers and state troopers arrived on the scene.

Trooper Gentile went to the passenger side, instructed Ms. Clark to get out of

-3- J-S25010-24

the vehicle, told her she was being detained, put handcuffs on her, and placed

her in the back of the troopers’ vehicle.

While Appellant remained handcuffed on the ground surrounded by at

least three police officers, Trooper Gentile searched under and around the

driver’s seat and recovered a firearm with a loaded magazine. The officers

put Appellant into a Bensalem Police vehicle, and Trooper Gentile continued

his search of the car, joined by other troopers. At one point, there were a

total of eight officers at the scene. See, e.g., Ex. CS 1 at 26:47. When

Trooper Gentile was finishing up the search, one of the troopers asked if a tow

truck was coming, to which Trooper Gentile replied, “Yeah,” and then said to

the trooper, “Let us know when the tow comes.” Id. at 26:07, 28:09. Trooper

Gentile and the Bensalem Police Officers then transported Appellant and Ms.

Clark to law enforcement headquarters.

B.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the above offenses.

Appellant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress claiming, inter alia,

that Trooper Gentile did not prove the existence of exigent circumstances to

justify the warrantless search of his vehicle. The court held a hearing on

August 27, 2021, where both Trooper Gentile and Trooper Sentak testified.

Trooper Gentile testified that even after Appellant was handcuffed, he “was

still trying to get up and pull away from officers that were holding him.” N.T.

Suppression at 29. When asked about the option of having the vehicle towed

-4- J-S25010-24

to obtain a warrant before a search could be conducted, Trooper Gentile

testified that Appellant’s empty holster suggested the presence of a firearm

within the vehicle, which could “accidentally discharge causing potential injury

to anyone.” Id. at 31. Trooper Gentile testified that he rejected the

alternative of waiting with the vehicle while another trooper secured a

warrant, stating: “that couldn’t be feasible because it would be a handcuffed

individual in a vehicle with a suspected firearm on the side of a main road.”

Id. at 31-32. The court denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on September 1, 2021, after which

the court found him guilty of each charge. The court imposed an aggregate

sentence of 4½ to 10 years’ incarceration, 7 years of probation to run

concurrently with the incarceration, and one year of probation to run

consecutive to the term of incarceration.

Following the reinstatement of his appellate rights, Appellant filed this

timely appeal on December 22, 2023. Both Appellant and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

C.

Appellant presents the following issue for this Court’s review:

Did the lower court err in denying the pre-trial motion to suppress, when it found that exigent circumstances existed for the search of [Appellant’s] vehicle?

Appellant’s Br. at 3.

-5- J-S25010-24

D. Appellant argues that the search of his vehicle was not supported by

exigent circumstances and, therefore, the court erred in denying his motion

to suppress. Our review of “a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion

is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010).

We may only review “the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when

examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.” Commonwealth v.

Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 499 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “It is within

the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The suppression

court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence presented at the

suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 185 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (citation omitted). This Court is bound by the suppression

court’s factual findings that are supported by the record, but we are not bound

by its legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Commonwealth v.

Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 320-21 (Pa. 2011).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens against

unreasonable searches and seizures. This protection requires police to obtain

a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate before conducting a search,

-6- J-S25010-24

unless an exception applies. Commonwealth v. Perry, 798 A.2d 697, 699-

700 (Pa. 2002) (OAJC); see also Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d

609, 625 (Pa. 2017) (observing that “a search without a warrant may be

proper where an exception applies and the police have probable cause to

believe a crime has been or is being committed.”) (citation omitted)). In

December 2020, the Supreme Court overruled prior precedent, rejected the

federal automobile exception, and reasserted that “the Pennsylvania

Constitution requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent

circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile.”

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 181 (Pa. 2020).2 Under

Alexander, “[o]btaining a warrant is the default rule. If an officer proceeds

to conduct a warrantless search, a reviewing court will be required to

determine whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the officer’s

judgment that obtaining a warrant was not reasonably practicable.”

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 208 (Pa. 2020) (emphasis in

original).

The Supreme Court has identified several types of exigent

circumstances, including situations “where the police must search in order to

____________________________________________

2 Although the search in the instant case occurred two months prior to Alexander, because Appellant preserved the issue of exigent circumstances at “all stages of adjudication up to and including the direct appeal[,]” Alexander is applicable. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 780 A.2d 649, 652 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).

-7- J-S25010-24

avoid danger to themselves or others[,]” such as “where police had reason to

believe that explosives were present in the vehicle.” Perry, 798 A.2d at 701

(citation omitted).

In Perry, the Supreme Court agreed with this Court that exigent

circumstances justified the warrantless search of a vehicle. There, a witness

informed a police officer that individuals in a white Lexus had shot at him and

his passenger in his car moments earlier. Shortly thereafter, police officers

spotted the Lexus and a pursuit ensued. Police officers ultimately stopped the

vehicle in the middle of a street. Without directing the driver to turn the

engine off, police officers asked the suspects to step out of the car. The

officers frisked them and found no weapons. Within 15 minutes, a police

officer brought the witness to the stopped vehicle who, after seeing the

suspects, proclaimed, “that’s them and they have two guns.” Perry, 798 A.2d

at 698. The officers handcuffed the suspects and placed them in a police

vehicle. The witness informed police that at least one of the guns appeared

to be an automatic weapon. After the police lieutenant arrived at the scene

and heard the witness’s statement, he directed the police officers to search

the vehicle. Officers recovered two firearms from under the car mats. The

vehicle was then towed and no further search of the vehicle occurred.

In affirming this Court’s determination that the warrantless search was

justified, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the totality of the

circumstances, including that the car was left running in the middle of the

-8- J-S25010-24

street and the “fragile” nature of the purported automatic weapon that posed

“an immediate threat to any officer who attempted to move the vehicle,”

supported the warrantless search. Id. at 703. See also id. at 706 (Castille,

J., concurring); id. at 719 (Saylor, J., concurring).

In Commonwealth v. Gelineau, 696 A.2d 188, 191, 194 (Pa. Super.

1997), this Court affirmed the grant of a suppression motion where, at the

time of the vehicle search, there were no “exigent circumstances, such as

danger to the police or the public,” because “the vehicle was in the control of

the officers,” the passengers were handcuffed and had not resisted arrest, and

the evidence under the hood of the car “could not have been destroyed while

one of the three officers on the scene obtained a search warrant.” Id.

E.

In the case now before us, the suppression court concluded that the

search of the vehicle “was supported by probable cause and exigent

circumstances existed.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/23/24, at 9. The court observed that

whether the vehicle remained on the side of the road or was towed, the need

to protect the public and police officers from a firearm provided an exception

to the warrant requirement. Id. at 11. In support, the court noted that the

traffic stop was valid and the totality of the circumstances provided the officers

with probable cause that criminal activity was afoot, specifically because

Appellant failed to immediately pull over when signaled, hunched over the

driver’s seat prior to and after stopping the vehicle, had an empty gun holster

-9- J-S25010-24

strapped to his ankle, tried to get back in the car after Trooper Gentile told

him he was detaining him, and then continued to resist arrest and try to get

away, even when he was on the ground and handcuffed. Finally, the court

credited Trooper Gentile’s testimony that there was “no plausible way to

maintain the vehicle until a warrant could be obtained.” Id.

Appellant contends that the Court erred by denying his motion to

suppress because “[t]he representations of Trooper Gentile explaining why he

searched the car without waiting for a warrant and without knowing the basis

for his assertions are insufficient to demonstrate the existence of exigent

circumstances for searching [Appellant’s] vehicle.” Appellant’s Br. at 15.

After reviewing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing,

including the videotape, we conclude that the exigent circumstances in the

form of danger to the police or public was no longer an issue at the time

Trooper Gentile conducted the warrantless search. The vehicle was parked on

the right side of a very wide shoulder. Neither Appellant—who was on the

ground in two sets of handcuffs and surrounded by three officers—nor Ms.

Clark—who was handcuffed in the back of the troopers’ vehicle—could have

accessed the vehicle. The fact that Appellant resisted arrest at some point is

not relevant to whether at the time of the search the police officers or the

public were in danger. In fact, the danger had ended when Appellant and Ms.

Clark were detained and no longer able to access the vehicle. Thus, as in

- 10 - J-S25010-24

Gelineau, supra, the need for officer safety no longer provided an exception

to the warrant requirement.

In addition, there is no evidence to support the court’s conclusion that

there was “no plausible way to maintain the vehicle until a warrant could be

obtained.” Trial Ct. Op., at 11. We disagree for several reasons. First,

Appellant’s vehicle was parked off the road on a wide shoulder and thus, not

interfering with the flow of traffic. See Ex. CS 1 at 2:16. Additionally, there

were at least six law enforcement officers at the scene and they discussed the

towing of Appellant’s vehicle. See, e.g., Ex. CS 1 at 26:07, 26:47, and 28:09.

Thus, there was sufficient personnel to wait with the vehicle while officers

obtained a search warrant.

Accordingly, we reverse the suppression court’s order, vacate

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand to the trial court for further

Suppression order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case

remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 9/10/2024

- 11 -