Com. v. Conaway, S.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

SYLVESTER KLINE CONAWAY JR. :

:

Appellant : No. 1432 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000296-2024

BEFORE: SULLIVAN, J., NEUMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: August 25, 2026

Appellant, Sylvester Kline Conaway Jr., appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 22 to 48 years’ incarceration,

imposed after a jury convicted him of third-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. §

2502(c), aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), and tampering with

physical evidence, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4910(1). After careful review, we affirm.

Following a jury trial in August of 2025, Appellant was convicted of the

above-stated offenses based on evidence he stabbed Joshua Kelly and Shawn

Hriscisce. Hriscisce died at the scene of the stabbing, while Kelly survived.

On August 18, 2025, Appellant was sentenced to 20 to 40 years’ incarceration

for his murder conviction, and a consecutive term of 2 to 8 years’ incarceration

for his aggravated assault conviction. No further penalty was imposed for his

crime of tampering with evidence.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied on

September 22, 2025. He did not file a timely appeal. However, on October

27, 2025, Appellant filed a motion seeking to appeal nunc pro tunc. The court

granted that motion by order entered October 28, 2025. Appellant filed a

nunc pro tunc appeal on November 5, 2025. He and the court thereafter

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Herein, Appellant states five issues for our review, which we reorder for

ease of disposition:

I. Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts?

II. Whether the verdicts were contrary to the weight of [t]he evidence?

III. Whether the court erred in denying the pre-trial suppression motion of Appellant’s statements made to the police after he was taken into custody?

IV. Whether the court erred in allowing … Appellant’s statements to be admitted into evidence at trial ([via] video)?

V. Whether the trial coiurt [sic] erred in allowing photograph[s]

of the victim to be admitted and shown to the jury because the photograph[s were] more prejudicial than probative?

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant first argues the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault. See Appellant’s

Brief at 23. Initially, we observe:

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge presents a question of law. Our standard of review is de novo,

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and our scope of review is plenary. In conducting our inquiry, we examine[,]

whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, [is] sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence. For purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(cleaned up).

Here, the trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s

trial, as follows:

The Commonwealth’s first witness … was Susan Griffith, an employee of Fayette County Emergency Management. … Griffith produced a report of the 911 call, which was received on January 23, 2024.

Next, Paul Pellick, the assistant chief of the Grindstone Volunteer Fire Department, testified that rescue vehicles responded to 529 Hilltop Road, Grindstone, Fayette County, Pennsylvania, where a victim was stabbed and [had] died before the first emergency personnel could arrive to the scene[,] despite responding in three minutes.

Eric McFeely was called as a witness and stated he overheard an escalating altercation become physical[,] with a woman[’s] exclaiming that a male had a knife. … McFeely called 911 after he saw Hriscisce walk through the front door with a stab wound to his chest.

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Nathan Musisko affirmed he tried to save Hriscisce, but Hriscisce died from a stab wound to his chest.

Joshua Kelly asserted Hriscisce was already at the scene when Appellant arrived … that night. … Kelly testified only Appellant fought with Hriscisce on the porch when [Hriscisce] was stabbed in the chest. … Kelly also affirmed he tried to save Hriscisce.

Heather Hollis said there was an argument over money and Appellant was asked to leave when she saw a knife in his hand.

Emmanuel Jordan … knew and identified Appellant. Jordan indicated he went with Appellant to the scene to acquire drugs that night. Jordan asserted he owed money to someone in the residence and a fight ensued…, during which time he saw Appellant make a stabbing motion toward Hriscisce[,] and then Hriscisce dropped to the ground. Further, he knew Appellant was carrying a knife prior to the stabbing, and after leaving the scene he watched Appellant throw the knife out of his car window.

Carrie Mattie … went to the residence with Appellant and Jordan in the hopes of acquiring drugs. Mattie detailed a fight broke out because Jordan owed someone money, … and she later told the police where to look for the knife that she watched Appellant throw out of the car window.

Charles Morrison, Jr., formerly a supervisor of a forensic unit for the state police, detailed that the police photographed and collected an extensive amount of incriminating evidence, including the suspected knife.

Dr. Jennifer Hammers, a physician specializing in forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on Hriscisce and found he had a stab wound to the chest that[] she determined[,] within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty[,] was the primary cause of [his] death.

Trooper Tyler Shutterly collected surveillance video … and executed a search warrant for Appellant’s DNA and clothing.

Brittni Andaloro, a forensic DNA scientist, stated[,] within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty[,] that Appellant’s DNA was on the handle of the knife.

[Pennsylvania State] Trooper Brandon Madden … interviewed Appellant for approximately one hour and informed him[, under

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Miranda,1] of his right to remain silent, that he had the right to counsel, and that anything he said could be used against him in future criminal proceedings.

Lastly, [Pennsylvania State] Trooper Austin Weaver … interviewed Appellant and also read him his Miranda rights.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 1/2/26, at 2-4 (citations to the record omitted).

Based on this evidence, the court concluded the “the jury’s verdict was

supported by overwhelming evidence[,]” as “multiple witnesses and exhibits

demonstrated … Appellant committed third-degree murder.”2 Id. at 6. In

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1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 Appellant did not raise a challenge to his aggravated assault conviction in

his Rule 1925(b) statement, wherein he averred: “The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to prove that [Appellant] committed murder.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/3/25, at 3 (emphasis added). Based on Appellant’s concise statement, the trial court only addressed, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Appellant’s third- degree murder conviction. See TCO at 5-7. However, we will not deem Appellant’s sufficiency claim regarding his aggravated assault conviction waived, as the court’s Rule 1925(b) order did not notify Appellant “that any issue not properly included in the Statement timely filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be deemed waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv). Instead, the court’s order stated, “Appellant is notified pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(2) … that failure to comply with this Order shall be considered by the Appellate Court as a waiver of all objections to the Order, ruling, or other matter complained of.” Trial Court Order, 11/10/25, at 1-2. Because the court did not specifically notify Appellant that any issue not raised in his concise statement would be deemed waived, we decline to find waiver of Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his aggravated assault conviction. See Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (holding that, “[i]n determining whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an appellant’s obligation[;] … therefore, we look first to the language of that order”) (citations omitted).

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particular, the court determined “the jury was permitted to conclude …

Appellant acted with malice….” Id.

Aside from citing legal concepts applicable to our review of a sufficiency

claim, Appellant’s entire argument on appeal to support his sufficiency issue

is as follows:

Here, … Appellant submits that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts of third-degree murder or [a]ggravated [a]ssault, [a]ttempt to [c]ause [s]erious [b]odily [i]njury. There was testimony by nearly every Commonwealth witness that the house was a drug house, [with] prostitution, drinking, [and] multiple individuals coming and going, staying for days. And, on the night of the incident, the witnesses confirmed an altercation that escalated into a physical fight between multiple people. The residence was a recipe for disaster.

The Commonwealth did not show … Appellant displayed a conscious disregard that death or injury would occur, not could occur. … Appellant submits the charges should be dismissed, [namely,] third-degree murder and aggravated assault.

Appellant’s Brief at 23-24 (emphasis in original).

Appellant’s cursory argument on appeal does not convince us the court

erred, or demonstrate the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions

for either third-degree murder or aggravated assault. Regarding both these

crimes, our Court has explained:

Pennsylvania retains the common law definition of murder, which is a killing conducted with malice aforethought. Section 2502 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code categorizes murder into degrees. Third-degree murder is defined as “all other kinds of murder,” i.e., those committed with malice that are not intentional (first-degree) or committed during the perpetration of a felony (second-degree). The pertinent provision of the aggravated assault statute requires proof that the defendant attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another, or caused such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference

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to the value of human life. The mens rea required for a conviction of aggravated assault, like third-degree murder, is malice; only the result of the crimes differ.

Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up).

It appears Appellant is attempting to challenge the mens rea element of

both his third-degree murder and aggravated assault convictions, arguing the

Commonwealth failed to prove he “displayed a conscious disregard that death

or injury would occur….” Appellant’s Brief at 24 (emphasis in original).

However, “our courts have consistently held that malice is present under

circumstances where a defendant did not have an intent to kill, but

nevertheless displayed a conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely

high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm.” Packer,

168 A.3d at 168 (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

See also id. at 172 (stating the “standard for malice … requires recklessness

of consequences and the conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely

high risk that a chosen course of conduct might cause a death or serious

personal injury”) (emphasis added).

Here, the Commonwealth proved this element. Namely, multiple

witnesses testified Appellant had a knife, and his DNA was found on the handle

of that weapon. Kelly testified Appellant was the only person physically

fighting with Hriscisce, and Jordan saw Appellant make a stabbing motion

before Hriscisce fell to the ground. Hriscisce was stabbed in the chest, and

that injury caused his death. Moreover, Kelly testified Appellant swung a knife

at his torso, stabbing him in the back of his left arm. See N.T. Trial, 8/4/25,

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at 86. This evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant consciously disregarded

an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or

serious bodily harm to Hriscisce and/or Kelly. Packer, supra.3 Accordingly,

Appellant has not demonstrated he is entitled to relief on his challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence.

Weight of the Evidence

Next, Appellant avers the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of

the evidence. We have explained:

A motion seeking a new trial based on the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. It has often been stated that a new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

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3 As is clear from Appellant’s cursory argument quoted supra, he does not meaningfully develop any claim that he did not cause, or attempt to cause, serious bodily injury to Kelly by swinging the knife at Kelly’s torso and stabbing him in the back of the arm. Thus, this argument is waived. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities. … [W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”).

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An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Person, 325 A.3d 823, 836 (Pa. Super. 2024), appeal

denied, 334 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 2025) (cleaned up; some formatting altered).

As with Appellant’s sufficiency issue, he presents a cursory argument to

support his weight claim:

Here, the Commonwealth did not present credible and strong evidence that … Appellant acted with intent to cause serious bodily injury, intent to kill and or [acted] with malice. The Commonwealth did not demonstrate … Appellant’s actions showed a reckless disregard for human life. The reliability and consistency of the witness testimony was lacking. The events surrounding the incident, … [and] Appellant’s state of mind or his intent, did not support the elements of third-degree murder or aggravated assault.

… Appellant contends that given the facts and evidence, the Court should find the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence and award … Appellant a new trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 25-26.

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Initially, we conclude Appellant has waived his challenge to the weight

of the evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. In his post-

sentence motion, Appellant stated: “The verdict was against the weight of the

evidence as to count 1, third[-]degree murder.” Post-Sentence Motion,

8/28/25, at 1 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted). Appellant

made no mention of his aggravated assault conviction, and he does not

identify how or where he otherwise preserved this issue for our review. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) (stating that a claim that verdict was against weight of

evidence must be raised before trial court orally or in a written motion prior

to sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (directing

that the appellant must set forth in the argument portion of his brief where in

the record he preserved the issue before the trial court). Thus, it is waived.

See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 938 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding

a weight-of-the-evidence claim waived where the appellant failed to raise it in

a pre-sentence motion, did not address the issue orally prior to sentencing,

and did not raise it in a post-sentence motion).

Regarding Appellant’s third-degree murder conviction, his boilerplate

assertions are insufficient to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion

by concluding its “sense of justice was not shocked by the guilty verdict.” TCO

at 5. The court explained “[t]he jury returned with verdicts consistent with

the substantial amount of inculpatory evidence presented by the

Commonwealth[,] as discussed above.” Id. Given the evidence we discussed

supra in addressing Appellant’s sufficiency issue, we discern no abuse of

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discretion in the court’s decision to reject his weight of the evidence claim

regarding his third-degree murder conviction. Thus, no relief is due on

Appellant’s second issue.

Suppression of Appellant’s Statements to Trooper Weaver

In Appellant’s third claim, he contends the trial court erred by denying

his omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress statements he made during an

interrogation by Trooper Weaver.4 Initially, we recognize:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Abdul-Ali, 333 A.3d 1059, 1068 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(citation omitted).

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4 We note the transcript of Appellant’s interrogation states three troopers’ names on the cover sheet, i.e., Troopers Weaver, Crowley, and Madden, and only states “Trooper” when noting which individual is speaking. See, e.g., Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 2 (transcript of Appellant’s interview). We presume, from the record, trial court’s opinion, and Appellant’s brief, that Trooper Weaver conducted at least portions of the interrogation. See N.T. Trial, 8/5/25, at 286 (Trooper Weaver’s testifying he was one of the troopers who interviewed Appellant); TCO at 8 (referring to Trooper Weaver as conducting the interrogation); Appellant’s Brief at 16-18 (Appellant’s naming Trooper Weaver as the trooper interrogating him). For ease of disposition, we will refer only to Trooper Weaver in our discussion, although we recognize other troopers may have been asking questions of Appellant, or making certain statements that Appellant challenges herein.

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Here, in Appellant’s pretrial motion, he sought the suppression of the

transcript and video of his interrogation by Trooper Weaver, during which

Appellant made inculpatory admissions. According to Appellant, the trooper

improperly continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to counsel,

and his statement was also involuntary because he was intoxicated and cannot

read or write. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 1/21/25, at 4-5; Appellant’s Brief

at 12-13. On appeal, Appellant points to the following portion of his

interrogation as demonstrating he invoked his right to counsel, which occurred

just after Trooper Weaver read Appellant his Miranda rights for a second

time:

[Trooper Weaver:] Do you understand [those rights]?

[Appellant:] I want an attorney because younz [sic] are going to fuck me over. I was trying to protect myself.

[Trooper Weaver:] So you want an attorney now?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Trooper Weaver:] Okay. That means you don’t want to speak with us anymore.

[Appellant:] No.

[Trooper Weaver:] Okay. All right.

[Appellant:] I’ll take it to court.

[Trooper Weaver:] Okay.

[Appellant:] I mean, like I said, I probably did stab -- stabbed him in the chest or whatever.

[Trooper Weaver:] So you’re going to make us bring Manny and Carrie into court as witnesses.

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We were just hoping you were going to do the right thing, okay, and talk about this thoroughly and truthfully, but now we’re going to have to get Manny and Carrie involved in this mess.

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 36-37. See also Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.

Appellant’s entire argument on appeal regarding why his statements to

Trooper Weaver following this exchange should have been suppressed is as

follows:

The interrogation should have stopped at that point. Trooper Weaver continued to interrogate … Appellant in the form of comments, over and over, pressure [sic] him into talking. … Appellant clearly invoked his right to have an attorney and remain silent. From the outset of the interrogation, statements were made by the officer to get … Appellant to abandon his right to remain silent. Any statements made after the invocation should be suppressed as Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right was violated.

… Appellant submits the Commonwealth failed to comply with the long-held decision of Miranda…, as well as all other cases, and therefore, any statement made by … Appellant should be suppressed.

Appellant’s Brief at 16.

Appellant’s cursory argument does not convince us he is entitled to

relief. Initially, the only “other case” to which Appellant briefly cites, besides

Miranda, that involves the invocation of a defendant’s right to counsel is

Commonwealth v. Hayes, 755 A.2d 27 (Pa. Super. 2000). There, we stated

that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, “not only must the current

interrogation cease, but he may not be approached until counsel has been

made available to him….” Id. at 32 (cleaned up). We continued:

If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the

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suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards. This is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights….

Id. at 32-33 (cleaned up). Appellant offers no discussion of how Hayes — or

any other decision — applies to the facts of his case, or demonstrates his

statements to police should have been suppressed. We will not craft this

argument for him.

Moreover, the only “comments” in the above-quoted exchange made by

Trooper Weaver after Appellant stated he wanted counsel were confirmations

Appellant wanted an attorney, he did not want to talk to the troopers anymore,

and remarks of, “Okay[,]” and, “Alright.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 36. It

was only after Appellant spontaneously blurted out “I probably did stab … him

in the chest[,]” id., that Trooper Weaver commented that “Manny and Carrie”

would have to be brought in as witnesses, and he was hoping Appellant would

talk to the officers truthfully, id. The interrogation then continued, as follows:

[Appellant:] No, I don’t want to get nobody involved. I mean --

[Trooper Weaver:] I mean, it is what it is, man. Like we have to use the witnesses because they told a different story. Everything up to, hey, a black male grabbed him by the throat -- that happened, because you know why? Because we spoke with five other people who said the same thing. What didn’t happen was how you stabbed that individual. That’s not how it happened because I have four people saying something very consistent who were there. So[,] if you don’t want to do the right thing, that’s fine. You can let a judge and a jury see how much of a liar you are. That’s fine with me. That’s better than a confession in my opinion because it shows you have no remorse for what you did. So --

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[Appellant:] I do. If I killed a man, I do have remorse.

[Trooper Weaver:] Fine. If you don’t want to tell the truth about it, that’s fine. Hey, you don’t need to talk anymore. If you want to tell the truth that’s fine. I’ll have Manny and Carrie tell the truth on the stand.

And guess what, I’ll give you five minutes to think about it before you want to actually tell the truth. But if I hear one more lie, I’m done. I’m going to have Manny do it, I’m going to have Carrie do it, I’m going to have five other people in that house do it. So[,] if you want to come off as a liar and tell me this bull shit story of your glasses fell off, you don’t know where you stabbed him, that’s not true.

[Appellant:] No, man.

[Trooper Weaver:] You were standing up when it happened.

[Appellant:] Yes, I was.

[Trooper Weaver:] I know you were. Okay.

[Appellant:] I’m telling you the truth.

[Trooper Weaver:] Are you ready to tell the truth?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Trooper Weaver:] … So if you want to finally tell the truth and do the right thing, man up, not involve your friends, do the right thing, man. That’s all we’re asking. We already know. Okay?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Trooper Weaver:] So what happened? Before we move on, I read you this. Okay?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Trooper Weaver:] You’re going to tell us what happened without an attorney and you’re okay with that. Right?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Trooper Weaver:] You sure?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Trooper Weaver:] Okay. Go ahead.

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Id. at 37-39.

Considering this record, we conclude that no relief is due.5 We have

explained:

In the landmark case of Miranda…, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where an individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is

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5 We recognize that at the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court did

not “enter on the record a statement of findings of facts and conclusions of law” as required by our rules of criminal procedure. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). Additionally, in the court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it did not specifically address Appellant’s assertion that the troopers violated his constitutional rights by continuing with the interrogation after he invoked his right to counsel. See Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (determining we were “constrained to focus” on a suppression court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, where the suppression court did not enter findings of fact on the record at the conclusion of the suppression hearing). Instead, the court addressed, in general terms, the voluntariness of Appellant’s waiver of his Miranda rights, “review[ing] the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s waiver[,]” TCO at 7, and concluding it “was made voluntarily and was his free and unconstrained choice[,]” id. at 7-8. Although we disapprove of the court’s non-compliance with the unambiguous mandate in Rule 581(I), and with its failure to specifically discuss in its opinion Appellant’s claims regarding his invocation of the right to counsel, we conclude remanding for the court to comply with Rule 581(I) would not serve the interests of judicial economy or justice. See Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 689 (Pa. 2005) (holding we may consider the merits of an appeal if “a remand for compliance [with Rule 581(I)] would not serve the interests of judicial economy or justice”). The issues before us involve the legal questions of whether Appellant’s statements to Trooper Weaver constituted an invocation of his right to counsel and, if so, whether his constitutional rights were violated by the trooper’s actions thereafter. These legal issues can be determined based on the applicable standard of review. See id. (addressing legal issues that were determinable based on the application of the proper standard of review to the record). It is also well-settled that this Court is permitted to affirm the trial court “on any valid basis, as long as the court came to the correct result….” Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 577 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). Finally, Appellant does not raise any claim that the court erred in these regards or ask this Court to remand. Therefore, remand is unwarranted.

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present. Fifteen years later, in Edwards v. Arizona, [451 U.S. 477 (1981)], the Supreme Court, as a corollary to its earlier decision in Miranda, adopted a bright-line rule that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights…. [An accused having] expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.

Commonwealth v. Davis, … 565 A.2d 458 ([Pa. Super.] 1989) (quotations and some citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court [has also] expressed:

For the Miranda/Edwards rule to apply, there must be an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel[.] The Supreme Court explained in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 … (1994)[,] that “to avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations,” the determination of whether the right to counsel was invoked by the accused is an “objective inquiry.” Id. at 458–59…. Effective assertion of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 … (1991) (emphasis omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fears, … 836 A.2d 52, 61 ([Pa.] 2003) (quoting McNeil's holding in this regard). If the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference that would lead an officer, in light of the circumstances, to believe that the accused might be invoking the right to counsel, the police interrogation need not cease. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 … (emphasis supplied). Instead, the suspect must “articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id.

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Commonwealth v. Champney, … 65 A.3d 386 ([Pa.] 2013).

Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1183–84 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Here, we first conclude Appellant’s statement, “I want an attorney[,]”

followed by his answering, “Yes[,]” when Trooper Weaver specifically asked

him if he wanted counsel, were unequivocal invocations of his right to counsel

under Miranda/Edwards. See id. at 1185 (concluding Kunkle’s statement

“I want a lawyer[,]” was “valid, unequivocal, and sufficient under

Miranda/Edwards”). After Appellant invoked his right to counsel, Trooper

Weaver did not continue to interrogate him, but simply made statements

confirming Appellant did not want to speak with him anymore, and then said,

“Okay[,]” and “All right.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 36. Appellant does

not explain how these statements constituted further interrogation, and

nothing in them indicates Trooper Weaver intended to evoke an admission

from Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Umstead, 916 A.2d 1146, 1152

(Pa. Super. 2007) (“Interrogation is defined as police conduct calculated to,

expected to, or likely to evoke admission.”) (cleaned up). Instead, Trooper

Weaver’s comments indicated he was ending the interrogation. However,

Appellant then spontaneously blurted out that he “probably did stab” the

victim, thereby initiating further conversation with the trooper. See

Edwards, supra. Moreover, after Appellant initiated further conversation, he

was asked, and repeatedly confirmed, that he wished to talk to the troopers

without an attorney before he made statements regarding the specifics of the

incident. Based on these circumstances, we conclude Trooper Weaver did not

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violate Appellant’s constitutional rights by continuing the interview after

Appellant reinitiated the conversation with the trooper.

Moreover, Appellant does not offer any developed discussion of how or

why his alleged intoxication, or inability to read or write, impacted his

understanding of his Miranda rights or the voluntariness of his waiver thereof.

We have explained:

When a defendant challenges the admission of a statement made during a custodial interrogation, the Commonwealth bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In re T.B., 11 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa. Super. 2010). We engage in a two-part inquiry:

First[,] the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda rights have been waived.

Id. at 505-06 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cephas, … 522 A.2d 63, 65 ([Pa. Super.] 1987)).

Commonwealth v. Smith, 210 A.3d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Here, Appellant was repeatedly read his rights, indicated he understood,

and waived them by speaking with the troopers without counsel present. See

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 2 (Trooper Weaver’s stating he “read the rights

and warning and waiver” to Appellant); id. at 34 (Trooper Weaver’s twice

asking Appellant if he wanted his Miranda rights read again, and Appellant’s

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responding that he did not); id. at 35 (Trooper Weaver’s asking Appellant if

he wanted his Miranda rights read again, and stating he “will read it slow if

[Appellant] want[ed,”] to which Appellant replied, “No”); id. at 35-36 (Trooper

Weaver’s reading Appellant his Miranda rights); id. at 38 (Trooper Weaver’s

asking Appellant if he was sure he wished to talk to them without an attorney,

and Appellant’s stating, “Yes”). In reviewing the voluntariness of Appellant’s

statement, the trial court “considered that Appellant stated he made it to

twelfth grade with special education” and “that Trooper Weaver carefully

explained to Appellant his rights and Appellant stated he understood what he

was told by Trooper Weaver multiple times.” TCO at 8 (citation to the record

omitted). The court also noted the interrogation “began at a reasonable time

of day, around 7:15 P.M., and lasted approximate[ly] one hour.” Id. After it

“reviewed the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s waiver[,]”

id. at 7, the trial court “found that Appellant’s waiver was made voluntarily

and was his free and unconstrained choice[,]” id. at 8. Appellant does not

develop any meaningful argument explaining how or why the court’s decision

was erroneous. In light of the record before us and the legal authority cited

supra, Appellant has not demonstrated he was coerced into making his

statement, or that he did not understand the rights he was waiving by doing

so. Thus, he is not entitled to relief.

Admission of the Video of Appellant’s Interrogation

In Appellant’s fourth issue, he insists the court erred by admitting the

video of his interrogation. Initially, we note:

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The standard of review employed when faced with a challenge to the trial court’s decision as to whether or not to admit evidence is well settled. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted).

In this case, Appellant argues the video of his interrogation should not

have been admitted because it showed Trooper Weaver’s accusing Appellant

of lying, repeatedly pressuring him to “do the right thing” and tell the truth,

and continuing with the interrogation despite Appellant’s telling the trooper he

was high. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.6 However, Appellant does not explain

— or cite any legal authority to support — why Trooper Weaver’s remarks

were improper or coercive, or how they rendered Appellant’s statements

____________________________________________

6 See also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 7 (Trooper Weaver’s stating, “You

know your eyes went up here because you’re thinking of a lie, man.”); id. at 13 (Trooper Weaver’s saying Appellant’s claim his “mind just goes blank” at the point the stabbing occurred was “not really believable”); id. at 21 (Trooper Weaver’s saying, “We’re just trying to see if you’re lying to us right now.”); id. at 35 (Trooper Weaver’s stating, “We’re just trying to determine whether you’re going to do the right thing this evening.”); id. at 36 (Trooper Weaver’s saying, “We were just hoping you were going to do the right, thing, okay, and talk about this thoroughly and truthfully”); id. at 37 (Trooper Weaver’s stating, “So[,] if you don’t want to do the right thing, that’s fine. You can let a judge and a jury see how much of a liar you are.”); id. at 50 (Appellant’s stating he was high, and Trooper Weaver’s responding with, “All right. Just chill. Wait a second. You’re pissed off.”).

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involuntary. We discern nothing intimidating or impermissible about the

trooper’s asking Appellant to do the right thing and be honest, or his

confronting Appellant with the unbelievability of the version of events

Appellant was providing the trooper. In any event, we have also declared that

“[p]olice may make coercive statements when questioning suspects, so long

as the totality of the circumstances suggests the confession was voluntary.”

Commonwealth v. Smith, 210 A.3d 1050, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted). For the reasons set forth supra, the totality of the circumstances

demonstrate Appellant’s statement was voluntary, regardless of the remarks

made by Trooper Weaver.

Additionally, Appellant’s claim he was intoxicated at the time of his

statement does not, in and of itself, render it involuntary. See

Commonwealth v. Milligan, 693 A.2d 1313, 1316 (Pa. Super. 1997)

(stating intoxication “does not automatically invalidate [an accused’s]

subsequent incriminating statements”). Instead, “[t]he test is whether [the

accused] had sufficient mental capacity at the time of giving his statements

to know what he was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it.” Id.

at 1316-17 (citation omitted). Intoxication “does not make [a] confession

inadmissible, but only goes to the weight to be accorded to it.” Id. at 1317

(citation omitted). Here, Appellant answered the trooper’s questions

throughout the interview in an understandable and appropriate manner.

Although at times Appellant was evasive, he was responsive and presented

his thoughts clearly. Accordingly, his cursory and legally unsupported

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argument that his statements to Trooper Weaver were involuntary due to his

intoxication, or because of remarks made by Trooper Weaver, is insufficient

to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the

video of Appellant’s interrogation.

In sum, after considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot

agree with Appellant that his statements to Trooper Weaver were “the result

of factors which overwhelmed his ability to exercise a reasoned choice.” Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Webb, 421 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. 1980)). The

court concluded Appellant’s statements were voluntary, and that the probative

value of the video did not outweigh its prejudicial impact. See TCO at 9

(concluding the video “showed Appellant, the opposing party, voluntarily

making incriminating statements to the police during his interview” and the

video’s “probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”).7 The court also provided a

cautionary instruction, stating the jury “must decide whether [Appellant’s]

statements were voluntary,” and describing the factors the jury should weigh

in making that decision. See N.T. Trial, 8/6/25, at 355-56. Given this record,

Appellant has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the court in

admitting the video of his interrogation.

____________________________________________

7 Appellant presents no argument that the prejudicial impact of the video outweighed its probative impact, thereby waiving any such challenge for our review. See Hardy, supra.

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Admission of Photographs

In Appellant’s fifth and final issue, he argues the trial court erred in

admitting photographs of the deceased victim, Hriscisce, which lacked

probative value and were inflammatory.8 In reviewing this claim, we note:

Where a photograph “possesses gruesome or inflammatory qualities likely to inflame the passions of the viewer” a trial court must not merely exclude them based on those qualities, but must determine whether their “essential evidentiary value … clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.”

Commonwealth v. Lyons, … 79 A.3d 1053, 1069 ([Pa.] 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Schroth, … 388 A.2d 1034, 1036- 37 ([Pa.] 1978)); see also Pa.R.E. 403 (providing the trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of,” inter alia[,] “unfair prejudice….”).

When the Commonwealth seeks to introduce photographs of a homicide victim into evidence, the trial court must engage in a two-part analysis. First, the trial court must examine whether the particular photograph is inflammatory. If the photograph is not inflammatory, it may be admitted if it is relevant and can serve to assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case.

If the photograph is inflammatory, the trial court must determine whether the photograph is of such essential evidentiary value that its need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.

____________________________________________

8 We note the trial court deemed this claim waived based on Appellant’s failure

to identify, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, “which photograph he is referring to.” TCO at 10. However, the court went on to assess “the only exhibits that Appellant could take issue with[,]” which were the photographs of the deceased victim. Id. Given the errors in the court’s Rule 1925(b) order discussed supra, see note 2, supra, and the fact the court could infer which photographs Appellant was referencing, we decline to deem this issue waived.

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Commonwealth v. Woodard, … 129 A.3d 480, 494 ([Pa.] 2015) (citations omitted).

[A] criminal homicide trial is, by its very nature, unpleasant, and the photographic images of the injuries inflicted are merely consonant with the brutality of the subject of inquiry. To permit the disturbing nature of the images of the victim to rule the question of admissibility would result in exclusion of all photographs of the homicide victim, and would defeat one of the essential functions of a criminal trial, inquiry into the intent of the actor. There is no need to so overextend an attempt to sanitize the evidence of the condition of the body as to deprive the Commonwealth of opportunities of proof in support of the onerous burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing a trial court’s admission of gruesome photographs, [appellate courts reverse] only for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Walter, … 119 A.3d 255, 286 ([Pa.] 2015) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Focht, 334 A.3d 931, 939–40 (Pa. Super. 2025).

Here, Appellant objected at trial to the admission of four photographs of

the deceased victim, two of which showed the victim’s entire body

(Commonwealth’s Exhibits 6 and 18), and the other two which showed the

victim’s wounds (Commonwealth’s Exhibits 19 and 20). See N.T. Trial,

8/5/25, at 207. Appellant argued the photographs were prejudicial and

inflammatory. Id. In response, the Commonwealth stressed it had made the

pictures black and white to lessen their inflammatory nature, and argued the

photographs were more probative than prejudicial. Id. at 208. Specifically,

the Commonwealth explained that Exhibit 6 showed the victim “on the porch

as he was found[,]” Exhibit 18 showed the victim’s “condition when he

arrive[d] for [the] autopsy[,]” and Exhibits “19 and 20 show[ed]

measurements of the wound[] that killed the [victim].” Id.

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Ultimately, the court ruled that Exhibits 6 and 18 were essentially

cumulative of each other, and found Exhibit 18 to be “less inflammatory” and

“less prejudicial….” Id. at 209. The court ruled Exhibit 18 was relevant to

prospective witness testimony about the victim’s autopsy, and would give the

jury “an adequate visual that [would] coincide with what the witnesses

[would] testify to, who did the autopsy.” Id. at 210. Thus, the court admitted

Exhibit 18, but precluded Exhibit 6. Id. Regarding Exhibits 19 and 20, the

court noted the photographs were not exceptionally inflammatory, as they

“essentially just show[ed the victim’s] torso” and not his face. Id. The court

also found that “any type of prejudice would be outweighed by giving the jury

the visual … of seeing the wound[,]” as well as the measurements of the

wound. Id. at 209. Thus, the court ruled those photographs were admissible.

Id. at 210.

Now, on appeal, Appellant claims the court erred in admitting Exhibit 18

because it had “no probative value” and was cumulative of other evidence

because “there was testimony through witnesses that victim Hriscisce was

dead.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. He insists that, “although the photo was black

and white, … it was more inflammatory than probative.” Id. at 21. However,

Appellant offers no elaboration on how or why Exhibit 18 was prejudicial or

inflammatory. He also does not address the court’s reasoning that Exhibit 18

was probative to assist the jury in understanding witness testimony about the

victim’s autopsy. Accordingly, Appellant’s undeveloped argument fails to

demonstrate the court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 18.

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Additionally, aside from explaining what Exhibits 19 and 20 showed, id.

at 19, Appellant presents no argument regarding how or why the court erred

by admitting them. Accordingly, he has waived his challenge to the admission

of those photographs. See Hardy, supra.

In sum, none of the issues raised by Appellant warrant relief.

Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 08/25/2026