Com. v. Charles, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: 1931 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A16004-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMAL CHARLES : : Appellant : No. 1931 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005102-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2025

Jamal Charles appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following a stipulated waiver

trial after which the trial court convicted him of criminal conspiracy, 1

possession with intent to deliver (PWID),2 simple possession,3 and multiple

firearm offenses.4 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court succinctly stated the facts surrounding Charles’ arrest as

follows:

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

3 Id. at § 780-113(a)(16).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), & 6108. J-A16004-25

On the evening of June 14, 2023[,] just after 7 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Lacorte (Officer Lacorte) of the Narcotics Enforcement Team was surveilling the area of 137 West Chelten Avenue for illegal narcotics sales after numerous complaints. N[.]T[., Suppression Hearing, 2/7/24], [at] 6, 22. Officer Lacorte observed Jamal Charles [] and another male, later identified as Jenkins. Id.[,] at [] 7, 23. Shortly thereafter, Officer Lacorte observed a Hispanic male[, Perez,] approach [Charles] and [Robert] Jenkins and, after a brief discussion, Jenkins and the male walked to the side of the building. Id. at 9. Once there, Jenkins reached into a black plastic bag that he was carrying and took out a light blue packet containing alleged marijuana and handed it to the male in exchange for an unknown amount of U.S. [c]urrency. Id. at 9, 10. The male then left the scene. Id. at 9. While this sale was going on, [Charles] remained standing in front of the store, “looking in all directions up and down the street.” Id. A few minutes [later], Jenkins and [Charles] were approached by a Black male[, Fullwood,] and engaged in brief conversation. Id. at 11. Jenkins and this second male walked around to the side of the building where Jenkins again reached into the black plastic bag and retrieved a light blue packet containing alleged marijuana and handed it to the male. Id. Once again, during this exchange, [Charles] remained in position on the sidewalk and kept looking up and down West Chelten Avenue in all directions and back to where Jenkins and the male were conducting their exchange. Id. The male then left the scene. Id. At approximately 7:17 p.m., [Charles] and Jenkins began walking westbound on West Chelten Avenue and, based on his experience, Officer Lacorte believed they were leaving the area after completing their transactions. Id. at 12. Officer Lacorte alerted backup officers to stop the two men. Id. Jenkins threw the black plastic bag over a wall. Id.[,] at 13. Backup officers stopped the two men and recovered the bag, which was found to contain seven packets of marijuana matching those recovered from the two buyers, and Jenkins and [Charles] were both placed under arrest. Id. at 13-15. A firearm was recovered from [Charles’] person in a search incident to arrest. Id. at 13.

[Charles] was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses, including possession with intent to deliver, conspiracy, and carrying firearms without a license.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/24, at 1-2.

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On August 10, 2023, Charles filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking

to suppress the firearm recovered from his person where his arrest was illegal

because it was unsupported by probable cause. On February 7, 2024, the trial

court denied Charles’ suppression motion and, on the same day, found him

guilty of all offenses. On June 25, 2024, the court sentenced Charles to an

aggregate term of two to four years’ confinement, followed by five years of

probation. Charles filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 5 Charles

presents the following issues for our review:

(1) Did [the] police have probable cause to arrest [] Charles for drug offenses based on his looking at a busy street near another person who was selling drugs?

(2) Was the evidence insufficient to establish a conspiracy where there was no evidence that [] Charles agreed to help his co- conspirator sell drugs?

(3) Was the evidence insufficient to support [] Charles’ drug- related convictions where he neither possessed nor delivered any controlled substances?

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

5 Charles filed a motion for extension to file his Rule 1925(b) statement because he had not yet received transcripts necessary to compose the statement. Even though the trial court did not rule on the extension motion, because Charles attached the transcript purchase orders to the motion and filed his extension request at least five days before the statement’s due date, the motion is deemed to have been granted. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2)(ii).

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First, Charles contests the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress

the firearm seized on his person, claiming that the police lacked probable

cause to arrest him. It is well-settled that:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. . . . [W]e must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Those properly supported facts are binding upon us and we may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether probable cause exists, a totality of the

circumstances test is applied. Id. (citation omitted). Probable cause is

established when “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge

of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably

trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution

in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Id.

(citation omitted). In deciding whether officers had probable cause to arrest

a defendant whom they believed participated in a drug transaction, “[t]he time

is important; the street location is important; the use of a street for

commercial transactions is important; the number of such transactions is

important; the place where the small items were kept by one of the sellers is

important; the movements and manners of the parties are important.”

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Commonwealth v. Lawson, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa. 1973). Additionally,

probable cause exists “when criminality is one reasonable inference; it need

not be the only, or even the most likely, inference.” Commonwealth v.

Romero, 673 A.2d 374, 377 (Pa. Super. 1996). See Commonwealth v.

Stroud, 699 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“[P]robable cause does not

deal with certainties[.]”).

In Thompson, supra, our Supreme Court found that a police officer

had probable cause to stop and search the defendant because “a police

officer’s experience may fairly be regarded as a relevant factor in determining

probable cause [where there is] a nexus between his experience and the

search, arrest, or seizure of evidence.” Id. at 935 (citing Dunlap, 941 A.2d

at 676, 679)). In Commonwealth v. Banks, 658 A.2d 752 (Pa. 1995), the

Supreme Court recognized additional factors which could give rise to probable

cause such as: (1) a trained narcotics officer observing the exchange of either

drugs or containers commonly known to hold drugs; (2) the police observing

multiple, complex, suspicious transactions; or (3) a police officer responding

to a citizen’s complaint or to an informant’s tip. Id. at 753. See also

Commonwealth v. Melendez, 251 A.3d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2021) (Table)6

(concluding officer had probable cause based on defendant continually

6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of this Court

issued after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

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glancing at officer in back seat, at surroundings, and into side rear-view

mirror; conduct consistent with someone keeping lookout for police or other

sources of trouble).

Here, the evidence supports the conclusion that Officer Lacorte had

probable cause to arrest Charles and conduct a search incident to his arrest. 7

Charles’ argument that he was arrested only because “he had the misfortune

to gaze up and down a busy commercial street while an acquaintance sold

marijuana at a building on the same block,” Appellant’s Brief, at 11, is

unpersuasive. Officer Lacorte reasonably inferred that Charles was a lookout

for Jenkins based on the recognizable pattern of criminal behavior between a

drug dealer and his cohort. Specifically, Officer Lacorte was conducting

surveillance at 137 West Chelton Avenue when he observed Jenkins and

Charles “hanging outside [a] store” that had “numerous complaints of illicit

narcotic sales [taking] place inside and outside of [it].” N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 2/7/24, at 6. Officer Lacorte first watched as Charles and Jenkins

were approached by a Hispanic male (Perez), observed all three males have

a “brief conversation . . . standing together,” and then watched Jenkins and

Perez walk to the side of the building where the alleged drug transaction

7 “The search incident to arrest exception allows arresting officers, in order to

prevent the arrestee from obtaining a weapon or destroying evidence, to search both the person arrested and the area within his immediate control.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 799 (Pa. Super. 2016) (some punctuation omitted).

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occurred, while Charles “was standing outside looking in all directions up and

down the street.” Id. at 7, 9; Melendez, supra. See also Trial Court

Opinion, 11/12/24, at 4 (“Then after the individual [left], [Charles’] disposition

would become relaxed again, and he and Jenkins would resume their

conversation until another individual approached them[,] and the process

would repeat.”). After Perez handed Jenkins an unknown amount of currency,

Jenkins reached inside of a black plastic bag, that was on his person, and took

out a light blue packet that he handed to Perez. See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 2/7/24, at 9.

Five minutes after Perez left the scene, Jenkins and Charles were

approached by another individual, Fullwood. Id. at 11. Again, the three

individuals had a “brief conversation” after which Jenkins and Fullwood walked

to the side of the building while “Charles kept looking up and down Chelton

Avenue in all directions and then looked back to where Jenkins was[.]” Id.

Jenkins reached into the same black plastic bag, pulled out another packet,

and handed it to Fullwood. Id. After Fullwood left in his vehicle, Jenkins and

Charles “started walking westbound on Chelton Avenue” and were stopped by

Officers Williams and Rodriguez. Id. at 13.

Officer Lacorte testified that he believed Jenkins and Charles left the

area after less than ten minutes based on the past 20 times he had surveilled

the area and watched “all the defendants make [one] or [two] sales, and

the[n] leave the area[.] ” Id. at 12. Officer Lacorte also testified that during

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his 25 years on the Narcotics Enforcement Team, he had done “thousands” of

surveillance jobs, including about 20 “positive jobs” for narcotics surveillances

in the last two years in the area of the incident. Id. at 8-9. Officer Lacorte

testified that, based on his experience, Charles’ behavior, his interaction with

the suspected buyers and Jenkins, and the way that Charles’ “head [was] on

the swivel looking in all directions” during the two transactions, he believed

Charles’ actions were consistent with those of a lookout for a narcotics

transaction. Id. at 17-18.

Accordingly, we conclude that, based upon Officer Lacorte’s detailed

testimony at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth established a nexus

between the officer’s training and experience and his subsequent search and

seizure of Charles. See Thompson, supra at 936 (nexus between officer’s

experience and observations he made established where nine-year veteran

officer “was personally familiar with heroin sales activity in the neighborhood,

heroin packaging, and hand-to-hand drug exchanges on the street”). Officer

Lacorte’s experience with drug transactions in the exact area where Charles

was arrested led him to believe he had witnessed Charles act as a lookout for

two drug sales. Having established the required nexus, we conclude that

Officer Lacorte had probable cause to arrest Charles.

Next, Charles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conspiracy conviction. He argues that there is neither evidence of an

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agreement between Charles and Jenkins nor evidence of his involvement in a

drug-dealing conspiracy.

Our standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is well-established:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact- finder. . . . The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). “To sustain a conviction for criminal

conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) entered

an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or

persons[,] (2) with a shared criminal intent[,] and (3) an overt act was done

in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 1025,

1030 (Pa. 1996); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. However, because an explicit

or formal agreement to commit a criminal act is rarely proven, such an

agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as “the relation,

conduct, or circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts of the co-

conspirators[.]” McCall, 911 A.2d at 997. See Commonwealth v. Ruiz,

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819 A.2d 92, 97 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted) (“Among the

circumstances [that] are relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove

a corrupt confederation are: (1) an association between alleged conspirators;

(2) knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of

the crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the

conspiracy.”).

Nevertheless, a defendant’s “[m]ere association with the perpetrators,

mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient”

to demonstrate involvement in a criminal conspiracy. Commonwealth v.

Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (citation

omitted). While the defendant need not commit the overt act because a co-

conspirator may do so, he or she must be an active participant in the criminal

enterprise rather than a “passive bystander.” Id.; McCall, 911 A.2d at 997.

In Melendez, supra, this court found sufficient evidence to uphold a

defendant’s conspiracy conviction where he sat next to the suspected drug

dealer, continually looked around, and police recovered packets of drugs and

a gun from his person. Id. at 1247. See also McCall, 911 A.2d at 997

(conviction for criminal conspiracy of PWID affirmed on appeal where

defendant took “active role in the illicit enterprise” by acting as lookout and

receiving money from his cohort, although he never possessed or sold drugs).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence is sufficient to establish

that Charles was involved in a conspiracy where he entered into an agreement

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with Jenkins to commit an unlawful act. Although mere presence at the scene

of the crime is insufficient to prove conspiracy, the evidence shows that

Charles conversed with Jenkins prior to both drug buys, then talked with

Jenkins and the two buyers, looked up and down the street while the

transactions occurred, and, finally, left the area with Jenkins after the two

transactions were completed—facts supporting an association between the

alleged co-conspirators. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/7/2024, at 7-17.

Officer Lacorte also stated that Charles and Jenkins were standing inches apart

when he observed them. Id. at 15. While Jenkins engaged in the drug

transactions with third parties at the side of the building, Charles “kept looking

up and down Chelten Avenue in all directions and then looked back to where

Jenkins was[.]” Id. at 11. Based on Charles’ active role as a lookout, an

agreement between Charles and Jenkins can sufficiently be inferred to

establish a conspiracy. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903

Finally, Charles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his drug

possession charges, arguing that the convictions should be reversed because

he did not possess any drugs.8 Instantly, the trial court convicted Charles of

drug possession based on conspiratorial liability, not actual possession.

8 To establish PWID, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant “manufacture[d], deliver[ed], or possess[ed] with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance[.]” 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30). Similarly, to prove that someone knowingly and intentionally possessed drugs, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally possess[ed] a controlled or counterfeit substance[.]” Id. §§ 780-113(a)(16).

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Despite conceding that there is binding Pennsylvania Supreme Court9

precedent supporting co-conspirator liability, Charles contends the common-

law rule is “untenable in light of the plain language of the Crimes Code” and

should be overturned. Appellant’s Brief, at 27. See also Appellant’s Brief, at

25 (“In fairness to the lower court, there is binding Supreme Court precedent

supporting this line of reasoning.”).

Conspiratorial liability is “routinely [] utilized” to convict one person for

the acts of another. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 408 (Pa.

2018). “All co-conspirators are responsible for actions undertaken in

furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of their individual knowledge of such

actions and regardless of which member of the conspiracy undertook the

action.” Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1017 (citation omitted). See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 985 A.2d 886, 896–97 (Pa. 2009) (finding

evidence sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder as co-

conspirator despite not being one to fire fatal bullet). In McCall, supra, the

court found sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of PWID based on

conspiratorial liability for his active role as a lookout, despite not actually

handling the drugs or collecting money directly from the buyers. Id. at 997.

Having found that there is sufficient evidence to prove a conspiracy, see

supra at 11, we conclude that Charles is criminally liable for the actions of his ____________________________________________

9 We note that our Court is bound by existing Supreme Court precedent.See Commonwealth v. Martin, 205 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2019) (Superior Court bound by existing precedent under doctrine of stare decisis and follows controlling precedent).

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co-conspirator, Jenkins. Similar to the defendant in McCall, supra, Charles

acted as Jenkins’ lookout in two narcotics transactions without handling any

drugs or money like his cohort, Jenkins. Id. at 997. Thus, because the

evidence was sufficient to convict Charles for conspiracy, the evidence was

sufficient to convict Charles, as a co-conspirator, for PWID and simple

possession.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 9/12/2025

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