Com. v. Chance, A.

Opinion

J-S17027-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTHONY H. CHANCE : : Appellant : No. 177 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 10, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-1110051-1987

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2026

Appellant, Anthony H. Chance, who is serving a life sentence for first-

degree murder, appeals from an order denying relief under the Post Conviction

Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on June 18, 1987, at the intersection of

24th Street and Ridge Avenue, Isaac Wilson, the victim, was walking with

Jeffrey McCants, Isaac McCants, Terry Bellamy, and D’Angelo White. Jeffrey

McCants noticed Appellant approaching the group. He grabbed Appellant’s

chain necklace, and the two got into a physical altercation that lasted

approximately two minutes. Appellant ran away. (N.T. 10/12/1988, at 46,

109-15; 10/13/1988, at 190, 215, 220-21, 277-80).

Appellant ran to his house and retrieved his .22-caliber rifle. He

returned and chased Jeffrey McCants and the victim up the street without ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S17027-26

catching up with them. Appellant walked back to his home, threatening to kill

Jeffrey McCants as he passed D’Angelo White. N.T. 10/12/1988, at 114-17,

142; 10/13/1988, at 190-94, 202-03, 222. When Appellant returned home,

he met with Ernest Hammond. Appellant packed the .22-caliber rifle and a

table leaf into a duffle bag. At around 11:50 p.m., Appellant called an

unlicensed cab to drive him and Ernest Hammond to the intersection of 29th

and Girard Streets, near the victim’s residence. Appellant and Ernest

Hammond carried the bag together to the intersection and placed it on a

newsstand. The victim walked up the street, and Appellant retrieved the rifle,

approached the victim, asked where his chain was, and fired a shot before the

victim could respond. The victim fell, and Appellant stood over him and fired

three more shots. N.T. 10/13/1988, at 222-33.

The victim suffered four gunshot wounds to the chest, arm, pelvis, and

thigh. Police officers transported the victim to Hahnemann Hospital, where

he died. N.T. 10/12/1988, at 97-99, 106-07; 10/13/1988, at 311. Appellant

fled, returning to his home and calling another unlicensed cab. The cab drove

him to the Girard Avenue bridge near the Philadelphia Zoo, where Appellant

threw the rifle into the Schuylkill River. N.T. 10/14/1988, at 414-15.

Police recovered four .22-caliber fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”), all of

which were the same brand. N.T. 10/14/1988, at 354. Over the course of

the investigation, detectives interviewed Jeffrey McCants, Isaac McCants,

D’Angelo White, Shawn White, Terry Bellamy, and Ernest Hammond. On

September 9, 1987, police arrested Appellant, who made a statement

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confessing to the shooting. He recounted that he was walking down the street,

and a group of men approached him and stole his chain. The only person he

knew in the group was the victim. He ran to his house and returned with his

.22-caliber rifle, but the group was gone. He went home again, put his rifle

into a bag with a table leaf to support the rifle, and told Ernest Hammond he

was going to 29th Street and Girard Avenue, where the victim lived, to find his

chain. He called an unlicensed cab and arrived at 29th and Girard and saw

the victim shortly afterwards. The victim walked up to him, and Appellant

recited as follows:

I told [the victim] I didn’t want no problems, just to give me the chain back. [The victim] said to me what makes you think you’re going to get your chain back. [The victim] told me if I wanted my chain back that had (sic) to go and find [Jeffrey McCants] and take it back. As [the victim] was saying that, I was starting to get my anger back. When [the victim] said that, I just took the rifle out of the bag. He said to me I was not going to shoot nobody. That is when I had pulled the trigger. [The victim] fell and I ran.

Appellant admitted that he disposed of the gun in the Schuylkill River. N.T.

10/14/1988, at 378-84, 390-91. Appellant tried to claim that he was aiming

for the victim’s legs and did not intend to kill him but admitted that he shot

the victim four times. Appellant also admitted that he was so angry at Jeffrey

McCants for stealing his chain that he would have shot him if he saw him.

N.T. 10/14/1988, at 392, 394, 411.

Appellant’s three-day waiver trial began on October 12, 1988. The

Commonwealth presented testimony from D’Angelo White, Terry Bellamy,

Ernest Hammond, and Isaac McCants, along with additional witnesses and

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numerous Philadelphia police personnel. White, Bellamy, and McCants

testified that Appellant and Jeffrey McCants got into a physical altercation

because Jeffrey took Appellant’s chain. Neither White, Bellamy, nor Isaac

witnessed the shooting. Ernest Hammond was an eyewitness to the shooting

and described how Appellant fatally shot the victim while he lay wounded on

the ground. N.T. 10/12/1988, at 112-14; 10/13/1988, at 190-93, 231-33,

277-80. Former Detectives Santiago and Jastrzembski, whose unrelated

alleged misconduct was at issue in the PCRA petition, did not testify at the

trial.

Appellant did not dispute that he was the killer but argued for third-

degree murder and testified in his own defense. He also maintained that the

gunshot pattern was not one shot followed by three additional shots, but

instead that he pulled the trigger once and four shots fired. N.T. 10/14/1988,

at 410-12.

On October 14, 1988, Judge Stiles found Appellant guilty of first-degree

murder and possession of an instrument of crime. The court immediately

sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.

On November 15, 1989, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgments of

sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on September 21,

1990. Appellant subsequently filed multiple unsuccessful PCRA petitions. On

February 5, 2020—almost three decades after his judgment of sentence

became final—Appellant filed the PCRA petition at issue here. Appellant

retained counsel and filed an amended petition claiming the new fact

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exception to the PCRA’s time provisions, in particular alleging after-discovered

evidence and alleged Brady1 material. Appellant claimed that he recently

discovered new witness Shawn White (hereinafter Shawn), brother of trial

witness D’Angelo White (who by then was deceased), who would testify that

police detectives assaulted and coerced D’Angelo White into providing a false

statement to detectives. Amended PCRA Petition, 7/7/2022, at 4-6.

D’Angelo White had provided two statements to homicide detectives,

and former Detective Santiago took one of the statements. Based on

Detectives Santiago’s and Jastrzembski’s misconduct in unrelated cases,

Appellant alleged that former Detective Santiago coerced D’Angelo into

providing a false statement.

On October 27, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. The

PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on December 9, 2024, during which

Shawn testified that D’Angelo told him that detectives beat and coerced him

to provide a false statement. He added that D’Angelo was with him on the

night of the shooting and that neither of them witnessed Appellant’s and

Jeffrey McCants’ fight over the chain. N.T. 12/9/2024, at 39, 56-62. The

PCRA court found this testimony incredible. N.T. 12/9/2024, at 172-76; PCRA

Court Opinion, 7/2/25, at 3. On December 10, 2024, the PCRA court formally

dismissed Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.

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1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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On August 13, 2021, the Commonwealth indicted former Detectives

Santiago and Jastrzembski for perjury and false swearing in unrelated cases.

See Commonwealth v. Santiago, CP-51-CR-0003402-2022;

Commonwealth v. Jastrzembski, CP-51-CR0003400-2022. In 2026,

former Detective Santiago was convicted of perjury and false swearing, and

former Detective Jastrzembski was convicted of false swearing.

Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:

1. Where the brother of a key Commonwealth witness came forward and contacted the Appellant and advised that the statement of his brother, a key Commonwealth witness leading to Appellant’s conviction, was coerced by Detectives who not only committed misconduct during the time period this statement was taken, and this misconduct was suppressed by the Commonwealth, did this constitute a Brady violation compelling the grant of a new trial where the misconduct led to a first-degree murder conviction?

2. Did the same factors in question one compel the grant of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence?

3. Did the lower court commit misconduct by essentially taking over the questioning of a witness at the evidentiary hearing and improperly assuming the role of an advocate by not only cross- examining this witness, but dominating the questioning?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

Our review of the PCRA court’s denial of relief is limited to whether “the

PCRA court’s findings . . . are supported by the record and free from legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Duffey, 889 A.2d 56, 61 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA

court’s findings and the evidence of record is “viewed in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party”—here, the Commonwealth. Id. The PCRA

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court’s credibility determinations, “when supported by the record, are binding

on this Court.” Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 971 (Pa. 2018).

All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The one-year

time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and proves one of

the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, and

(2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520,

522 (Pa. 2006) (overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small,

238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)).

In this case, Appellant’s judgment became final in late 1990, the

deadline for appealing his judgment of sentence to the United States Supreme

Court. The present petition is facially untimely, having been filed almost three

decades after the expiration of the time for filing a timely PCRA petition. Id.

Appellant argues that his petition is timely under the newly discovered

facts exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). At several points in his brief,

however, Appellant appears to confuse the newly-discovered facts exception

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in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) with the after-discovered evidence basis for relief

delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). Therefore, before reaching the

substance of Appellant’s claims, we briefly distinguish the newly-discovered

exception from the after-discovered evidence doctrine.

The newly-discovered facts exception in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires

the petitioner to plead and prove that (1) the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown, and (2) these unknown facts could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Id.; see also Commonwealth

v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 638 (Pa. 2017). “The focus of this exception is on

the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source

for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714,

720 (Pa. 2008). “Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable

steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not

have learned of the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further,

the “fact” on which the petitioner predicates his claim to an exception to the

time-bar must bear some logical connection to a plausible claim for relief. See

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

The after-discovered evidence doctrine embodied in section

9543(a)(2)(vi) provides that when a petition is otherwise timely, the petitioner

must prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial

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and could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable

diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to

impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict. Burton,

158 A.3d at 629.

In his first argument, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred when

it dismissed his after-discovered evidence claim that former Detectives

Santiago and Jastrzembski coerced witness D’Angelo White to provide a false

statement and testimony. Appellant offered the brother—Shawn White—of

the now-deceased witness to recount what the dead man allegedly told him.

In the PCRA court, Appellant did not explicitly address whether his

petition was timely under the newly-discovered evidence exception in Section

9545(b)(1)(ii). He only argued that Shawn White’s statement satisfied the

after-discovered evidence doctrine in Section 9543(a)(2)(vi):

Shawn White’s statement literally came out of left field. It surfaced because his mother and brother were upset that her son had been part of providing critical evidence leading to the conviction of Anthony Chance, and this evidence was false. She finally felt like she and her son Shawn should right this wrong. She, thus, came forward along with her son Shawn White, who knew much more about what police coercion occurred with her son…

Further, the misconduct of Detective Santiago has only recently come out after his misconduct in the trial of Anthony Wright was exposed … He has recently been indicted in that case for his role in coercing a statement and falsely implicating him in a murder.

This is not evidence that could have been obtained to the exercise of due diligence. D’Angelo White is dead and the misconduct of Detectives Santiago, Cimino and McNesby was hidden for decades.

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Amended PCRA Petition, 7/7/22, at 6.

The PCRA court did not address whether the petition was timely under

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Instead, it dismissed the petition on the grounds that

Shawn White’s testimony during the PCRA evidentiary hearing was incredible

and the newly discovered evidence (the assault on D’Angelo White by the

police detectives) would not have changed the verdict. Similarly, the

Commonwealth does not argue in this Court that the petition was untimely; it

contends instead that Shawn White’s testimony during the PCRA hearing was

incredible and that his testimony would not have changed the verdict.

For two reasons, we will assume for purposes of this memorandum that

the petition is timely under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). First, it is reasonable to

assume that until Appellant filed the present petition in 2020, he did not have

access to Shawn White, because (1) Shawn was the brother of a

Commonwealth witness who had given damaging testimony against Appellant

during trial, and (2) Appellant had no reason to know that police detectives

allegedly had coerced D’Angelo White into giving a statement against

Appellant or that D’Angelo White had told Shawn White about the police

detectives’ conduct. Second, neither the PCRA court nor the Commonwealth

contends that the present petition fails to satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).

Even though we assume that the present petition is timely, the

substance of Appellant’s argument does not warrant relief. The gist of this

argument is that Shawn White’s testimony concerning the police detectives’

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coercive conduct against D’Angelo White constitutes after-discovered

evidence that entitles Appellant to a new trial. We agree with the PCRA court

that Shawn White’s testimony, even if believed, would not have changed the

outcome of this case, because the evidence against Appellant was

overwhelming. Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (claim of after-discovered evidence

fails unless, inter alia, it would likely compel a different verdict).

D’Angelo White’s trial testimony set forth three essential points: (1)

Appellant and Jeffrey McCants fought over Appellant’s chain; (2) after the

fight, Appellant chased Jeffrey McCants and the victim down the street with a

rifle; and (3) when Appellant did not catch either during the chase, he returned

and stated “he going to kill [Jeffrey McCants] for taking his chain.” N.T.

10/12/1988, at 112-17, 142. These points were established not only by

D’Angelo White but by other witnesses, including Appellant himself.

Multiple witnesses, including Terry Bellamy, Isaac McCants and

Appellant, all confirmed that Appellant and Jeffrey McCants fought over

Appellant’s chain before the shooting. N.T. 10/13/1988, at 190-93, 279-80;

10/14/1988, at 390. Bellamy stated to police that he saw Appellant running

in the area with a rifle in his hand after the fight. N.T. 10/14/1988, at 326.

Appellant testified that he retrieved his rifle after the fight and was outside.

Id. at 422. Finally, eyewitness Ernest Hammond testified that when Appellant

returned to his apartment after the fight, he repeatedly said, “he was going

to get him.” N.T. 10/13/1988, at 222. The identification of the shooter was

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not at issue, since Appellant confessed to police and admitted at trial that he

fatally shot the victim. Furthermore, the detectives Appellant now accuses of

misconduct did not testify at trial.

The only points of dispute during trial were Appellant’s intent and the

degree of Appellant’s homicide. Appellant’s own statement and testimony,

however, were alone sufficient to prove his intent to kill. “A jury may infer

the intent to kill based on the accused’s use of a deadly weapon on a vital part

of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 201 A.3d 791, 795-96 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (cleaned up). Appellant admitted he shot the victim four times,

including a shot to the chest. N.T. 10/12/1988, at 106; 10/13/1988, at 302-

05, 311. He admitted that he shot the victim after he got angry during an

argument. N.T. 10/14/1988, at 391. He verified that he sought out the victim

and engaged in an argument with him while he was in possession of a firearm.

Id. at 408-11. Additionally, he fled the scene and disposed of the firearm in

the Schuylkill River. Id. at 414-15.

There was also substantial evidence that disproved any self-defense

theory or lesser degree of homicide. After the men took Appellant’s chain, he

went to his apartment, retrieved a rifle, and sought the victim at the corner

where he lived. N.T. 10/14/1988, at 390-91, 403; see Commonwealth v.

Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 460 (Pa. Super. 2021) (evidence sufficiently disproved

defendant’s self-defense claim when testimony established that Jones could

have left the bar after the victim threatened him but he chose to return).

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Further, Appellant told police that he initially fired one shot and then decided

to fire three additional shots. N.T., 10/14/1988, at 391. Eyewitness Ernest

Hammond corroborated this testimony, stating that Appellant fired one shot,

the victim fell over, and Appellant fired three additional shots while standing

over him. N.T. 10/13/1988, at 233-34; see Commonwealth v. Truong, 36

A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super. 2012) (defendant’s imperfect self-defense claim

was meritless because he used more force than necessary to protect himself

when he stabbed the victim nineteen times in the torso and back).

Appellant would have us conclude that the outcome of trial would have

changed had D’Angelo White not testified in accordance with his allegedly

coerced statement. The evidence summarized above demonstrates

otherwise. Even if D’Angelo White never testified, there was overwhelming

evidence of Appellant’s guilt, and the outcome of trial would have been the

same. Thus, Appellant’s claim that Shawn White’s testimony concerning the

detectives’ misconduct does not constitute after-discovered evidence that

entitles Appellant to relief.

Next, Appellant argues that the police detectives’ alleged conduct

entitles him to relief under Brady. We disagree.

To establish a Brady violation, the petitioner must show: (1) the

prosecution suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the

evidence is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence is material.

Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 328 (Pa. 2011). “Evidence is

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material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information

might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the

trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.” Id. “To be

entitled to a new trial for failure to disclose evidence affecting a witness’

credibility, the defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness

may well be determinative of his guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v.

Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 308-09 (Pa. 2011).

Appellant’s Brady argument fails for the same reason that his after-

discovered evidence claim fails. There was overwhelming evidence of

Appellant’s guilt and Shawn White’s testimony concerning the detectives’

misconduct would not have resulted in a different outcome. Birdsong,

Dennis, supra.

Finally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court’s questioning of witness

Shawn White improperly shifted into advocacy. Brief for Appellant, at 30-37.

We disagree. The court was allowed to ask questions of a witness, and

Appellant failed to establish anything unduly prejudicial in the court’s

questioning here.

To begin, Appellant only raised objections to two questions during

Shawn’s testimony and did not explain the basis for either objection. N.T.

12/9/2024, at 31, 87. Appellant never claimed lack of impartiality, the

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argument he attempts to raise on appeal. Nor did he ask the court to recuse

itself. Thus, he has waived his challenge to the court’s alleged lack of

impartiality. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

In any event, the record facially refutes Appellant’s claim of bias.

“Where the interest of justice so requires, the court may examine a witness

regardless of who calls the witness.” Pa.R.E. 614(b). “[W]here an important

fact is indefinite or a disputed point needs to be clarified, the court may see

that it is done by taking part in the examination[.]” Commonwealth v.

Roldan, 572 A.2d 1214, 1215 (Pa. 1990). “A new trial is required…only when

the trial court’s questioning is prejudicial, that is when it is of such nature or

substance or delivered in such a manner that it may reasonably be said to

have deprived the Appellant of a fair and impartial trial.” Commonwealth v.

Manuel, 844 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Here, the PCRA court was within its discretion in questioning Shawn

White about the date on which he learned the alleged new facts and the

underlying facts that Appellant relied upon to support his after-discovered

evidence and Brady claims. The information was plainly relevant to the

requisite elements of both claims. See Small, 189 A.3d at 971 (after-

discovered evidence claim requires petitioner to act with due diligence and

that the evidence be likely to result in a different verdict); Birdsong, 24 A.3d

at 328 (reciting materiality prong). Moreover, the record demonstrates

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absence of prejudice to Appellant. The PCRA court was the fact-finder at the

evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Seabrook, 379 A.2d 564, 567

(Pa. 1977) (recognizing “especially when…sit[ting] as a finder of fact,” the

judge need not remain a quiet and passive “mechanical instrument into which

the parties feed testimony”). Moreover, as discussed above, the record

demonstrates that Appellant did not suffer prejudice. The court’s manner of

questioning did not override the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt.

For these reasons, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief.

Order affirmed.

Date: 7/17/2026

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