Com. v. Carney, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 16, 2024
• Docket: 2999 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A26038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : DANIEL CARNEY : : Appellant : No. 2999 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002644-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : DANIEL CARNEY : : Appellee : No. 3105 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002644-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2024

Appellant, Daniel Carney, and Cross-Appellant, the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Monroe

County Court of Common Pleas, following Appellant’s jury trial convictions for

attempted sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, simple assault, and J-A26038-23

indecent assault.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts of this appeal are as follows. For Labor Day weekend

in 2019, Appellant gathered with friends and family at the Shawnee Inn.

Appellant was scheduled to marry his fiancée, Nicole Norris, 2 on Sunday,

September 1, 2019, and the wedding party had several events planned

throughout the weekend. On Friday, August 30, 2019, Appellant, Ms. Norris,

and members of the wedding party spent the afternoon rafting,

paddleboarding, and consuming alcohol on the Delaware River. One of the

bridesmaids, R.F. (“Victim”), became intoxicated. The trial court described

what happened next:

[Victim] stated that on the date of the incident, after consuming some beer and a shot of vodka she was feeling the effects of intoxication. After leaving the river trip, the victim was standing in the parking lot of the Shawnee Inn and she was cold. The victim wanted to go inside to get warm and [Appellant] led her inside. Then she remembers [Appellant] tell[ing] her that she was beautiful and trying to touch her. [Appellant] then “came onto” her harder and kissed her. After that the victim lost consciousness. She awoke to [Appellant] biting her nipple and she immediately pushed him away. [Appellant] was pulling her and pulled her down on top of him. Although she was trying to pull away, the victim was being held down by her shoulders and arms. At some point the victim’s top and bottom of her bathing suit were off and [Appellant] was touching her in her vagina and telling her to relax. [Appellant] penetrated ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3125(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), and 3126(a)(1), respectively.

2 Throughout the record, Ms. Norris is also referred to as “Nicole Carney” in

references to events that occurred after the wedding. To be consistent, we refer to her only as “Ms. Norris” in this memorandum.

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her vagina with his finger. He was rubbing himself on her and actually touching her vagina. At that point the victim hit her head on the wall behind [Appellant] and lost consciousness.

The next thing she heard was [Ms. Norris] screaming his ([Appellant’s]) name. At this point, the victim was on top of [Appellant]. The victim testified that she was very upset and she felt very violated. She stated that she was not aware of what happened….

(Opinion and Order Denying Post-Sentence Motions, filed 11/4/22, at 11-12)

(record citations omitted).

Victim came to realize that Appellant had taken her inside the men’s

locker room at the resort. At some point, Ms. Norris entered the locker room,

discovered Victim and Appellant, and quickly exited. As Appellant began to

button his pants, the maid of honor entered the locker room, “grabbed

[Appellant] and pushed him out.” (N.T. Trial, 5/9/22, at 76). The maid of

honor encouraged Victim to “stay here,” but Victim proceeded out into the

hallway. (Id. at 78). Another member of the wedding party, Beau Norris,

ultimately transported Victim to his house where she spent the night.

On Saturday, August 31, 2019, Victim woke up feeling sore.

Nevertheless, Victim continued to participate in wedding events, including the

rehearsal dinner. At the dinner, Victim overheard other guests discussing

what had transpired in the locker room the day before. Because her

recollection was hazy, Victim went to the resort’s security department to

inquire about surveillance footage from the hallway leading to the locker room.

Security personnel recovered the surveillance video and reviewed it with

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Victim. The video confirmed that Appellant and Victim walked down the

hallway leading to the men’s locker room. Victim was “extremely unsteady

on her feet and swaying.” (Affidavit of Probable Cause, dated 10/3/19, at 2).

Just before they reach the locker room, Appellant “is observed turning around

and pulling the victim into the locker room.” (Id.)

On Sunday, September 1, 2019, the wedding ceremony proceeded as

planned. Hours before the ceremony, however, Appellant sent the following

text message to Victim:

… I want to apologize again for everything, can we please just be happy as possible for [Ms. Norris] today, mistakes are behind us and I just need total closure before I do this, this is why I’m sending this, I’m as happy as ever to marry [Ms. Norris].

(N.T. Trial, 5/9/22, at 119). The message continued:

I know this is terrible as well, but my dick was out in the shower, we never did do it, but would you consider taking Plan B to make damn certain just in case, there is almost no chance but still, please tell me yes, I’m begging you.

(Id. at 121-22).

Victim later explained that prior to receiving these text messages, she

“thought [Appellant] had only tried to kiss me[.]” (Id. at 123). After receiving

these texts, however, Victim believed that Appellant “had done something in

violation of me, I just didn’t know what.” (Id.) Later that night, after the

wedding had ended, Victim went to Lehigh Valley Hospital—Pocono for a

sexual assault forensic examination (“SAFE”). The emergency room physician

and a SAFE nurse both examined Victim and observed bruising and abrasions

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on Victim’s body. Thus, the physician diagnosed Victim as having suffered a

sexual assault. (See N.T. Trial, 5/10/22, 30).

The trial court set forth the subsequent procedural history of this appeal

as follows:

After an investigation, the Commonwealth filed its criminal complaint against [Appellant] on October 3, 2019. Arraignment occurred on [December] 11, 2019 after which [Appellant] filed his omnibus [pretrial] motion on January 9, 2020. A hearing on that motion was held on February 18, 2020. The court directed the parties to file briefs on the matter within 30 days of receipt of the transcript of the February 18, 2020 hearing. The transcript was completed on March 2, 2020 so briefs on [Appellant’s] omnibus [pretrial] motion were initially due on April 1, 2020. However, the court granted the Commonwealth’s March 1[7], 2020 motion to extend the deadline for filing briefs until April 20, 2020.

Notably, on March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order declaring a general, statewide judicial emergency due to the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2020). The order provides that the president judges of the various judicial districts “SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY to suspend the operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 within a judicial district.” Id. (capitalization in original). The Supreme Court further explained that “[t]he purport of the suspension will be that the time period of the local judicial emergency … shall be excluded from the time computation under Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(c).” Id.

That same day, on March 16, 2020, President Judge Patti- Worthington declared a judicial emergency until April 14, 2020 pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order. In her order Judge Patti-Worthington declared that “[t]he operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 shall be suspended in the 43rd District during the period of the local judicial emergency.” In re 43rd Judicial District Declaration of Judicial Emergency, No. ___ M 2020 (Mar. 16, 2020).

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On April 1, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its second supplemental order to the March 16, 2020 declaration of judicial emergency. In that order, it extended the deadline of all filings due between March 19, 2020 and April 30, 2020, until May 1, 2020. [Appellant] timely filed his brief in support of [the pretrial] motion on April 20, 2020, but the Commonwealth did not file its brief against the motion.

President Judge Patti-Worthington extended the March 16, 2020 Declaration of Judicial Emergency (“DJE”) in a number of subsequent orders. The April 1, 2020 order extended the suspension of Rule 600 to April 30, 2020. Then, on April 22, 2020, President Judge Patti-Worthington further extended the suspension until May 31. Regarding Rule 600, the April 22, 2020 order stated:

Any postponement caused by this Judicial Emergency shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.

The March 16, 2020 DJE was further extended to September 7, 2020, through a May 29, 2020 order. That order provides that “Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 is suspended subject to constitutional requirements.” A subsequent order on September 2, 2020 extended the March 16, 2020 DJE until January 4, 2021. The final extension of the suspension of Rule 600 was enacted by the December 3, 2020 order. That order extended the March 16, 2020 DJE until June 30, 2021. Concerning Rule 600 it stated that:

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure is SUSPENDED subject to Constitutional limitations. Any postponement caused by this Judicial Emergency shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600.

On July 21, 2020, [Appellant] filed a supplemental habeas motion in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s

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decision in Commonwealth v. McClelland[, 660 Pa. 81, 233 A.3d 717 (2020)]. The court ordered a hearing on [Appellant’s] motion on September 25, 2020, but the Commonwealth requested a continuance of that hearing on September 23, 2020. Over [Appellant’s] objection, the court granted that motion and scheduled a new hearing on October 30, 2020. Following the October 30, 2020 hearing, the court ordered that briefs be filed within 30 days of the hearing transcript being filed. The transcript was filed on November 19, 2020 and both [Appellant] and the Commonwealth timely filed their briefs within 30 days. On March 26, 2021, the court entered its order denying [Appellant’s] motion and scheduled the case for pretrial conference on August 18, 2021.

(Opinion and Order Denying Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Motion, filed 1/11/22, at 1-4)

(unnumbered) (some capitalization and citations omitted).

On August 13, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges

with prejudice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. The court conducted a Rule 600

hearing on September 20, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court

took the matter under advisement and directed the parties to submit briefs.

Following the submission of briefs, the court issued an opinion and order

denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion on January 11, 2022.

Appellant proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of attempted

sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, simple assault, and indecent

assault. The jury found Appellant not guilty on one count of attempted rape

of an unconscious victim. The court deferred sentencing and ordered

Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) to conduct an

evaluation of Appellant. The court also ordered a presentence investigation

(“PSI”) report. With the benefit of the SOAB assessment and a PSI report,

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the court conducted Appellant’s sentencing hearing on July 26, 2022. At that

time, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-four (24) to forty-

eight (48) months’ imprisonment, followed by three (3) years of probation.

The court also classified Appellant as a Tier III sex offender, subject to lifetime

registration under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23.

On July 28, 2022, the Commonwealth timely filed a motion for

reconsideration of sentence. In it, the Commonwealth argued that the

sentence of incarceration was too lenient. The Commonwealth claimed that

the court placed “excessive weight” on “character letters” written on

Appellant’s behalf, and the court “failed to properly balance the protection of

the public and the gravity of the offenses[.]” (Post-Sentence Motion, filed

7/28/22, at 5). Appellant timely filed his own post-sentence motion on August

2, 2022. Among other things, Appellant challenged certain evidentiary rulings

and alleged that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. On

November 4, 2022, the court issued an order and opinion denying the parties’

post-sentence motions.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on November 29, 2022, which

this Court docketed at 2999 EDA 2022. The Commonwealth timely filed a

notice of appeal on December 1, 2022, which this Court docketed at 3105 EDA

2022. Following the submission of the notices of appeal, the court ordered

the filing of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statements of matters complained of

on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on December

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14, 2022. The Commonwealth timely filed its Rule 1925(b) statement on

December 21, 2022.

At No. 2999 EDA 2022, Appellant raises the following issues for our

review:

Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant’s] motion to dismiss under Rule 600 despite finding a lack of due diligence by the Commonwealth?

Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant’s] request for a reasonable mistake of fact charge concerning lack of consent?

Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant’s] motions in limine prior to trial challenging the admissibility of evidence under Rules 402, 403, and 404(b), denying the introduction of evidence under a Rape Shield proffer relevant to consent and by refusing to order a report by the Commonwealth’s sexual assault expert?

Whether the trial court erred when it failed to suppress the statements [Appellant] made when questioned by Trooper Leri at Skytop Lodge without being Mirandized?[3]

Whether the trial court erred when it failed to suppress [Appellant’s] statements made during a controlled telephone call with [Victim] where the intercept was not supported by reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity as required by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704?

Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] post- sentence motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence to support [Appellant’s] guilty verdicts?

(Appellant’s Brief at 12-13).

____________________________________________

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

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At No. 3105 EDA 2022, the Commonwealth raises one issue for this

Court’s review:

Whether the sentence imposed and reasons provided by the sentencing court following a conviction of attempted sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault and misdemeanor assault offenses contradicts the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process warranting a remand and resentence?

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 12).

In his first issue, Appellant acknowledges Monroe County’s April 22,

2020 order stating that any postponement due to the pandemic would be

considered excludable delay for Rule 600 purposes. Appellant contends that

“[t]he intent of the order was clear. If a case [was] ready for trial but had to

be delayed by the pandemic and judicial emergency, the delay would be

excluded in determining a defendant’s rights under Rule 600.” (Appellant’s

Brief at 37). Appellant insists that his case was not ready for trial at the time

of the judicial emergency. As such, “any postponement or delay would not be

caused by the pandemic and the judicial emergency and should not be

excluded.” (Id. at 37-38).

Against this backdrop, Appellant argues that the court committed

multiple errors in evaluating his Rule 600 motion. Specifically, Appellant

asserts that the court “miscounted” certain periods of delay. (Id. at 38).

Appellant complains that the court compounded this error by improperly

classifying certain periods as excludable delay when those periods “should

have been deemed normal progression and included in the [Rule] 600

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calculation[.]” (Id. at 38-39). Appellant also claims that his July 21, 2020

pretrial motion did not actually delay the commencement of trial “since the

court had not decided the original omnibus [pretrial motion] issues due to the

Commonwealth’s delinquency” in filing a brief. (Id. at 39-40).

Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth’s failure to file a brief until

December 15, 2020 amounted to a lack of due diligence, and the

Commonwealth created a 229-day delay that the court should have

considered when calculating the adjusted run date under Rule 600. Upon

performing his own calculations, Appellant opines that his trial did not occur

before the correct adjusted run date. Appellant concludes that the trial court

erred by denying his Rule 600 motion, and this Court must reverse his

convictions and dismiss the charges against him. We disagree.

The following principles apply to our review of a speedy trial claim:

Our standard of review in a Rule 600 issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Our scope of review when determining the propriety of the trial court is limited to the evidence in the record, the trial court’s Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the trial court’s findings. We must also view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]

Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 449 n.14 (Pa.Super. 2020),

appeal denied, 664 Pa. 562, 244 A.3d 1230 (2021).

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective

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prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In considering these matters …, courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 809-10 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-35 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

Rule 600 sets forth the speedy trial requirements and provides in

pertinent part:

Rule 600. Prompt Trial

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

* * *

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth

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when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a), (C)(1).

Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth. Due diligence includes, inter alia, listing a case for trial prior to the run date, preparedness for trial within the run date, and keeping adequate records to ensure compliance with Rule 600. Periods of delay caused by the Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence must be included in the computation of time within which trial must commence.

Martz, supra at 810-11 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moore, 214 A.3d 244,

248-49 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 224 A.3d 360 (2020))

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

To obtain relief, a defendant must have a valid Rule 600 claim at the

time he files the motion to dismiss. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234

(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). “When considering a Rule 600 motion, the court

must identify each period of delay and attribute it to the responsible party,

then adjust the 365-day tally to arrive at the latest date upon which the

Commonwealth may try the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Barbour, 647

Pa. 394, 399, 189 A.3d 944, 947 (2018). Recently, this Court addressed the

concepts of “mechanical” and “adjusted” Rule 600 run dates, as well as the

impact of local emergency orders on the calculation of these dates:

In a Rule 600 analysis, the “mechanical run date” is 365

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days after the complaint was filed. The “adjusted run date” is then calculated by adding any time that is “excluded from the computation” under Rule 600(C)(1). If a defendant is not brought to trial by the adjusted run date, the case is dismissed. Two key cases guide our analysis here.

First, in [Commonwealth v. Harth, 666 Pa. 300, 252 A.3d 600 (2021)], our Supreme Court held that “before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay,’” the Commonwealth must “demonstrate that it acted with due diligence.” That is:

[I]n ruling on a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss, a trial court must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case; if the Commonwealth meets its burden of proving due diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its own congested calendar or other scheduling problems as justification for denying the defendant’s motion.

Second, this Court considered the effect of local emergency orders in Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743 (Pa.Super. 2022). The issue in Carl was whether a period of a local judicial emergency would be excluded from the Rule 600 computation, i.e., whether to add the days of the judicial emergency to the run date. The relevant order contained two provisions: “Suspend statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial,” and: “Any postponement caused by the judicial emergency shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application of Rule 600.” This Court read the first provision as an absolute, unqualified suspension and the second provision as a supplemental rule for additional postponements. The second provision set a local policy to address ongoing delays. Because the first provision unambiguously suspended Rule 600, the days of that suspension should have been added to the run date regardless of the Commonwealth’s diligence.

Harth and Carl frame the inquiry for the effect of emergency orders on Rule 600. If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600 without qualification, then the period of

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the suspension is added to the run date without considering the Commonwealth’s diligence. Alternatively, if an order characterizes a delay as a court postponement, then that period is only excluded if the trial court determines after a hearing that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence through the life of the case.

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 718-19 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal

granted in part, ___ Pa. ___, 305 A.3d 541 (2023) (internal citations and

footnote omitted).

Instantly, the Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint on October 3,

2019. Therefore, the mechanical run date was October 2, 2020.4 Appellant

proceeded to his arraignment on December 11, 2019. On January 9, 2020,

Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion. The court conducted a hearing on

the motion on February 18, 2020. After the hearing, the court took the matter

under advisement and ordered the parties to submit briefs within thirty days.

(See Order, filed 2/21/20, at 1). At the request of the Commonwealth, the

court extended the deadline for filing briefs until April 20, 2020. 5 (See Order,

filed 3/18/20, at 1).

On March 16, 2020, our Supreme Court issued its order declaring a

4 2020 was a Leap Year.

5 In its second order regarding the statewide judicial emergency, our Supreme

Court declared that “any legal papers or pleadings which are required to be filed between March 19, 2020, and April 30, 2020, SHALL BE DEEMED to have been timely filed if they are filed by May 1, 2020….” In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 658 Pa. 444, 446, 229 A.3d 229, 230 (2020). Thus, the deadline for filing for the filing of pretrial briefs became May 1, 2020.

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general, statewide judicial emergency. That same day, Monroe County’s

President Judge declared a judicial emergency and suspended Rule 600 during

the period of the local judicial emergency. In subsequent orders, Monroe

County’s President Judge extended the local judicial emergency until June 30,

2021, declaring this period “excludable” for Rule 600 purposes. (See Opinion

and Order Denying Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Motion at 2-4) (unnumbered).

In evaluating the delays, the court found sixty-seven (67) days of

excludable delay from January 9, 2020 through March 16, 2020, due to

Appellant’s filing of the pretrial motion. See Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875

A.2d 1175, 1190 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 723, 890 A.2d

1057 (2005) (explaining defendant is “unavailable” for trial if delay in

commencement of trial is caused by filing of pretrial motion). This delay

yielded an adjusted run date of December 8, 2020.

The court also identified an additional four hundred seventy-one (471)

days of delay from March 16, 2020 through June 30, 2021, due to the local

judicial emergency. As noted by Appellant, the court did not immediately add

this period of delay to the adjusted run date. Instead, the court proceeded to

evaluate the Commonwealth’s due diligence during this period. (See

Appellant’s Brief at 37). In light of the relevant language from the orders

extending the local judicial emergency in Monroe County, we cannot say that

the court erred by undertaking a review of the Commonwealth’s due diligence.

See Lear, supra.

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The court determined that “the Commonwealth clearly failed to satisfy

the requirement to exercise due diligence by failing to file a timely brief in

response to [Appellant’s] January 9, 2020 omnibus motion.” (See Opinion

and Order Denying Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Motion at 7) (unnumbered). The court

also found that the delay attributable to the Commonwealth began on May 1,

2020 (the deadline for filing a brief) and extended through July 21, 2020,

when Appellant filed the supplemental pretrial motion seeking habeas corpus

relief. The court observed that the filing of the supplemental pretrial motion

“created a new period of [delay] in the progression of this case wherein a trial,

regardless of the Commonwealth’s due diligence, could not commence.” (Id.

at 8) (unnumbered). Consequently, the court decided that only the eighty-

one (81) days between May 1, 2020 and July 21, 2020 were attributable to

the Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence. 6 The court then

subtracted the amount of delay caused by the Commonwealth’s failure to

exercise due diligence (81 days) from delay created by the local judicial

emergency (471 days). This calculation yielded a total of three hundred ninety

(390) days of excludable delay, which created a final adjusted run date of

January 2, 2022. (Id. at 10) (unnumbered).

6 In his brief, Appellant correctly notes that the court mistakenly calculated

the period between May 1, 2020 and July 21, 2020 as forty-eight (48) days. (See Opinion and Order Denying Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Motion at 8) (unnumbered). Thus, we modified the court’s subsequent calculations of the adjusted run date based upon an 81-day delay.

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Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, we conclude that the court did not

err in applying the mandates of Rule 600 to the instant case. Appellant ignores

the impact that his pretrial filings had on the progression of the proceedings.

The court did not abuse its discretion in attributing certain periods of delay to

these pretrial filings or in determining the excludable portion of the local

judicial emergency. See Risoldi, supra. Therefore, Appellant did not have

a viable speedy trial claim when he filed his Rule 600 motion, and he is not

entitled to relief on his first claim.

In his second issue, Appellant contends that he requested a jury

instruction “on reasonable mistake of fact concerning [Victim’s] alleged

unconsciousness (count 1) and lack of consent (counts 2, 3, 4 and 5).” 7

(Appellant’s Brief at 43). While the court granted Appellant’s request as to

count 1, the court denied his request for an instruction on lack of consent for

the remaining counts. Appellant also notes that the court instructed the jury

that “reasonable mistake of fact was only a defense to count 1 and no other

count.” (Id.) Appellant maintains that “[t]here was enough evidence to

warrant a reasonable mistake of fact instruction” for the remaining counts,

and the jury could have found that Appellant “reasonably believed [Victim]

had [consented] and that [Appellant’s] actions were in response to her

7 The verdict slip listed count 1 as attempted rape, count 2 as attempted sexual assault, count 3 as aggravated indecent assault, count 4 as simple assault, and count 5 as indecent assault. (See Verdict Slip, filed 5/12/22, at 1).

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conduct toward him.” (Id. at 47, 48).

Moreover, by giving the requested reasonable mistake of fact instruction for count 1 and then telling the jury reasonable mistake of fact was only a defense to count 1, the trial court allowed the jury to convict [Appellant] on [Victim’s] alleged lack of consent regardless of [Appellant’s] knowledge [that] she was not or his recklessness in appreciating she may not be consenting but deciding to proceed regardless.

(Id. at 48). Appellant concludes that the court’s failure to provide the

requested jury instructions warrants a new trial. We disagree.

“The trial court has considerable discretion in fashioning a jury charge.”

Commonwealth v. Gomez, 224 A.3d 1095, 1102 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 661 Pa. 484, 236 A.3d 1053 (2020). “The court is free to use its own

expressions, provided it clearly and accurately conveys the applicable legal

concepts at issue.” Id. “The trial court is not required to give every charge

that is requested by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge does

not require reversal unless the appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.’”

Commonwealth v. Scott, 73 A.3d 599, 602 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Brown, 911 A.2d 576, 583 (Pa.Super. 2006)).

“In reviewing instructions to a jury, we consider the entire charge, ‘not

merely discrete portions thereof.’” Gomez, supra at 1102 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 630 Pa. 493, 552, 107 A.3d 52, 88-89 (2014)).

“We examine the entire instruction ‘against the background of all evidence

presented, to determine whether error was committed.’” Commonwealth v.

Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 540 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v.

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Grimes, 982 A.2d 559, 564 (Pa.Super. 2009)). “A jury charge is erroneous

if the charge as a whole is inadequate, unclear, or has a tendency to mislead

or confuse the jury rather than clarify a material issue.” Id. (quoting Grimes,

supra at 564).

The defense of mistake-of-fact is defined as:

§ 304. Ignorance or mistake

Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if:

(1) the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or

(2) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 304.

It is well established that a bona fide, reasonable mistake of fact may, under certain circumstances, negate the element of criminal intent. It is not necessary that the facts be as the actor believed them to be; it is only necessary that he have a bona fide and reasonable belief in the existence of facts which, if they did exist, would render an act innocent. When evidence of a mistake of fact is introduced, the Commonwealth retains the burden of proving the necessary criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the Commonwealth must prove either the absence of a bona fide, reasonable mistake, or that the mistake alleged would not have negated the intent necessary to prove the crime charged.

Scott, supra at 603 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874,

878-79 (Pa.Super. 2001)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Instantly, the court conducted a charging conference on May 11, 2022.

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At that time, the parties engaged in an extensive argument over the

parameters of any instruction on mistake of fact. (See N.T. Trial, 5/11/22, at

247-57). Specifically, defense counsel advanced the following argument in

favor of providing the jury with a mistake of fact instruction as to Victim’s lack

of consent:

But I submit in this case where the argument or the element is lack of consent and not forcible compulsion, we are entitled to a charge that the jury has to look at and see if it was reasonable based upon the facts at hand in light of the need to prove knowledge and/or recklessness on the part of [Appellant], that he—if he—if she did not consent, but he was reasonably mistaken that she had, then that is a defense.

(Id. at 249). The next day, prior to instructing the jury, the court conducted

an in camera meeting with counsel. At that time, the court announced that it

would provide a mistake of fact instruction as to count one, attempted rape,

only. The court added, “The case law seems to suggest that if it deals with

victim’s consent, then it’s not appropriate.” (N.T. Trial, 5/12/22, at 3).

Thereafter, the court charged the jury. The charge included a mistake

of fact instruction for count one. (See id. at 90-92). At the conclusion of the

mistake of fact instruction, the court reiterated: “And so that defense raised

by the defendant would apply to this charge I am going to now instruct you

on.” (Id. at 92). The court subsequently instructed the jury on the elements

for each of the offenses at issue. With its instruction on indecent assault, the

court also provided the following explanation of consent:

When considering consent, the age and mentality of the

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victim must also be considered. A defendant acts recklessly with regard to an alleged victim’s non-consent if he or she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim is not consenting to the contact. The risk disregarded must be the sort of risk that is grossly unreasonable for the defendant to disregard.

(Id. at 100).8

In reviewing the charge as a whole, the court “was satisfied that all of

the instructions adequately and clearly present[ed] the law to the jury.”

(Opinion and Order Denying Post-Sentence Motions at 15). Our review of the

jury instructions confirms that the court adequately, accurately, and clearly

stated the law. See Rush, supra; Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d

1111, 1113-18 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted,

560 Pa. 410, 745 A.2d 1214 (2000) (holding defendant was not entitled to

mistake of fact instruction in prosecution for involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse and aggravated indecent assault; prosecution arose from college

dormitory incident where victim told defendant that she did not want to

engage in sexual relations; defendant provided “grossly divergent” version of

events, contending that he reasonably believed he had obtained consent;

defendant also presented evidence in support of this contention at trial). See

also Commonwealth v. Farmer, 758 A.2d 173, 177-78 (Pa.Super. 2000),

appeal denied, 565 Pa. 637, 771 A.2d 1279 (2001) (holding trial counsel was

8 Defense counsel reiterated his objection to the court’s failure to provide the

requested mistake of fact instruction following the court’s instructions. (See id. at 109).

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not ineffective for failing to request jury instruction regarding reasonable

mistake as to consent in case involving rape, involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse, and indecent assault; reiterating that Fischer expressly held that

such instruction would be significant departure from current state of law);

Commonwealth v. Wilton, 290 A.3d 708 (Pa.Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum)9 (evaluating sufficiency of evidence supporting convictions for,

inter alia, sexual assault and indecent assault without consent; citing Farmer,

supra to reiterate that mistake of fact about victim’s consent is not defense

to sex offenses).

Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that Appellant was

prejudiced by the court’s refusal to provide mistake of fact instructions for

counts two through five. See Scott, supra. Thus, the court did not abuse

its considerable discretion in fashioning the charge, and Appellant is not

entitled to relief on his second issue. See Gomez, supra.

In his third issue, Appellant raises three discrete arguments regarding

the trial court’s specific evidentiary rulings. First, Appellant contends that he

filed a pretrial motion and written proffer under Pennsylvania’s “rape shield”

law, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104. In it, Appellant asked for permission to submit

evidence demonstrating that, in 2013, Victim “had a sexual interest in

[Appellant] and the desire to have a ‘threesome’ with Nicole Norris and

9 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

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[Appellant].” (Appellant’s Brief at 50) (quoting Pretrial Motion, filed 3/25/22,

at 3). Appellant complains that the court denied his proffer and found “the

reference to a threesome was specifically proscribed by [Section] 3104 and

finding the [2013] incident was too remote.” (Id.) Appellant maintains that

the court violated Section 3104 by denying his proffer, and the court’s ruling

effectively hampered the jury from resolving the issue of Victim’s lack of

consent.

Next, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth sought to present an

expert, Jo Ellen Bowman, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920. 10 Upon learning

that Ms. Bowman would be testifying, Appellant’s counsel requested a copy of

the expert’s report. The Commonwealth, however, responded that it was not

planning to have Ms. Bowman prepare a report. Appellant contends that his

counsel responded by filing a pretrial motion to exclude Ms. Bowman’s

testimony or, in the alternative, require the production of an expert report and

pretrial submission of proposed questions. Appellant argues that the court

erred by denying this motion and finding that Ms. Bowman “would only testify

10 “Expert testimony under Section 5920 is, by nature, different than expert

testimony on other subject matter, as its purpose is to inform the jury that a … victim of sexual assault may engage in behavior that may appear counter- intuitive to the layperson.” Commonwealth v. Dunn, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 300 A.3d 324, 335-36 (2023) (Mundy, J., in support of affirmance). “As a result, the testimony elicited from expert witnesses in this area largely relates to common behavioral responses of sexual abuse victims, or stated differently, facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim behaviors.” Id. at ___, 300 A.3d at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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generally and not regarding the particular facts before the jury.” (Id. at 55).

Appellant avers that the court compounded this error by allowing Ms. Bowman

“to indirectly bolster [Victim’s] sudden recall of details over time and explain

[Victim’s] initial failure to recall under the guise of generalized [Section] 5920

testimony.” (Id.)

Finally, Appellant acknowledges that he and Ms. Norris argued in the

resort’s parking lot immediately after the assault on Victim. Appellant filed a

pretrial motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence regarding this argument,

which he alleged was irrelevant. Appellant also alleged that the prejudicial

effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value. Despite Appellant’s

arguments, the court denied his motion in limine. Appellant emphasizes that

the jury subsequently heard testimony about the argument, which the court

classified as evidence of Appellant’s consciousness of guilt. Appellant

maintains, “In admitting the evidence and instructing the jury on

consciousness of guilt, the trial court committed an error….” 11 (Id. at 60).

Based upon the foregoing, Appellant concludes he is entitled to a new trial.

We disagree.

This Court’s standard of review for issues regarding the admissibility of

11 Moreover, Appellant notes that the Commonwealth filed notice of its intent

to offer evidence pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b). Appellant submits that the Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) notice was defective because it “did not mention the parking lot incident and did not state the specific nature, permitted use, and reasoning for the use of” such evidence at trial. (Appellant’s Brief at 61- 62).

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evidence is well settled:

Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 664 Pa. 546, 244 A.3d 1222 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa.Super. 2014)).

“Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc),

appeal denied, 633 Pa. 787, 128 A.3d 220 (2015).

Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or tends to support a reasonable inference or proposition regarding a material fact. Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Commonwealth v. Danzey, 210 A.3d 333, 342 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 656 Pa. 9, 219 A.3d 597 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

After a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and

the relevant law, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

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making the evidentiary rulings at issue. See LeClair, supra. Consequently,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his third issue for the reasons stated in

the opinion that the Honorable Stephen M. Higgins entered on November 4,

2022. (See Opinion and Order Denying Post-Sentence Motions at 16-18).

Regarding Appellant’s proffer under Section 3104, Judge Higgins

emphasized that Appellant sought to introduce evidence of an incident

involving Victim that occurred in 2013. The 2013 incident involved a Skype

call where Victim proposed a threesome with Appellant and Ms. Norris.

Although the court determined that this evidence did not amount to

speculation or conjecture, the court concluded that the 2013 Skype call was,

inter alia, too remote in time. (See id. at 17). See also Commonwealth v.

Knowles, 637 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa.Super. 1994) (stating, “Whether evidence

is too remote in time to be probative … is largely within the discretion of the

trial court”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 808 A.2d 215, 225 (Pa.Super. 2002)

(stating, “In determining whether the evidence is so remote that the

prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value, the court has no fixed

standard on which to rely, but must instead consider the nature of the crime,

the evidence being offered, and all attendant circumstances”).

Regarding Appellant’s motion to require an expert report from the

Section 5920 expert, the court correctly noted that the expert’s testimony

“pertained to general dynamics of sexual assaults and did not discuss a

particular victim or the facts of the case.” (Opinion and Order Denying Post-

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Sentence Motions at 19). (See also N.T. Trial, 5/10/22, at 42-72). Because

the expert’s testimony amounted background information to assess Victim’s

credibility, the court did not require an expert report. Given the current state

of the law on this topic, we cannot say that the court erred. 12

Finally, as to Appellant’s claims regarding the evidence of his argument

with Ms. Norris, the court emphasized that “[t]he evidence was not admitted

under Pa.R.E. 404(b).” (Opinion and Order Denying Post-Sentence Motions

at 18). Rather, “the parking lot incident” was relevant, and “the probative

value outweighed any prejudicial effect on [Appellant].” (Id.) Here, we agree

that such evidence, which occurred immediately after the sexual assault,

tended to support reasonable inferences regarding material facts at issue.

See Danzey, supra. While Appellant would have this Court reweigh the

probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence, we are mindful of the

relevant standard of review and conclude that the trial court did not override

12 In his brief, Appellant noted that our Supreme Court would consider the issue of whether the Commonwealth must furnish a report from a Section 5920 expert in Dunn, supra. (See Appellant’s Brief at 54 n.6). Our Supreme Court decided Dunn after Appellant submitted his brief. The Dunn Court was evenly divided on the issue of whether the defendant suffered prejudice under the facts at issue. The Court’s opinion in support of affirmance also stated: “We do not address whether Section 5920 and Rule 573 require preparation of an expert report in all cases involving testimony about victim behaviors and responses to sexual abuse because the Commonwealth did, for the purposes of Section 5920, provide an expert report in this case.” Dunn, supra at ___, 300 A.3d at 335. Absent further guidance from the Supreme Court on this precise issue, we decline to say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to require an expert report in the instant case.

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or misapply the law in admitting this evidence. See LeClair, supra.

Accordingly, we adopt Judge Higgins’ reasoning as our own in denying relief

on Appellant’s third issue.

In his fourth issue, Appellant claims he made certain statements to state

police troopers after the incident with Victim. Appellant maintains that he and

Ms. Norris believed they were talking to the troopers about their stolen

wedding rings. Nevertheless, the troopers, “each with visible firearms,”

escorted Appellant “to an alcove and questioned [him] in an accusatory

manner.” (Appellant’s Brief at 64). Appellant avers that he “was never told

he did not have to speak with the troopers or that he was free to leave.” (Id.)

Appellant posits that the troopers conducted a custodial interrogation, and the

troopers should have provided Miranda warnings prior to questioning him.

Appellant concludes that the court should have suppressed all statements he

provided to the troopers under these circumstances. We disagree.

The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion

to suppress:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal

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conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018).

Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general

classifications:

The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal

denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super. 2000)).

“It is long-settled that Miranda warnings are only required for the third-

level interaction, i.e., custodial interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Spence,

290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa.Super. 2023).

The court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine if an encounter is investigatory or custodial, but the following factors are specifically considered: the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transported against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat or use of

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force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306 (Pa.Super. 2011),

appeal denied, 616 Pa. 651, 49 A.3d 442 (2012). “Further, an interrogation

occurs when the police should know that their words or actions are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Spence, supra

at 315 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1032 (Pa.Super.

2006)).

Instantly, the suppression court described Appellant’s encounter with

the state police as follows:

[After Victim reported the incident to state police], Trooper [Justin] Leri was notified by patrol troopers that [Appellant] had reported a separate incident concerning alleged theft of the wedding rings. He learned Appellant and [Ms. Norris] were staying at Skytop Lodge in Barrett Township, Monroe County. After he was unable to contact [Appellant] through the front desk, he called [Appellant’s] cell phone and told him he was working on an investigation and would like to talk. [Appellant] asked if that investigation pertained to the rings, and Trooper Leri responded, “yeah, there’s a lot of things we need to talk about.” He at no time mentioned [Victim] or her allegations.

[Appellant], with [Ms. Norris], met Trooper Leri and Trooper Giello at the front door of the building. They dressed in plain clothes and arrived in an unmarked vehicle, although both were wearing holstered firearms, as required by the Pennsylvania State Police. Trooper Leri identified himself and asked if they would prefer to go someplace more private than right in front of the car entrance. Together, they walked around to an alcove in the corner of the building. Trooper Leri does not remember if he and Trooper Giello stood between [Appellant] and the open space. Never did he say either [Appellant] or [Ms. Norris] was under arrest. But he also did not tell them specifically that they were not

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obligated to follow him and could leave whenever they wanted. [Appellant] was never cuffed, and Trooper Leri explained to him that he was not under arrest, though he did not specifically advise [Appellant] that he was free to leave.

During this conversation, [Appellant] stated the incident was consensual. At one point, he said that, if there were ever a case where a woman raped a man, it probably happened here. He admitted to engaging in digital penetration, using the word “fingering,” while in the shower with [Victim]. He said [Victim] got on top of him, but he could not get his penis erect. [Appellant] did admit that he grabbed her roughly enough to leave marks. Trooper Leri told [Appellant] he is not capable of making good decisions with alcohol. He suggested maybe “getting some sort of counseling, because these decisions while intoxicated are incredibly wrong, legally or morally.” During this time, [Ms. Norris] was visibly upset.

(Opinion and Order Denying Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed 3/26/21, at 6-7)

The suppression court evaluated these facts and concluded that

“following two troopers into a corner with them possibly standing between the

subject and the open world does not necessarily make the interaction

custodial.” (Id. at 9). The court added that these circumstances “did not

deprive [Appellant] of his physical freedom to the extent required so as to

become the functional equivalent of an arrest.” (Id.) We agree with the

court’s conclusion. To the extent Appellant also complains that the troopers

did not inform him that he was free to leave, this was just one factor under

the totality of circumstances. See Goldsborough, supra. Absent more, the

suppression court did not commit an error of law in concluding that Appellant

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was not subjected to a custodial interrogation when questioned by the

troopers outside Skytop Lodge. See Ford, supra. Because the interaction

did not amount to a custodial interrogation, the troopers did not have a duty

to provide Appellant with Miranda warnings. See Spence, supra. Thus,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his fourth issue.

In his fifth issue, Appellant asserts that the state police arranged for

Victim to engage in a monitored telephone call with Appellant. Appellant

insists, however, that the state police could not legally intercept this telephone

call unless they possessed reasonable grounds to suspect that criminal activity

had occurred. Appellant contends that the police could not meet this standard

where, aside from Victim’s allegations, they possessed “no facts other than

[the trooper] had been shown the ‘Plan B’ text message, that [Victim] was

highly intoxicated and was ‘piecing together’ what had occurred.” (Appellant’s

Brief at 67). Appellant concludes that the state police did not possess a

reasonable belief that a crime had been committed, and the court should have

suppressed Appellant’s statements from the intercepted telephone call on this

basis. We disagree.

This Court has explained that the Wiretap Act

is a pervasive scheme of legislation which suspends an individual’s constitutional rights to privacy only for the limited purpose of permitting law enforcement officials, upon a showing of probable cause, to gather evidence necessary to bring about a criminal prosecution and conviction. The statute sets forth clearly and unambiguously by whom and under what circumstances

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these otherwise illegal practices and their derivative fruits may be used.

Commonwealth v. Glass, 200 A.3d 477, 483 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 654 Pa. 507, 216 A.3d 226 (2019).

The Wiretap Act provides the following exception, which allows law

enforcement to utilize wiretaps without obtaining prior judicial approval when

one of the parties to the conversation provides consent:

§ 5704. Exceptions to prohibition of interception and disclosure of communications

It shall not be unlawful and no prior court approval shall be required under this chapter for:

(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any person acting at the direction or request of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication involving suspected criminal activities, including, but not limited to, the crimes enumerated in section 5708 (relating to order authorizing interception of wire, electronic or oral communications), where:

(ii) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However, no interception under this paragraph shall be made unless the Attorney General or a deputy attorney general designated in writing by the Attorney General, or the district attorney, or an assistant district attorney designated in writing by the district attorney, of the county wherein the interception is to be initiated, has reviewed the facts and is satisfied that the consent is voluntary and has given prior approval for the interception; however, such interception shall be subject to the recording and record keeping requirements of section 5714(a) (relating to recording of intercepted

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communications) and that the Attorney General, deputy attorney general, district attorney or assistant district attorney authorizing the interception shall be the custodian of recorded evidence obtained therefrom[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2)(ii). “In determining whether the approval of a

consensual wiretap was proper, this Court has determined that police officers

must articulate ‘reasonable grounds’ for the monitoring and the … district

attorney must verify that that these reasonable grounds exist.”

Commonwealth v. McMillan, 13 A.3d 521, 525 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal

denied, 611 Pa. 668, 27 A.3d 224 (2011).

Instantly, the suppression court explained the circumstances that

culminated with the state police monitoring Victim’s telephone call to

Appellant:

[Victim] reported the incident to the police, and Trooper Justin Leri investigated. She repeatedly told him she did not consent to any type of sexual activity with [Appellant]. Trooper Leri took her written statement…. Trooper Leri believes this statement broadly coincides with what she told him verbally and had reported to the sexual-assault nurse at the hospital.

Trooper Leri believed the best course of action was to set up a one-party consensual intercept and have [Victim] call [Appellant]. To do this, he called the on-call district attorney, explained the circumstances, the information he had at the time, and why a consensual intercept would be the best course of action. He prepared an officer’s memorandum and submitted it to the district attorney for review. Assistant District Attorney Julianne Fry then personally met with [Victim] and went over a consent memorandum with her. She signed the consent form on September 2, 2019. The form states that no promises or threats have been made, and she is freely and voluntarily giving consent. [Victim] texted [Appellant] in order to

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arrange the call. The actual recording was submitted by the Commonwealth as Exhibit 5 in the first omnibus hearing.

(Opinion and Order Denying Omnibus Pretrial Motion at 5-6) (record citations

omitted).

The suppression court concluded that Trooper Leri articulated

reasonable grounds for monitoring the call where Victim “reported [Appellant]

sexually touching her and biting her without consent while she was ‘blacked

out.’” (Id. at 15). We agree that the Commonwealth satisfied the applicable

standard. See Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 252 A.3d 656 (Pa.Super. 2021)

(stating intercepted recording of informant’s communication with defendant

was supported by reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity; informant

approached detectives with defendant’s phone number, street alias, and motel

room from which defendant was selling heroin, informant positively identified

picture of defendant, and district attorney consensualized informant prior to

intercepting and recording informant’s communication with defendant);

McMillan, supra (holding detectives possessed reasonable grounds to

suspect that defendant would discuss his past sexual encounters with minor

during intercepted phone call; although defendant had no contact with minor

for over one year before interception, detectives felt defendant would discuss

encounters based on defendant and minor’s close relationship);

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 622 A.2d 329 (Pa.Super. 1993) (explaining that

reasonable grounds existed to support a consensual wiretap where, prior to

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interception, informant provided police with information about his illegal

dealings with defendant).

Although Appellant attempted to challenge the credibility of Victim’s

report, the court correctly found that Victim’s uncorroborated statement was

sufficient. See Bellamy, supra at 668 n.19 (reiterating that “[t]o the extent

[the a]ppellant appears to challenge the suppression court’s weight and

credibility determinations, we reject such challenge. As an appellate court,

we cannot upset the credibility determinations of the suppression court”).

Therefore, the Commonwealth complied with the mandates of the Wiretap Act,

and Appellant is not entitled to relief on his fifth issue. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

5704(2)(ii).

In his final issue, Appellant evaluates the evidence offered by the

Commonwealth to support the convictions for attempted sexual assault,

aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault. Appellant submits that the

Commonwealth needed to present evidence that he “knew or subjectively

appreciated that [Victim] was not consenting but disregarded the risk of non-

consent[.]” (Appellant’s Brief at 68) (emphasis omitted). While Appellant

concedes that the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim can

provide sufficient evidence to support a conviction, Appellant emphasizes that

“[a] court is not required to accept what common sense, life experience, and

a reasonable intellect would otherwise indicate. Juries sometimes get it

wrong.” (Id. at 71).

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Appellant insists that Victim’s trial testimony conflicted with statements

she made to the emergency room doctor and SAFE nurse. Moreover,

Appellant asserts that Victim could not recall many details of the assault at

trial due to the amount of alcohol she consumed on the day of the assault.

After picking apart Victim’s testimony in excruciating detail, Appellant posits

that her testimony was “so inherently unreliable that a verdict based upon it

‘amount[s] to no more than surmise or conjecture.’” (Id. at 78-79) (citing

Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 533 Pa. 412, 419, 625 A.2d 1167, 1170

(1993)). For these reasons, Appellant concludes that the court erred in

denying his post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of

the evidence. We disagree.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where

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the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

Additionally,

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of the fact who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the … verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d 666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellant court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(2003), cert denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)

(most internal citations omitted). “Furthermore, it is well-established that ‘the

uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a

defendant of sexual offenses.’” Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889 A.2d

1228, 1232 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bishop, 742 A.2d

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178, 189 (Pa.Super. 1999)).

The Crimes Code defines criminal attempt and sexual assault as follows:

§ 901. Criminal attempt

(a) Definition of attempt.―A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901 (a).

§ 3124.1. Sexual assault

Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to rape) or 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.

Additionally, the Crimes Code defines aggravated indecent assault,

simple assault, and indecent assault, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 3125. Aggravated indecent assault

(a) Offenses defined.—Except as provided in sections 3121 (relating to rape), 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault), 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) and 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault), a person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits aggravated indecent assault if:

(1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(1).

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§ 2701. Simple assault

(a) Offense defined.—Except as provided under section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of assault if he:

(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

§ 3126. Indecent assault

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and:

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1).

Instantly, Victim testified about the assault that occurred inside the

locker room. At first, Victim “woke up to the pain of [Appellant] biting my

nipple.” (N.T. Trial, 5/9/22, at 70). Victim discovered that Appellant “was

holding me on my back” with one hand, and “with the free hand … was

touching me and my vagina and telling me that he—just relax, just relax.”

(Id. at 72, 73). Victim tried to get away, but Appellant “had pulled me—I

don’t know if it was pulling back but it was pulling down.” (Id. at 72). Victim

expressly stated that Appellant penetrated her vagina with his hand, and he

was “playing with himself and touching” Victim. (Id. at 73). After the assault,

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Victim “was sore in my thighs but also in my arms and just in general overall

sore.” (Id. at 85). Victim eventually went to the hospital where the

emergency room physician and SAFE nurse observed bruising and abrasions

on Victim’s body. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, Victim’s uncorroborated testimony

supported each of Appellant’s convictions. See Castelhun, supra; 18

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2701(a)(1), 3124.1, 3125(a)(1), 3126(a)(1).

Although Appellant maintains that Victim’s testimony was unreliable and

incredible, the jury was free to believe all, some, or none of her testimony.

See Champney, supra. In analyzing Appellant’s challenge to the weight of

the evidence, the trial court concluded:

The evidence in this case shows that [Appellant] had physically pulled the victim into the area of the showers. The testimony of the victim was compelling, and the jury chose not to believe the conflicting testimony of [the maid of honor] and [Ms. Norris]. [The trial c]ourt observed the entire trial and we find that the jury correctly determined the facts in this case. Further, the verdict is not so contrary to the evidence which would shock one’s sense of justice.

(Opinion and Order Denying Post-Sentence Motions at 20). Based upon our

review of the record, we cannot say that the court palpably abused its

discretion in ruling on the weight claim. See Champney, supra. Therefore,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final claim.

In its one issue for cross-appeal, the Commonwealth concedes that

Appellant’s sentence falls “within the statutory limits at the very, very bottom

of the mitigated range and separated from a downward departure sentence

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by one day.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 21-22) (emphasis in original). The

Commonwealth insists, however, that Appellant’s sentence is “offensive to

victims of sexual assault and contrary to the fundamental norms underlying

the sentencing process for sexual assault convictions[.]” (Id. at 22). More

specifically, the Commonwealth alleges that Appellant’s sentence “is

excessively and unjustifiably lenient given the lack of reasons supporting

mitigation.” (Id.) Additionally, the Commonwealth complains that the court

demonstrated “bias toward the victim and sympathy toward [Appellant]”

throughout the proceedings. (Id. at 23). The Commonwealth concludes that

this Court must remand the matter for resentencing due to the court’s

imposition of an excessively lenient sentence. As presented, the

Commonwealth’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing.

See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 641 Pa. 524, 168 A.3d 1287 (2017) (explaining claim that sentencing

court failed to provide adequate reasons for sentence imposed constituted

challenge to discretionary aspects of sentencing).

“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of

sentencing issue:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P

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902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Hyland, supra at 1183).

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of

the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d

162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). “A substantial question exists only when the

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code;

or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

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process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(en banc), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 774, 126 A.3d 1282 (2015) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 2011)). “[T]he

sentencing court’s failure to set forth adequate reasons for the sentence

imposed also raises a substantial question.” Hicks, supra at 227.

Instantly, the Commonwealth timely filed its notice of appeal, preserved

its issue in a post-sentence motion, and its brief included a Rule 2119(f)

statement. Further, the Commonwealth raises a substantial question as to

the appropriateness of the sentence by alleging that the court did not provide

adequate reasons to justify the sentence imposed. See id. Accordingly, we

proceed to address the merits of the Commonwealth’s issue.

This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the

following principles:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

In reviewing a record to determine if the sentencing court abused its discretion, the Sentencing Code instructs this Court to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the sentencing court’s findings as well as the court’s opportunity to observe the defendant, including through presentence investigation; and the sentencing guidelines.

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The Sentencing Code also instructs sentencing courts to consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The balancing of these Section 9721(b) sentencing factors is within the sole province of the sentencing court.

The sentencing court must also consider the sentencing guidelines when sentencing a defendant. However, the sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature—they are not mandatory.

Further, the weight accorded to the mitigating factors or aggravating factors presented to the sentencing court is within the court’s exclusive domain. This Court has stated that when a court possesses a PSI, it is presumed the court was aware of and weighed all relevant information contained [in the report] along with any mitigating sentencing factors.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 311 A.3d 12, 19 (Pa.Super. 2024) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

A sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in question[.] [W]hen a trial court imposes a sentence that is within the statutory limits, there is no abuse of discretion unless the sentence is manifestly excessive so as to inflict too severe a punishment.

Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d 1087, 1098 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal

Instantly, the court provided the following statement at the conclusion

of Appellant’s sentencing hearing:

Alright, well I did review the presentence report in this matter, it’s a very thorough well written report. It contains

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accurate information regarding an assessment of the guidelines that are applicable in this case. I am aware of the guidelines for each offense having reviewed that report. I also had the benefit of not only sitting through the trial in this case and listening to all the testimony, but there were a number of pre-trial proceedings. This case dates back several years, there has been numerous litigation on various legal issues, so I am quite familiar with the allegations here. I know that the jury found the defendant guilty of these four offenses, they took about eight or nine hours deliberating, rendered a verdict after 9 p.m. on the last day of the trial, and I don’t think there’s any dispute of anyone involved here that [Appellant] has been found guilty of some very serious offenses.

You know, the facts of this case are hard to comprehend on how this occurred during [Appellant’s] wedding weekend, I think that’s what’s gotten the media so interested in this case, the fact that a groom is charged with a sexual assault, or now convicted of a sexual assault on his wedding weekend. The parties were all together that day or two before the wedding, rafting down the Delaware, or tying boats together, floating equipment, a flotilla, which is a common occurrence here in the warm weather months.

People were stumbling around the river and it was a dangerous situation, and from that river, according to the evidence that was presented, [Appellant] escorted [Victim] up into the Shawnee Inn, and there was a video feed showing them walking down the hallway together, and then what the jury saw and what I saw was ultimately [Appellant] pulling [Victim] in through a door that ultimately led into the men’s locker room. They were in there for some time, either Amanda Glidden or [Ms. Norris] arrived and saw what occurred in the locker room, there’s certainly different assessments of what happened there, but you know it was, all along it was difficult for me to comprehend how this was occurring on [Appellant’s] wedding weekend, how this was occurring, and I know that [Victim] was heavily intoxicated, I saw her outside of the locker room, there was a video of her, she could barely stand up, she was clearly intoxicated, and I’m not sure how intoxicated [Appellant] was, but I can

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only imagine that he was very intoxicated based on the information being provided by others on the boat, and the fact that he was engaging in this type of behavior on his wedding, during his wedding weekend, it was really incomprehensible what was happening here, and the jury heard it all and they found him guilty of these serious charges, and you know, I have to look … and individualize my sentencing here and I need to consider everything, and I’m going to do that and you know, I get a lot of information from the pre-sentence investigation report about [Appellant’s] circumstances, his history, his background.

I learned a lot as well from the letters that were submitted on his behalf. I was really amazed how many letters were put together, I counted close to a hundred letters that were submitted on [Appellant’s] behalf, and these are letters from religious, or the clergy, lawyers, doctors, other professionals in the community who know [Appellant], know his family, many of them specifically addressed [Appellant], and you know, he, obviously with these people that wrote these letters, he enjoys a good reputation with them, and he has done a lot of good in his life and I don’t think that can be discounted, but I have to consider what he’s convicted of as well and the serious nature of the charge. The serious charge, or the most serious charge is attempt to commit sexual assault and it’s a felony of the second degree, and it’s an offense gravity score under our guideline of an 11[.]

So I need to consider that, I need to consider the impact that offense has had on the victim here when imposing a sentence, and this is not easy, this case and this sentencing has been weighing on me. I’ve been thinking about for quite some time since the verdict was returned, what’s the appropriate sentence.

I have to acknowledge that a sentence of probation or even a county range sentence is inappropriate in this case, that would result in a guideline departure. I’m not going to impose a departure range sentence in this case. I think such a sentence would depreciate the serious nature of the

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offense, but I also want to take into consideration some mitigating factors that I think exist in this case. [Appellant’s] history and background, the fact that this is, I believe an aberration, that this conduct is unlikely to happen again, so I think there are some mitigated factors here. So I intend to impose a sentence on him, within the guidelines, but giving consideration to some mitigation, and I’m trying to impose what I feel is the right sentence.

[Appellant] is a certified public accountant, he may lose his CPA license as a result of this, he’s going to have to register under Megan’s Law, lifetime registration. I mean there’s huge consequences all around here, but to me in reviewing everything, under all these circumstances, and giving the jury, the verdict the respect that it deserves of what they found the defendant guilty of, a sentence of total incarceration is warranted and I intend to impose that.

(N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/26/22, at 22-27).

Here, the court properly weighed the relevant factors in fashioning the

sentence, including the nature and circumstances of the crimes and the

gravity of the offenses as they relate to the impact on the life of the victim.

See Baker, supra. The court’s on-the-record statement provided adequate

justifications for the sentence imposed, and the presence of a PSI report

allows us to presume that the court considered all relevant factors. Moreover,

the Commonwealth concedes that Appellant’s sentence does not fall outside

the guidelines. Under such circumstances, we decline the Commonwealth’s

invitation to reweigh the mitigating and aggravating factors presented to the

sentencing court. See Baker, supra (holding court acted within its discretion

in imposing eight-year probationary sentence for defendant’s various drug-

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related charges; even though sentence was below mitigated range, court

provided reasons for deviating from guidelines in extensive, on-the-record

discussion). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge McLaughlin joins this memorandum.

Judge Dubow files a dissenting memorandum.

Date: 8/16/2024

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