Com. v. Cager, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided August 25, 2017·No. Com. v. Cager, J. No. 1994 WDA 2014·Unpublished

Opinion

J-S28001-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAROD CAGER, Appellant No. 1994 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 16, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013713-2011

BEFORE: OLSON, MOULTON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2017 Appellant, Jarod Cager, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on June 16, 2014 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, as made final when the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on October 30, 2014. We affirm.

The factual and procedural history in this case is as follows. On August 14, 2011, Kiona Sirmons was at the home of relatives on Rochelle Street in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. She was joined by several friends, including Ravin Reid, Montaja Littlejohn, and Valon Pennix. Sometime later, Sirmons’ boyfriend, Antwan Leake, and Jacelyn Terry joined the gathering. Upon arrival, Terry remained in the living room with the other women but Leake went into the kitchen. According to Detective James McGee, Sirmons stated in an interview on September 2, 2011 that two black males entered * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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the residence and proceeded to the kitchen approximately 15 minutes after Leake arrived.1 After two or three minutes, Sirmons heard multiple gunshots and saw Appellant and Terrel Noaks run from the kitchen and exit the front door.2 In a recorded statement given to the police on September 9, 2011, which the Commonwealth published to the jury, Sirmons confirmed that she saw Appellant and Noaks exit the home shortly after the shooting. Sirmons also identified Appellant and Noaks in a photographic array.

At trial, none of the women present at the Rochelle Street residence recalled details of the shooting on August 14, 2011, including the identities of any males who entered or left the house other than Leake. Sirmons testified that she previously identified Appellant and Noaks as the shooters because detectives harassed her and visited her at work. She also testified that the police told her who to circle on the photographic array and she denied telling police nicknames used by Appellant and Noaks.

Leake died after sustaining four gunshot wounds during the August 14 attack. Of these, wounds inflicted on Leake’s head and chest were deemed capable of causing death. A ballistics expert called by the Commonwealth

testified that five shell casings recovered from the crime scene were .40

1 Another detective testified at trial that Pennix met with investigators in February 2013 and said that Appellant was present in the home before Leake’s arrival and that he entered the kitchen area after Leake. 2 Sirmons testified at trial that she grew up with Appellant and that she knew Noaks from her neighborhood.

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caliber Smith and Wesson casings fired from a Glock handgun. These casings matched the .40 caliber bullet fragments recovered from the fatal wounds inflicted upon Leake. The Commonwealth also called Tanner Shawl as a witness against Appellant. Shawl testified that in December 2010, approximately eight months prior to the murder, he purchased a .40 caliber Glock handgun on behalf of Appellant. Shawl further testified that Appellant selected the gun and supplied funds to purchase the firearm.

Lastly, the Commonwealth introduced testimony from a witness trained in the field of cellular telephone data analysis. This testimony established that Appellant received four calls from Leake on the day of Leake’s murder. In addition, Noaks telephoned Appellant five times on the date of the crime. Four calls from Appellant’s telephone on August 14, 2011 between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. utilized a cellular tower situated in the same general area as the crime scene and Appellant’s mother’s residence.

At the conclusion of trial on February 4, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a), and carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). The jury acquitted Appellant of criminal conspiracy. On June 26, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for his murder conviction and a concurrent term of 40 to 80 months’ incarceration for carrying a firearm without a license.

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Appellant filed his initial post-sentence motion on June 26, 2014 and, thereafter, filed an amended motion on October 24, 2014. The court denied post-sentence relief on October 30, 2014. Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal on December 8, 2014, after the court reinstated his direct appeal rights. Following several extensions, Appellant, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 26, 2016. The trial court issued its opinion on August 2, 2016.

Appellant raises the following questions for our review:

Whether [Appellant] is entitled to a Frye[3] hearing to determine the admissibility of an eyewitness identification expert consistent with the recent holding in Commonwealth v. Walker[, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014)?]

Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence concerning a firearm that had been purchased for [Appellant]

approximately eight months before the homicide[?]

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the verdict in this matter was not against the weight of the evidence[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant’s first two claims challenge trial court rulings governing the admission of evidence. The following standards govern our review of such claims.

3 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923).

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The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1068 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied his request for a Frye hearing to determine whether expert testimony would have assisted the factfinder in assessing eyewitness identification evidence. At trial, none of the Commonwealth’s witnesses identified Appellant. Nonetheless, Sirmons’ pretrial statements to police identified Appellant as one of two individuals who entered the home before Leake was shot and fled the scene after shots were fired. The court admitted her statements of identification for substantive purposes as prior inconsistent statements pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(B) and (C). Citing Walker, Appellant argues that he was entitled to show how expert testimony would have aided the jury in considering Sirmons’ statement since the Commonwealth primarily relied on her identification, which she made following a stressful episode that involved gunfire. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court determined that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification would not have aided the jury in this case since

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none of the Commonwealth’s witnesses identified Appellant at trial. We conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief.4 In Walker, our Supreme Court set aside the per se restriction on expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications. Instead, the Court held,

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