Com. v. Booker, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 3, 2025
• Docket: 1863 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S26037-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LARUE BOOKER : : Appellant : No. 1863 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003153-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 3, 2025

Larue Booker (“Booker”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed by the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)

following his convictions of criminal conspiracy to commit delivery of a

controlled substance and criminal use of a communication facility.1 On appeal,

Booker challenges the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress and the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. We affirm.

The charges stem from a drug and alleged gun deal between Booker

and a confidential informant (“the CI”) working for the Pennsylvania Office of

the Attorney General. On July 7, 2020, the CI called Booker to purchase a

handgun and fentanyl. Booker had the handgun but needed a source to bring

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(a), 7512(a). J-S26037-25

the fentanyl. Booker instructed the CI to come to his residence to receive the

gun and fentanyl that same day.

Agents of the Attorney General’s office searched the CI prior to the

meeting and did not find any drugs or guns. The CI then met with Booker,

entered his residence, and waited for the source to arrive. The CI kept Agent

Ian Urbanski updated throughout the meeting via text. After the source

arrived and entered Booker’s residence, the CI texted Agent Urbanski that the

deal was complete. The CI left and delivered a handgun and fentanyl to Agent

Urbanski.

Agents arrested Booker several months later and transported him to

Kingston Police Station for processing. While being processed by Agent

Urbanski, Booker made comments and asked questions about his arrest.

Agent Urbanski immediately orally advised Booker of his Miranda2 rights.

Booker stated he understood his rights. Booker then continued speaking and

told Agent Urbanski he had purchased the gun for the CI. He also expressed

confusion as to why he was being charged with a drug crime because he did

not make any profit on the deal and was only helping a friend.

Booker filed a motion to suppress these statements. Following a

hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Booker then entered a guilty plea

to conspiracy and criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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later permitted him to withdraw this plea. The case proceeded to trial, after

which the jury found Booker guilty of conspiracy and criminal use of a

communication facility, and not guilty of delivery of a controlled substance and

unlawful sale or transfer of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Booker to an

aggregate term of 72 to 144 months of incarceration. This timely appeal

followed.

Booker raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the court erred in denying [Booker]’s [m]otion to [s]uppress [s]tatements taken by [l]aw [e]nforcement[?]

II. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to convict [Booker] of [c]onspiracy and [c]riminal [u]se of a [c]ommunication [f]acility[?]

Booker’s Brief at 1.

Motion to Suppress

Booker asserts the trial court should have suppressed the statements

he made at the police station after being arrested. Id. at 5, 8. Because he

began making statements before Agent Urbanski administered Miranda

warnings, Booker contends the statements are inadmissible. Id. at 8. He

further argues his statements after hearing his Miranda rights are also

inadmissible because the totality of the circumstances, including not signing a

written Miranda waiver, indicate he did not voluntarily waive his rights. Id.

Our review of a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress

is well established:

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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre[]trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34-35 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

Miranda rights are required only prior to a custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [his] freedom of action in any significant way. Furthermore, volunteered or spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible without the administration of Miranda warnings. When a defendant gives a statement without police interrogation, we consider the statement to be 'volunteered' and not subject to suppression.

Commonwealth v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694, 698 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

[T]he term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the

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suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1136-37 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citation omitted).

At the suppression hearing, Agent Urbanski testified that law

enforcement arrested Booker and brought him to the police station where they

transferred custody of him to Agent Urbanski. N.T., 9/16/2022 at 8-9. While

Agent Urbanski was processing Booker at the station, Booker began asking

questions and talking about his arrest. Id. at 9. Agent Urbanski immediately

stopped Booker and administered Miranda warnings to him, which Booker

said he understood.3 Id. While Agent Urbanski continued to process Booker

after reading him his rights, Booker then, without prompting, stated he did

not believe he did anything wrong regarding the fentanyl delivery because he

did not make a profit and was only helping a friend. Id. at 9, 12.

3 It is unclear from the record what specific statements Booker made before

Agent Urbanski interrupted him to administer Miranda warnings.

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Regarding Booker’s statements before receiving Miranda warnings, the

trial court found Booker made voluntary, spontaneous statements that did not

require the administration of Miranda warnings. Trial Court Opinion,

2/18/2025, at 4 (unpaginated). We agree. Booker’s statements were

unprompted and volunteered. Indeed, he made the statements while Agent

Urbanski was processing him, without any questions posed, and there were

no actions or circumstances “likely to elicit an incriminating response from the

suspect.” See Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1136-37. Therefore, the trial court

properly denied the motion to suppress Booker’s pre-Miranda statements.

See Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 856 A.2d 62, 75-76 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(finding the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress when the

defendant made voluntary and inculpatory statements without Miranda

warnings); see also Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 720 (Pa. 1998)

(“[V]olunteered or spontaneous utterances are admissible even though the

declarant was not ‘Mirandized.’”).

Regarding Booker’s statements after receiving Miranda warnings,

Booker voluntarily made these statements after waiving those warnings. See

Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/2025, at 4 (unpaginated). The record reflects that

Agent Urbanski was still processing Booker and did not ask any questions,

establishing that Booker was not under an interrogation. Further, Booker

unequivocally acknowledged that he understood his rights and continued

speaking. As such, when Agent Urbanski administered Miranda warnings,

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Booker waived the warnings and made voluntary and spontaneous

statements. See Baez, 720 A.2d at 720. The absence of a written waiver of

Miranda warnings does not render the waiver involuntarily given.

Commonwealth v. Baez, 21 A.3d 1280, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2011) (explaining

that an “explicit waiver” of one’s Miranda rights is required under

Pennsylvania law as demonstrated by “‘an outward manifestation of a waiver

such as an oral, written or physical manifestation.’”) (emphasis added).

Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress Booker’s

post-Miranda statements. Booker’s first claim is without merit.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Booker next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

convictions. This Court assesses sufficiency claims according to the following

standard:

Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the [fact finder] to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the [fact finder].

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Commonwealth v. Scott, 325 A.3d 844, 849 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

Conspiracy

Regarding the conspiracy conviction, Booker argues the Commonwealth

did not offer the CI as a witness, resulting in no firsthand account of the

incident. Booker’s Brief at 10, 11. Booker further contends the CI’s absence

prevented him from examining the CI’s credibility on cross-examination. Id.

at 10.

Criminal conspiracy requires the Commonwealth to prove “1) an

agreement, 2) shared criminal intent, and 3) an overt act.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted); see

also 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a). “[A] conspiracy may be inferred where it is

demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or circumstances of the parties, and

the overt acts of the co-conspirators sufficiently prove the formation of a

criminal confederation.” Johnson, 180 A.3d at 479.

Agent Urbanski testified that on a recorded phone call, Booker arranged

for the CI to receive a handgun and to have a source provide the CI with

fentanyl. N.T., 5/21/2024 at 26. Booker invited the CI to his residence for

the exchange. Id. at 27. Agent Urbanski then testified that he saw Booker

with the CI and the CI texted Agent Urbanski that they were waiting for

Booker’s fentanyl source. Id. at 28-30. Agent Urbanski witnessed a man

arrive at the residence, meet with Booker and the CI, and then exit the

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residence. Id. at 30. The CI then texted Agent Urbanski the deal was

complete and brought the fentanyl to him after leaving the residence. Id. at

31. Agent Urbanski testified Booker admitted at the police station that he was

“helping a friend” with the drug deal. Id. at 41. Kayla Flick, an investigative

analyst for the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office who was present when

Agent Urbanski was processing Booker, also testified that Booker admitted he

was involved in the exchange. Id. at 80.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, the jury could reasonably infer that Booker made an

agreement with the source to deliver fentanyl to the CI and shared the intent

to do so. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1238-39 (Pa.

2004) (finding sufficient evidence for a conspiracy to deliver a controlled

substance conviction where the appellant determined if a buyer was a police

officer, the appellant called the supplier over, and the supplier knew this

meant there was a potential buyer). The evidence shows Booker arranged for

his source to come to his residence to deliver fentanyl and admitted to “helping

a friend” execute the drug deal. See Commonwealth v. Little, 305 A.3d 38

(Pa. Super. 2023) (stating that any co-conspirator can make the overt act,

not only the defendant). The absence of the CI’s testimony at trial did not

render the evidence insufficient, as Agent Urbanski provided the details of the

controlled buys, including providing the buy money and recovering the drugs

after the deal. See Commonwealth v. Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 319-20 (Pa.

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Super 2019) (finding the evidence sufficient for a delivery of a controlled

substance conviction when only an agent testified to the details of a drug deal

executed by a confidential informant with the appellant). Therefore, the

evidence was sufficient to support Booker’s conspiracy conviction.

Criminal Use of a Communication Facility

For the criminal use of a communications facility conviction, Booker

argues a jury could not reasonably infer his guilt without the CI’s testimony,

and the text messages between the CI and Agent Urbanski, which were not

admitted into evidence. Booker’s Brief at 11.

Criminal use of a communication facility requires the Commonwealth to

prove “(1) [a]ppellant[] knowingly and intentionally used a communication

facility; (2) [a]ppellant[] knowingly, intentionally or recklessly facilitated an

underlying felony; and (3) the underlying felony occurred.” Commonwealth

v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. Super. 2004); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512.

A communication facility is “a public or private instrumentality used or useful

in the transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or

intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part, including, but not

limited to, [a] telephone.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(c).

As described above, Agent Urbanski testified that the CI made a

recorded phone call to Booker during which Booker stated he had to call his

source for fentanyl. N.T., 5/21/2024 at 26. Booker also invited the CI to his

residence for the exchange. Id. Agent Urbanski testified that the CI met with

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the source at Booker’s residence and received the fentanyl from him, which

he then delivered to Agent Urbanski. Id. at 30-31.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain Booker’s conviction. The recorded

phone call from the CI evidences that Booker used a telephone as a

communication device for facilitating the delivery of a controlled substance.

Booker’s invitation to the CI to have the exchange take place at his residence

furthers the facilitation of this felony. Agent Urbanski’s testimony that the CI

received and brought the fentanyl to him is sufficient evidence that the

underlying felony of delivery of a controlled substance occurred. Neither the

CI’s testimony nor the text messages as exhibits are necessary for a jury to

conclude Booker criminally used a communication facility. See Ellison, 213

A.3d at 319-20; see also Scott, 325 A.3d at 849. Therefore, the evidence is

sufficient to sustain Booker’s conviction.

Judgement of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 09/03/2025

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