J-A17002-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM : : Appellant : No. 886 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000760-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM : : Appellant : No. 888 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000751-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM : : Appellant : No. 889 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000762-2022
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. J-A17002-25
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: October 15, 2025
Zachary William Baum appeals from the judgments of sentence entered
at three dockets for his convictions for multiple crimes against three victims:
strangulation, stalking, and simple assault, related to victim C.F.; indecent
assault, related to victim K.S.; and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
(IDSI), sexual abuse of children, and corruption of minors, related to victim
R.T.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of expert
testimony, and the use of Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
Instruction (Pa. SSJI (Crim)) § 4.13B. We affirm.
Baum’s appellate claims address his convictions related to victim R.T.
only. Therefore, we limit our discussion to the procedural and factual history
relevant to those convictions. The Commonwealth charged Baum with
numerous sex offenses related to R.T., including IDSI. As to IDSI, the
information alleged that Baum “forced his penis into the known juvenile
victim’s mouth against her will[.]” Criminal Information at CP-03-CR-
0000762-2022.
Before trial, Baum filed a motion for a Frye hearing, seeking to
disqualify the Commonwealth’s expert psychologist, Veronique Valliere, Ph.D.
He claimed that “[t]here are articulable grounds to believe that [Dr. Valliere]
has not applied accepted scientific methodology in a conventional fashion” in
reaching her conclusions. Motion for Frye Hearing, filed 8/28/23, at ¶ 7 ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2709.1(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 3126(a)(2), 3123(a)(1), 6312(b)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(iii), respectively.
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(citation and quotation marks omitted). Baum then filed a second motion to
disqualify Dr. Valliere, this time “based on the face of her expert report[.]”
Motion to Disqualify Commonwealth Expert, filed 8/29/23, at ¶ 10. He argued
that her report “demonstrates that to reach her expert opinion she applied no
methodology, let alone a ‘methodology generally accepted by scientists in the
relevant field[.]’” Id. at ¶ 4 (citing Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038
(Pa. 2002)). Baum stated at the top of the first page of both motions, “No
Hearing Requested.” The court denied both motions. Order, filed 9/7/23.
Baum also filed a motion in limine to preclude the use of the standard
criminal jury instruction 4.13B, which reads:
4.13B Conviction Based on Reported Victim’s Uncorroborated Testimony in Sexual Offenses--General
The testimony of [name of reported victim] standing alone, if believed by you, is sufficient proof upon which to find the defendant guilty in this case, if the Commonwealth has established all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the reported victim need not be supported by other evidence to sustain a conviction. Thus, after consideration of the evidence, you may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of [name of reported victim] convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.13B. Baum argued that the instruction violated his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his
rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Motion In Limine Regarding
Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.13B, filed 8/28/23. The court also denied this motion.
See Order, filed 9/7/23.
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During the voir dire of Dr. Valliere, she described her educational
background, training, and experience regarding sexual assault and
victimization. N.T., Trial, 9/25/23, at 5-6. She also explained that her work
with the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB) resulted in her “work[ing]
with literally thousands of offenders and hundreds and hundreds – probably
in the thousands of victims of now, either performing the care, doing
evaluations or supervising the care of victims and offenders.” Id. at 7. In
addition to her experience on the SOAB, Dr. Valliere testified that she had two
outpatient clinics where she treated both victims and offenders of sexual
offenses. Id. Dr. Valliere testified that she had published three books about
“victims, perpetrators and the criminal justice system” and had previously
testified “dozens of times” on victim behavior and response related to sexual
offenses. Id. at 8, 9.
Defense counsel pointed out that Dr. Valliere’s expert report stated that
she gained her knowledge in victim behavior and response “through [her] own
studies as well as [through] clinical work treating hundreds of victims of
assault.” Id. at 11 (citing Defense Exhibit A (“Expert Report”)). Dr. Valliere
explained that these studies included “[a]ll the studying I have done to learn
about victims, all of the research I did to write my books, all of the books that
I have read.” Id. She further testified that her knowledge about victim
response and behavior is “based partly on what people tell me, what my
experience shows and what the research shows.” Id. at 33. Counsel also
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inquired about the books written by Dr. Valliere and the methodology of
doctors cited in the books. Id. at 16, 19, 20.
Following voir dire, counsel objected to Dr. Valliere being offered as an
expert because “there is no methodology.” Id. at 34. The court overruled the
objection, finding that Dr. Valliere met the standard for testifying as an expert
based on her “special training or experience beyond that that a lay person
would have.” Id. at 36. The court then explained to the jury that it was
permitting Dr. Valliere to testify as an expert in clinical and forensic
psychology. Id. at 37.
In her testimony, Dr. Valliere explained that she was testifying as a
“blind expert,” meaning that she had no knowledge of the facts of the case,
the victim, or the perpetrator. Id. She further explained that her testimony
was limited to “information based upon [her] training, experience and
knowledge primarily about victim behaviors before, during and after a sexual
assault[.]” Id. at 38. During cross-examination, counsel questioned Dr.
Valliere about the books she authored and inquired as to her potential bias.
Dr. Valliere did not testify about the specifics of the case, the victims, or Baum.
R.T. testified that she had come to know Baum when she was 16 years
old.
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J-A17002-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM : : Appellant : No. 886 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000760-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM : : Appellant : No. 888 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000751-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM : : Appellant : No. 889 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000762-2022
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. J-A17002-25
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: October 15, 2025
Zachary William Baum appeals from the judgments of sentence entered
at three dockets for his convictions for multiple crimes against three victims:
strangulation, stalking, and simple assault, related to victim C.F.; indecent
assault, related to victim K.S.; and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
(IDSI), sexual abuse of children, and corruption of minors, related to victim
R.T.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of expert
testimony, and the use of Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
Instruction (Pa. SSJI (Crim)) § 4.13B. We affirm.
Baum’s appellate claims address his convictions related to victim R.T.
only. Therefore, we limit our discussion to the procedural and factual history
relevant to those convictions. The Commonwealth charged Baum with
numerous sex offenses related to R.T., including IDSI. As to IDSI, the
information alleged that Baum “forced his penis into the known juvenile
victim’s mouth against her will[.]” Criminal Information at CP-03-CR-
0000762-2022.
Before trial, Baum filed a motion for a Frye hearing, seeking to
disqualify the Commonwealth’s expert psychologist, Veronique Valliere, Ph.D.
He claimed that “[t]here are articulable grounds to believe that [Dr. Valliere]
has not applied accepted scientific methodology in a conventional fashion” in
reaching her conclusions. Motion for Frye Hearing, filed 8/28/23, at ¶ 7 ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2709.1(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 3126(a)(2), 3123(a)(1), 6312(b)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(iii), respectively.
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(citation and quotation marks omitted). Baum then filed a second motion to
disqualify Dr. Valliere, this time “based on the face of her expert report[.]”
Motion to Disqualify Commonwealth Expert, filed 8/29/23, at ¶ 10. He argued
that her report “demonstrates that to reach her expert opinion she applied no
methodology, let alone a ‘methodology generally accepted by scientists in the
relevant field[.]’” Id. at ¶ 4 (citing Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038
(Pa. 2002)). Baum stated at the top of the first page of both motions, “No
Hearing Requested.” The court denied both motions. Order, filed 9/7/23.
Baum also filed a motion in limine to preclude the use of the standard
criminal jury instruction 4.13B, which reads:
4.13B Conviction Based on Reported Victim’s Uncorroborated Testimony in Sexual Offenses--General
The testimony of [name of reported victim] standing alone, if believed by you, is sufficient proof upon which to find the defendant guilty in this case, if the Commonwealth has established all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the reported victim need not be supported by other evidence to sustain a conviction. Thus, after consideration of the evidence, you may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of [name of reported victim] convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.13B. Baum argued that the instruction violated his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his
rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Motion In Limine Regarding
Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.13B, filed 8/28/23. The court also denied this motion.
See Order, filed 9/7/23.
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During the voir dire of Dr. Valliere, she described her educational
background, training, and experience regarding sexual assault and
victimization. N.T., Trial, 9/25/23, at 5-6. She also explained that her work
with the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB) resulted in her “work[ing]
with literally thousands of offenders and hundreds and hundreds – probably
in the thousands of victims of now, either performing the care, doing
evaluations or supervising the care of victims and offenders.” Id. at 7. In
addition to her experience on the SOAB, Dr. Valliere testified that she had two
outpatient clinics where she treated both victims and offenders of sexual
offenses. Id. Dr. Valliere testified that she had published three books about
“victims, perpetrators and the criminal justice system” and had previously
testified “dozens of times” on victim behavior and response related to sexual
offenses. Id. at 8, 9.
Defense counsel pointed out that Dr. Valliere’s expert report stated that
she gained her knowledge in victim behavior and response “through [her] own
studies as well as [through] clinical work treating hundreds of victims of
assault.” Id. at 11 (citing Defense Exhibit A (“Expert Report”)). Dr. Valliere
explained that these studies included “[a]ll the studying I have done to learn
about victims, all of the research I did to write my books, all of the books that
I have read.” Id. She further testified that her knowledge about victim
response and behavior is “based partly on what people tell me, what my
experience shows and what the research shows.” Id. at 33. Counsel also
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inquired about the books written by Dr. Valliere and the methodology of
doctors cited in the books. Id. at 16, 19, 20.
Following voir dire, counsel objected to Dr. Valliere being offered as an
expert because “there is no methodology.” Id. at 34. The court overruled the
objection, finding that Dr. Valliere met the standard for testifying as an expert
based on her “special training or experience beyond that that a lay person
would have.” Id. at 36. The court then explained to the jury that it was
permitting Dr. Valliere to testify as an expert in clinical and forensic
psychology. Id. at 37.
In her testimony, Dr. Valliere explained that she was testifying as a
“blind expert,” meaning that she had no knowledge of the facts of the case,
the victim, or the perpetrator. Id. She further explained that her testimony
was limited to “information based upon [her] training, experience and
knowledge primarily about victim behaviors before, during and after a sexual
assault[.]” Id. at 38. During cross-examination, counsel questioned Dr.
Valliere about the books she authored and inquired as to her potential bias.
Dr. Valliere did not testify about the specifics of the case, the victims, or Baum.
R.T. testified that she had come to know Baum when she was 16 years
old. N.T., Trial, 9/26/23, at 118. The two met on Snapchat. Id. at 119. During
their first meeting in December 2019, R.T. performed oral sex on Baum, who
was 21 years old at the time. Id. at 121. R.T. testified that their sexual
relationship eventually progressed to what she described as consensual
vaginal intercourse and occurred multiple times throughout their relationship.
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Id. at 124, 176, 177. She also described separate incidents in which Baum
became violent with her. During one incident, Baum choked R.T. while she
was lying on the bed after he learned that another male had seen a video of
Baum and R.T. having sex. Id. at 143, 144. Another time, Baum pressed
R.T.’s head against a window while grabbing her neck after discovering a
“hickey” on her neck. Id. at 126.
R.T. also testified that she took medication for anxiety and depression
and at times she would take too much. Id. at 129, 130. During those times
she would feel “kind of foggy” and had difficulty remembering things in the
moment. Id. at 130. She described one sexual encounter in Baum’s car on a
day that she had taken a larger amount of her medication. She testified that
during the “middle” of sex with Baum “my head was feeling foggy and I was
like ‘How did I get here? I don’t remember [Baum] taking me up here. I want
to stop.’” Id. at 131. She told Baum to stop and “[Baum] just kept going even
though I was saying no” and told her, “Don’t tell your friends I raped you.”
Id. This occurred while R.T. was still 16 years of age. Id. at 133. During
another sexual encounter, Baum ejaculated inside of R.T. without telling her.
Id. at 150. A few weeks later, R.T. learned that she was pregnant. R.T.
informed Baum of the pregnancy and “he said he would kill himself on his way
to work if [R.T.] didn’t have an abortion.” Id. at 151. Baum and R.T. did not
have sex after R.T. became pregnant. Id. at 152, 153.
R.T. gave birth to the child in April 2021. Id. at 152. A final sexual
encounter occurred between Baum and R.T. in July 2021. Id. at 163. R.T.
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drove with her child to pick Baum up to see the child. The three went to a park
and afterwards R.T. drove Baum to his sister’s house. Id. at 165. Baum told
her to drive to the end of the street near a stop sign. Id. at 166. Once she
arrived, Baum said he would not get out of the car unless R.T. performed oral
sex on him. Id. The child was still in the car at the time. Id. Baum exposed
his erect penis and R.T. put her face over it. Id. at 166, 201. Baum then
pushed R.T.’s head down causing his penis to enter her mouth. Id. at 166,
167. She testified that she “was hoping on all I had to do was touch it and he
would leave, but he pushed my mouth down more than I had wanted it.” Id.
at 201. R.T. got up and told Baum to get out of the car. Id. at 167. R.T.’s
communication with Baum “mostly stopped” after this incident. Id. at 168.
The jury found Baum guilty of the above referenced offenses, and the
court sentenced him to an aggregate term of nine to 25 years’ incarceration.
This timely appeal followed.
Baum raises the following issues:
1. Was the evidence insufficient to support a conviction of 18 Pa.C.S. § 312[3](a)(1) involuntary deviate sexual intercourse?
2. Does expert testimony that is not based on a methodology accepted in the field violate a defendant’s rights under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Pa. Const. art. I § 9?
3. Should Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.13B, regarding the uncorroborated testimony of a victim in sexual offense cases, be disallowed as a violation of a defendant’s right to due process under U.S. Const. amend. V and Pa. Const. art. I?
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Baum’s Br. at 4 (answers of trial court omitted).
Baum’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his IDSI
conviction. He claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove the element of
forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion. He points to R.T.’s
testimony where she agreed that Baum did not threaten to harm her but said
he would not get out of the car until she performed the sexual act. He claims
the victim initially consented, noting her testimony that she “was hoping on
all I had to do was touch it and he would leave, but he pushed my mouth
down more than I had wanted to.” Id. at 16. Baum claims that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that Baum knew the limitation on consent or
the subsequent withdrawal of consent by the victim. He also alleges the
Commonwealth failed to prove that his act of pushing the victim’s head down
amounted to forcible compulsion or the threat of forcible compulsion.
Additionally, he asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove that his act of
refusing to get out of the car amounted to forcible compulsion or the threat of
such.
Our standard of review for a sufficiency claim is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1091
(Pa.Super. 2023). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth and determine whether “there is sufficient evidence to enable
the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (citation omitted).
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The crime of IDSI occurs when a person “engages in deviate sexual
intercourse[,]” including oral intercourse, “with a complainant by forcible
compulsion.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801
A.2d 551, 556 (Pa. 2002) (listing oral intercourse as a form of deviate sexual
intercourse). To establish forcible compulsion, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the force was “absen[t] of consent, inducing
submission without further resistance.” Commonwealth v. Buffington, 828
A.2d 1024, 1031 (Pa. 2003). Such force may be physical, psychological, or
the threat of physical force. See Commonwealth v. Quinones, 200 A.3d
1004, 1012 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 A.2d
541, 544 (Pa. 1999)). Forcible compulsion is determined based on the totality
of circumstances and may include consideration of the following factors:
the respective ages of the victim and the accused, the respective mental and physical conditions of the victim and the accused, the atmosphere and physical setting in which the incident was alleged to have taken place, the extent to which the accused may have been in a position of authority, domination or custodial control over the victim, and whether the victim was under duress.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 721 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986)).
Here, the court rejected Baum’s sufficiency challenge. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the court found
that the Commonwealth established every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. It explained:
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In this case, R.T. testified that when she gave Mr. Baum a ride, Baum told her he would not get out of her car unless she performed oral sex on him. She did not wish to perform oral sex, but hoped that if she touched his penis he would leave the car. As she lowered her head toward his penis, he used his hand or hands to push her head down and her mouth onto his penis. She angrily pulled her head up and demanded that he get out of her car, which he did.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to prove each and every element of the offense. In particular, the evidence that Mr. Baum surprised R.T. by pushing her head down so that his penis entered her mouth, together with the evidence that she angrily pulled her head back up and demanded that he exit the car, shows that she did not agree to perform oral sex and that his penis only entered her mouth because he pushed her head.
Rule 1925(a) Opinion, Docket 762, filed 8/30/24, at 12-13. We agree with the
court’s holding.
Based on the totality of the evidence, including the prior encounters
between Baum and R.T., we conclude that the Commonwealth established the
element of forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion. First, the
Commonwealth presented evidence of Baum’s past physical violence against
R.T. Then, against that background, the victim testified that on the occasion
in question, Baum told her that he would not leave her car until she performed
oral sex. R.T. testified that she “was hoping on all I had to do was touch it and
he would leave,” but Baum pushed her head down onto his penis farther than
she wanted. N.T., Trial, 9/26/23, at 201. The fact that Baum had to push her
head supports the inference that he was aware that he was acting without the
victim’s consent. Baum’s claim is meritless.
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Next, Baum challenges the admissibility of Dr. Valliere’s expert
testimony. He argues that Dr. Valliere failed to employ a methodology
generally accepted in the field, and such testimony violated his rights under
the Sixth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution. He claims her testimony
revealed that she “employed no methodology and that Dr. Valliere had, in
fact, in her book, rejected another purported expert’s conclusions because he
had employed no methodology[.]” Baum’s Br. at 19. He also asserts that this
case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594
(Pa.Super. 2018), where this Court rejected a challenge to the admission of
Dr. Valliere’s expert testimony. See id. at 19-21 (citing N.T., Trial, 9/25/23,
at 20-22).
The admission of expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion.
Cramer, 195 A.3d at 605. Rule 702 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
provides the factors for determining if a witness may give expert testimony.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;
(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field.
Pa.R.E. 702.
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Here, Baum does not argue that Dr. Valliere employed a methodology
that is not generally accepted in the field, in violation of Rule 702. Rather, he
argues that her testimony was inadmissible because she employed “no
methodology” at all. Baum’s Br. at 19. The record belies this claim. She
explained how her training, education, experience, and research formed her
substantive testimony on victims’ behavior and responses related to sexual
assault. Moreover, Baum’s reliance on the Frye2 standard is misplaced. It only
applies if the party challenging the admissibility of expert scientific testimony
first shows that the testimony involves novel scientific evidence. See Cramer,
195 A.3d at 606; Trach v. Fellin, 817 A.2d 1102, 1109 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en
banc). Baum has made no effort to carry that initial burden. To the extent
Baum has claimed a violation of the Sixth Amendment or the Pennsylvania
Constitution, he waived the issue because his brief includes absolutely no
argument on either question. Baum has not shown that the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting Dr. Valliere’s testimony.
In his final issue, Baum challenges suggested standard criminal jury
instruction 4.13B regarding the jury’s ability to rely on uncorroborated witness
testimony in sexual offense cases. Baum directs us to out-of-state cases
disapproving of a “uncorroborated testimony” or “single witness” jury
instruction. He maintains that “[t]his Court should mandate a . . . ‘non
____________________________________________
2 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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particularized instruction applicable to all witness testimony,’ if not disallow
[jury instruction] 4.13B altogether.” Baum’s Br. at 31.
This claim is meritless. Suggested standard criminal jury instruction
4.13B remains a proper statement of Pennsylvania law. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3106 (“The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in
prosecutions under this chapter.”). See also Commonwealth v. Holiday,
No. 870 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 8923110 at *5 (Pa.Super. filed Dec. 27, 2023)
(unpublished mem.) (rejecting constitutional challenge to suggested standard
criminal jury instruction 4.13B). Baum has not cited any Pennsylvania
authority stating otherwise.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 10/15/2025
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