J-S80022-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
DAMIEN RAYON BARNHILL
Appellant No. 709 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered April 26, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0004485-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and RANSOM, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2017
Appellant, Damien Rayon Barnhill, appeals from the April 26, 2016
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, denying
his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. In addition, counsel has filed a Turner-
Finely “no-merit” letter1 and a motion seeking to withdraw. Following
review, we grant counsel’s petition and affirm the order of the PCRA court.
On September 18, 2013, at the conclusion of a four-day bench trial,
the trial judge found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder (18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2502(a)). On September 23, 2013, the trial judge imposed the mandatory
____________________________________________
1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). J-S80022-16
sentence of life imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this
Court claiming trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his July
27, 2012 statement to police, and erred in denying his motion in limine to
exclude his wife’s testimony concerning his non-verbal actions around the
time of the victim’s death. A panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Barnhill, No. 1901 MDA 2013,
unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed August 14, 2014).
On June 22, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was
appointed and submitted a counseled amended petition on October 23,
2015. The Commonwealth filed its response on November 19, 2015. A
hearing was held on February 9, 2016, during which both Appellant and trial
counsel testified. The sole issue raised at the hearing was Appellant’s jury
trial waiver.
Following the hearing, Appellant filed a “Brief sur Amended PCRA” on
March 10, 2016, and the Commonwealth filed a response on March 30,
2016. By order entered April 26, 2016, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s
petition. This timely appeal followed.
On July 19, 2016, Appellant’s PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel along with a “no-merit” letter, seeking review of the issue
rejected by the PCRA court, i.e., whether “trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to fully and competently advise [Appellant] concerning his right to a
-2- J-S80022-16
trial by jury which resulted in [Appellant] making an unknowing decision to
waive his right to a jury trial.” Counsel’s No-Merit Letter, 7/19/16, at 3.2
Before we may consider whether the PCRA court abused its discretion
by denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and requested relief, we must address
whether PCRA counsel has met the requirements of Turner/Finley. For
PCRA counsel to withdraw under Turner/Finley in this Court:
(1) PCRA counsel must file a no-merit letter that details the nature and extent of counsel’s review of the record; lists the appellate issues; and explains why those issues are meritless.
(2) PCRA counsel must file an application to withdraw; serve the PCRA petitioner with the application and the no-merit letter; and advise the petitioner that if the Court grants the motion to withdraw, the petitioner can proceed pro se or hire his own lawyer.
(3) This Court must independently review the record and agree that the appeal is meritless.
See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citing or quoting Turner, Finley, Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875
(Pa. 2009), and Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super.
2008), abrogated by Pitts). ____________________________________________
2 We note that counsel indicated in his no-merit letter that “in the event this Court grants this Motion to Withdraw,” Appellant would have the right to proceed pro se or with assistance of privately-retained counsel. Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/19/16, at ¶ 5. In light of counsel’s statement, this Court issued an order on August 17, 2016, to clarify that Appellant could file with this Court a response to the petition within 30 days of the order and that “failure to file a pro se or counseled response may be considered as a waiver of [Appellant’s] right to present his issues to this Court.” Order, 8/17/16, at 1. Appellant did not file a response.
-3- J-S80022-16
We find that PCRA counsel has complied with Turner/Finley. PCRA
counsel has filed an application to withdraw and filed a Turner/Finley no-
merit letter. Finally, PCRA counsel informed Appellant of his right to hire a
new lawyer or file a pro se response.3
We now turn to this appeal to determine whether it is indeed
meritless. As this Court has explained:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
In its opinion issued in conjunction with the order denying relief, the
PCRA court explained Appellant’s contention that his trial counsel failed “to
fully and competently advise him concerning his right a jury trial and that
this purportedly ineffective assistance resulted in his making an unknowing
waiver of his right to a jury trial such that he should be entitled to relief
under the PCRA.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/26/16, at 1. The PCRA court then ____________________________________________
3 See n. 2.
-4- J-S80022-16
summarized the factual and procedural background of the case, the written
jury trial waiver, and the testimony from both the on-the-record colloquy
and the PCRA hearing, complete with citations to the record. Id. at 1-7.
The court cited Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1998)
(Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court), and the established three-
pronged test for ineffectiveness of counsel, i.e., that the underlying claim is
of arguable merit; that counsel had no reasonable basis for the action or
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J-S80022-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
DAMIEN RAYON BARNHILL
Appellant No. 709 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered April 26, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0004485-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and RANSOM, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2017
Appellant, Damien Rayon Barnhill, appeals from the April 26, 2016
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, denying
his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. In addition, counsel has filed a Turner-
Finely “no-merit” letter1 and a motion seeking to withdraw. Following
review, we grant counsel’s petition and affirm the order of the PCRA court.
On September 18, 2013, at the conclusion of a four-day bench trial,
the trial judge found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder (18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2502(a)). On September 23, 2013, the trial judge imposed the mandatory
____________________________________________
1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). J-S80022-16
sentence of life imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this
Court claiming trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his July
27, 2012 statement to police, and erred in denying his motion in limine to
exclude his wife’s testimony concerning his non-verbal actions around the
time of the victim’s death. A panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Barnhill, No. 1901 MDA 2013,
unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed August 14, 2014).
On June 22, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was
appointed and submitted a counseled amended petition on October 23,
2015. The Commonwealth filed its response on November 19, 2015. A
hearing was held on February 9, 2016, during which both Appellant and trial
counsel testified. The sole issue raised at the hearing was Appellant’s jury
trial waiver.
Following the hearing, Appellant filed a “Brief sur Amended PCRA” on
March 10, 2016, and the Commonwealth filed a response on March 30,
2016. By order entered April 26, 2016, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s
petition. This timely appeal followed.
On July 19, 2016, Appellant’s PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel along with a “no-merit” letter, seeking review of the issue
rejected by the PCRA court, i.e., whether “trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to fully and competently advise [Appellant] concerning his right to a
-2- J-S80022-16
trial by jury which resulted in [Appellant] making an unknowing decision to
waive his right to a jury trial.” Counsel’s No-Merit Letter, 7/19/16, at 3.2
Before we may consider whether the PCRA court abused its discretion
by denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and requested relief, we must address
whether PCRA counsel has met the requirements of Turner/Finley. For
PCRA counsel to withdraw under Turner/Finley in this Court:
(1) PCRA counsel must file a no-merit letter that details the nature and extent of counsel’s review of the record; lists the appellate issues; and explains why those issues are meritless.
(2) PCRA counsel must file an application to withdraw; serve the PCRA petitioner with the application and the no-merit letter; and advise the petitioner that if the Court grants the motion to withdraw, the petitioner can proceed pro se or hire his own lawyer.
(3) This Court must independently review the record and agree that the appeal is meritless.
See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citing or quoting Turner, Finley, Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875
(Pa. 2009), and Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super.
2008), abrogated by Pitts). ____________________________________________
2 We note that counsel indicated in his no-merit letter that “in the event this Court grants this Motion to Withdraw,” Appellant would have the right to proceed pro se or with assistance of privately-retained counsel. Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/19/16, at ¶ 5. In light of counsel’s statement, this Court issued an order on August 17, 2016, to clarify that Appellant could file with this Court a response to the petition within 30 days of the order and that “failure to file a pro se or counseled response may be considered as a waiver of [Appellant’s] right to present his issues to this Court.” Order, 8/17/16, at 1. Appellant did not file a response.
-3- J-S80022-16
We find that PCRA counsel has complied with Turner/Finley. PCRA
counsel has filed an application to withdraw and filed a Turner/Finley no-
merit letter. Finally, PCRA counsel informed Appellant of his right to hire a
new lawyer or file a pro se response.3
We now turn to this appeal to determine whether it is indeed
meritless. As this Court has explained:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
In its opinion issued in conjunction with the order denying relief, the
PCRA court explained Appellant’s contention that his trial counsel failed “to
fully and competently advise him concerning his right a jury trial and that
this purportedly ineffective assistance resulted in his making an unknowing
waiver of his right to a jury trial such that he should be entitled to relief
under the PCRA.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/26/16, at 1. The PCRA court then ____________________________________________
3 See n. 2.
-4- J-S80022-16
summarized the factual and procedural background of the case, the written
jury trial waiver, and the testimony from both the on-the-record colloquy
and the PCRA hearing, complete with citations to the record. Id. at 1-7.
The court cited Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1998)
(Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court), and the established three-
pronged test for ineffectiveness of counsel, i.e., that the underlying claim is
of arguable merit; that counsel had no reasonable basis for the action or
inaction; and that the defendant has been prejudiced by the ineffectiveness
of counsel. PCRA Court Opinion, 4/26/16, at 13.
“A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will
require rejection of the claim.” Com. v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956, 972 (Pa.
2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 984 (2005) (citations omitted)). Although failure to
satisfy even one prong of the ineffectiveness test defeats the claim, the
PCRA court addressed all three prongs, explaining its conclusions that
Appellant failed to satisfy even a single prong. PCRA Court Opinion,
4/26/16, at 13-17. The PCRA court concluded that Appellant’s “jury trial
waiver was valid and was the product of trial counsel’s effective
representation.” Id.
We find that the PCRA court’s factual findings are supported by the
record. Therefore, we shall not disturb them. Further, we find the PCRA
court’s legal conclusions are supported by the evidence of record and are
-5- J-S80022-16
free of legal error. Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s petition.
Motion to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum.
Judge Ransom concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/2017
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