Com. v. Bainey, V.

2025 Pa. Super. 34

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 14, 2025
• Docket: 529 WDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A02023-25

2025 PA Super 34

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : VANESSA REGINA BAINEY : No. 529 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000026-2022

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

CONCURRING OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: February 14, 2025

I agree that the trial court erred by dismissing the charges against

Vanessa Bainey under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) for the

reasons it provided.1 I write separately to explain why this is not a typical

competency case and to remind the trial court and the parties that the issue

of Bainey’s competence may be revisited as the litigation proceeds.

After Bainey was charged with crimes involving her young son, she

petitioned the trial court for an evaluation of her competency. The court

ordered an evaluation. Dr. Louis Martone evaluated Bainey and prepared a

ten-page report. Dr. Martone concluded that despite her low IQ, Bainey could

understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her.

Report, 5/13/23, at 9. Notably, he also concluded that Bainey “is able to

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1 1976, July 9, P.L. 817, No. 143, 50 P.S. §§ 7101–7503 as amended. J-A02023-25

‘participate and assist’ in her criminal defense, however she requires

accommodations in order to do so.” Id. at 9–10 (recommending nine

accommodations). In light of this report, Bainey moved to dismiss the charges

against her.

Thereafter, the trial court held a “hearing on ‘trial parameters’” based

on Dr. Martone’s recommended accommodations. N.T., Hearing on “Trial

Parameters,” 8/11/23, at 1. The parties and the court questioned Dr. Martone

about two of the nine accommodations he recommended in his report: that

there be no “unnecessary personnel” in the courtroom and that trial days be

reduced to half-day segments or that breaks be given. Ultimately, the court

granted Bainey’s motion to dismiss because it believed these two

accommodations would not be feasible. The Commonwealth appealed.

Under the MHPA, a criminal defendant is incompetent if she “is found to

be substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings

against [her] or to participate and assist in [her] defense.” 50 P.S. § 7402(a);

see Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 2004). The MHPA

provides for the trial court to order “an incompetency examination” in certain

circumstances. 50 P.S. § 7402(d). “Upon completion of the examination, a

determination of incompetency shall be made by the court where

incompetency is established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. The

court generally makes this determination “at a subsequent competency

hearing.” Commonwealth v. duPont, 681 A.2d 1328, 1330 (Pa. 1996); see

50 P.S. § 7403(a).

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Here, Bainey bore the burden to establish her incompetency, i.e., that

she was substantially unable either to understand the nature or object of the

proceedings against her or to participate and assist in her defense. However,

the only evidence at the “hearing on ‘trial parameters’” was the report and

testimony of Dr. Martone about his recommended accommodations.

According to Dr. Martone, Bainey could understand the nature of the

proceedings. Report, 5/13/23, at 9. Furthermore, Bainey could participate

and assist in her defense, albeit with accommodations. Id. at 9–10; N.T.,

Hearing on “Trial Parameters,” 8/11/23, at 16 (“[A] majority of the

accommodations recommended would be needed for her to be able to

participate and assist in her defense.”).

Dr. Martone’s conclusion that Bainey was conditionally competent sets

this apart from a typical case of incompetency. The hearing on “trial

parameters” was not about Bainey’s competency, but rather the conditions

under which Dr. Martone believed Bainey could proceed to trial. It appears,

based on the report and the nature of the hearing itself, that the parties and

the court presumed Bainey’s competency, so long as accommodations could

be made. Indeed, the majority notes that the trial court gave no indication

that its decision was based on its personal observation of Bainey because she

failed to attend the hearing. Majority Opinion at 8, n.2.2

2 Bainey’s counsel stated that he could not waive his client’s presence, however, he did not object to the court proceeding with the hearing in her (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Thus, the court never actually determined whether Bainey proved her

incompetency under the MHPA. The court granted the request to dismiss the

charges, based not on Bainey’s ability to interact with her counsel and/or

assist in her own defense, but on its own concerns for the practical aspects of

courtroom attendance and trial scheduling. Because this is a separate

question from Bainey’s incompetency, I agree that the trial court erred in

dismissing the charges on those grounds.

Finally, I note that the parties and the trial court can revisit the question

of Bainey’s competency at every stage of the proceedings. If it appears that

Bainey cannot participate or assist in her defense given the realities of trial,

our opinion should not prevent an appropriate action under the MHPA.

absence. N.T., Hearing on “Trial Parameters,” 8/11/23, at 5-6. He also did not object to the nature of the hearing, that addressed only the accommodations, and not the underlying question of Bainey’s competency. Id. at 6.

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