Com. v. Amendola, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 1309 WDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S34012-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ANTHONY AMENDOLA : No. 1309 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0000677-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: January 8, 2025

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the

November 1, 2023 order of the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas

dismissing charges filed against Appellee, Anthony Amendola, based upon a

violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After careful consideration, we are constrained

to affirm.

As this case involves application of Rule 600, the procedural history is

most relevant, and the facts supporting the charges are not. Thus, we will

address only the procedural history. On December 31, 2021, the

Commonwealth charged Appellee with Terroristic Threats and Simple Assault.1

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2706(a)(1) and 2701(a)(1). J-S34012-24

On June 27, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend the bill

of information to add one count of Endangering the Welfare of Children,

graded as a third-degree felony.2 At a July 25, 2022 pretrial conference, the

court granted Appellee 60 days to file a response to the Commonwealth’s

motion, following Appellee’s receipt of the transcript of the preliminary

hearing. On October 25, 2022, the day after receiving the transcript, Appellee

filed his objection to the motion to amend and “alternatively a request for a

habeas corpus hearing on said amendment,” to determine whether the

Commonwealth could establish a prima facie case for the new charge, which

had not been addressed at the preliminary hearing. Appellee’s Objection,

10/25/22, at 6-7 (unpaginated).

On October 27, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to amend and,

most relevant to our analysis, entered an order directing that the court

administrator schedule a one-hour hearing on Appellee’s request for habeas

corpus relief. Nearly six months later, on April 13, 2023, the court

administrator scheduled the hearing for June 1, 2023. The record does not

demonstrate any action taken by the District Attorney to expedite the

scheduling of the hearing.

On May 24, 2023, Appellee filed a Rule 600 motion to dismiss. On July

17, 2023, the court held a hearing on the Rule 600 motion, at which Peter

Flanigan, the Westmoreland County Criminal Court Administrator, testified

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

-2- J-S34012-24

regarding the scheduling of the habeas hearing. The administrator explained

that when a trial court issues an order to schedule a hearing, the

administrator’s office places the order at the bottom of a “bin” of orders for

“hearings of longer duration, like habeases, suppression hearings and the

like[,]” which are then “scheduled at the first available date for the respective

courtrooms.” N.T., 7/17/23, at 10. Based upon the administrator’s

testimony, the trial court found that “[a]fter the order makes its way to the

top [of the bin], it is placed on the court’s calendar at the earliest date

consistent with the court’s schedule as it exists at that time.” Trial Ct. Op.,

11/1/23, at 4 (unpaginated). “The only way to circumvent this process is for

counsel of either party to seek a court order directing that the hearing be

scheduled on a particular date or within a particular time period.” Id.

On November 1, 2023, the trial court dismissed the charges under Rule

600, concluding that the Commonwealth failed to bring Appellee to trial prior

to the adjusted run date, which the court determined to be April 2, 2023. In

calculating the adjusted run date, the court excluded only the 92 days between

July 25, 2022, and October 25, 2022, which covered the time the court

granted to Appellee to respond to the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the

information.

In so doing, the court rejected the Commonwealth’s request that the

court exclude the 218 days from October 27, 2022, when the court ordered

the scheduling of the habeas corpus hearing, to June 1, 2023, the date of the

-3- J-S34012-24

habeas corpus hearing.3 The trial court concluded that “the Commonwealth

did not present evidence that it exercised due diligence during the period of

delay.” Id. at 5. Specifically, the court found that “the Commonwealth had

the opportunity to bring the final trial date issue to the Court’s attention” and

“had the ability to request a court order directing the Court Administrator to

schedule a hearing on the defendant’s motion prior to the expiration of the

final trial date.” Id. at 11. The court emphasized that the Commonwealth’s

“failure [was] particularly notable since the defendant’s motion was filed to

address issues raised by the Commonwealth’s amendment of its criminal

information which itself had already caused substantial delay.”4 Id.

On November 3, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. The

Commonwealth subsequently complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the trial

court relied on its November 1, 2023 opinion for purposes of Rule 1925(a).

The Commonwealth raises the following questions on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err when it dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 600 in finding that the adjusted run date had passed?

II. Did the trial court err when it dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 600 in finding that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence?

3 The record reflects that the court held a hearing on the habeas motion on

June 1, 2023, and took the matter under advisement.

4 The trial court also stated that the scheduling of the hearing “was done in

the normal course” and was not a “anomaly in the judicial system.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13 n.7. We, nevertheless, note with displeasure the 5½-month delay in scheduling the hearing for habeas corpus relief. We find it unconscionable that a defendant would have to wait so long for a hearing.

-4- J-S34012-24

Commonwealth’s Br. at 4. We address these related issues jointly.

A.

In reviewing a trial court’s Rule 600 decision, appellate courts apply an

abuse of discretion standard. See Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810,

821 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal denied, 320 A.3d 82 (Pa. 2024). A trial court

abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or enters an order that is

manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Id. “Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the speedy

trial hearing and the findings of the lower court, reviewed in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764,

793 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

In applying Rule 600, courts must remain cognizant of the Rule’s “dual

purpose of both protecting a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights and

protecting society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases.”

Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 955 (Pa. 2018) (citation

omitted).

Rule 600 mandates that trial commence within 365 days of the

Commonwealth’s filing of a written complaint against a defendant.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In applying Rule 600, a court first calculates the

“mechanical run date,” which is 365 days after the Commonwealth filed the

complaint. Commonwealth v. Lear, 325 A.3d 552, 560 (Pa. 2024). The

court then accounts for and adds any excludable time to the mechanical run

-5- J-S34012-24

date “to produce the ‘adjusted run date,’ which is the deadline for the

Commonwealth to bring the defendant to trial under Rule 600.” Id.

Rule 600(C)(1) governs the relevant computation of includable and

excludable periods of delay:

[P]eriods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

Under this provision, a trial court “must exclude from the time for

commencement of trial any periods during which the defendant was

unavailable[.]” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C) cmt. A defendant’s filing of a

pretrial motion, such as a motion to suppress, does not automatically result

in the defendant being “unavailable” for trial. Commonwealth v. Hill, 736

A.2d 578, 587 (Pa. 1999); see also Commonwealth v. Cook, 865 A.2d 869,

875–76 (Pa. Super. 2004). “Rather, a defendant is unavailable only if the

filing of the pretrial motion caused a delay in the commencement of trial.”

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 804 A.2d 675, 679 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Additionally, to exclude time attributable to a pretrial defense motion, “the

Commonwealth must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

it exercised due diligence in opposing or responding to the pretrial motion; a

delay caused by the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence will not constitute

excludable time.” Id.

-6- J-S34012-24

“Due diligence is fact specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does

not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the

Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 982 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted). Our Supreme

Court has long recognized that due diligence requires that “[w]hen a case has

possible Rule [600] problems, prosecutors must do everything reasonable

within their power to see that the case is tried on time.” Commonwealth v.

Browne, 584 A.2d 902, 905 (Pa. 1990) (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 618 (Pa. 2021). Thus, “[d]ue

diligence includes, among other things, listing a case for trial prior to the run

date, preparedness for trial within the run date, and keeping adequate records

to ensure compliance with Rule 600.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d

1097, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2007). “The Commonwealth bears the burden of

proving due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Burno, 154 A.3d

at 794.

As specifically relevant to the case at bar, this Court has not required

the Commonwealth to notify a “court of an imminent run-date violation [as] a

necessary condition to due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900

A.2d 413, 417 (Pa. Super. 2006). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth’s failure

to notify a court of an impending Rule 600 violation may “factor” into the due

diligence analysis. Id.

B.

-7- J-S34012-24

The Commonwealth asserts that, in calculating the adjusted run date,

the trial court should have excluded the time after October 25, 2022, when

Appellee sought a habeas corpus hearing. Commonwealth’s Br. at 13-14. The

Commonwealth contends that it “cannot be expected to bring the defendant

to trial with his pre-trial motion still outstanding.” Id. at 14. Thus, the

Commonwealth maintains that the trial court should have denied Appellee’s

Rule 600 motion because only 206 days of includable time have passed,

excluding all time after October 25, 2022.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth asserts that it acted with due diligence

and that it could not have done anything to secure an earlier hearing. Id. at

16-18. It argues that it would be inappropriate to “leapfrog” this case in front

of other cases waiting for hearing dates “during presumptively excludable time

while the parties awaited a hearing on a defense motion.” Id. at 17-18.

We disagree with the Commonwealth and instead are constrained to

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

Appellee’s charges pursuant to Rule 600. As with other pretrial defense

motions, such as suppression motions, the time needed to resolve Appellee’s

pre-trial habeas corpus request was attributable to the defense and excludable

only if the Commonwealth exercised due diligence. We conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Commonwealth failed

to demonstrate due diligence in regard to the scheduling of the habeas

hearing, because it failed to do “everything reasonable within [its] power to

see that the case [was] tried on time.” Browne, 584 A.2d at 905.

-8- J-S34012-24

Specifically, the trial court emphasized that the Commonwealth had the

opportunity to alert the trial court to the impending deadline and to request

an order for an expedited hearing date. Trial Ct. Op. at 11. The court found

that the Commonwealth, instead, “passively relied on the [c]ourt

[a]dministrator’s office to satisfy the Commonwealth’s own obligation to keep

track of and respect the requirements of Rule 600.” Id. at 11. The record

supports the court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate

due diligence in the instant case, as the Commonwealth took no action to

expedite the hearing while the scheduling order was pending in the court

administrator’s office.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

dismissing the charges pursuant to the Commonwealth’s violation of Rule 600.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 01/08/2025

-9-