Home/D. Massachusetts/Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture

Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture

417 F. Supp. 651, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14594
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJune 16, 1976
DocketCiv. A. No. 75-5230-M
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 417 F. Supp. 651 (Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture, 417 F. Supp. 651, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14594 (D. Mass. 1976).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

FRANK J. MURRAY, District Judge.

In this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the plaintiff (Columbia) seeks an order compelling the defendants, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), to disclose the personnel records of two former APHIS meat inspectors, Mauriello and Germano. The defendants assert that the records are exempt from disclosure under exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

On November 22, 1974, administrative proceedings were instituted against Columbia to determine whether Columbia is unfit to receive federal meat and poultry inspection services because Columbia and one of its officers, Morris M. Sherman, were convicted of bribing federal meat inspectors. (See Exhibit A to Verified Complaint).1 Columbia takes the position that it was the victim of harassment by meat inspectors, including Mauriello and Germano, who intended to and succeeded in eliciting the bribes. Mauriello and Germano were subsequently convicted of felonies for their conduct. Columbia hopes that disclosure of the personnel records will provide information substantiating its position and tending to mitigate its conduct.2

Resolution of the issue of whether the records are within exemption 6 involves questions of law which, so far as the court is aware, have not previously been decided in a factual context similar to this case.3 [654]*654The statutory exemption exists for “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The personnel records are exempt, therefore, only if their disclosure would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11, 44 U.S.L.W. 4503, 4508-10 (1976); Robertson v. Department of Defense, 402 F.Supp. 1342 (D.D.C.1975). Determination of whether a particular disclosure results in such an invasion involves a balancing process in which the court weighs the individual’s privacy interest in nondisclosure against the public interest in disclosure. Rose, supra; Ditlow v. Shultz, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 517 F.2d 166 (1975); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 498 F.2d 73 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 450 F.2d 670 (1971). In weighing the interests, the court is mindful that the Freedom of Information Act embodies a general policy of disclosure and that the exemptions to disclosure are strictly construed. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). Further, the language “clearly unwarranted” appearing in the statute “instructs the court to tilt the balance in favor of disclosure”. Getman v. NLRB, supra at 674.

Within the framework of the principles outlined above, the following procedure is mandated. First, the court must determine whether disclosure would result in an invasion of personal privacy, and if so, how serious the invasion would be. Second, the court must determine the public interest in disclosure. Third, balancing these interests, the court must determine whether the records are exempt because their disclosure would result in a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” See, e. g., Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, supra.

The privacy interests of the individual meat inspectors involved are weighty indeed. The records provide a detailed synopsis of each individual’s career within the Department of Agriculture, data about family relationships, financial information and medical records. The records therefore contain “ ‘intimate details’ of a ‘highly personal’ nature,” Getman v. NLRB, supra at 675, the type of information that the privacy exemption was intended to protect. Further, since plaintiff seeks the personnel records of specified individuals, it is not possible to delete personal identifying details thereby protecting the individual’s privacy interests to an extent. Compare Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 402 F.Supp. 378 (D.D.C.1975). Another factor in assessing the privacy interest is whether the information was given to the agency with the expectation of confidentiality. See Ditlow v. Shultz, supra; Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, supra. No facts brought to the attention of the court indicate that any of the information appearing in the records was given under a promise of confidentiality.4 The information, however, is of the type that normally is not revealed even to an employer except with a justified expectation, if not a promise, of confidentiality.

[655]*655These several factors indicate that disclosure would result in a serious invasion of the substantial privacy interests at stake. However, Mauriello and Germano created a legitimate public interest in their careers by using their positions to become involved in illegal activities resulting in their convictions. To this extent, the privacy interests are diminished. See Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F.Supp. 1318 (M.D.Tenn.1975).

Initially, the public interest purposes asserted by Columbia do not appear very weighty. Columbia seeks the records to assist its defense in the administrative proceedings, i. e., to advance its own private interests, not the public interest. The FOIA is not intended to be an administrative discovery statute for the benefit of private parties. See Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F.Supp. 1200 (W.D.Pa.1976); cf., Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, at 491-492 (2d Cir. 1976). However, certain public interest purposes appear which are advanced, directly or indirectly, by the plaintiff here. First, there is a public interest in the availability of an adequate supply of wholesome meat and poultry. If the records sought assist Columbia in showing that it is entitled to continued receipt of meat and poultry inspection services, this interest will be served. There is the broader public interest in the correct adjudication of administrative proceedings.

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Columbia Packing Co., Inc. v. US Dept. of Agri.
417 F. Supp. 651 (D. Massachusetts, 1976)

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417 F. Supp. 651, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14594, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/columbia-packing-co-v-united-states-department-of-agriculture-mad-1976.