Colson v. Annucci

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 28, 2023·No. 7:23-cv-00654·Unknown

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: RONALD R. COLSON, DATE FILED: 3/28/2023 Plaintiff(s), -against- COMMISSIONER ANTHONY J. ANNUCCTI; 23-CV-0654 (NSR) SUPERINTENDENT M. CAPRA; SGT. SANCHEZ; C.O. BEADLE; C.O. K. GREEN; ORDER OF SERVICE C.O. ROSS; C.O. ORTIZ; S.O.R.C. J. MANUEL; and THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Municipality, Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants unlawfully searched him and provided him with a procedurally defective disciplinary hearing. He names as Defendants: (1) Anthony Annucci, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”); (2) Michael Capra, Sing Sing Superintendent; (3) Sing Sing Officers Sanchez, Beadle, Green, Ross, Ortiz, Manuel, and Venettozzi;! and (4) the State of New York. By order dated February 27, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).” As set forth below, the Court: (1) dismisses the claims brought against the State of New York under the Eleventh Amendment;

' Plaintiff’s spelling of this defendant is not the same throughout the complaint, but this spelling appears to be the most common for this name. Plaintiff did not include this defendant in the caption of the complaint but listed him as a defendant in the body of the complaint. The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to add this officer as a defendant. ? Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

(2) dismisses the claims brought against Commissioner Annucci for lack of personal involvement; and (3) directs service on Capra, Sanchez, Beadle, Green, Ross, Ortiz, Manuel, and Venettozzi. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. State of New York “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have

waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff brings claims against the State of New York, asserting that it is a “municipal corporation.” (ECF 2, at 3.) New York State, however, is a state government entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against this defendant are therefore dismissed because they seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). B. Lack of Personal Involvement To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff

must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official . . . .” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff brings claims against Commissioner Annucci because he is a supervisor at DOCCS “headquarters.” (ECF 2, at 2.) Plaintiff does not allege, however, any facts showing how Annucci was personally involved in the events underlying his claims. Plaintiff’s claims against the Commissioner are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). C. Order of Service Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service.3 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to

serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Capra, Sanchez, Beadle, Green, Ross, Ortiz, Manuel, and Venettozzi through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for these Defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these Defendants. If the complaint is not served within 90 days after the date the summonses are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)